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Abstract 
 
In 1999, with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, European Union (EU) 
migration went from being an area of intergovernmental cooperation to one 
governed by ever closer version of the Community Method. This shift resulted in a 
significant production of secondary legislation being agreed at the EU level, 
regarding all areas upon which the EU had some degrees of competence, namely 
asylum and refugee, irregular migration, legal migration, administrative 
cooperation, and border and visa policy. The academic literature is divided in how 
to interpret policy developments in this area. Some academic contributions have 
emphasised the divergence from traditional EU policy methods, others have 
analysed migration policy in the perspective of traditional questions about EU 
integration, and the majority had some normative assessments of the policies being 
formulated. 
This thesis tackles EU migration policy from the point of view of delegation. 
It proposes to assess the extent of EU integration in this area by measuring the 
amount of powers the Council of the European Union has granted to the European 
Commission. The dissertation finds that delegation has occurred in this policy area, 
and to an extent that is comparable to other, older policy areas, but is uneven across 
migration categories. Past delegation studies highlighted a number of possible 
determinants of delegation, such as reducing uncertainty, strengthening the 
credibility of commitments, achieving efficiency, as well as institutional contexts. 
This dissertation finds evidence for the credibility and efficiency rationales, as well 
as conflict between the Council and the Commission. This study is relevant to 
current debates about how much power EU institutions are and should be granted, 
whether these institutions are biased towards the nature of the policies, and current 
trends in EU integration. 
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1. Setting the scene: Introducing EU migration 
policy 
 
 
Migration is an all-pervasive phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It is part of 
member state societies, laws and economies, and is hotly debated in national and 
European political arenas. Net migration1 in the EU has totalled over one million 
per year in nine of the twelve years between 1999 and 2009 (table 1.1), however 
the story is far from uniform. Net migration in Spain accounted for approximately 
one fifth of the EU-27 total in 1999, but that share increased to more than half by 
2007. There was a ten-fold increase in Italy’s net migration figures between 1999 
and 2007, a doubling in the UK, and a trebling in Ireland during the same period. 
Yet net migration in Germany decreased consistently from 2001 to 2009, at this 
point the state was experiencing negative levels of net migration for the second 
consecutive year2. Eurostat, the statistical body of the EU, has revealed that since 
1992 the contribution net migration has made to population growth has been more 
significant than that of natural growth, which reached a historic low point in 2002 
(Eurostat 2011b).  
 
Table 1.1. Net migration in selected EU countries, in thousands (1999-2009) 
Country 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
EU-27 1013.6 666.4 1785.4 1542.3 1539.5 681.7 
Belgium 16.1 34.4 33.6 49.2 58.9 64.1 
France 157.3 181.9 196.9 187.2 73.8 31.8 
Germany 202.1 274.8 142.2 81.6 45.2 -10.7 
Ireland 24.2 39.3 32.2 63.4 74.4 -19.1 
Italy 34.9 39.8 407.8 202.7 436.0 212.4 
Spain 237.9 510.8 661.5 633.9 776.4 136.8 
UK 137.6 172.9 208.0 298.4 300.8 237.3 
Source: Eurostat; Demographic balance and crude rates (code: demo_gind). 
Note: Net migration is the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of 
emigrants. In the context of the annual demographic balance however, Eurostat produces net 
migration figures by taking the difference between total population change and natural change; this 
concept is referred to as net migration plus statistical adjustment.  
 
Migrant populations have become an established component of European 
societies. Table 1.2 illustrates changes in stocks of foreign-born populations, with 
                                                          
1 Net migration is the difference between immigration to and emigration from a given area during 
the year (net migration is positive when there are more immigrants than emigrants and negative 
when there are more emigrants than immigrants) Eurostat, 'Glossary:Migration', Statistics 
Explained (updated 30 July) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Net_migration>. 
2 But it increased sharply in 2010 to more than 130,000. 
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numbers in member states such as the UK almost doubling over the featured period 
and numbers more than trebling in Italy and Spain. A focus on absolute numbers 
however indicates significant changes in the population structures of all European 
countries. Finally, it is important to note that uneven levels of refugee stocks exist 
across member states, a migration category that has grabbed headlines in a number 
of EU countries in the last twenty years.  
 
Table 1.2. International migrant stocks, shares of migrant stocks compared to 
population, and refugee populations in selected European countries (1990-
2010) 
Country  1990 2000 2010 
France 
International migrant stock  5 897 267  6 278 718  7 196 481 
As percentage of total population* 10.4 10.6 11.4 
Estimated refugee stocks   186 629   131 115   200 687 
Germany 
International migrant stock  5 936 181  8 992 631  9 734 034 
As percentage of total population* 7.4 10.8 11.7 
Estimated refugee stocks   722 250   940 750   594 269 
Italy 
International migrant stock  1 428 219  2 121 688  4 798 701 
As percentage of total population* 2.5 3.7 7.9 
Estimated refugee stocks   12 379   6 437   56 397 
Spain 
International migrant stock   829 705  1 657 285  6 234 283 
As percentage of total population* 2.1 4.1 13.5 
Estimated refugee stocks   8 490   6 851   3 820 
UK** 
International migrant stock  3 647 126  4 705 567  7 005 100 
As percentage of total population* 6.4 8.0 11.3 
Estimated refugee stocks   43 395   121 275   238 150 
Source: UNPD. 
Note: *International migrant stock as a percentage of total population. For these countries, 
international migration stocks do not include estimated refugee population. ** Including Northern 
Ireland.  
 
In terms of EU migration legislation, an Italian case concerning a residence 
permit application is illustrative of the impact this body of law has had on member 
state positions on migration. In February 2012 an Italian man, who had lived in 
Spain and while there had married a Uruguayan man, successfully sought an Italian 
residence permit for his husband (La Repubblica 2012a). The permit was at first 
denied by Italian authorities, but the couple successfully appealed citing the right 
of free movement for EU citizens and their partners as enumerated in the 2004 Free 
Movement Directive and transposed into Italian law in 2006. While the Court 
abstained from ruling on the validity of the couple’s marriage, it upheld the right of 
the “spouse” of an EU citizen to be granted a residence permit. This ruling was 
based on the fact that the definition of the term “spouse” is set through national 
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legislation and, as the Italian Court recognised the marriage was legal under Spanish 
law, Italian authorities were required to issue the permit. This case marks a 
significant infiltration of EU migration law into domestic affairs (La Repubblica 
2012b). It also illustrates the level of freedom left to member states in this policy 
area, with certain migration categories dominated by EU legislation binding only to 
its objectives and not in the form of its application (i.e. Directives). 
 
At the time of writing migration is at the centre of intra and inter-state debates 
and, at times, tensions (Jones 2012: 54). Attention to this issue has been high since 
the 1990s, with European efforts being heralded as an example of the positive 
effects of regional cooperation in the absence of a more global approach (Financial 
Times 2002h). That said tensions remain high. France clashed with Italy over what 
the German Interior Minister labelled as a “small influx” of migrants in the wake 
of the Arab Spring in North Africa (Le Figaro 2011). Political tensions have also 
been heightened at times between member states and EU institutions. The row 
between France and Italy came only weeks after the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) had struck down an Italian law that prescribed between 
one and four years imprisonment for undocumented migrants as it conflicted with 
Community legislation (The Economist 2011). However criticisms have also been 
known to come from the opposite direction at times. For example, the former Italian 
Interior Minister Roberto Maroni has often attributed major responsibility for 
Italy’s current immigration and border control issues to the EU (Ministero 
dell'Interno 2010; Rijpma 2010).  
 
 
 1.1. Research objectives 
 
Although brief, the above overview of the topical nature of migration in Europe 
gives some ideas of why the academic literature on this topic has grown 
significantly since the end of the 1990s. The literature has analysed and assessed 
policy developments in this area in different ways. Some contributions have 
emphasised divergence from traditional EU policy methods, either to underscore 
policy makers’ efforts at finding viable alternatives to a Community Method that is 
becoming ever-less relevant (Monar 2001), or conversely to track the changes that 
have brought this policy area closer to traditional EU policy-making methods 
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(Niemann 2008). The majority of the academic contributions have involved some 
normative assessments of the policies being formulated, either as a factor amplified 
by EU institutional architecture (Guiraudon 2000a) or as part of a broader global 
trend in migration policy (Huysmans 2000). 
 
This thesis seeks to explain the rationales for and the extent of integration at 
the European Union (EU) level between member states in the area of migration 
policy. For the purposes of this research, integration is captured by measuring levels 
of delegation. The primary research question is therefore a simple one: why and to 
what extent have member states delegated powers to EU institutions in the field of 
migration? The first objective of this work is to chart and measure EU integration 
in this policy area. The empirical realm of this research is EU secondary legislation3 
on migration adopted between 1999 and 2009, i.e. between the Amsterdam and 
Lisbon Treaties. The EU produced a high volume of secondary legislation in all 
areas of its competence during this period: asylum and refuge; irregular migration; 
legal migration; administrative cooperation; and, border and visa policy. The second 
objective of this dissertation is to assess whether and to what degree the factors 
most commonly assumed to be conducive to delegation – i.e. institutional contexts, 
reducing uncertainty, strengthening credibility of commitments, and achieving 
efficiency – are validated in the case of migration policy. These aims are achieved 
in two ways. First, delegation in secondary legislation is measured quantitatively 
using models employed in previous delegation studies. And secondly, this 
quantitative analysis is followed by a series of qualitative analyses focusing on 
different migration categories, the aim of which is to understand the actual effect of 
each of the delegation determinants identified above. 
The main findings of this analysis are that delegation does exist in EU 
migration policy; the extent of this delegation is comparable with other older policy 
areas, but it is unevenly spread across migration categories. Of the three grounds 
and two institutional contexts tested, findings confirm that delegation results only 
from motivations of credibility and efficiency, but is limited by the conflict between 
the Council of the European Union (the Council) and the Commission on this 
                                                          
3 In legal terms, while the Treaties and other fundamental principles of EU law (e.g. the requirement 
of protecting fundamental rights) are termed ‘primary law’, all legislation flowing from Treaty 
articles is generally termed ‘secondary legislation’ Kieran St C Bradley, 'Legislating in the 
European Union', in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds.), European Union Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 103..  
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matter. 
 
This chapter is intended to demonstrate how this dissertation approaches EU 
migration policy from a new angle. It is arranged as follows: Section 2 provides an 
overview of the history of policy cooperation in this area; Section 3 reviews the 
relevant literature on EU migration; Section 4 briefly introduces the main 
hypotheses of this dissertation; Section 5 clarifies the methodology adopted; and 
finally, section 6 outlines the structure of the chapters to follow. 
 
 
 1.2.  History of policy coordination on migration in the EU 
 
This section seeks to shed light on the reasons for choosing delegation as an 
interpretative lens for this research. Before Maastricht (February 1992 to November 
1993)4, the then European Communities had enacted a limited number of measures 
concerning the movement of EU member state citizens from one member state to 
another. Free movement provisions were initially limited to “workers, self-
employed persons and providers of services”, but were then expanded to include 
“families of intra-Community migrants” (Stetter 2000). Political attention to 
migration ranged from low to non-existent at the EU level for much of the period 
running up to the Single European Act (February 1986 to June 1987), and policies 
concerning third-country nationals (TCNs, i.e. not citizens of EU member states) 
were excluded from this set of measures altogether. The Single Market initiative, 
with its emphasis on the abolition of all internal border controls, has however been 
regarded by many commentators to have been one of the triggers for increased 
cooperation on this policy front (Niemann 2008). Around the time of its emergence, 
much of the limited cooperation between member states was intergovernmental in 
nature and existed largely outside the EC institutional framework. The Schengen 
Agreement and its implementing Convention (signed in 1985 and 1990 
respectively), which mainly dealt with the removal of internal borders among 
contacting parties and some corollary measures, are good examples of such 
intergovernmental cooperation. Similarly, the Dublin Convention that aimed to 
facilitate coordination of asylum processing and distribution across participating 
member states (signed in 1990) is another such example. Many authors have viewed 
                                                          
4 The two dates refer to Treaties signing and entry into force.  
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these developments as crucial to subsequent developments in EU cooperation 
(Monar 2001, 2011), with a key role being played by networks of national officials 
operating outside the EU (e.g. Pompidou Group, 1972; Trevi Group, 1975). Indeed 
such networks have framed as a new form of governance that substitutes more 
traditional and formal methods of EU integration, mainly through what has been 
labelled the Community Method (see below). 
 
Migration policy entered into the Union’s institutional structure through the 
Treaty of Maastricht (Title VI of TEU, Art. K1 to K.9). Strictly speaking, it was not 
designated as a Community competence because migration issues were confined to 
the “third pillar” of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In a nutshell this meant that 
JHA decision-making was largely intergovernmental within the Council, without 
the traditional involvement of the Commission, the CJEU or the European 
Parliament (EP) (Majone 2005: 53). Among the nine areas of “common interest” in 
JHA, three were directly related to migration: “asylum policy”; “rules governing 
the crossing of the Community’s external borders”; “immigration policy and policy 
regarding third country nationals” (den Boer and Wallace 2000: 500; E. Uçarer 
1999: 250).  
That said much of the cooperation under that framework was labelled as 
“soft” as the policy output had no binding value. According to both Council and 
Commission, therein lay the problems and the solutions to finally bringing about an 
effective EU migration policy. The Council and the Commission issued an Action 
Plan “on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
establishing an area of freedom, security and justice”, where they held that, 
 
the instruments adopted so far often suffer from two weaknesses: 
they are frequently based on ‘soft law’, such as resolutions or 
recommendations that have no legally binding effect. And they do 
not have adequate monitoring arrangements. The commitment in 
the Amsterdam Treaty to use European Community instruments in 
the future provides the opportunity to correct where necessary these 
weaknesses (Council 1998: 5).  
 
These words reflect the awareness of the political elites of many member 
states that, as stated by the then Deputy Minister for European Affairs Michel 
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Barnier, arrangements in the third pillar “did not work well” and change was 
necessary either through empowerment of the Commission or importing Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) from other areas (Beuter 2002; Corrado 2002; Deloche-
Gaudez 2002). Problems in monitoring and verification of actual implementation 
persisted years later, with Nordic countries reportedly critical of the arrangements 
set out in EU legislation (Agence Europe 2001c).  
 
Amsterdam marked a shift in gear for migration policy (October 1997 to May 
1999). Indeed the text of the various Treaties displays that shift. The Maastricht 
Treaty referred to migration policies as “matters of common interest” (TEU, Title 
VI, Art. K.1) whereas the Amsterdam Treaty categorised them as one of its 
“objective[s]” (Art. 2 TEU, fourth indent), which placed them on an equal footing 
with priorities such as the completion of the internal market. In practice the 
Amsterdam Treaty gave the green light for the transfer of some migration issues 
into the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)5, i.e. the “first pillar”. 
Commentators have characterised this move as beginning a process of 
'communitarisation' (Niemann 2008; Stetter 2000). Although a set of issues was 
brought within the scope of the Community (Title IV, Art. 61-69 TEC), these were 
ruled by comparatively different arrangements in terms of institutional competences 
and policy-making. In brief, the Commission had an unusual shared right of 
initiative6, the EP was loosely involved overall, the form of voting in the Council 
differed according to migration categories, and the CJEU’s jurisdiction was 
severely limited due to restrictions on preliminary ruling procedures. The enduring 
nature of some of these elements until adoption of the Lisbon Treaty makes clear 
that member states’ reticence did not disappear. 
Political momentum on migration issues remained high until the end of the 
decade, as marked by the Vienna and Tampere European Councils (December 1998; 
October 1999). These Councils, while standing clear of ambitious calls for 
harmonisation, aimed at defining more detailed political objectives for EU 
cooperation and achieving more overall convergence (The Times 1999). They 
became part of EU migration policy-making as they were held every five years to 
                                                          
5 Unless otherwise specified, in this work all the subsequent Treaty acronyms refer to “Treaty 
establishing the European Community” (TEC), and the “Treaty on European Union” (TEU). 
6 The Commission already asked for the monopoly of the right of initiative in the weeks ahead of 
the Tampere European Council European Report, 'Setting the Stage for Tampere Law and Order 
Summit', European Report, 25 September 1999a.. 
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provide long to medium-term guidelines and objectives to otherwise short–term EU 
activities. This division of work echoes Hix’s framing of the EU as a dual executive, 
where the Council and the European Council deal with medium to long-term issues, 
while the Commission manages short-term affairs (Hix 2005: 27).  
 
In parallel to these treaty developments a number of policy initiatives have 
also mushroomed in this area. This has particularly been the case with the “external 
dimension of migration policy” (Cristina Boswell 2003c). Although the connections 
between migration and foreign policy were recognised early on, actions did not 
follow suit and the effectiveness of the external dimension of EU migration policy 
remained contested at the time of writing (Menz 2014). Ten years after a “global 
approach to migration” was proposed (Commission 2005c), synergies in foreign 
affairs and migration policy are still awkward in relation to issues such as 
readmission agreements (Cristina Boswell 2003c), asylum and refugee policy 
(Haddad 2008) and the connection between development and migration policy 
(Lavenex and Kunz 2008). Migration policy has also been influenced by the broader 
revision of EU policy making, as evidenced by the introduction of the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) in 2001. This represented a form of loose coordination 
between member states that avoided the binding arrangements typical of the 
traditional Community Method. In addition, individual member states 
circumvented the Council by undertaking direct political initiatives, this was the 
case with the 2008 French-led 'European Pact on Immigration and Asylum' (Carrera 
and Guild 2008). Again, in line with broader developments in EU politics, the EP's 
role and input in migration policy-making has increased in recent years. This has 
been analysed both in terms of the power this institution is capable of wielding and 
the net result for the policies themselves, mainly in terms of a liberal / restrictive 
divide (Lopatin 2013; Ripoll Servent 2010). Finally, the increase in the number 
agencies working in this area is worth noting given that, by the end of 2014, there 
were at least five working either directly or indirectly on migration-related issues. 
 
 
 1.3.  Explaining EU migration policy 
 
The growing importance of EU migration policy has been matched by a 
corresponding increase in attention within the academic literature. The aim of this 
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section is to provide an overview of how authors have explained these 
developments and the current level of integration in EU migration policy. Overall 
there are some commonalities in most of these accounts. First, the majority of these 
contributions cover only short timeframes (Cerna 2009; Menz 2011). Secondly, 
authors tend either to focus on treaties (Niemann 2008; Stetter 2000) or on a few 
select policies such as the external dimension of migration (Cristina Boswell 2003c; 
Pollak and Slominski 2009; Wolff 2008). Others again focus on broader policy areas 
such as irregular migration (de Haas 2009; Giuseppe Sciortino 2004) or border 
policy (Hobbing 2005; Mitsilegas 2007). Thirdly, a number of these works have a 
normative element in that they try to assess whether EU policies have become 
restrictive or liberal towards migrants (Carrera and Guild 2008; Mitsilegas 2004). 
This research therefore makes a valuable contribution to this area of scholarship as 
it involves analysis of a longer time period than previous studies (ten years to be 
precise), its remit is broad as it includes all legislation produced during that ten year 
period, and it avoids normative assessment of policy content. The following 
analysis of academic literature groups contributions under three distinct headings:  
 
 How EU migration policy relates to the Community Method;  
 How migration policy has been framed within and contributed to EU 
studies; and finally,  
 Debate concerning the liberal or restrictive nature of EU migration 
policy.  
 
 
 1.3.1) Delegation and the Community Method 
 
Policy-making in the EU has been practiced and understood exclusively in terms of 
the Community Method (the Method) for quite some time. Wallace characterises it 
as “a centralized and hierarchical institutional process, with clear delegation of 
powers, and aimed at 'positive integration'” (2005: 79-80). In particular, a  
 
strong role [is] delegated to the European Commission in policy 
design, policy-brokering, policy execution, and managing the 
interface with 'abroad' (Wallace 2005: 79-80).  
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In the last two decades however, the meaning and the practice of the Method 
has come to vary a great deal in the academic literature. The idea of a Community 
Method was first applied to traditional EU competences such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy. However as the EU remit of action has expanded alterations to 
the Method have begun to appear. Consequently the Community Method has not 
only changed historically, but has meant different things according to the policy 
area in which it has been applied. For instance, Puetter defines the key feature of 
the Community Method as its process of integration by law, this is distinct from 
policy coordination with non-binding consequences seen in areas such as Economic 
and Monetary Union (2012: 162). For some authors on the other hand, the 
Community Method stands for the necessary involvement of EU actors. 
Consequently Bickerton et al. argue that “major new areas of EU activity” diverged 
from traditional Community Method inasmuch as they have “studiously avoided” 
supranational involvement, i.e. the Commission and CJEU (2014). For Niemann it 
seems that voting procedures within the Council and the EP’s involvement are 
relevant in terms of Community Method (2008). 
An important strand of the literature understands EU migration policy-
making mechanisms as differing significantly from the Community Method. First, 
it is argued that EU migration policy emerged outside the EU (Monar 2011). 
Secondly, some of the early traits of informal and intergovernmental cooperation 
continue to persist to date (Geddes 2014; Monar 2010). In particular, soft forms of 
cooperation typical under Maastricht were not regarded as failures from which 
future EU action departed, but have remained a central feature of the EU approach 
to migration policy (Monar 2010: 237-38). Thirdly, EU action in this area has 
included a number of outputs other than hard law, such as recommendations, best 
practices, operational measures, and programmatic documents. It is then argued that 
limiting analysis to the products of the Community Method would fail to capture 
the novelty of this policy area. The basic point is that, similar to Puetter’s distinction 
between integration by law and other means of cooperation (2012), EU integration 
should not be equated exclusively with the adoption of binding agreements. The 
importance of European Council meetings dedicated to migration supports 
assertions within the experimentalist literature that such activities are evidence of a 
political choice to diverge from the traditionally exclusive reliance on the 
Commission for policy initiatives (Monar 2010). However this assessment of 
European Council’s role echoes Hix’s framing of the EU as featuring dual 
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executive, where the Council and the European Council deal with medium to long-
term issues and the Commission manages short-term affairs (Hix 2005: 27). In other 
words, this division is not something entirely new in EU affairs or peculiar to 
migration policy. Finally the AFSJ7 is common only to a sub-set of states, as three 
member states8 have elected not to accede to portions of this Treaty Chapter while 
reserving the right to opt in at a later stage, either in part or in full.  
 
Having emerged in the 1990s, studies concerning governance have favoured 
a less state centric approach and instead focused on the ways policies are made at 
the EU level (Jachtenfuchs 2001). This perspective suggests that a combination of 
factors determined the evolution of the JHA area, included among them are 
“laboratories” and “driving forces” (Monar 2001, 2010). The willingness of policy-
makers to push ahead in this area, both in terms of experimenting with new policy-
making solutions and branding this area a policy priority, coalesced with increased 
internal and external pressure to act. Laboratories constituted the template for the 
subsequent network-style, ad hoc arrangements in the third pillar. Schengen, by far 
the most important laboratory, was crucial to a number of areas that found their 
place within the EU framework almost a decade later (e.g. asylum, borders and 
visas policies). Schengen became an institutionalised forum for high-level meetings 
ranging from those solely involving officials to those held at the ministerial level. 
This in turn helped to develop mechanisms, cultures and experiences for the 
cooperation that would follow.  
The transnational activism that triggered the early phases of European 
cooperation on migration was chiefly led by networks of officials from the Justice 
and Home Affairs Ministries, who emerged as the groups most dominant in shaping 
the form and content of the EU (Guiraudon 2003: 264-65). Guiraudon9 argues rather 
influentially that, when dealing with migration in their domestic arenas national 
executives and officials wished to escape pressure from a variety of sources such as 
competing ministries within their own governments, parliamentary oversight, and 
the judicial branch. Consequently they sought more suitable policy venues within 
                                                          
7 The “area of freedom, security and justice” stated in art. 61 (TEC).  
8 Ireland and the UK are covered by Protocols 3 and 4 attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, while 
Protocol 5 covers Denmark.  
9 Her argument has become one of the most convincing on the emergence of EU cooperation. 
Lavenex has adapted that argument to also explain the burgeoning eternal dimension of EU 
migration policy Sandra Lavenex, 'Shifting up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European 
Immigration Control', West European Politics, 29/2 (2006), 329-50 at 331.. 
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which they could design competences and implement measures. From the mid-
1980s, governments increasingly created transnational cooperation mechanisms 
dominated by law and order officials where EU institutions played only minor roles. 
Joppke implicitly confirms that there were definite incentives to fleeing domestic 
settings were national courts presented the prospect of imposing serious constraints 
on executive action. In sum, the determining factor for EU cooperation was the 
locus and not the powers, i.e. the locus was chosen precisely because it had no 
powers on its own.  
 
From the perspective of governance, authors have consistently focused on the 
introduction of the OMC as a further example of the relevance of these policy 
methods in understanding the development of EU migration policy (Caviedes 
2004). Tholoniat has argued that “the OMC has helped to overcome initial 
resistance to EU action”, identifying “a common European interest” and creating 
“a role for the EU in previously untouched areas, such as migration policy (2010: 
113). However a note of caution is in order. It may be true that there was resistance 
due to divergent interests, but political pressure was high, particularly in the first 
years after Tampere. For example, the European Council frequently called upon 
both the Council and the Commission to speed up policy delivery. An alternative 
reading is that cooperation on these matters was difficult for EU states due to the 
presence of distinct administrative practices, different legal systems and unique 
historical backgrounds regarding migration (Düvell 2011a: 293).  
 
Following Amsterdam, some contributions to the academic literature began 
referring to migration policy as communitarised (Menz 2014; Stetter 2000), while 
others “gradually” filtered this term in after Lisbon (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes 
2013: 180). However the reader is at times left in the dark as what this entails in 
practice and what it means for EU integration. For example, it is unclear whether 
the term communitarisation refers to the Community Method or the fact that 
migration issues were brought within the Community pillar (‘the first pillar’). If the 
former is the case, describing developments under Amsterdam as a 
“communitarisation” of EU migration policy could be misleading. That is, up to 
2005 the Commission was not the sole initiator of migration policy as it shared this 
function with the Council, and until Lisbon the CJEU had only limited jurisdiction, 
which seems at odds with Wallace’s account of the Community Method. In the latter 
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scenario, it is certainly correct to state that some migration issues were transferred 
to the first Pillar. However, an unintended consequence of this statement is that 
policy–making was homogeneous both in relation to migration and all other EU 
policy areas included in the first pillar. This is simply not the case. A possible third 
interpretation of this phrase refers to the gradual expansion of migration-related 
issues touched on or covered by EU initiatives, an even broader use of the term 
Community (Stetter 2000). 
 
To solve these ambiguities and differing interpretations, this dissertation 
offers an explanation based on the notion of delegation. The definition of this notion 
varies according to the school of thought or discipline from which it is approached. 
Delegation may be defined in an operational sense as coming about where powers 
such as policy proposal and implementation are formally ceded to “semi-
autonomous central institutions” (Moravcsik 1993: 509)(Moravcsik 1993, 509). 
Instead of directly determining and executing aspects of policy formulation or 
implementation, a group of actors may decide to include an agent in the process. 
This involvement can vary in terms of degree and scope, ranging from compulsory 
consultative roles (e.g. principals are under obligation to take the agent's opinion 
into account when making a decision), to operational management of some kind 
(e.g. the agent is in charge of running the day-to-day working of a Fund), to external 
representation (e.g. the agent represents the principal in international fora).  
While a thorough discussion of this concept is undertaken in Chapter 2, this 
thesis posits that delegation is an example of integration because member state 
governments collectively agree to advance towards a set of policy goals by 
involving a third party to whom powers are accordingly conferred. At that moment, 
member state governments abandon individual approaches to solving external and 
cooperative problems and allow themselves to be governed by shared positions. 
This is in spite of the fact that these common positions may subsequently operate 
against an administration’s wishes or against the wishes of their political 
successors. 
 
The matter of delegation is however relevant to broader questions of EU 
integration. For example, if the Community Method is identified as the process of 
integration then divergences from this Method cannot represent instances of 
integration. However, such a simplistic statement masks a more nuanced reality of 
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both EU affairs and the academic study thereof. Many of the works investigating 
new forms of cooperation in the EU have not been normative in their assumptions, 
indeed they have attempted to show how these new methods expand understanding 
of current trends in EU integration (Bickerton et al. 2014). That said the selection 
of the dependent variable for this research – the delegation of powers – involved 
commonality with research focused on the Community Method. First as highlighted 
in Wallace’s contribution, delegation is a key aspect of the Community Method. 
Secondly, the definition of delegation is based on a contractual agreement 
formalised in law, which matches the legal focus highlighted by Puetter.  
 
Focusing on delegation is a simple and more traditional way of addressing 
questions concerning EU integration. It is simple because past scholarship offers 
models to detect it. Traditionally, delegation is regarded as the hallmark of EU 
cooperation. From an International Relations perspective, the supranational nature 
of the EU project is what makes it distinctive (Moravcsik 1993; Rosamond 2000). 
No other international institution has the same degree of authority or autonomy in 
exercising its powers. The negative side of selecting delegation as the focus of this 
dissertation however is that it seems to suggest that cooperation and integration are 
only significant when brought about through legally binding institutionalised 
mechanisms. This is an underlying assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik 1999) as well as other theoretical framings of EU integration such as 
the 'comparativist' approach (Hix 2005: 37-38), which sees the Community Method 
as the only effective means of EU policy-making. This literature further assumes 
that member states either cooperate and delegate, or they do not “really” aim at 
coordinating their actions but instead opt for EU level window-dressing by 
promoting some form of loose coordination. Consequently, a focus on delegation 
seems to exclude other informal ways of cooperating.  
While it is true that these forms of cooperation should not be ignored, 
choosing to focus on delegation makes sense in a number of ways. The AFSJ is one 
of the few EU policy areas where legislative output has been on the rise (Smismans 
2011: 511), hence this indicates a preference for binding agreements in this area 
among the actors involved. Methodologically speaking the fact that delegation is 
codified in law offers a clear and less arbitrary way of measuring and evaluating 
integration than other forms based on discursive analysis or network relationships. 
Unlike delegation, networks operate through more informal contacts, which can 
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make the detection and analysis of their contributions more difficult. Furthermore 
delegation clearly maps the powers that EU institutions enjoy in a given policy area, 
thus capturing and offering a simple but structured response to questions that often 
appear in the media concerning the powers wielded by the EU. Unfortunately, the 
media often portrays powers as having been ceded to, grabbed or even stolen by the 
EU. In the haze of uncertainty on the true nature of EU / member state power 
dynamics, all manner of political games and tactics can play out. By re-phrasing 
questions about the EU around delegation, it is possible to re-establish some clarity 
about “who does what and why” (Franchino 2006a: 2). In sum, delegation offers a 
way of entering into the important academic debate on integration that has shaped 
EU studies from the beginning, while at the same time offering answers to more 
contemporary questions regarding what the Union actually does. 
 
This research seeks to demonstrate that delegation has occurred and is 
significant, however it also shows that migration policy has been included in 
traditional methods of EU policy-making (Bonjour and Vink 2013). This is even 
more the case if EU policy-making methods are regarded as constantly evolving 
(Buonanno and Nugent 2013: 1). Thus EU migration policy has also been brought 
into the fold because EU policy-making has, on the whole, conspicuously 
diversified over the last two decades. This dissertation shows that the amount of 
legislation adopted in this area, the level of powers conferred on the Commission 
through secondary legislation, and the inter-institutional dynamics commonly 
associated with the Community Method are interlinked in the case of migration 
policy. The links between delegation and EU integration are further analysed in the 
contributions surveyed in the next section. 
 
 
 1.3.2) EU migration policy and European integration 
 
Since the 1990s, and particularly after the success of the Single Market initiative, 
some commentators considered that EU integration was beginning to push into 
areas so essential to nation states that they argued the process was likely to stop or 
slow down considerably (Jones 2012; Messina 2007, 2009; Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdis 1999; Ross 2011). Mounting concerns over subsidiarity and the pillar 
structure agreed in Maastricht were, and still are, regarded as confirmation of the 
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predominance of intergovernmentalism in the EU at the time. Migration was 
additionally regarded as an explicit threat to national capacity to control external 
boundaries and internal identitarian bonds (Geddes 2005b). In their two 
contributions analysing the Treaty of Amsterdam, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis held 
that despite significant pushes for supranationalisation of the entire Third Pillar 
before and during negotiations, a mixed outcome emerged concerning decision-
making, institutional powers, and competence granted to the Community. In their 
view “institutional sovereignty[,] geographical specificity [and] widely disparate 
interests” made any further integration impossible (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1998: 
29). A similar line is followed by Messina who argues that the peculiar form that 
EU migration policy has taken after Amsterdam, 
 
can best be understood against the backdrop of the national 
interests and political pressures that [were] propelling each EU 
Member State along the path of cooperation and collective action 
(Messina 2007: 139-40).  
 
The net outcome of both arguments was that member states were unlikely to 
grant significant powers to EU institutions, signalling resistance among national 
executives to any rhetoric of policy improvements under the EU aegis and the 
pursuit of an intergovernmental style of policy-making at the EU level. 
Givens and Luedtke assert that the formation of a European migration policy 
is conditional upon the interests of and pressures faced by national governments. 
Following an intergovernmental logic, this contribution links domestic politics with 
EU outcomes. In brief, these authors contend that harmonisation, or lack thereof, in 
a given policy area and the nature of that harmonisation (either restrictive or liberal), 
is the product of the salience of that issue in a given member state (as revealed 
through press coverage) and of the domestic liberal structure (which either 
constrains the national executive or leaves it free to follow its preferred course of 
action in restricting immigration) (Terry Givens and Luedtke 2003; Terri Givens 
and Luedtke 2004, 2005). However, links between the two levels are not clear and 
the choice of dependent variables, i.e. harmonisation and liberal / restrictive, is 
problematic and normative. Authors diverge in their assessment of harmonisation 
attained by EU law mainly because they focus on individual aspects in isolation (for 
example comparing the policy areas of borders and asylum), or they pay attention 
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to legal texts or implementation mechanisms (Hollifield et al. 2014; Jordan et al. 
2003; Mitsilegas 2002). Authors also diverge greatly on whether the content of 
policy is liberal or restrictive, as the next subsection will show.  
 
Maintaining a focus on domestic forces, but taking a public policy rather than 
a purely intergovernmental approach, Freeman contends there is no one size fits for 
all for migration policy in Europe. Different migration policy areas rest at different 
points of the supranational / intergovernmental spectrum. For Freeman, for 
example, the fact that visa policy had been surpranationalised meant that “a 
domestic politics framework may be of declining relevance to that policy in 
Europe” (Freeman 2006). Although there had been several attempts to introduce 
asylum policy at the EU level, “it is still sensible to inquire into the national sources 
of asylum policies” (Freeman 2006: 241). Still recently, commentators have 
indicated that “major policy decisions [are evenly] shared between the EU and 
national levels”, indicating that the process of integration is only halfway through 
(Buonanno and Nugent 2013: 7). 
 
In line with rational-choice approaches10, Stetter proposes a new framing of 
EU migration developments based on “regulation and principal agent theories” 
(2000: 80). Stetter notes that while neofunctional arguments “do account for the 
causes” that have put migration on the EU agenda, “they fail to provide an 
explanation for the ways and means that the EU espoused in order to deal with 
migration issues” (2000: 81). In the era of globalisation the regulation of migration 
                                                          
10 Studies of delegation are marked by a rational bias Mark A. Pollack, 'Rational Choice and Eu 
Politics', in Knud E. Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack, and Ben Rosamong (eds.), Handbook of 
European Union Politics (London: SAGE, 2007b) at 32.. However rationality is “thin”, meaning 
that it does not necessarily have to be loaded with utilitarian assumptions about actors’ 
motivations, but can contemplate a plurality of objectives Pollack, 'Rational Choice and Eu 
Politics',  at 33.. Rational-choice assumptions have to match the various contexts in which they 
are applied Pollack, 'Rational Choice and Eu Politics'.. Taking into account the context in which 
policy-making takes place, EU architecture and environment elicit rational behaviour. Any 
Commission proposal undergoes extensive exploratory research before being tabled, a process 
that involves civil society, lobby groups, organised interests, and also experts and research 
institutes Laurie Buonanno and Neill Nugent, Policies and Policy Processes of the European 
Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 40-45, 102-05, Neill Nugent, The 
Government and Politics of the European Union (seventh edn.; Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) at 121-25.. National figures such as ministers, prime ministers and heads of 
state and more Brussels-based actors such as the Permanent Representations represent the 
interests and positions of member states at EU level. The latter are the bodies that actually take 
care of most day-to-day issues in EU affairs, attending Council meetings and liaising with the 
capitals Jeffrey Lewis, 'Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The 
Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 36/4 (1998), 479-504.. 
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has become regarded as a public good which has to be collectively managed to 
prevent negative effects on individual countries (Caviedes 2004: 291; Lavenex and 
Uçarer 2002). Intergovernmental agreements could solve negative externalities, as 
was the case for those created in the abolition of internal frontiers. However 
implementation of the Maastricht arrangements accentuated the fact that 
intergovernmental arrangements were not working, hence a step had to be taken 
towards supranationalisation in order to solve problems associated with 
cooperation. Stetter argues that these “regulatory failures” left no option other than 
to “communitarise” more. These regulatory failures are confirmed in the previous 
quotation from the Council and Commission Action Plan, where emphasis is given 
at overcoming the soft law output (Council 1998). The focus on previous regulatory 
failure is also present in Niemann’s work, which sets out that a second source of 
functional pressures was the “dissatisfaction of collective goal attainment” (2008: 
570-72). In other words due to the investment EU politicians had made in the EU 
level approach to migration, pressures resulted from the shortcomings in previous 
Maastricht arrangements, i.e. overlapping competences, cumbersome legal 
instruments, unanimity requirements, absence of judicial review, and the 
diminished role of the Commission. This disappointment apparently diminished 
with the achievements reached through Amsterdam, but returned after Tampere due 
to delayed and uneven attainment of fixed targets (Niemann 2008: 571). 
Unfortunately Stetter does not unpack the notion of delegation and only 
superficially touches upon its determinants. While he refers to factors such as 
credibility and uncertainty11, these are left unexplained (Stetter 2000: 81, 83). A 
principal-agent approach of this sort has however been employed recently to 
explain policy development in the external dimension of EU migration policy 
(Menz 2014). 
Niemann offers a neofunctionalist argument to explain the progressive 
communitarisation of migration policy through treaty changes. His framework is 
not state-centric and combines four factors: a) “functional pressures”; b) “the role 
of supranational institutions”; c) “socialisation, deliberation and learning 
processes”; and, d) “countervailing forces” (Niemann 2008: 561). Niemann holds 
that the first three factors are “dynamics” which contribute to and strengthen 
integration, whereas the final element “goes against these integrational logics” 
                                                          
11 See next Chapter. 
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(2008: 561).  
 
Guiraudon has however criticised rationalist accounts of the development of 
EU migration policy for not appearing credible (2003: 264). “Rationality” is typical 
of two different approaches. The first, common before Maastricht, saw the 
emergence and development of EU migration policy as “compensatory measures” 
that needed to be established because of parallel projects elsewhere in the EU. 
Monar presents an example of this line of reasoning in highlighting the 
compensatory nature of Schengen as regards the Single Market initiative (2001: 
750-54). After Maastricht the Fortress Europe rhetoric found its way into migration 
policy. Again, this perspective availed itself of coordination based on a rational 
response to the perceived threat from forms of migration such as irregular migration 
and asylum seeking. Guiraudon criticises how these rationalist approaches mask the 
“complexity and incompleteness” of EU migration policy and portray these policies 
as “an inevitable solution to a commonly defined problem” (2003: 264). 
Guiraudon’s description of the process of EU integration in this field in terms of a 
“garbage-can” model portrays the idea of an EU project historically emerging as an 
unintended consequence of other processes (2003). 
This dissertation responds to these criticisms by noting that delegation results 
from logics of “complexity”, which it helps to solve. More precisely, delegation is 
a device frequently used in international contexts to solve complex cooperation 
problems by involving a third party. Indeed delegation is not the only potential 
solution to such problems, but rather it is one of many and is therefore not 
inevitable. Past empirical studies have shown that delegation is neither extremely 
conspicuous when present nor constant across legislative measures and policy 
areas, similar findings should be expected from this dissertation (Franchino 2004; 
Pollack 2003b). In short, delegation is only one of the tools available to and used 
by principals. Finally, delegation does not imply that all actors involved share or 
perceive problems similarly. Rather it implies that they share common beliefs and 
approaches on how to solve international issues. For instance, delegating agenda 
setting to a third party does not imply the same viewpoint or interest, but rather it 
demonstrates agreement over whether to go about solving a given issue. 
 
 
 1.3.3) Delegation and the liberal/restrictive nature of EU migration 
30/326 
policy 
 
A number of commentators have analysed EU migration policy along a liberal / 
restrictive divide (Terri Givens and Luedtke 2005; Kaunert and Léonard 2012; 
Ruffer 2011). Rather than asking questions about policy-making or about EU 
integration, this strand in the literature addresses more normative dimensions. 
Unfortunately, however, this literature does not clarify to what this normative / 
restrictive divide is compared to. Is it compared to the ex ante situation at the 
European level? Is the comparison concerning the situation in a given set of 
countries? Is the comparison casted against some ideal type of policy (e.g. more 
effective, or more accountable, or fairer to migrants’ rights)? Joppke questions what 
might explain the “gap between restrictionist policy goals and expansionist 
outcomes” in migration policy (Joppke 1998). In line with negative public 
perceptions, governments wished to reduce unwanted flows of immigrants. Joppke 
considers two forms of unwanted immigration: asylum-seekers and family 
reunification, forms accepted by liberal states on humanitarian grounds; and, 
“illegal immigration”, which happens because of “states' sheer incapacity to keep 
migrants out” (Joppke 1998). This failure does not stem from international 
obligations or states’ reduced capabilities within a new global scenario (Koslowski 
1998; Sassen 1998). Instead Joppke emphasises the role of domestic “legal process” 
as a means of explaining that gap (Joppke 1998: 271). That is, she cites the 
accumulated jurisprudence of some member states as making it impossible for 
executives to achieve their stated, restrictive goals, which severely limits their 
policy options. Joppke’s work originally arose as a response to a past contribution 
on this debate, which held that western member states were proceeding towards 
expansionist policies in liberal states (Freeman 1995). Although still separated into 
two different sets, i.e. old and new immigration destinations, EU member states 
were nonetheless bound to integrate their “approach to immigration [and …] take 
the liberal democratic form”, which is “broadly expansionist and inclusive” 
(Freeman 1995: 881). According to Freeman, the fact that “governments grapple 
with common problems” explained this convergence (Freeman 2006: 227). 
 
The idea of an overall trend in EU migration policy is present also in 
Guiraudon’s work, which sets out that,  
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migration management in the EU context is focused on preventing 
unwanted migration, through visa policy and carrier sanctions, the 
establishment of buffer zones[,] the constitution of a database of 
inadmissible aliens (the Schengen Information System) and of 
asylum-seekers’ fingerprints (EURODAC) (see also Finotelli and 
Sciortino 2013; 2003: 267)12.  
 
Recent academic contributions point in the direction of a qualification of 
Guiraudon’s “venue shopping” argument. Kaunert and Leonard suggest that 
contrary to what is expected in light of the a venue shopping argument, “the main 
EU asylum legal instruments have overall rendered asylum standards more liberal, 
rather than more restrictive in the EU” (2012: 1409). There has, in particular, been 
a recent wave of literature that associates liberal policy trends with the Commission 
and restrictive ones with the Council (Kaunert 2010; Luedtke 2011; Menz 2014; 
Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2014).  
 
While highlighting an important area of debate, these contributions seem to 
tackle the issue of EU integration in this area by referring, either implicitly or 
explicitly, to policy convergence. This convergence can be in the direction of liberal 
or restrictive policy goals, however it has been difficult to find agreement between 
these positions thus far as the two notions are contested. Some authors compare EU 
policies to existing member state policies, while others make comparisons with the 
policies of entering member states (Luedtke 2011; Mitsilegas 2002). Another group 
uses international norms as a benchmarks and tends to emphasise the lowering of 
standards (Bell 2010; Juss 2005). And yet another group points to possible future 
developments once supranational actors get involved, hinting at  an increased 
monitoring and more even implementation emerging as a result (Acosta Arcarazo 
and Geddes 2013; Menz 2014; Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2014).  
 
Huysmans asserts that the Single Market represented a political opportunity 
for a new framing of migration in terms of threat to societies (2000: 759-60). 
Echoing developments at domestic levels, and particularly in the context of 
                                                          
12 The SIS database contains information on some categories of wanted or missing persons and 
objects. The EURODAC is an EU asylum fingerprint database which gather data from asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants.  
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important shifts in “Western European welfare states”, “migration has been 
increasingly presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic 
and labour market stability” (Huysmans 2000: 752). This laid down the groundwork 
for Europe-wide views on migration that were instrumental in integrating policies 
at the EU level. That said the point for Huysmans is more about understanding how 
and to what extent the process of EU integration has influenced the securitisation 
of migration, rather than how the securitisation of migration explains the emergence 
and the present institutional standing of EU migration policies. 
 
Recently some authors have begun to take issue with these explanations. 
Contrary to the common view that migration has been increasingly securitised after 
9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, with Frontex acting as undeniable 
evidence of that trend (Wolff 2008: 255), Neal holds that Frontex is better 
understood as “a logical continuation of the integration process and the principle of 
free internal movement in the EU”,  even if “this does not completely discount the 
security dimension (2009: 334). Indeed, Frontex exemplifies instances of 
integration which are not, as the securitisation arguments would suggests, fruits of 
emergence and exception but are rather the continuation of risks management logics 
which had already been part of the EU vocabulary for years when the agency was 
established.  
 
In terms of the substance of research, this dissertation strives to steer clear of 
evaluating the restrictive or liberal nature of EU policies. While such an analysis 
would address important and central questions on this topic, it could distract from 
the analysis of EU integration in this area. While it is difficult to remain neutral on 
a sensitive political issue such as migration, it is essential that a normative-free view 
of what has occurred in this policy area be provided here (Christina Boswell 2010: 
2278). The whirlwind of media headlines certainly stirs up questions of how EU 
cooperation on migration might affect the state of democracy, the EU political 
project and migrants' rights. The answers to these questions are indeed important, 
particularly in the context of ever-increasing politicisation of migration, mounting 
concerns over the democratic legitimacy of an EU level approach to such issues, 
not to mention the EU project as a whole. Yet it is puzzling that as the “democratic 
deficit” critique of EU institutions was mounting and gaining support, so too was 
delegation of powers to the EU in this area. Commentators such as Geddes (1995) 
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were quick to highlight the social and political risk of such contradictory behaviour, 
which saw the gradual transfer of powers, that had up to that point been the preserve 
of national administrations, to what the public saw as 'unaccountable' institutions 
(Financial Times 2002d). This dissertation seeks to address these remarks in two 
ways. First it maps the EU’s powers in this area to illustrate exactly what lies within 
its remit, and particular attention is paid to the legal mandate of the Commission. 
Secondly, it identifies the most likely reasons behind the Commission's 
empowerment in this area, thereby making sense of what could at first appear to be 
a puzzling cession of powers and competences. In terms of the latter, this 
dissertation provides a further response to frequent questions concerning 
'centralisation' trends in the EU (Parsons and Smeeding 2006: 19).13 By unpacking 
and explaining delegation, this dissertation addresses gaps in knowledge on the 
extent to which powers have been centralised through EU institutions and the 
degree of freedom EU bodies have in exercising those powers. 
 
 
 1.4. Hypotheses and theories of this research 
 
Borrowing insights from past academic studies, this thesis uses delegation to 
explain the evolution of EU migration policy and its present role. Supported by 
principal-agent models14, this approach sheds some light on the dynamics 
underlying delegation by describing how principals and agents can interact under 
different policy and institutional settings. These models facilitate understanding of 
the varying degrees of delegation and discretion identified by referring to a number 
of factors. In particular, the review of academic literature on delegation in Chapter 
2 highlights the role of some likely determinants, namely: uncertainty; credibility 
of commitments; and, efficiency; plus institutional dynamics. That said this review 
shows the extent to which independent variables used by scholars are entangled and 
overlap, which makes attributions of relative importance extremely difficult. The 
ultimate purpose of Chapter 2 is therefore to bring some conceptual clarity and, 
importantly, to operationalise these notions so they are suitable for analytic use in 
                                                          
13 This theme is much in vogue also in other policy areas at present (November 2013), as for 
instance in economic and fiscal policies Financial Times, 'Eu Calls for Centralisation of Powers', 
Financial Times, 2 October 2012, Otmar Issing, 'The Risk of European Centralisation', 
EuropeanVoice (2013).. 
14 See next chapter.  
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the empirical chapters. 
 
Lavenex and Uçarer hold that migration policy is, by definition, likely to 
engender collective action problems (2002: 209). This is echoed in official EU 
documents. In the words of the Commission, “immigration is by nature a cross-
border phenomenon. A coordinated approach is essential to help Member States 
to manage it more successfully” 15 (Commission 2007d). The idea underlying this 
and other statements made in official EU documents is that migration, being a social 
phenomenon that is by definition international16, is likely to feature negative 
externalities and therefore should trigger cooperation between states. Consequently 
member states can delegate powers to a third party (or parties) to regulate that 
cooperation. If migration policy is essentially about controlling borders, deciding 
who has the right to enter a country or not, what he or she is entitled to, and what 
he or she is entitled to do in that country, has clear effects on the receiving state and 
also other states. In the EU this is true in two respects. The first concerns member 
states, which must coordinate in order to avoid unilateral action within their ranks. 
In the second respect, collective action by EU member states causes adjustments of 
some form or other in other non-EU states.17 
 
Theories of delegation hold that institutional contexts are relevant to the 
emergence of delegation. Authors converge on the fact that conflict between 
Council and Commission is likely to hinder the possibility of delegation, but are 
divided as to the effects of divisions within the Council (Franchino 2006a; Pollack 
2003b). Turning to rationales, it has been argued that member states would confer 
powers to the Commission in relation to agenda setting, monitoring and sanctioning 
in order to solve problems of “credibility of commitments” in this policy area 
(Moravcsik 1999; Pollack 2003b). Past delegation studies predict that higher levels 
of uncertainty connected to a policy area make it likely that more delegation would 
be witnessed therein. This is either because the agent to whom powers are conferred 
is an ‘expert’ in that area, or because the policy area is riddled with information 
gaps (Franchino 2006a; Pollack 2003b). Finally according to some authors, the 
more principals are likely to gain from streamlined decision-making and “a 
                                                          
15 Emphasis in the original.  
16 This does not intend to diminish the significant dimension of internal migration. 
17 For reasons of space and resources, this work is not going to look at this “external dimension” 
of EU migration policy. 
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reduction in workload [through] reliance on bureaucratic expertise”, the more 
delegation should be expected (Franchino 2002: 685; Pollack 2003b). However as 
highlighted in section two of this chapter and as will be highlighted in the next 
chapter, authors at times refer to efficiency as related to the achievement of policy 
goals, something which is more accurately described as effectiveness (Stetter 2000). 
If these two notions are disentangled the resulting picture is more complex. In terms 
of effectiveness, previous failures are likely to trigger more institutionalised 
cooperation. 
 
 
 1.5. Methodology 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research is employed with the aim of understanding the 
extent of and rationales for delegation in migration policy at the EU level. To 
achieve this existing academic literature is first examined to single out the rationales 
commonly identified as conducive to delegation, they are then applied to the case 
of EU migration policy. In addition to this “confirmational strategy” (Bordens and 
Abbott 2011: 48), Chapter 2 is focused on making order of a theory of delegation 
that relies on vague and ill-defined independent variables. Chapter 3 then applies a 
promising quantitative method that has seldom been tested to date. This is carried 
out in the context of a policy area where quantitative research is largely absent, 
normative viewpoints tend to dominate, and comprehensive studies are scarce. 
 
The first method employed in analysing delegation involves two rather 
similar quantitative models previously employed by Franchino (2004) and Pollack 
(2003b). The objective of which is to quantify how much delegation is present both 
in single legislative measures and in clusters of legislative measures grouped mainly 
according to their legal bases. This approach has produced a systematic account of 
delegation within an EU policy area (migration policy in this case), and has 
facilitated an in-depth examination of the constituent parts of this policy area. 
Owing to the limits of the quantitative models on offer in the literature18, the second 
method involves qualitatively analysing the determinants of delegation identified 
in the literature review carried out in Chapter 2. This is achieved over the course of 
four chapters, and the examination of each determinant concludes with a further 
                                                          
18 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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look at delegation arising from individual measures and policy sub-areas (i.e. 
migration categories). 
 
Migration can be framed within the context of a wide variety of disciplines 
such as anthropology, sociology, legal studies, political science, and comparative 
literature, to name but a few (Christina Boswell 2010: 278). Much of this work is 
interdisciplinary in nature, involving literature on delegation, the EU, and migration 
studies. Insights derived from legal studies are included here as some legal 
background is essential to understanding developments in the remit and competence 
of EU law in this area. Relevant legal commentaries and interpretations of EU 
migration law are also used throughout (Chalmers et al. 2014; Craig and de Búrca 
2011; Hailbronner 2010; Peers and Rogers 2006; Peers 2011). Yet despite calling 
on interdisciplinary sources to enrich its content and findings, this thesis remains 
rooted within the realm of political science. 
 
Indeed, in relation to political science, decisions on migration matters are 
traditionally considered as states’ competences. Within the EU, substantial 
differences exist between member states over who is considered a migrant and who 
is not. Although the UN has put forward a recommendation as to who should be 
classed as an international migrant (mainly based on the intended duration of stay), 
the application of that definition by member states has been inconsistent (Fassmann 
2009: 29-36). In practice and for statistical purposes, a migrant can be defined as a 
person not holding the nationality of the country he or she moves to or they could 
also be defined as a foreign-born resident. Geis, Uebelmesser and Werding nicely 
capture the effect of these two different definitions by displaying different 
calculations for immigrant populations in Germany, France and the UK (2011: 770-
72). The difference between these two definitions results in a variation of more than 
two million among for immigrants aged 18-65 in France, while for Germany the 
variation is more than 3.5 million, and for the UK it amounts to a variation of 1.8 
million. There were nearly 22.875 million foreign citizens in the EU-25 in 2005, 
but 40.560 million people were born in a different country from the one they resided 
in (Fassmann 2009: 30-33). 
 
This dissertation does not focus on an analysis of the migration phenomenon 
per se as might be captured by pursuing questions such as ‘why do people 
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migrate?’, or ‘what could explain the occupational level of group X as compared 
with group Y in country Z?’. Rather this study focuses on the policies the EU has 
developed regarding migration. In the EU a first differentiation is between rules 
concerning EU nationals and TCNs. At an abstract level this distinction is solely 
administrative in nature, and is superimposed on the same phenomenon of 
movement of people. Although in the majority of cases it is possible to differentiate 
between EU legislation addressing the former or the latter group, there are 
exceptions where both groups are covered within a single measure19. And while a 
comparison of these two sets of legislation is worth investigating, it is not the object 
of this dissertation. This study instead focuses on legislation regarding TCNs, and 
this choice presents several benefits. First it involves a smaller time span, as 
competences regarding TCNs only emerged after Maastricht. Secondly, and partly 
arising as a consequence of the latter, the legislative sample is also reduced when 
compared with the body of legislation adopted over more than 50 years of 
cooperation on freedom of movement for EC workers. 
EU legislation on migration is divided into five categories: asylum and 
refuge; irregular migration; legal migration; administrative cooperation; and, 
borders and visas. First, such categorisation facilitates consideration and 
challenging of the existing literature, as these are the most common groupings 
found therein. Secondly, these categories reflect administrative divisions at the EU 
level. The Commission usually divides migration issues along these lines, for 
instance through its Communications. For the Council, the story is more 
complicated. While there is only one Council formation dealing directly with 
migration at ministerial level, fourteen others have been identified as having dealt 
with migration issues at the lower levels, the majority of which concerned borders 
and visas. Finally, and most importantly, these categories match treaty articles, 
which form the basis of secondary legislation20. Decision-making across these areas 
has not been uniform, as the Treaty laid down varying rules for these articles. Thus 
Chapter 3 examines the extent to which different decision-making regimes entailed 
varying degrees of delegation. The ultimate aim is to gain an understanding of what 
accounts for variations in delegation across migration categories. 
 
                                                          
19 For instance, this is the case of 2004 Free Movement Directive. The Directive covers both EU 
nationals and their TCNs family members.  
20 However, not all EU legislation can be easily referred to a single article. On this, see Chapter 3 
for a broader discussion.  
38/326 
The analysis focuses on secondary EU legislation enacted between May 1999 
and November 2009. This is the empirical material that sets out the dependent 
variable, i.e. delegation. Yet this alone does not clarify why secondary legislation, 
and not primary legislation, is the subject of analysis. First, measuring delegation 
present in secondary legislation maps what has happened after the guiding 
principles and objectives of a policy area have been crystallised through the 
Treaties. In other words, it provides evidence of the relative distribution of powers 
among EU actors in an evolving policy domain and provides guidance as to how 
the governance of that policy can be understood. Secondly, previous studies have 
argued that there are fundamental differences between delegation in primary and 
secondary legislation. This dissertation tests the extent to which this is actually the 
case. More precisely, Majone argues that there is a fundamental difference between 
delegation through the Treaties, which is fundamentally motivated by the need to 
strengthen credibility and thus displays high discretion for the Commission, and 
delegation through secondary legislation, which is aimed at achieving efficiency 
and hence shows lower levels of discretion for the Commission (2001). Yet Pollack 
holds that Majone’s position is debatable on both theoretical and empirical grounds 
(Pollack 2007a). Theoretically speaking the distinction between the two rationales 
is not as neat as Majone suggests, but is more of a continuum. Empirically, past 
studies have shown that discretion varies gradually rather than dichotomously. 
 
 The Commission and the Council are the two main actors considered in this 
dissertation. A study of delegation is biased towards those institutional actors with 
the power to grant authority and the positioning to receive it. The Council21 and the 
Commission fit this profile within the context of the EU. In addition, arrangements 
in EU migration policy emphasise the importance of looking at member state 
governments. Until 2004 the power of legislative initiative was shared between the 
Council and the Commission in relation to the majority of migration sub-sectors, 
while the power of adopting legislation rested mainly with the Council. The EP was 
only loosely involved through consultation until 2004 when it joined all but a few 
areas, such as labour migration. The impact of other actors was also considered 
                                                          
21 Particularly after the broad change in policy-making occurred in 2005, a case can be made for 
including the EP as a further principal within the principal-agent relation. However, due to the 
complexity of Council/EP and Commission/EP relationships, the focus has been kept on the 
Council as the main actor. Documents from the EP have been consulted regularly, but a fuller 
coverage of the EP was beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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during the documentary analysis concerned with investigating the independent 
variables. These actors included international organisations, the media, national 
politicians, EU officials, think tanks and academic contributors to this field. 
Particular attention is paid to a limited set of countries, which are either considered 
representative of broader trends or are central to the issue under discussion. The 
criteria on which such selections where made are: size of foreign population; size 
of native population; different migratory experiences; and, voting weight in the 
Council22. This has resulted in a focus on France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Italy 
has only experienced substantial migration inflows since the mid-1980s and can be 
considered representative of the so-called new countries of immigration in Europe, 
a set that also includes Spain and Greece (Arango 2012; Geddes 2003; Okólski 
2012b, 2012a; Zincone 2011). For Zincone, Italy and these countries share “rapid 
inflow, substantial volume and a high proportion of undocumented immigrants” 
(2011: 247). Germany experienced mass immigration from at least the 1950s 
(Borkert and Bosswick 2011; Fassmann and Reeger 2012; Martin 2014; Okólski 
2012a). In terms of volumes23, it has been the top destination country for asylum 
seekers for several years and has featured the largest migrant population in Europe. 
Importantly, together with France, Germany was one of the countries willing to seek 
a European solution to migration issues since the 1980s. France and the UK, former 
colonial powers, have much older and diversified experiences concerning migration 
(Cerna and Wietholtz 2011; Geddes 2003; Hansen 2014; Hollifield 2014; Wihtol de 
Wenden 2011). There are a number of elements that distinguish these two countries, 
but the most noteworthy for this research is the different stances taken with regard 
to border control. The consequent decision of the UK to negotiate a different 
relationship with the EU on the entire JHA area is also notable (Adler-Nissen 2009).  
 
Chapter 2 and 3 look at the criteria for coding. The benefit of employing such 
a technique is that coding can clearly provide confirmation of whether delegation 
is present in a single piece of secondary legislation or across a group of measures 
and policy sectors. In order to ensure that this approach was feasible and would 
yield significant results, a pilot study was carried out on a subset of legislative 
                                                          
22 Indeed, they alone account for 116 votes (29 each) of the total 345 (33.6 percent) (as of 2009). 
Under Nice, a triple majority was needed to get measures through the Council. That said 
empirical research warns against rushed judgements on the importance of Council voting, as this 
rarely takes place and a consensus practice prevails The Economist, 'Why Voting Weights Don't 
Matter', The Economist, 15 June 2007, sec. Charlemagne.. 
23 For more details on stocks and flows in these countries, see Chapter 1, 4 and 6.  
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measures (the EU migration funds). Consistency in the coding results was ensured 
by carrying out the procedure twice, once at the very beginning of the project, and 
then again in parallel with the qualitative analyses set out in the following empirical 
chapters. That said, as set out in some detail in Chapters 2 and 3, there are several 
limitations to an exclusively quantitative research based on the models developed 
so far in the literature, such as coding criteria and vagueness of notions to be tested. 
To address these problems, qualitative analyses were carried out for the five policy 
areas identified above. 
 
A number of sources were consulted to find and assess the relative importance 
of the determinants of delegation. First, official sources such as Commission, EP 
and Council documents were examined. While obtaining documents by the former 
two was not problematic, a small proportion of Council documents were restricted 
from public access due to security concerns (i.e. relating to residence permits and 
visas) or foreign policy implications (e.g. visa lists). It was essential to focus on the 
Council because this is the institutional gathering for the member states; i.e. the 
principals in the principal-agent model employed here (see Chapter 2). It is also 
seen as an important driver of policy-making and legislation in this policy area, due 
to the relative weakness of the EP during much of the period considered (Aus 2008; 
Terry Givens and Luedtke 2003; Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2014). And finally, the 
Council is the most direct expression of member state involvement in the EU 
architecture. Hence, it is sensible to look at Council documents as confirmatory 
evidence for the analysis.  
Information from major migration information providers was used to 
contextualise and critically evaluate these documents, and to identify and explain 
other factors at play. These sources included the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM), Eurostat, the European Migration Network (EMN), as well as established 
think tanks and organisations focused in whole or in part on migration issues (e.g. 
MPI, CEPS). To complement this analysis, media coverage of migration has been 
examined extensively using both the Nexis and Agence Europe databases. Other 
studies have already identified this method as an effective strategy for grasping the 
relevance of a given issue at both national and European levels (Caviedes 2015; 
Terri Givens and Luedtke 2005; Pollack 2003b: 71; Giuseppe Sciortino and 
Colombo 2004). In addition, a small number of elite interviews were conducted 
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with EP officials, the Permanent Representations, and the Commission24. 
 
Use of these materials is intended to shed light on the factors accounting for 
member states' repeated choices to delegate competencies to the EU institutions. In 
other words from a rational-choice perspective, the “validity” question25 is 
addressed by referring to sources that explicitly make links between issues of 
uncertainty, credibility of commitments and efficiency, and their effects on policy 
areas or issues where delegation occurs. Content analyses were run within the two 
above-mentioned databases. However, the objective was not to measure the topics 
by counting the number of occurrences, as is the case in most content analyses 
(Matthews and Ross 2010: 395). The objective was more to identify the presence 
of trends and phenomena in member states’ public, political and in expert / 
practitioner discourses. The main motivation behind this choice was to check for 
the existence of the phenomena that are purportedly conducive to delegation and, 
where present, to look at their effects. Consequently, this was a more thematic 
analysis (Matthews and Ross 2010: 372-85). 
To ensure reliability of findings and replicability, the coding method for the 
dependent variable is set out clearly. The advantage of employing a textual analysis 
of independent variables is discussed in Chapter 2. Appropriate references are 
provided for all documents, data sources and literature discussed in the text. 
 
 
 1.6. Plan of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of a total of eight chapters, including the present introductory 
chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on theory and provides a comprehensive and in-depth 
analysis of some of the more notable theoretical proposals concerning delegation in 
the EU. This review does not limit itself to a presentation of the main arguments, 
                                                          
24 A number of potential candidates were intentionally sampled in three EU institutions, the 
Commission, the Council and the EP (“purposive sampling”) Alan Bryman, Social Research 
Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 333-34. Unfortunately only a few were 
available for interviews. In addition, the majority of respondents came from the Commission, 
which skewed any possible balanced account. As the main goal of the interviews was to ascertain 
interviewees' opinions on the reasons for cooperation and delegation in migration policy, semi-
structured interviews were selected as the most appropriate approach Bryman, Social Research 
Methods..  
25 Put simply, a validity question asks ‘am I researching what I think I am?’ Bob Hancké, Intelligent 
Research Design, a Guide for Beginning Researchers in the Social Sciences (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) at 86-90.. 
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but also extracts suitable hypotheses about the delegation in EU migration policy 
from the works presented. The empirical portion of the text runs from Chapter 3 to 
Chapter 7 inclusively.  
Chapter 3 focuses on coding secondary EU legislation on migration. This is 
an important exercise in mapping current EU powers on migration and also entails 
testing the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2. While most literature on EU policy 
focuses narrowly on individual areas such as asylum or labour migration, Chapter 
3 presents a quantitative analysis of the entire legislative acquis that relates to 
migration policy. Chapters 4 to 7 in turn deal with the migration categories, i.e. 
asylum and refuge, irregular migration, legal migration, and borders and visas. The 
objective of which is to assess each of the three independent variables to relation to 
the level of delegation in both individual measures and across policy subsectors. 
Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the theoretical perspectives on delegation, 
insights from EU migration literature, the main accounts of EU integration, and the 
findings of the empirical chapters, and draws conclusions in relation thereto.  
  
43/326 
 
2. Varieties of delegation 
 
Delegation is far from being an uncontested notion. Indeed, delegation studies often 
involve different views on what delegation is and why it occurs. Yet this variety is 
under appreciated in the literature. This is no more the case than in relation to the 
likely determinants of delegation, which has seen a number of different hypotheses 
put forwards in the literature. Therefore this chapter offers a comparison of different 
theories of delegation rather than presenting delegation theory as a unified body of 
thought. Section 2.1 opens with an extensive treatment of the dependent variable, 
i.e. the notion of delegation. Section 2.2 assesses the determinants of delegation 
already identified in the literature, with the aim of identifying relevant hypotheses 
to guide analysis in the following empirical chapters. Finally, Section 2.3 concludes 
by briefly summing up the main findings of the chapter.  
 
 
 2.1. The Dependent Variable: Delegation 
 
Studies on the EU have long debated whether and to what extent member states 
were integrating (Rosamond 2000). This dissertation captures integration in the 
form of a specific policy-making outcome, which is the conferral of power over a 
policy matter to a given institution, i.e. ‘delegation’. Considered from the standpoint 
of EU law, delegation is rather narrowly defined in terms of “quasi-legislative acts”. 
The Commission is also identified as having “significant powers in the field of 
delegated legislation”, and indeed the Council can confer “quasi-legislative powers 
upon the Commission” (Chalmers and Tomkins 2007: 94; Nugent 2006: 171-72). 
The Lisbon Treaty further specified the nature of these “delegated acts” (Chalmers 
et al. 2014: 67-72). Across the legislative set consulted in this study, these powers 
were generally allocated to the Commission, save for a handful of exceptions (Peers 
2011: 21). In this dissertation however, the term delegation is taken in a much wider 
sense, as set out below.  
 
The dependent variable of this research project has been variously framed in 
the academic research. Moravcsik has analysed delegation in the context of a wider 
study of the reasons for and conditions of cooperation at the EU level, in a complex 
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interplay between domestic and international dynamics (1999). For Moravcsik, the 
EU differs from all other international organisations because of its high level of 
“institutionalisation” (1993: 509). Sovereignty is delegated when powers such as 
the power of policy proposal or implementation are conceded to “semi-autonomous 
central institutions” (Moravcsik 1993: 509). It is important to highlight that 
delegation for Moravcsik only arises upon a substrate of previously established 
cooperation, which materialises through a liberal preference formation at the 
domestic level and an intergovernmental bargain at the EU level. Indeed the true 
goal of his thesis is to understand the conditions for cooperation itself, and only 
after this is institutionalisation dealt with (Moravcsik 1999). Finally Moravcsik is 
exclusively interested in institutional changes occurring in the Treaties, and 
disregards secondary legislation. The different loci of delegation are however 
tackled by Pollack.  
 
Pollack identifies the first form of delegation as deriving from primary 
legislation (i.e. EU Treaties) and institutional design (2003b: 56, 65). He then adds 
a cross-spectrum policy comparison to this institutional analysis, recording the level 
of delegation and discretion in secondary legislation (2003b: 775-154). In contrast 
to Moravcsik (1999) but in common with Franchino (2004), Pollack’s analysis 
takes cooperation as a given. Indeed the latter two authors do not question how 
cooperation comes about, but instead start from there to identify the criteria for 
delegation in the EU. Pollack notes that functionalist theories of delegation explain 
 
institutional choices [...] in terms of the functions that a given 
institution is expected to perform, and the effects on policy 
outcomes it is expected to produce, subject to the uncertainty 
inherent in any institutional design (2003b: 20).  
 
In other words, functionalist theory explains delegation starting from its expected 
“effects”. This definition immediately exposes the “instrumental” rationality 
assumptions of this framework, which ultimately relies on the ability of actors to 
estimate the likely consequences of different institutional options and shape their 
conduct accordingly. This conception of rationality is apparent in how Pollack 
describes principal-agent models. In his words these models draw,  
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from rational-choice theories of domestic and international politics, 
arguing that rational actors […] instrumentally delegate powers to 
executive and judicial agents systematically in order to lower the 
transaction costs of policy-making, and that in doing so they tailor 
the discretion of their agents, again systematically, as a function of 
several factors including the demand for credible commitments, the 
demand for policy-relevant information, and the expected gap 
between the preferences of the principals and the agents (2007, 4).  
 
Principal-agent analyses are validated insofar as “executive and judicial agents” are 
found to correspond to these functional roles (Pollack 2003, 6). He foresees “four 
key functions” which principals are likely to delegate in the EU: a) “monitoring 
compliance”; b) “solving problems of incomplete contracting' among principals”; 
c) “adopting credible, expert regulations of economic activities in areas where the 
principals would be either ill-informed or biased”; and, d) “setting the legislative 
agenda so as to avoid the endless 'cycling' that might otherwise result if the 
principals retained that power for themselves” (Pollack 2003, 6). In practical terms, 
provisions in secondary legislation that grant such powers are considered 
delegation. 
Rationalist approaches to delegation agree on the importance of transaction 
costs as a reason for delegation. Drawing on regime theory, Moravcsik argues that 
functionalist theory predicts the “creation of common rules and procedures” to 
reduce transaction costs, which in turn affects “the information and expectations of 
national governments” (1993: 514). Dahlman holds that there are three main 
categories of transaction costs, “search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs” (1979: 148). Similarly, Moravcsik 
identifies transaction costs as “the costs of identifying issues, negotiating bargains, 
codifying agreements, and monitoring and enforcing compliance” (1993: 508). 
Transaction costs are thus connected to problems of efficiency and effectiveness of 
collective actions. 
 
While Moravcsik’s aforementioned definition focuses on institutional 
autonomy and is captured in debates on EU integration, Franchino’s provides a 
more hands-on policy-oriented formulation wherein “any major provision that gives 
the […] Commission the authority to move the policy away from the status quo” is 
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considered delegation (2006a: 109-10). Franchino asserts that strategic game 
calculations within different sets of decision rules among EU level players are 
essential to grasping delegation dynamics in the EU (2004). Pollack adopts a 
functionalist interpretation of delegation as the essential notion to understand 
principal-agent dynamics in the EU (2003b). And all three appear to share common 
views on the relevance of “principal-agent conflict” in explaining the dynamics of 
delegation within the EU (2006b: 218-19). In particular, principal-agent models 
give a reliable description of the mechanisms that constrain agents and their likely 
attempts to escape excessive control.  
In a study covering a period of over 40 years, Franchino gathers 158 “major 
pieces of [EU] legislation” and finds that delegation to member states accounts for 
87 percent of the sample (138 measures out of 158) (2004: 280). He observes that 
the delegation in EU secondary legislation tend to favour member states’ 
administrations rather than EU institutions. This finding confirms the theoretical 
premise that member states delegate to third parties only on the basis of lacking 
credibility surrounding national implementation (Franchino 2006a: 299). Franchino 
therefore argues that delegation to EU bodies is a sort of second option of member 
states (2004: 276-80). This finding can at first appear paradoxical. Indeed at first 
glance it could be seen as member states delegating to themselves (Franchino 2001: 
191). However delegation from the Council to member state administrations is still 
understood as delegation because these are distinct entities. Franchino observes that 
if the Council is considered an EU institution (as it should) then the act of delegation 
is not void of substance but, on the contrary, constitutes an act of integration. In fact 
when the Council delegates to member state authorities it is always done through 
an EU act, which is legally binding upon member states and imposes a competence 
on the EU in that particular policy area. This indicates that member states have 
decided to cooperate and integrate in that particular area. 
 
Besides these commonalities, there are also differences in how authors 
understand and explain delegation. Moravcsik contends that in addition to being 
functional, delegation can be politically motivated. While he does not present a 
definition of the latter, it seems it serves legitimising and blame-shifting purposes 
for member state governments (Moravcsik 1993). This is echoed by Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet who suggest that one reason for delegation is avoiding “taking blame 
for unpopular policies” (2003: 3-4). Hawkins et al. define delegation as, 
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a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that 
empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former. This grant of 
authority is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the 
principal (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7).  
 
It is important to remember that this authority is made explicit in a legal text, which 
differentiates it from other aspects of the Commission’s involvement in EU affairs 
such as its informal agenda setting function (Pollack 2003b). The Commission may 
or may not exercise such powers, but the essential point is that it has a statutory 
authority to do so if it wishes. 
McNamara takes another approach in defining delegation as shaped by both 
rational and cultural factors (2003). She holds that the,  
 
basic premise of principal agent theory is that in certain instances, 
one actor (the principal) may gain from delegating power to 
another actor (the agent) if there is an expectation, first, that the 
agent’s subsequent actions will be aligned with the principals' 
preferences and, second, that moreover there is some advantage 
to moving policy capacity to the agent (2003: 43).  
 
While this characterisation of principal agent approaches in many respects includes 
some of the features already mentioned above, a more controversial aspect of 
McNamara’s definition emphasises the synchronisation of principal-agent 
preferences. However this undermines what Pollack described as the need for 
mechanisms of control, and, at a deeper level, the principal-agent model itself. In 
fact this model is based on the possibility that the principal and the agent might 
diverge in their opinions and preferences at some point in time. In such instances, 
the fact that the agent may sanction the principal for non-compliance with policy 
objectives can be the consequence of a deliberate institutional architecture that aims 
to insulate the agent. On the other hand, there is obviously the risk that the agent’s 
initiatives might fail to please the principals, and the model provides insights on 
how to address the potential for slippage on the part of the agent in favour of the 
principal. Theoretically the agent can be obliged by a statutory constraint to stick to 
a determined objective, as for instance is the case for the European Central Bank. 
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In line with this reasoning delegation to an agent, particularly in the case of multiple 
principals, allows the agent to monitor and, if needs be, sanction the principals for 
deviating from any pre-defined policy path. A divergence of preferences is implicit 
in such a scenario. 
 
Majone clarifies this latter point about insulation with reference to 'trustees'. 
Trustees should be established in those policy areas where political contestation is 
high and can adversely affect the policies carried out. Some authors emphasise that 
it is specific aspects of policy and not contestation that is behind higher delegation 
in those areas where stability favours economic investment and broader 
involvement of actors. However Wonka and Rittberger doubt a differentiation 
between economic and social areas is justified from the point of view of discretion 
being granted to an agent (Wonka and Rittberger 2010). Delegation to trustees 
should incorporate a shield from future political interventions precisely because the 
purpose of a trustee is to limit political interference and achieve Pareto efficient 
outcomes. Using this logic of delegation, the best option for principals is to choose 
agents “whose policy preferences differ systematically” from their own (Majone 
2001: 104). The greater the degree of discretion member states concede to an 
institution the greater the degree of commitment they show, which in turn implies 
cooperation (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003: 12). This logic of delegation contrasts 
with efficiency-based arguments, which has the purpose of reducing decision-
making costs given that one of the “key problems political principals face is 
bureaucratic drift” (Majone 2001: 103-04). In sum, principals should design agents 
and control mechanisms in different ways according to their needs. While Majone’s 
insights have the benefit of highlighting the difference between different forms of 
delegation, his idea that the two are empirically separated in normal EU affairs is 
less convincing. Indeed it is not entirely clear why EU primary legislation answers 
to a logic of credibility, while secondary legislation to one of efficiency.  
 
Principal-agent theories however tell a cautionary tale. It is possible to view 
this as a contemporary Machiavellian approach, in that the model suggests the 
Principe (mutatis mutandis, the principal) should assume that the agents is likely to 
act on the basis of their own preferences. Thatcher and Stone Sweet argue that 
“agents are likely to develop their own interests” (2003: 4) for a number of reasons: 
they want to “produce the best policies”; they are the subject of pressures from a 
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variety of actors such as lobby interests, NGOs and think tanks (Hix 2005: 27-31); 
or, they want to expand the remit of their competences (Franchino 2006a). When 
agents behave differently to how principals had anticipated, the latter incur “agency 
loss”. Principals have a number of control mechanisms they can adopt ex ante or ex 
post to re-direct policy towards their preferred goals (Pollack 2003b). 
 
However, principals face a dilemma relating to the effectiveness of their 
policy, as they are dependent on the agent’s capacity to carry out the mandated 
tasks. The more principals constrain agents in their actions, the more the 
achievement of these goals might be jeopardised. Minimal “discretion” must 
therefore be guaranteed, indeed this is the reason these actors are called 'agents' and 
not 'tools' (Dimitrakopoulos 2001: 112). Principals must get this measure of 
discretion right to avoid jeopardising their primary goal while also preventing loss 
of control. As this framework goes to great lengths to explain the design portion of 
policy and institutions, it is naturally inclined towards the kind of rationality 
assumptions the Frankfurt school termed “instrumental rationality” (Williams 1993: 
82-98). 
 
It is therefore fair to say that delegation is not solely about the conferral of 
power. It is also about the discretion with which that power is wielded. Discretion 
refers to the potential for agent participation in shaping a policy’s content, timing, 
duration, scope of action, or indeed any other aspect thereof. Discretion entails 
responsibilities, which in turn calls for accountability (Majone 2000: 290-98). In 
other words, the more discretion is granted to an agent the more questions about 
legitimacy are likely to arise. The academic literature has long focused on issues of 
accountability, legitimacy and transparency in EU migration policy (Christina 
Boswell 2010; Pollak and Slominski 2009). 
 
This rational-choice approach has nevertheless been the subject of criticisms 
on a number of fronts. Rosamond (2000: 115, 116) holds that these approaches tend 
“to define institutions as formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules that 
impose obligations upon self-interested political actors” (Rosamond 2000: 115,16). 
In such a framework, “preference formation” is “exogenous to the institutional 
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venue”26 and preferences are created and ordered through “self-interest”. 
Institutions are thus portrayed as constraints. Indeed, the principal function rational 
choice institutionalism attributes to institutions is a reduction of “‘transaction costs’ 
– those risks and penalties that arise when actors engage in negotiation with one 
another”. In other words institutions impinge on actors’ actions to reduce those 
costs, functioning hence as constraints. An obvious criticism of this evaluation is 
that institutions are presented as completely devoid of agency and appear only to 
serve as passive limitations on actors’ actions. The assumptions of rationality 
present in principal-agent models have direct consequences for their use in 
predicting empirical outcomes. Thatcher and Stone Sweet highlight that,  
 
stipulating the existence of sufficient functional demand to support 
and sustain a new non-majoritarian institution tells us nothing 
about how actors came to define problems in ways that pointed to 
delegation (2003: 6).  
 
In other words, the fact it might seem obvious that ex post functional rationales are 
behind the creation of or delegation to an institution does not in itself explain how 
actors decided this was the path to take. According to Kassim and Menon, the “ex 
post attribution of motives without empirical investigation” plagued principal-agent 
literature (2003: 127). 
 
 
 2.2. The independent variables 
 
Moravcsik holds that institutional choices like delegation are the “result of a cost-
benefit analysis” that weighs the “increased political risk of being outvoted or 
overruled on any individual issue” against the benefit of “more efficient collective 
decision-making” (1993: 509-10). While efficiency features prominently here, 
Moravcsik later goes on to emphasise an “explanation based on the need for 
credible commitments” (1999: 73). Three elements can “encourage national 
governments to support a movement from unanimity to delegated or pooled 
                                                          
26 There are obviously exceptions to this succinct presentation. A rational-choice institutionalist 
such as Franchino holds that actors' preferences are importantly shaped in a strategic game, 
which is played within these institutions and takes into account institutional decision rules. 
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decision-making”: (a) “The potential gains from cooperation”; (b) “The level of 
uncertainty regarding the details of specific delegated or pooled decisions” (not 
only present details, but also future consequences ensuing from these present 
decisions); and, (c) “The level of political risk for individual governments or 
interest groups with intense preferences” (Gilligan 2009; Moravcsik 1993: 510, 11; 
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999: 76). Pollack’s principal-agent analysis suggests 
that three determinants are likely to lead to delegation: “uncertainty”, “efficiency”, 
and “credibility” (Pollack 2003b: 6, 7, 10). These three factors should bring about 
delegation in the form of the four aforementioned functions: “monitoring 
compliance”; “solving problems of incomplete contracting among principals”; 
“adopting credible, expert regulations of economic activities in areas where the 
principals would be either ill-informed or biased”; and, “setting the legislative 
agenda” (Pollack 2003b: 6). Pollack finds support for the credible commitments 
rationale in delegation to the Commission, as it enjoys agenda setting, “monitoring, 
incomplete contracting, and regulatory functions” (Pollack 1997: 107). Whereas 
this is not so much the case for the expertise function, “EU supranational agents are 
thinly staffed”, and have “little scientific or technical expertise” (Pollack 2003b: 
10). Moravcsik also reaches this conclusion. 
As discussed later, an unfortunate feature of the academic literature on the 
determinants of delegation is that the use of these notions is extremely vague. It is 
indeed difficult to understand what “intangible” independent variables such as 
uncertainty or credibility of commitment actually mean (Pollack 2006: 172). 
Operational definitions are either absent or unsatisfactory. Thus the main goal of 
the following subsections is to bring some clarity to these concepts and identify 
testable definitions and hypotheses.  
 
To test the hypotheses identified below against related to the three rationales 
of uncertainty, credibility of commitments and efficiency, official documents from 
the Council, Commission, and EP are examined. Reports and policy papers by 
international organisations such as the OECD, IOM and UNHCR are analysed, as 
is secondary literature and press coverage. A similar approach is also taken to 
testing these hypotheses in relation to the institutional context, this time mainly 
examining official documents from the three main EU institutions. Elements such 
as the length of Council negotiations or the number and persistence of national 
delegations’ “reservations” (i.e. objections or vetoes) are likely indicators of 
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conflict within the Council (Aus 2008: 108). The same Council documents usually 
report the Commission’s representative opinions. These opinions, together with 
Commission and EP documents and media reports such as Agence Europe (Pollack 
2003b: 71), are examined to detect conflicts between Council and Commission. 
 
 
 2.2.1) The relevance of EU politics. Institutional conflicts and 
delegation 
 
While Moravcsik, Pollack, and Franchino agree that conflict between the Council 
and the Commission should lead to less delegation and discretion (Franchino 
2006b: 219), the last two authors diverge regarding the role of internal Council 
divisions. Conflict within the Council is interpreted variously throughout the 
literature, with some regarding it as a standalone factor while others consider it 
within the broader remit of EU studies, and others again see it as a necessary 
condition for delegation. 
Buonanno and Nugent argue that internal conflict is linked to credibility, as 
the more internal conflict the more likely it is that transposition and implementation 
problems will arise. Consequently member states interested in correctly managing 
and implementing a policy are likely to grant powers to the Commission. Nugent 
and Buonanno also spell out where delegation is likely in relation to transposition 
and implementation:   
 
transposition problems commonly occur in member states which: 
opposed or expressed strong reservation in the Council about a 
Directive; have existing legislation that is different from the 
content of a Directive; and have a weak legislative and/or 
administrative capacity (2013: 109).  
 
For Franchino conflict within the Council is necessary for delegation to the 
Commission to materialise. That is because conflict within the Council makes 
explicit the “lack of credibility of national implementation” (Franchino 2006a: 
299). In the absence of such conflict, the Council would prefer to delegate their 
national administrations (2006a: 292). Interestingly, Franchino holds that past 
delegation decisions towards national administrations that failed to attain their 
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objectives constitute an incentive for the Council to delegate to the Commission 
(Franchino 2006a: 293). While Franchino holds that in such events past delegation 
decisions simply “lack […] credibility”, it is not clear how Franchino views the 
relationship between this institutional factor and the credibility of commitment 
rationale. 
This argument is criticised by Pollack. At first he argues that credibility and 
conflict pertain to two different rationales (2003b: 34) and then, contrary to the 
previous discussion, he asserts that the higher the level of conflict within the 
Council the less likely it is that delegation will occur. This is because, in a principal-
agent analysis, high conflict between principals increases the costs of sanctioning a 
runaway agent (Pollack 2003b: 32). Pollack follows this by considering conflict 
between principals and agent. From this perspective, the more the Council and the 
Commission’s stances diverge the less delegation should occur. Again according to 
the principal-agent model, this divergence makes agency costs ever more likely 
(Pollack 2003b: 32-33). This view is also shared by both Franchino (2004) and 
Moravcsik (1999). However it is important to note that this runs contrary to 
Majone’s idea of a fiduciary principle wherein the more the credibility of a policy 
is at stake, the more delegation should occur. This is because it is the only guarantee 
that the policy will be managed under a less short-term political approach.  
 
Following these observations, two hypotheses emerge to be tested in relation 
to the institutions: 
 
H1 The more conflict within the Council, the more delegation to the 
Commission should be expected. 
H2 The more conflict between the Council and the Commission, the less 
delegation to the Commission should be expected. 
 
 
 2.2.2) Expert and reliable source of information and knowledge? 
Uncertainty contextualised 
  
Uncertainty broadly relates to the existing knowledge about something or the 
changing nature of an object27. The relationship between uncertainty and policy-
                                                          
27 These two features emerge from Oxford’s and Cambridge’s definitions of “uncertain” and 
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making is complex and multi-layered, and has long been the subject of debate in 
political science (Weber 2004). Most accounts deemed knowledge as valuable in an 
instrumental sense, i.e. it is required for a policy actor to have the necessary 
competence to produce effective and justified policy decisions (Hix 2005: 49, 57, 
66; Page 2010). Expert knowledge is also relevant to “legitimising” an actor and 
“substantiating” their policy decisions (Christina Boswell 2008). This latter point 
suggests an element of tension compared with more neutral accounts of knowledge 
and information, emphasising their potential uses rather than the technical or 
scientific nature of the expertise. 
 
There are various understandings of uncertainty in delegation studies. For 
Moravcsik broad political agreements among member states can have uncertain 
future consequences (1999: 74). Because of that instability, delegation could 
represent an answer for those politicians eager to secure the future of a given policy 
area (1999: 74). Moravcsik considers the hypothesis of delegation because of the 
“the need for centralised expertise and information” (1999: 69). In his terms, an 
informational explanation for delegation is based on a “technocratic governance” 
viewpoint of EU affairs (1999: 71, 73). He discards the idea of delegation occurring 
because of the Commission’s expertise, citing that a thinly staffed body such as the 
Commission cannot match the knowledge and expertise of national administrations 
(1999: 72). A second explanation connecting delegation with uncertainty is that the 
Commission is at the centre of networks of experts (1999: 72).  
According to Franchino, where the “link between policy and outcome” is 
uncertain28, “legislators face greater complexity and will have to gather more 
information to produce detailed legislation” (2004: 274). This need for information 
is therefore an incentive for delegating. However, Pollack cautions against such a 
deceptively simple hypothesis, holding that,  
 
[m]easuring the inherent uncertainty, or informational intensity, of 
an issue area is a difficult and contentious process since the actual 
complexity of an issue area is impossible to measure directly 
                                                          
“uncertainty” Anonymous, 'Oxford Advanced Learner's Encyclopedic Dictionary', in Jonathan 
Crowther (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 985, Anonymous, 'Cambridge 
Advanced Learner's Dictionary', in Elizabeth Walter (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at 1579-80. 
28 Franchino calls them “informationally intense” issue areas Fabio Franchino, 'Delegating Powers 
in the European Community', British Journal of Political Science, 34 (2004), 269–93.. 
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(2003b: 62-63).  
 
Pollack asserts that there is a relationship between uncertainty and delegation, and 
maintains that an operational definition of the latter is more difficult than commonly 
assumed. Indeed, he renounces this strategy because he sees all proxies created to 
capture 'complexity' or 'informational intensity' as dubious at best (Pollack 2003b: 
62-63). This is why he favours what the literature has traditionally defined as an 
arbitrary definition of complexity.29 Member states could have an incentive to 
delegate in cases where there is high uncertainty when “executive and judicial 
agents may solve problems of incomplete information (by providing policy-relevant 
information to legislators)” (Pollack 2003b: 6). According to Pollack, these are the 
cases where member states delegate because they want to rely on the expertise of 
agents. Indeed he identifies “the demand for policy-relevant expertise” as one of 
“the most important motivations for delegation and the most important 
determinants of agent discretion” (Pollack 2003, 28). 
 
Expertise is heavily connected with the supposed complexity of an issue or 
policy area (Wonka and Rittberger 2010). The more difficult it is to understand or 
analyse an issue (e.g. macroeconomic policy) or the more operationally complex 
policy-making is (e.g. how to deal with TCNs' integration), the more principals are 
likely to delegate to agents to ensure the policy is managed effectively. Expertise is 
not only part of the literature on delegation, but it also refers back to older schools 
of thought on EU integration. Neofunctionalists argues that one of the reasons for 
creating a supranational arena is because of the expertise found at the level 
(Rosamond 2000). Indeed this supranational level had to be constructed in such a 
way as to assure expertise and technical knowledge. The common practice of 
equating the supranational level with expertise has become so entrenched that it has 
been defined as “the common currency of politics in the European Union” (Geddes 
2014: 5; Kraler and Rogoz 2011: 24). In the context of trade policy, Zimmermann 
observes that information is a key “factor in establishing the autonomy of the 
Commission”, and it enables “it to pursue a strategy with relatively little 
interference from the Member States” (H. Zimmermann 2007: 821). 
                                                          
29 One of Franchino's criteria for measuring complexity is word count. However, and as also noted 
by Pollack, the degree to which a policy is detailed and long can be the expression of a number 
of things: the difficulty of reaching an agreement, the novelty of a policy issue, or the deliberate 
intention of keeping the wordings vague in order to satisfy some reluctant participants. 
56/326 
 
Accounts of the Commission's expertise are not always positive though. Hix 
states that the Commission “does not have a monopoly on information and 
expertise” (Hix 2005: 68) while Franchino highlights that the selection procedure 
for the Commission staff favours officials with “generalist” knowledge. EU 
agencies present a more problematic case. Past research shows that the Commission 
can initiate loose cooperation on an issue, and then propose institutionalisation of 
that cooperation through an agency (Christina Boswell 2008). And the simple fact 
of its existing working relationships with these bodies strengthens the 
Commission’s image of expertise (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). On the other hand, 
the creation of such agencies could suggest that the Commission did not have 
sufficient expertise in a given policy area. Another element to be considered is the 
presence of ever rising numbers of Seconded National Experts within the 
Commission. Their presence is intended to provide the Commission with insider 
views of national administrations and to provide much needed expertise in given 
areas (Trondal 2008). That being said, there is little common agreement in political 
science on what constitutes 'expertise' (Page 2010: 258-59). 
 
Another view of uncertainty highlights the limited use of knowledge and 
information. It is maintained that agents work as providers of reliable information 
and little else. In a complex multi-layered structure such as the EU, the question of 
who provides information to whom is essential for to the working of the entire 
system. This is a key factor in any account based on transaction costs, wherein an 
agent (here the Commission) is charged with providing reliable and regular 
information to all actors involved (Hix 2005: 66).30 The need for information is 
further strengthened in the EU context by the different and constantly evolving 
legislative frameworks of member states. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that 
the legislative competences now held by the EU do not deprive member states of 
policy action at national level. In other words member states have not stopped 
legislating since the EU became competent in this area. This does however 
complicate the interplay between EU and national legislation, making timely 
communications and information essential (Wonka and Rittberger 2010). A 
minimalist perspective of this element would frame the Commission as little more 
                                                          
30 Overall negotiating costs for political actors are lowered in terms of search for information and 
production of knowledge (and possibly legislative proposals) on that basis. 
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than a Secretariat, in line with other International Organisations where information 
is gathered and passed on to key players (i.e. member state governments) (Hawkins 
et al. 2006). Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning move in this direction in claiming 
that,  
 
institutions help states reach a collectively superior outcome by 
[…] by providing the necessary information to reduce the states' 
uncertainty about each other's preferences and behaviour (2009: 
72).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, other scholars have argued that the 
Commission has gained an unparalleled view of individual governments' positions 
and the state of affairs regarding the policies covered by the EU31 precisely because 
of this position (H. Zimmermann 2007). Nugent has, for instance, argued that due 
to the Commission’s ubiquitous presence at all stages of EU policy-making and its 
cumulated expertise, “the Council and the EP may have to bow on 
technical/information grounds” (2001: 11, 13). Broadly speaking the academic 
literature is replete with images of the Commission “at the centre of a network of 
knowledge”, which “gives the individuals working in it an advantage to be weighed 
against the advantages of other players” (Rosamond 2000: 146).  
Arising from these minimalist and maximalist approaches, it is possible to 
discern two additional hypotheses: 
 
H3 The more policy-makers look for expertise in given policy domains, the 
more delegation to the Commission is likely. 
H4 The more cooperation in a policy area is dependent on communication 
or information sharing (or hampered by a lack thereof), the more 
delegation to the Commission is likely. 
 
H4 is connected with the fact that the Commission has historically been regarded as 
the place where information is sought, stored, shared among EU institutions and 
with the broader public. Pollack argues that, due to the fact that “the empirical world 
                                                          
31 In the context of Comitology, Hix believes that the “Commission must have very good 
information about the opinions of every national expert on every committee” Simon Hix, The 
Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 2005) at 57.. 
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is inherently uncertain”, in order to enact effective policies “legislators face 
constant demands for policy-relevant information about the state of the world 
(2003b: 29). It is therefore necessary to ask whether the need for centralised 
information management is the reason for delegation in the EU. Moravcsik 
highlights how commentators have argued that policy-making (e.g. “modern 
economic planning”) is “a highly complex activity requiring considerable technical 
and legal information”, and that such information is “most efficiently provided by 
a single centralised authority” (1999). In other words, “the collective-action 
problem facing governments is one of coordinating the production of information” 
(Moravcsik 1999). 
 
If reliance on an expert actor is one way to ensure the reduction of uncertainty, 
a second is to ensure that reliable information is regularly provided and accessible 
to all. If this task seems to downgrade the Commission's role in the EU architecture 
to a simple Secretariat, it is nonetheless an essential component of the EU 
machinery. This is a key recommendation of principal-agent analysis in cases of 
multiple principals, as is the case with the EU. By constraining the agent through 
requirements to report constantly to principals, informational asymmetries can be 
reduced not only between agents and principals, but also between principals 
themselves. Indeed information circulation is the basis of monitoring and 
sanctioning, two functions usually associated with credibility of commitments (see 
the next subsection). EU law usually requires member states to communicate 
relevant policy information to the Commission. This is the basis of the 
Commission’s role in monitoring member states’ actions, and enables it to carry out 
what Pollack terms “decentralised sanctioning” (2003b: 22). Monar admits that the 
constant reporting activity can “serve as an instrument of ‘collective discipline’” 
but, in a constructivist-informed remark, he adds that reporting also contributes “to 
a common perception of problems and needs for action through common situation 
assessments” (2011: 128). However, the reporting requirement present in secondary 
legislation fails to create this sort of constant and regular channel of information as 
reporting happens at discrete intervals, generally over four to five years. In addition, 
reporting fails to provide the form of proactivity that is the hallmark of discretion 
for the agent-Commission (at least for this dissertation). Reporting can of course be 
political in content. Nevertheless, the reporting requirement fails to register even a 
modicum of discretion, a feature identified in the literature as an essential ingredient 
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for delegation because of uncertainty. 
 
Past principal-agent studies also highlight the degree to which uncertainty and 
efficiency overlap. The accepted wisdom of this body of research is that principals 
are more likely to delegate on informationally intense policy areas for two reasons: 
first, as agents are deemed to be expert in the field, principals can be sure that policy 
choices will be effective and efficient; secondly, by delegating in informationally 
intense issue areas, principals can save resources which can be redeployed to other 
uses (Franchino 2004: 279). These reasons are tested separately here under two 
independent variables, the former under 'uncertainty' and the latter under 'efficiency 
and effectiveness'. Regarding uncertainty, the objective of the qualitative analysis 
is to assess whether and to what extent informational needs were expressed by 
policy actors, and whether and to what extent knowledge gaps are identified. 
 
 
 2.2.3) The essence of EU’s exceptionalism or pragmatic necessity? 
The credibility of commitments 
 
Scholars have connected delegation to the risk of policy deadlock or defection by 
present day or future governments (both political successors and other member state 
governments) (Coen and Thatcher 2008: 52; Hawkins et al. 2006: 16-21; Moravcsik 
1999: 3-4; Pollack 2007a: 14). The academic literature generally refers to these as 
“time-consistency” problems (Franchino 2006a; Majone 2001). Franchino lists 
them as “a mismatch between long- and short-term incentives, turnover in political 
personnel (i.e. the lack of political property rights) and ex-post incentives for 
unilateral noncompliance [defection]”, which as a consequence “may substantially 
undermine policy objectives and the value of legislation” (Franchino 2006a: 187). 
The idea is that member states acknowledge policy problems at a given time (‘T’), 
agree on how to solve them or at least some common guiding principles, and 
subsequently create common policies for that purpose. However member states 
realise that in order to make those policies work another policy actor should be 
empowered to fulfil certain necessary functions - e.g. proposing, monitoring and 
implementation -, and consequently they delegate to that body. It is widely 
recognised that Art. 211 TEC32 grants such powers to the Commission through 
                                                          
32 Now Art. 17 in the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on European Union).  
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primary EU legislation (Majone 2001; Pollack 2003b: 83-84). Thus at T+1, member 
states receive policy recommendations, are subject to monitoring and are sanctioned 
should they diverge from the policy path chosen at time T. In a broad sense, this is 
nothing new. For example, it was common practice among Italian Comuni to invite 
a third 'neutral' party to manage and administer a city during the middle ages 
(Artifoni 2008: 375-80). 
 
EU member states undertake broad, general commitments attached to the EU 
as a collective undertaking, which are usually stated in the Treaties, But can be also 
the result of CJEU jurisprudence (Majone 2001). However they also undertake 
specific commitments of various forms. European Council statements can help to 
identify a political agreement for a given policy. Among the general commitments 
made by member states in the context of the EU, solidarity is a key principle. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 1, third indent, TEU) states that the task of the Union 
“shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, 
relations between the Member States and between their peoples”. A commitment to 
solidarity has also been crystallised as a general principle of EU law through CJEU 
jurisprudence (Barbou Des Place 2002: 13). Burden-sharing is a form of solidarity 
wherein “costs of common initiatives or the provision of public goods33 should be 
shared between states” (Thielemann 2003: 253, 56-57). Solidarity can be seen as a 
“motivation for burden sharing” when it is a “commitment to other members of a 
group to abide by the outcome of their collective decision-making” (Thielemann 
2003: 257). The Council committed to solidarity as early as 1998 in implementing 
the Amsterdam provisions. On that occasion, it stated that the,  
 
principle of solidarity among Member States and between them and 
the European institutions, should apply in facing the transnational 
challenges presented by organised crime and migration movements 
(Council 1998: 11). 
 
As with uncertainty, credibility of commitments is an extremely vague notion. 
                                                          
33 “Public goods constitute a major class of collaboration dilemmas. When states can benefit from a 
good (such as clean environment) whether or not they contribute to its provision, the classic free 
rider problem arise and, in the absence of centralised provision, the outcome is likely to be sub-
optimal” (Hawkins et al. 2006: 16; see also Caviedes 2004: 291). 
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Looking at the literature, Moravcsik holds that the “credible commitments” 
rationale is the only one capable of explaining the gradual empowerment of EU 
institutions when compared with ideological and technocratic reasons for 
delegation (1999: 73-77). Pollack however sees no explicit link between the 
rationales for delegation and the four functions he expects will be delegated to the 
Commission. He suggests that monitoring and satisfying incomplete contracts 
should qualify under the credibility of commitments rationale, but links are not as 
pronounced for agenda setting and regulatory powers (2003b: 65). That said Pollack 
also acknowledges that “such delegation [of those functions] obliviously includes 
an informational component” (2003b: 65). Finally, he leaves the reader in the 
uncertain position “of recognizing a demand for credible commitment when we see 
it” (Pollack 2003b: 64). In sum, past studies do not help in generalising about the 
connection between individual instances of delegation and the rationales Pollack 
singles out. This is one of the reasons the quantitative analysis of delegation in 
Chapter 3 is accompanied by qualitative investigations in Chapters 4 to 7. 
 
In principal-agent dynamics it is reasonable to expect that, in areas where 
confidence crises have emerged among governments in the past, principals would 
delegate to a third party to pre-empt the potential re-emergence of this dynamic. 
While the importance of previous crises is recognised in the literature, and “a 
demand for delegating substantial discretion to independent agents” is somehow 
suggested, past scholarly efforts have “not specified clear criteria for identifying 
what sorts of issues are likely to create a ‘credibility crisis’ for legislators” (Pollack 
2003b: 64). That being said it is reasonable to expect that if governments have not 
previously lived up to their commitments in a given policy area (T-1), they should 
engineer suitable institutional mechanisms to prevent possible defections when that 
policy domain is re-negotiated (T).  
 
Difficulties are likely to arise in maintaining the credibility of commitments 
when the cost of agreements disproportionally impacts some principals (Hawkins 
et al. 2006: 21; Pollack 2003b: 30). Moravcsik held that “high conflict” related to 
“distributional” issues are not likely to result in delegation (1999). However, it must 
be noted that he was mainly referring to delegation in primary legislation. The 
peculiarity of delegation in secondary legislation is that it emerges on a substrate of 
political agreement, at least in principle. While zero delegation is surely an option, 
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complete withdrawal from already established patterns of cooperation is less likely. 
For instance, once a policy area is included in the Treaties member states can be 
encouraged by a Commission proposal to take action. However the more member 
state practices diverge before an agreement is reached on a given issue, the more 
likely defection is (Buonanno and Nugent 2013: 109; Thatcher 2002: 132). The 
simple idea behind this is, the higher the costs associated with implementation of a 
policy the higher the likelihood of reneging on a promise. To prevent this, member 
states have the option to lock themselves into a stated set of policy goals under the 
monitoring of a third party (e.g. Thatcher 2002: 132; Hawkins et al. 2006: 21-22).  
 
The following hypotheses therefore emerge regarding credibility of 
commitments: 
 
H5 In a context of previously established commitments, the more 
imbalances are present in the distribution of the relative costs and 
benefits, the more powers are likely to be conferred on the Commission 
to either propose solutions or monitor the policy implementation so that 
imbalances are dealt with. 
H6 The more crises of confidence have affected cooperation in the past, the 
more likely it is that powers are allocated to the Commission. 
 
In addition to generally being identified as the executive branch in the EU, agenda 
setting is the reason the Commission has legislative powers (Majone 2008: 228, 31-
32). The academic literature understands agenda setting in a variety of ways. 
Agenda is the “set of issues that receive serious attention in a polity”, and the 
“political agenda” consists of the issues “that receive attention from decision-
makers” (Princen and Rhinard 2006: 1120). In the EU context, authors have 
highlighted that because of a lack of political leadership (Nugent 2001) and because 
of the numerous policy actors involved in policy-making at different levels and to 
varying degrees (from interest groups, to social actors, to various experts in the 
institutionally organised committee), “agenda-setting [is] substantially easier than 
in most other settings” (Peters 2001: 79). Others are more concerned with how 
policy items are framed as a means of understanding the likelihood of their making 
it through the decision-making phases, or gauging the extent to which they are able 
to shape final policy outcomes (Peters 2001: 80). Focusing as it does on delegation, 
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this thesis neither frames the agenda setting function of the Commission as 
consisting of informally wielded powers nor managing to drive the content of a 
policy (Princen and Rhinard 2006). Instead for the purposes of this dissertation, 
agenda setting is the statutory obligation for any legislative proposal to stem from 
the Commission. This is the distinction that Pollack draws between formal and 
informal agenda setting (2003b: 47-49). 
Agenda setting strengthens the credibility of commitments by granting 
exclusive powers to propose or modify a policy to a third party. That body is 
empowered to determine whether existing legislation: is effective in tackling a 
policy issue; impinges disproportionally on some member states; requires updating; 
or indeed that new legislation is necessary to deal with a previous political mandate 
provided by the principals. The ability to amend legislation is obviously not entirely 
lost to principals but, at least in the EU context, doing so incurs the significant cost 
of re-contracting the entire agent mandate with the Commission. In a context where 
any legislator (or principal) has the right to express his or her view, an “endless 
series of proposals” can arise for any reason ranging from slowing down the process 
to disagreement to retaliation (Pollack 1997: 102-06). In such cases, it is sensible 
to delegate agenda setting powers to the Commission. While this supports the 
efficiency rationale behind agenda setting, i.e. there are clear time and resource-
saving benefits to delegating this function to the Commission, this also reinforces 
the credibility of commitments in a deeper sense. Indeed once the power of proposal 
becomes the agent’s prerogative and no longer rests with principals, the latter group 
depends on the agent to initiate and deal with the content of the proposal. Principals 
can then negotiate and amend the proposal, even substantially so, but it is the agent 
that sets the terms of the debate. Remarkably the EU Treaties further strengthen the 
Commission’s position by making it difficult for the Council to alter a Commission 
proposal in the context of QMV, the Council may only do so under unanimity rules. 
Principals can however make their voices heard informally before the agent 
presents a proposal, thus shaping its substance. Yet the point is that the agent has 
the statutory right to ignore or welcome suggestions coming from principals, and 
this the essence of discretion.  
 
In practice, agenda setting takes many forms in the legal text of secondary 
legislation. In the majority of cases a provision is present at the end of the legal text 
that grants the Commission the power of proposing amendments, which is defined 
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by the Commission as “a standard provision of Community law” (Commission 
2004d: 21). These provisions are always nested in clauses that tie them to evaluation 
reports of entire measures. Therefore, the Commission is empowered to propose 
modifications to existing legislation to the extent that the evidence suggests such 
changes are needed. The kind of expertise and knowledge that this reporting 
involves is limited as it deals exclusively with implementation of a given policy, 
and ex post, meaning it is intended that the Commission develop it over a number 
of years (usually specified in the legal clause). As a result it seems more appropriate 
to understand these provisions as instances of agenda setting, rather than 
uncertainty. This is not to say that the Commission will not become “expert” in a 
given number of years. Rather it highlights that at the time when the measure is 
adopted, member states are not interested in the expertise of the Commission. 
 
These observations on agenda setting lead to the contentious issue of 
Comitology.34 This dissertation includes Comitology provisions both as delegation 
to, as well as constraints upon the Commission. In all its forms, Comitology 
appoints the Commission as the agenda setter: a representative of the Commission 
always chairs the meetings and the Commission is a key player in proposing, 
withdrawing and adopting the measures at stake (Blom-Hansen 2008; Dehousse 
2003; Hix 2005: 52-58; Moury and Héritier 2012; Nugent 2006: 176-80). Scholars 
have also argued that Comitology could be seen as a problem-solving device 
(Pollack 2003a). Even in its most restrictive form, the regulatory procedure35, the 
initiative starts with the Commission. The Committee must use weighted votes, i.e. 
the same rules governing Council votes, and the Commission can adopt the measure 
only if it is in accordance with the determination of the Committee. Although the 
role of member states is more decisive in this procedure than in others36, the 
Commission still preserves its formal agenda setting powers. 
                                                          
34 The majority of legislation adopted in this area is covered by the Comitology rules adopted in 
1999 European Union, '1999/468/Ec: Council Decision of 28 June 1999 Laying Down the  
Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the  Commission', (Brussels, 
1999).. In July 2006 new Comitology rules entered into force European Union, '2006/512/Ec: 
Council  Decision of  17 July 2006  Amending Decision 1999/468/Ec Laying Down the  
Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the  Commission', (Brussels, 
2006b)..  
35 A regulatory procedure with scrutiny was added in 2006 to involve the EP in decision-making 
European Union, '2006/512/Ec: Council  Decision of  17 July 2006  Amending Decision 
1999/468/Ec Laying Down the  Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred 
on the  Commission',  at Art. 5a.. 
36 The Commission's power dwindles as the procedure becomes restrictive (i.e. from Advisory to 
Regulatory Procedure). 
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Comitology has traditionally been regarded as a key control mechanism 
through which member states can oversee and, if needs be, rein in the Commission’s 
implementation of a policy. Principal-agent studies have long discussed control 
mechanisms (Pollack 2003: 19), either in the form of fire alarm or patrolling. While 
the majority of studies focus on the control mechanisms that member states impose 
on the Commission, the monitoring functions imply that the latter could also avail 
itself of fire alarm or patrolling mechanisms (Hix 2005).  
 
In a Directive that sets only minimum standards, patrolling by the 
Commission can wind up being overtly onerous. Member states can be afforded 
varying degrees of freedom in the adoption of legislative measures, legal text can 
be full of exceptions or can be non-specific, or measures can entail the adoption of 
rules by a number of actors (e.g. reception facilities for asylum seekers). Patrolling 
then becomes impossible. This is a clear limitation for a sparsely staffed body such 
as the Commission, where resources have to be administered parsimoniously 
(Nugent 2006)37. The only option in such cases is to oblige member state 
administrations to notify the Commission of their decisions (in the context of 
implementation of an EU measure), so that the latter is made aware of events and 
can, if needs be, investigate further. Patrolling is easier in relation to Decisions and 
Regulations. These measures frequently entail some form of mechanism that 
directly involves the Commission or where member state discretion is low to non-
existent. In other words, the study of delegation must also take account of the type 
of legislative measures involved. 
 
There is more than a degree of confusion caused by the conceptual 
overlapping between what some authors term “uncertainty” and credibility of 
commitments. As previously discussed, uncertainty is at times understood as a lack 
of clear knowledge about what the future developments of a given policy area might 
be. This is the definition employed by Moravcsik (Moravcsik 1999: 73-77), while 
Wonka and Rittberger are more specific on this calling it political uncertainty (Elgie 
and McMenamin 2005; Wonka and Rittberger 2010). In such situations, policy 
                                                          
37 The Commission has the power to carry out infringement procedures in cases of member state 
non-compliance. However a high-ranking Commission official (Director) stated that the 
Commission is not keen on carrying out infringement procedures because, inter alia: they are 
resource consuming; long and therefore ineffective; and politically costly for the Commission 
(ODYSSEUS, Brussels conference, Friday 15 July 2011). 
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actors may choose to lock both themselves and their political successor into a 
particular set of policy goals under the authority of an institution. This is nothing 
new in EU politics, nor is it exclusive to migration policy. For instance, one of the 
motivations behind the German-backed proposal to establish a European IMF in 
2010 was to put in place an instrument that could reduce future uncertainty by 
establishing common rules (Atkins 2010). From a delegation standpoint, it could be 
said that what happens between policy actors after this uncertainty is acknowledged 
is what is important here. This highlights that the credibility of commitments is 
really what is at stake. In other words, member states delegate because they want 
to secure a given policy area, either because they fear what their political successors 
will do when in government or because they fear the consequences of an 
unregulated and unpredictable policy area. Thus even if the objective of delegation 
can be regarded as a reduction of uncertainty, the underpinning idea is again one of 
credibility of commitments faced with potential responses to political and or social 
changes. The idea is therefore to establish institutions that can cope with unforeseen 
consequences of an agreement or unpredictable future events (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 72). 
 
 
 2.2.4) More than a semantic quarrel: effectiveness and efficiency 
 
There is more than a degree of confusion concerning the relationship between 
efficiency and delegation in the academic literature. This seems to be due in no 
small part to a confusing use of the term efficiency, which is not a semantic trifle 
(Czaika and de Haas 2011: 6; Majone 2011: 19). Pasquino usefully distinguishes 
between efficacy and efficiency (Pasquino 2004: 267), seeing efficacy (or 
effectiveness) as “the ability of a given policy to achieve the stated goals”, and 
efficiency as the ability to achieve that goal at the lowest possible cost38. 
In this study, effectiveness, as a rationale for delegation, is connected to 
previous policy failures at either national or EU level. Consequently, if 
                                                          
38 Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary definition of “efficiency” is “when someone or 
something uses time and energy well, without wasting any”Anonymous, 'Cambridge Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary'.. Oxford for “efficiency” is “the state of quality of being efficient”, which 
in turn means “achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense” 
Anonymous, 'Oxford Advanced Learner's Encyclopedic Dictionary'.. “Efficacy”, on the other 
hand, is defined by Oxford as “the ability to produce a desired or intended result”, and by 
Cambridge as “an ability, especially of […] a method of achieving something, to produce the 
intended result; effectiveness”.  
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effectiveness is indeed a trigger for delegation, the Commission should be 
empowered to adjust a policy in response to its evident failures. The main 
determinants of delegation for Stetter are not the improvements of policy output but 
the need to address “previous regulatory failures” (Stetter 2000). In other words 
delegation is not about efficiency, but rather is about achieving the stated goals. 
Monar holds that the entire area of AFSJ has been progressively ‘communitarised’ 
because of the “undeniable lack of effectiveness of the alternatives” (Monar 2011: 
130). Majone points to the internal reconfiguration of the Commission as a 
consequence of regulatory failures in the BSE crisis (2000: 282, 99). Hix reinforces 
this point by making a direct comparison between the Single Market initiative and 
migration policy. He asserts that,  
 
the issue facing governments in the area of migration policies in 
the mid 1990s was similar to the issue they had faced market 
regulation policies in the mid-1980s: there was a growing public 
and elite perception of regulatory failure, and the easiest way of 
tackling this crisis was to delegate agenda-setting to an independent 
agent (Hix 2005: 365).  
 
Freeman questions whether some policy areas are more prone to failures. In a 
dismissive tone, he suggests that “gaps between intentions and outcomes are 
common in all areas of public policies and are not necessarily signs of failures” 
(Freeman 2006: 639). On the other hand, Castles offers an account of the reasons 
failures have been such a prominent feature of much migration policy so far. He 
proposes that there is a mismatch between short-term policies and the nature of the 
migration process as “a long-term social process with its own dynamics” (Castles 
2004). Thus the reason migration policy is frequently assumed to be failing is that 
the root causes of migration are related to “factors on which migration policies have 
little or no influence” (Czaika and De Haas 2013: 487). Some authors have 
emphasized the importance of avoiding assessments of policy failures based on 
“discursive gaps”, that is to say the gap between the level of discourse among 
politicians and the actual policies (Czaika and De Haas 2013: 496). Castles has also 
described a “bureaucratic belief” that well-designed policies can actually regulate 
migrant “admission and residence effectively shap[ing] aggregate behaviour”, 
managing migration to such an extent that its flows can “be turned on and off like 
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a tap by appropriate policy settings (Castles 2004: 208). The focus on previous 
failures also speaks to an older debate regarding migration and globalisation 
(Koslowski 1998; Sassen 1998). The idea being that states are unable to deal with 
new aspects of globalisation, from global financial markets to international 
migration, and are increasingly losing control as the main actors on the world stage. 
In this latter perspective, policy failures hence represent the epiphenomena of a 
deeper trend.  
 
Efficiency entails a perceived gain in terms of increased productivity, or relief 
of administrative or management burdens (Franchino 2002: 685). As argued by 
Franchino, that is why delegation so often takes the form of operational 
management by the Commission (2002). Pollack cites efficiency as an 
“unexpected” outcome of his analysis, which he connects to “a desire to reduce the 
workload of the Council and to increase the speed and efficiency of 
implementation” (2006: 189). This makes sense if account is taken of the “painfully 
slow” nature of the EU legislative process, where reaching agreement in the Council 
and the EP can take a considerable amount of time (Pollack 2006: 189). Pollack 
refers to efficiency in relation to agricultural and fisheries policy, where “speed and 
efficiency of decision-making” was the main concern of policy-makers (Pollack 
2003b: 10). Moravcsik considers that the prospect of “potential gains from 
cooperation” should be a determinant of delegation, where governments take a 
forward glance at how they want a particular policy area to look like (1993: 510). 
Gains can be as varied as: electoral gains (due to Moravcsik’s constant focus on 
domestic politics); enhanced legitimacy (offered by the “international venue”); 
quicker and more timely decisions; overcoming “previous failures to reach 
agreements”; the desire or need for implementation of what has already been 
agreed; and, shifts in national preferences (Moravcsik 1993: 510). It is clear that 
Moravcsik makes no distinction between effectiveness and efficiency. Interestingly, 
Franchino notes that delegation motivated by efficiency is a sort of default 
condition. He argues that when all other possible reasons for delegation have been 
ruled out, the only one still standing is grounded in “a reduction in workload” 
(Franchino 2002: 685). Franchino argues that principals should ponder on the 
“specific policy objectives” and ask themselves: “had this power not been conferred 
upon the Commission, would the objectives of this act be compromised?” (2002: 
681). 
69/326 
 
Two further hypotheses arise from this literature: 
 
H7 The more failure encountered in a policy area, at the national and or 
European level, the more likely member states are to delegate to the 
Commission. 
H8 The more principals are likely to gain from a reduction in workload and 
the saving of time and resources, the more delegation should be 
expected. 
 
Effectiveness and efficiency partially overlap with credibility of 
commitments and uncertainty. Regarding credibility of commitments, secondary 
legislation usually provides ways of addressing evident policy failures after 
adoption. This is usually provided for by means of a reporting requirement, often 
coupled with the possibility of tabling a proposal to amend the existing policy. This 
is a prudent method of handling unforeseen problems and addressing them through 
evidence-based policy responses. Reporting is also a safe way for principals to 
control and anticipate what their agent can propose later. In Majone's words, 
“principals cannot be presented with a fait accompli” (2000: 294). Interviews with 
Commission officials indicated that member states usually interpret indications of 
incorrect transposition, as furnished by the Commission, as a signal for possible 
infringement procedures (Interview 2). Having said that, Franchino does not 
consider a reporting function as sufficient to qualify as delegation, as it does not 
afford the Commission the power to change policy. More than that, he considers 
reporting requirements as a constraint imposed on the Commission. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, it is the potential for setting the direction of policy that 
is really at stake in these reporting-an-amending clauses, thus it was decided to 
interpret them39 as constituting agenda setting rather than effectiveness. It is 
therefore included under the credibility of commitments. 
 
Turning to uncertainty, issues of efficiency are at times connected with 
informational needs. In this sense delegation occurs because principals wish to 
acquire more information about a given issue, as well as about other member states 
                                                          
39 When coupled with the possibility of proposing amendments or modifications. In the absence of 
that, simple reporting is considered a constraint on the Commission.  
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participating in the negotiation. In principal-agent analyses, the role of the agent is 
to facilitate this flow of information towards and between principals and to provide 
up-to-date and reliable information about the issue at hand. It must however be 
noted that this does not imply any legislative or executive powers for agents in 
carrying out these tasks. This informational function affects the objective of 
reducing uncertainty in a collateral sense, as the information provided should 
illuminate both the decisional environment and the policy issue. As such the 
interpretation of efficiency blurs considerably with that of uncertainty. To address 
this, it has been decided that informational factors will be separated in this study by 
keeping them under the heading of uncertainty. 
 
Delegation based on efficiency assumes that the Commission differs little 
from a Secretariat in an International Organisation, albeit with perhaps more tasks 
and responsibilities. Such a perspective dismisses the notion of the Commission as 
a supranational agent capable of shaping, or at least contributing to, the overall 
direction of the EU political project (Pollack 2003b: 22). This reading of delegation 
is shared with reasons for delegation based on asymmetric information, as discussed 
in the uncertainty section. On the other hand, the regulatory failure explanation 
points to delegation as a higher order solution for unresolved problems, 
emphasising how the EU has become an essential policy arena for member states. 
Nevertheless the efficiency dimension should not go underestimated. While this 
chapter has striven to steer clear of any reference to migration, one example is 
particularly illustrative here. Migration entered the public policy and opinion 
domains of individual member states at different times. For southern European 
countries in the 1990s and eastern ones in the 2000s, relying on the EU for policy 
inputs and platforms and a number of managerial and operational tasks, meant 
unloading of great administrative costs. At the turn of the millennium, migration 
policy begun to rely extremely on new technologies, large IT systems, and 
expensive control mechanisms and policy choices (Broeders and Hampshire 2013; 
Freeman 2006: 639). Collective Community undertakings, where a number of 
actors foot the financial and administrative costs of such measures, are surely the 
source of major relief for many actors.  
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 2.3. Concluding remarks 
 
This review of delegation theory provides an indication of the main factors driving 
delegation in EU institutional contexts, i.e. the need for reduced uncertainty, the 
willingness to strengthen credibility, and the quest for efficiency. These initial 
factors are termed ‘rationales’ because they are related to the policy area in question. 
The other two factors identified here concern the dynamics both within the Council, 
which is the key legislative actor during much of the period analysed here, and 
between the Council and the Commission. While the first four of these factors 
encourage further delegation, the last is inversely related thereto. That is the more 
conflict present between the Commission and the Council, the less delegation 
should be expected. The following table summarises the hypotheses identified in 
the foregoing discussion. 
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2
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Table 2.1. Independent variables and hypotheses 
Independent 
variables 
Hypotheses Key elements 
Institutional 
contexts 
H1 The more conflict within the Council, the more delegation to the Commission 
should be expected. 
 
H2 The more conflict between the Council and the Commission, the less delegation 
to the Commission should be expected. 
Divergent preferences within the Council. 
Divergent preferences between the 
Council and the Commission.  
Uncertainty 
H3 The more policy-makers look for expertise in given policy domains, the more 
delegation to the Commission is likely. 
 
H4 The more cooperation in a policy area is dependent on communication or 
information sharing (or hampered by a lack thereof), the more delegation to the 
Commission is likely. 
Problems of knowledge → expertise. 
 
Problems of information sharing, 
collection and processing → Commission 
as secretariat (IR). 
Credibility of 
commitments 
H5 In a context of previously established commitments, the more imbalances are 
present in the distribution of the relative costs and benefits, the more powers are 
likely to be conferred on the Commission to either propose solutions or monitor the 
policy implementation so that imbalances are dealt with. 
 
H6 The more crises of confidence have affected cooperation in the past, the more 
likely it is that powers are allocated to the Commission. 
Allocation of costs (burdens). Were there 
any imbalances among member states in 
the way a given phenomenon affected 
them? 
 
Past crises: Have there been any crises of 
confidence in this policy area? 
Efficiency and 
effectiveness 
H7 The more failure encountered in a policy area, at the national and or European 
level, the more likely member states are to delegate to the Commission. 
 
H8 The more principals are likely to gain from a reduction in workload and the 
saving of time and resources, the more delegation should be expected. 
Policy failures at the national and/or EU 
level. 
 
Saving time and resources → 
Commission as secretariat (IR). 
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Problems concerning knowledge and information are considered when 
investigating reasons connected with uncertainty, this is both in terms of provision 
of expertise and the availability of a source of reliable and regular information 
within the EU framework. When investigating credibility, past crises and 
disproportionate costs are indicators of possible defection or implementation 
problems. Finally, efficiency and effectiveness are respectively likely to result from 
member state wishes to unburden themselves of administrative and operational 
duties, and past national or European policy failures. 
 
The study of delegation aims at grasping the singularity of the EU project by 
explaining its unique level of institutionalisation, and also offers a fine-grained 
analysis of where integration occurs and why. By considering a number of possible 
determinants for delegation, it may also be useful in explaining the unevenness of 
integration in EU affairs, a phenomenon that has been increasing in prominence 
since Amsterdam at the very least, when “flexibility” became a buzzword within 
the EU. On the other hand, the study of delegation as developed so far suffers as 
the result of a number of assumptions. It pays little attention to the burgeoning soft 
policy methods emerging in EU affairs. Due to its exclusive reliance on legal texts, 
it is ill suited for more informal governance approaches. Finally, principal-agent 
analyses in particular feature deeply embedded assumptions about actors and 
rationality. Actors are understood as unitary, mainly for parsimonious reasons, 
hence internal divisions, such as those seen within governments, are unaccounted 
for. Logics of consequences prevail, as the model is about calculations that 
principals and agents are presumed to have made in order to explain a given 
institutional setting. As a consequence, sociological and constructivists insights that 
have emerged in recent years to explain EU integration and policy outcomes are left 
unanswered.  
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3. Quantitative analysis of delegation in EU 
secondary legislation 
 
 
This chapter analyses secondary legislation on migration enacted between May 
1999 and November 2009. A preliminary point to note is that, as a result of the 
methodological limitations of quantitative analysis highlighted in this chapter, 
adding qualitative analyses serves an important control function in addition to being 
essential for a more in-depth investigation of the reasons behind delegation. In other 
words while this chapter mainly concentrates on the dependent variable, i.e. 
delegation, the ensuing chapters setting out the qualitative analysis primarily 
concentrate on the independent variables put forward in Chapter 2, i.e. conflict 
within the Council and between the Council and the Commission, reducing 
uncertainty, strengthening credibility of commitments, and achieving efficiency.  
Secondary legislation is analysed using existing templates drawn from 
academic literature. The objective is to chart delegation along the lines of several 
migration categories, measure its magnitude, and provide a first tentative account 
of the reasons behind findings. This chapter first specifies the selection criteria for 
the set of legislative measures present in the sample. Secondly, it clarifies the 
methodology for the coding criteria. Thirdly, it displays the relevant empirical 
findings of this investigation. Fourthly, a brief section discusses the results. The 
fifth section concludes.  
 
 
 3.1. The selection criteria and the set of legislative acts 
 
The first selection criterion for secondary legislation is its legal basis. In the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, the articles on migration are included in Title IV on “[v]isas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons” (Articles 61 
to 69 (TEC)). Although the Treaty of Nice “made some modest changes” to certain 
aspects of decision-making, it did not modify the separation of migration categories 
into Treaty articles (Peers 2006: 222-25). This dissertation looks at three forms of 
legislative instruments within this aquis, Regulations, Directives and Decisions. 
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According to EU law, these are the only forms of secondary legislation with a 
binding legal force40 (Chalmers et al. 2010: 98-100).  
In addition to secondary legislation stemming directly from the Treaty articles 
that define migration, it became increasingly clear during the research that it was 
also necessary to include secondary legislation originating with other TEC articles, 
as in the case the Migration Statistics Regulation. Migration is explicitly cited as a 
primary objective of these measures, for example the Regulation establishing a 
financial instrument for development that directly repeals and addresses past 
migration-related legislation. Because of this complex selection the assignment of 
migration 'categories' (see below) has turned out to be more difficult than expected. 
This is discussed below. 
A further issue emerged during the selection process concerning secondary 
legislation with a limited geographical validity. An example of legislation with an 
explicitly limited geographical scope would be visa agreements with China or 
Moldova. These are Decisions or Regulations concerning narrow areas of policy 
such as local border traffic. The coding methodology is ill equipped to deal with the 
structure of the legal texts of these measures. 
A number of different sources have been consulted in selecting and collecting 
relevant legislation. First the Commission publishes the legislative measures 
adopted in each field (borders, asylum, etc.), which has aided the selection process 
(Commission). Secondly, there is now a vast body of academic literature on EU 
migration law and policy, which has been used to confirm the selection of measures 
(Hailbronner 2010; Papagianni 2006; Peers 2011).  
 
As a consequence of this selection process, secondary legislation has been 
grouped into five broad migration categories in this dissertation: legal migration; 
administrative cooperation; irregular migration; asylum and refuge; and borders and 
visas. In the main these categories match Treaty articles or their subparagraphs. 
Having categories that closely match Treaty articles forms part of the coding models 
developed in previous delegation studies (Franchino 2004; Pollack 2003b). In 
addition, such a choice allows this dissertation to speak to migration studies that 
frequently group policies under similar labels (Christina Boswell and Geddes 
2011).  
                                                          
40 The two other typologies, i.e. Recommendations and Opinions, have no binding force. 
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Difficulties arose in assigning certain pieces of legislation to migration 
categories. This was, in the main, either because the legislation in question came 
from outside Title IV or because the measure was too general or originated from 
several articles. In these cases legislative measures were assigned to the closest 
relevant categories, which to a certain extent highlights the arbitrary nature of the 
categories chosen. The explicit objective of the legislative measure was the first 
criterion used to categorise such legislation. For instance, the Migration Statistics 
Regulation was assigned in this way. This Regulation does not originate from Title 
IV articles but was categorised under 'administrative cooperation' together with 
several other legislative acts from the same Article. The fact that this measure does 
not refer to any specific type of migration is what motivated this decision. Rather it 
is a measure that, due to the encompassing nature of its objectives and its technical 
focus, is best categorised as concerning administrative cooperation in EU migration 
policy. In some cases however the objective was broader than or only partially 
related to migration, an example of which is the Development Cooperation 
Regulation dealing with migration within the broader context of development 
policy.  
 
At this point it is important to highlight that the 'categories' denote different 
administrative practices within member states and the EU41. In other words, any 
decision on the selection criteria is arbitrary in the sense that it does not correspond 
to any ontological differences within migration as a social phenomenon (Geddes 
2008: 20-21). Indeed one can rightly argue that a number of EU level migration 
policy initiatives have aimed at establishing a basic consensus on what those 
categories mean (e.g. Asylum Qualification Directive).  
 
Further complicating this choice, Treaty articles can be governed by different 
decision-making procedures. This creates problems when trying to understand how, 
if at all, decision-making affects delegation and discretion. The sections below each 
deal with different migration categories and discuss the likely effect on decision 
making on delegation and discretion. Turning now to the legislation in question, the 
most relevant features of the set are examined. 
                                                          
41 On this issue, see also the remarks in Chapter 1.4. 
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Table 3.1. Legislative acts adopted by policy sector (1999-2009) 
  
With implementing measures Without implementing 
measures 
 Reg Dir Dec Tot Reg Dir Dec Tot 
Asylum 4 4 5 13 2 4 3 9 
Visas and Borders 22 0 19 41 21 0 2 23 
Irregular migration 1 8 6 15 1 8 3 12 
Administrative 2 0 5 7 2 0 5 7 
Legal 3 8 2 13 3 8 1 12 
Total  32 20 37 89 29 20 14 63 
Source: author’s own compilation from EurLex, Peers (2011). 
Note: Reg = Regulations; Dir = Directives; Dec = Decisions; Tot = Total. 
 
The left-hand section of Table 3.1 includes implementing measures and shows 
the extent to which member states and EU institutions have concentrated their 
legislative efforts on borders and visas. This sub-set is the most conspicuous one, 
totalling 41 legislative measures. It is also interesting to note that this is the only 
policy sub-set where Directives are absent. A first potential inference that could be 
drawn from this, which requires confirmation through the qualitative chapters to 
come, is that this is due to the different legal nature of Directives and Regulations. 
According to EU law, Directives are binding only with regard to their objectives 
and individual member states are free to determine how those objectives are 
achieved, whereas Regulations are binding in their entirety (Chalmers et al. 2010: 
98-99). The predominance of Regulations in this policy area can therefore be taken 
as an indication of member states’ intentions to eliminate or limit member states’ 
discretion in how policy is implemented. Another interesting feature is the 
frequency of Decisions in the borders and visas area. This is due to the number of 
implementing measures stemming from the Regulations adopted. In other words 
the Regulations left a number of details to be determined by the Commission under 
Comitology procedures, which in turn generated an abundance of Decisions. Indeed 
if all implementing Decisions are eliminated from this area (right-side section), this 
would result in an area with 23 legislative measures adopted, the majority of which 
being Regulations.  
Legislators' efforts seem to have been distributed much more evenly across 
the other three sectors of EU migration policy. The academic literature suggests that 
legal migration is the most underdeveloped policy area of EU migration policy 
(Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011). However that interpretation is only partially 
corroborated by the actual figures of legislative output broken down by sectors, 
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which in fact shows similar figures to those on asylum and refugee policy.   
 
While all three forms of binding legislative acts have been adopted, Decisions 
are the most prominent if implementing measures are counted. As noted earlier this 
is mainly because EU border and visa law required many implementing acts, 
particularly to apply the complex Schengen acquis which only entered the EU legal 
framework with Amsterdam. Decisions on borders and visas account for more than 
half of all Decisions listed in the left frame. Whereas in the right-hand frame the 
distribution of legal acts is more even with Regulations in this case accounting for 
more than a third of the total.  
 
 
 3.2. Coding criteria 
 
Franchino elaborates a list of provisions42 could be counted as delegation that if 
present in secondary legislation. It has to be remembered that  Franchino’s research 
design only considers “powers and constraints on executive action that are above 
and beyond those specified in the treaty” (2004: 293). Examples of delegation are, 
 
[…] the right to issue implementing regulations or directives or to take 
decisions with some discretion; imposition of fines and penalties; carrying 
out  negotiations with third countries; extension of discretionary authority to 
new issues or economic sectors; carrying out inspections or conducting 
investigations or inquiries (only if they complement other powers such as 
those to take decisions or to impose penalties); request of information (only 
if it complements powers to take decisions, to carry out investigations, to tax 
or to impose penalties); the authorization of or the right to take measures that 
may alter the policy; the right to grant derogations and exemptions; 
transposition of provisions of directives with some discretion; extension of 
policy authority that member states would have otherwise relinquished as a 
result of adopting the measure at hand; designation of authorities and 
institutions (Franchino 2004: 293).  
                                                          
42 Pollack and Franchino define as “provisions” articles and numbered paragraphs. However, there 
are exceptions regarding subparagraphs and indents Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of Integration 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003b) at 430-32.. 
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Franchino spells out what constitutes delegation on the basis of efficiency in 
another contribution to delegation literature,: “Computation and fixing of refunds”; 
“Specification of legal terms and Terminology”; “Adoption of rules, particulars, 
criteria, conditions and provisions of implementation”; and “Operative 
management of some measures” (2002: 682). The only modification made to 
Franchino's list in this dissertation is to include “agenda setting” measures as 
delegation, as per Pollack's argument. Franchino's account focuses on capturing the 
executive side of the Commission. Pollack's approach on the contrary, is to identify 
all the powers that characterise the Commission. An important example of how this 
“agenda setting” power is expressed in secondary legislation is the power to revise 
and propose amendments to existing legislation (generally within a given period). 
This is one of the most common clauses present in secondary legislation but is not 
universal, it is not for example present in the Carrier Sanctions Directive. Although, 
at the theoretical level, the Commission could have proposed a modification of the 
Directive43, it has not done so to date. 
 
Both Pollack and Franchino codify control mechanisms as “constraints” in 
secondary legislation. It is important to properly account for these elements because 
it allows understanding of the “discretion” left to agents within a principal-agent 
model. The primary aim of control mechanisms is to “mitigate […] the 
informational asymmetries [through monitoring]” and to “constrain or shape the 
incentives of the agents [through positive or negative sanctioning]” (Pollack 2003b: 
27). Pollack lists twelve procedural constraints on the Commission’s action,  
 
time limits; spending limits; reporting requirements; consultation 
requirements44; public hearings; rule-making requirements; 
appeals procedures; exemptions for individuals or classes of 
individuals; requirement for explicit legislative approval; the 
possibility of legislative overrule; a requirement for approval by an 
executive body; the possibility of overrule by an executive body 
(Pollack 2003b: 99, 430).  
                                                          
43 It is within its treaty powers.  
44 Including the 'advisory committee' procedure in Comitology Franchino, 'Delegating Powers in 
the European Community',  (at 293b.. 
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There are some problematic aspects to this operationalisation though. It was 
shown in the previous chapter that Comitology provisions, while constraining the 
Commission's activities to varying degrees, nevertheless offer the Commission a 
potential to shape debate by granting it the power of proposal. Another problem 
regards the notifications requirements. These are assumed to act exclusively as a 
constraint on the Commission's action. However this picture fails to represent 
adequately the essential function notifications have in keeping the EU project 
afloat. Notifications requirements flow in both directions from member states to the 
Commission and vice versa. Continuous reporting and compulsory exchange of 
information forms the basis of the Commission’s monitoring function. For instance, 
a failure to notify of the transposition of a Directive into national law constitutes 
the first alarm bell for the Commission. Notifications are also important in assessing 
the impact on the ground of EU policies as member states are required to submit 
statistics and figures to the Commission on the application of certain measures. That 
said these notifications do not provide the Commission with explicit powers to 
shape the direction of a given policy, thus they fail to meet Franchino’s stringent 
criteria for delegation (Franchino 2004). The Commission can however use this sort 
of information in its reports and use those reports to suggest changes to existing 
policies. In many cases, information obtained through notifications provides the 
essential building blocks of the Commission’s knowledge, as it does not have the 
resources to carry out large surveys and inspections. Yet it was decided to stick to a 
parsimonious account of delegation so that the findings of this thesis could be 
compared with those of previous studies. 
Notifications in this sense provide the opportunity to clarify some aspect of 
the choice of dependent variable. The Commission can create common readings 
and frameworks for given phenomena using information gathered through these 
notification requirements and other instruments such as commissioned studies, 
reports, and conferences,, but these can always be discarded by the Council and EP 
who are the ultimate decision-makers on such matters. For instance, the 
Commission released two studies, six Communications and one report between 
2000 and 2004 dealing, to varying degrees, with labour migration. However, the 
actual impact of all those efforts in terms of legislation remained limited at best. 
While these initiatives could have contribute to create a consensus and start a debate 
at the EU level on these issues, this dissertation on the other hand proposes to look 
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at delegation  as an instance of integration. It further examines whether and to what 
extent cooperation among member states indicates a willingness to integrate by 
recording the instances where powers to act on and shape policy were conceded to 
the Commission. 
 
On the mechanics of the coding, the 'delegation ratio' (dr) captures the power 
that a piece of secondary legislation confers on the Commission. It consists of the 
ratio between the number of provisions delegating some forms of power to the 
Commission and the total number of provisions present in the legal text. On the 
other hand, the 'constraint ratio' (cr) indicates the extent to which the Commission's 
action is limited. This is worked out by assigning the constraints present in the legal 
text to one of the 12 possible constraints listed above. Finally, the 'discretion index' 
(di) captures the Commission's room for manoeuvre once its powers and constraints 
are taken into account. This is calculated as the delegation ratio minus the 
delegation ratio multiplied by the constraint ratio (di = dr – (dr*cr)). The closer the 
constraint ratio is to the number 1 the lower the discretion index is as all types of 
constraint are present in a legislation. In this dissertation, quantitative analyses of 
delegation limits itself to descriptive statistics of delegation. Moreover, the 
independent variables are not suitable to be treated quantitatively, which rules out 
the possibility of employing inferential statistical methods. In effect, Pollack’s 
study was also limited to descriptive statistics of the distribution of delegation with 
respect to its independent variables (2003b).  
 
This explanation of how the delegation ratio and discretion index are 
calculated leads us to a discussion of the methodological difficulties that emerged 
during the coding. Coding long legislative measures tends to result in an 
underestimation of the delegation ratio and consequently the discretion index. For 
simple mathematical reasons these two indicators are susceptible to be skewed in 
cases in which there are high numbers of provisions in legislative text. This calls 
for a supplementary qualitative analysis to further investigate the nature of 
delegation in those texts. In Pollack's words, although the,  
 
delegation measure is highly sensitive to the total number of 
provisions in each chapter (that is, the denominator) it provides a 
good first-cut measure of delegation” (2003b: 92).  
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A further element deserving consideration relates to aggregation issues. 
Calculated as it is on the basis of single legislative measures, previous studies have 
extended this coding method to policy areas identified according to treaty headings 
(Pollack 2003b). This was conducted on the basis of a varying number of measures 
pertaining to those areas, from one for regional policy to thirty-six for free 
movement of persons (Franchino 2006a: 82). This dissertation employs a more 
systematic approach. As the entire policy area of migration is covered, it not only 
provides aggregate findings but also allows for a more in-depth investigation of 
differing values between measures. In other words, this work takes a policy 
perspective, analysing the main findings and rationales in sub-policy areas such as 
borders and visas and asylum, and also takes a results-oriented perspective. The 
main aim of which is to match the predominant drivers (Council division, 
Council/Commission conflict, uncertainty, credibility, efficiency/effectiveness) to 
each degree of delegation (high, medium, and low45). 
 
 
 3.3. Analysis of the results: policy-area analysis 
 
This section analyses the results of coding within each of the migration categories 
set out in the previous section. As previously discussed, the objective of these 
subsections is not to provide a full account of delegation and discretion in these 
policy sub-sectors but rather to map and describe where delegation occurs. On a 
methodological note, all tables below present aggregate results in two versions, one 
with and one without implementing measures. Implementing measures tend to skew 
the aggregate results, as most do not feature any delegating provisions. In other 
words, they tend only to add to the denominator of the averages but not to the 
numerator. Therefore, the final discussion on aggregates excludes implementing 
measures. 
 
  
                                                          
45 See below for this categorisation.  
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 3.3.1) Policy-area analysis: asylum and refugee 
 
Table 3.2. Delegation in asylum and refugee law 
Legislation A46 B47 C48 D49 E50 F51 
Commission Decision 2008/22/EC 
implementation of Decision 
573/2007/EC establishing the 
European Refugee Fund 
136 5 4 0.037 0.333 0.025 
Commission Decision 2007/815/EC 
adoption of strategic guidelines  
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council and EP Decision 
2007/573/EC establishing a European 
Refugee Fund 
193 38 5 0.197 0.417 0.115 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC on 
procedures for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status 
169 7 4 0.041 0.333 0.028 
Council Decision 2004/904/EC 
establishing a European Refugee 
Fund 
86 20 6 0.233 0.500 0.116 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on 
minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third 
country nationals as refugees 
99 2 3 0.020 0.250 0.015 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
1560/2003 for the application of 
Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 
DUBLIN II 
62 2 1 0.032 0.083 0.003 
Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 
establishing criteria for determining 
the Member State responsible 
(DUBLIN II) 
95 11 3 0.116 0.250 0.087 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying 
down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers 
87 1 1 0.011 0.083 0.011 
Council Regulation (EC) 407/2002 
laying down rules to implement 
'Eurodac' Regulation 2725/2000 for 
fingerprints (DUBLIN II) 
15 9 3 0.600 0.250 0.450 
Council Directive 2001/55 on 
temporary protection in case of mass 
influx of migrants 
76 4 2 0.053 0.167 0.044 
Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for 
comparison of fingerprints for Dublin 
115 9 4 0.078 0.333 0.052 
Council Decision 2000/596/EC 
establishing a European Refugee 
Fund 
63 19 6 0.302 0.500 0.151 
Aggregate results *1198 *127 **3.23 **0.132 **0.269 **0.084 
Aggregate results (no implementing) *983 *111 **3.78 **0.117 **0.315 **0.069 
Notes: *Total and **averages 
 
Past delegation studies have generally employed two measurements, the delegation 
                                                          
46 Number of provisions 
47 Number of delegating provisions 
48 Constraints 
49 Delegation ratio 
50 Constraint ratio 
51 Discretion index 
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ratio and discretion index (Franchino 2004; Pollack 2003b). The table above shows 
a medium value for the aggregate delegation ratio (13.2 percent), but low discretion 
(8.4 percent). If the outlier of the Eurodac implementing Regulation is taken out of 
this category, the aggregate delegation ratio is 11.7 percent and the aggregate 
discretion index is 6.9 percent. Looking to the academic literature, one of the most 
common observations on this migration category is that it has, at least until well 
into the 2000s, been an intergovernmental and lowest-common denominator policy 
sector (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 152)52. These quantitative findings 
confirm that reading, as only five out of the thirteen legislative measures feature 
delegation and discretion in double digits.  
 
The average constraint ratio in the asylum and refugees field (13 legislative 
measures) is 26.9 percent (31.5 percent without implementing measures), almost 
twice that of borders and visas. This would suggest that member states kept the 
Commission under close surveillance and accompanied delegation with a number 
of control mechanisms. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some authors believe 
that principals can delegate to an agent in order to secure the principals’ credibility 
of commitments from future political interventions in a given policy area, this is 
known as the locking-in thesis. This is even more likely in politically sensitive areas 
(Majone 2001). It is not however what happened in the highly sensitive area of 
asylum policy. The relatively high average constraint ratio, as compared against the 
other policy areas analysed here, indicates that member states did not write any 
blank cheques. In other words, Majone’s prediction of an insulated agent in cases 
where credibility is at stake is qualified by the high constraint ratio. One can say 
that principals have nonetheless found a way to shape future policy without having 
to concede powers to a third party. Nevertheless the idea of strengthening the 
credibility of commitments by delegating to a third party does not find any 
confirmation here. Efficiency may however explain this finding, as a central 
management authority was needed for the workability of these measures. Having 
said that it is difficult to assess the relative importance of the three determinants in 
any meaningful way without a supporting qualitative analysis. This is undertaken 
in the following chapters. 
                                                          
52 For a different opinion, see Dauvergne Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What 
Globalisation Means for Migration and Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 
146.. 
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Turning to the legislative measures in question, burden-sharing efforts in the 
form of the three European Refugee Funds and the presence of reallocation 
mechanisms (Eurodac and Dublin) have contributed significantly to the delegation 
ratio and discretion index. In terms of the independent variables, the willingness to 
credibly commit to a policy seems to be the most powerful determinant. The 
Eurodac Regulation displays a delegation ratio of 60 percent and a discretion index 
of 45 per cent. This Regulation illustrates the methodological problem mentioned 
in the previous section. This short legislative measure made up of only a few 
provisions, many of them conferring delegation, results in a high delegation ratio. 
Finally, the Dublin Regulation displays a medium delegation ratio. These results 
contrast with the low delegation in other headline-grabbing legislative measures 
belonging to this set (see next paragraph). Discretion in the Dublin Regulation is 
indeed slightly above average for this policy area. However, closer inspection 
reveals that Comitology procedures for this Directive were the strictest available at 
the time, i.e. regulatory procedure. 
Having said that, the measures that were fundamental to creating a “common 
European asylum policy”53 and that most captured commentators’ attention – 
namely, the Temporary Protection, the Asylum Reception, the Asylum 
Qualification, and the Asylum Procedure Directive - featured almost no delegation 
and discretion. The Commission is granted few if any powers in these measures and 
the discretion in exercising those powers is negligible. This finding may be relevant 
for the previous literature on delegation (Franchino 2006a). Such literature may 
accidentally skewed its coding results by selecting only the most important 
legislative measures in given policy areas. The case of asylum policy reveals that 
those dubbed as the most important legislative pieces not always are also those 
displaying significant delegation and discretion.   
 
Asylum and refugee policy has been among the policy sectors where 
decision-making was most fragmented where time taken to develop delegation and 
discretion is concerned. In Art. 63(1) and 63(2)(a) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
asylum and refugee policy was covered by a five-year “transitional period” during 
                                                          
53 Indeed, the treaty of Nice introduced a new article that stated that once the measures establishing 
minimum standards were achieved, the voting rule in the Council in this policy area could change 
from unanimity to QMV. 
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which the Council was supposed to adopt “[c]ommunity legislation defining the 
common rules and basic principles governing these issues” in accordance with a 
special procedure. Once that condition was fulfilled the subsequent legislative 
measures were to be adopted under what was then termed the co-decision 
procedure. Art. 63(2)(b), promoting a balanced effort among member states in 
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced 
persons, was not covered under the five-year “transitional period” but was 
eventually grouped measures which, as of 1 January 2005, were covered by Art. 
251 TEC. According to Franchino (2006a) delegation and discretion should 
increase following the introduction of QMV. However, unlike the policy area of 
irregular migration, the majority of measures featuring significant delegation and 
discretion took place before this change in decision-making (3 out of 4 before 
2005). On the other hand, it is also true that the majority of legislative measures 
were produced in the first period before 2005 (9 out of 13). Autrement dit, the shift 
from consensus to QMV does not seem to be connected to the level of delegation 
and discretion in the given legislative acts.  
 
 
  
87/326 
 3.3.2) Policy-area analysis: Irregular migration 
 
Table 3.3. Delegation in irregular migration law 
Legislation A B C D E F 
Council and EP Directive 2009/52/EC 
on minimum standards against 
employers of illegally staying third-
country nationals 
48 1 2 0.021 0.167 0.017 
Council and EP Directive 2008/115/EC 
on common standards and procedures 
in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals 
84 1 1 0.012 0.083 0.011 
Commission Decision 2008/458/EC 
implementing Decision 575/2007/EC 
on the European Return Fund 
118 5 4 0.042 0.333 0.028 
Commission Decision 2007/837/EC 
implementing Decision  575/2007/EC 
adoption of the strategic guidelines 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Decision 575/2007/EC of the EP and 
Council establishing the European 
Return Fund for the period 2008 to 
2013 
195 48 6 0.246 0.500 0.123 
Commission Decision 2005/687/EC on 
the format for the report on the 
activities of immigration liaison 
officers networks 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Decision 2004/573/EC on the 
organisation of joint flights for 
removals of third country nationals 
10 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the 
obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data 
19 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Directive 2004/81/EC 
residence permit for victims of 
trafficking 
49 1 2 0.020 0.167 0.017 
Council Decision 2004/191/EC setting 
out the criteria and practical 
arrangements for the compensation of 
the financial imbalances on expulsions 
18 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Regulation (EC) 377/2004 on 
the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network 
21 2 3 0.095 0.250 0.071 
Council Directive 2003/110/EC on 
assistance in cases of transit for the 
purposes of removal by air 
37 1 2 0.027 0.167 0.023 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining 
the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence 
10 0 1 0.000 0.083 0.000 
Council Directive 2001/51/EC 
supplementing the provisions of Article 
26 of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen 
12 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the 
mutual recognition of decisions on the 
expulsion of third country nationals 
20 1 1 0.050 0.083 0.05 
Aggregate results *645 *60 **1.47 **0.034 **0.122 **0.022 
Aggregate results (no implementing) *523 *55 **1.5 **0.039 **0.125 **0.026 
Note: *Total and **averages 
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Irregular migration contains 18 legislative measures with an aggregate delegation 
ratio of 4.3 percent (low) and a discretion index of 3 percent (low). Excluding 
implementation measures does not cause the average delegation ratio and discretion 
index to change much, 4.9 and 3.4 percent respectively. In aggregate terms, this set 
of legislation shows the lowest levels of delegation and discretion of all those 
examined here. The only exception to these low levels of delegation and discretion 
is the European Return Fund Decision that covers the period 2008 to 2013, which 
displays 24.6 and 12.3 percent in the delegation ratio and discretion index 
respectively. The most likely grounds for such results are efficiency, i.e. operational 
management of the Fund, and credibility, to address imbalances related to presence 
and inflows of irregular migrants. 
 
The irregular migration policy area appears to be particularly suitable for 
controlling the veracity of the blame-shifting rationale for delegation (Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2003: 3). Past academic studies have used this type of explanation in 
the case of EU agencies such as Frontex (Rijpma 2010), or for Directives 
concerning labour migration and family reunification and asylum-policy (Christina 
Boswell and Geddes 2011; Menz 2011). The basic idea behind this example is that 
member states engineered these agencies or policies, at least in part, so that citizens 
would direct their complaints and opposition against them rather than national 
politicians. Member states could have been encouraged to do this because of the 
combined effect of two factors. First, irregular migration has been portrayed as a 
threat to social cohesion or the European model of the welfare state (Bigo 2004: 74-
78; de Haas 2009; Mitsilegas 2004: 29). And secondly, this is a policy area with a 
history of past policy failures (Castles 2004). 
The Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data 
and the Employer Sanction Directive are two likely examples of delegation being 
useful from the point of view member state governments. Providing the 
Commission with more powers to control, monitor and sanction in these areas was 
useful for governments wishing to shift responsibility towards the Commission. 
Hypothetically, were the Commission to receive more delegated authority in these 
areas, carriers, businesses and enterprises would have had to direct complaints on 
administrative burdens, expenses and possibly sanctions to the Commission and not 
their respective national governments. Additionally, such measures could have led 
the broader public to think that problems in managing irregular migration was partly 
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related to shortcomings in the Commission's management. None of the above has 
happened, indeed little if any powers have been granted to the Commission in any 
of these measures. This both relates to monitoring member state governments and 
administrations (on top of Treaty powers), and also concerns the issues at stake in 
the broadest sense possible (e.g. employers, or carriers). In other words, the 
Commission has virtually no powers vis-à-vis member states in the text of the two 
Directives. Consequently the blame-shifting hypothesis finds little confirmation in 
this policy area.  
 
If decision-making affected delegation the most noteworthy shift in this 
policy area should have been expected right after the January 2005 switch to QMV 
in the Council54. This hypothesis finds support in the data, where the only measure 
with high delegation and medium discretion occurs after 2005. However, this 
supporting evidence is too light a basis on which to either confirm or reject this 
interpretation. 
 
 
  
                                                          
54 European Union, '2004/927/Ec: Council  Decision of 22 December 2004 Providing for Certain 
Areas Covered by  Title Iv of Part Three of the Treaty Establishing the European Community  to 
Be Governed by the Procedure Laid Down in Article 251 of That Treaty', (Brussels, 2004a) at 
art. 1(2). 
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 3.3.3) Policy-area analysis: Legal migration 
 
Table 3.4. Delegation in legal migration law 
Legislation A B C D E F 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC on 
conditions of entry ad residence for 
highly qualified employment 
96 1 3 0.010 0.250 0.008 
Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 
amending Regulation (EC) No 
1030/2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits 
17 2 1 0.117 0.083 0.107 
Commission Decision 2008/457/EC 
implementing Decision 575/2007/EC 
on the European Integration Fund 
129 5 4 0.039 0.333 0.026 
Council Decision 2007/435/EC 
establishing a European Integration 
Fund 
172 49 6 0.285 0.500 0.142 
Council Directive 2005/71 procedure 
for admitting third-country national 
for the purpose of scientific research 
51 1 1 0.020 0.083 0.018 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the 
conditions of admission for studies, 
pupil exchange, training  
44 1 1 0.023 0.083 0.021 
Council and EP Directive 2004/38 
right of EU citizens and their family to 
move and reside 
137 1 3 0.007 0.250 0.005 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC third 
country nationals long term resident 
104 1 2 0.010 0.167 0.008 
Council Directive 2003/86 on the right 
to family reunification 
78 1 2 0.013 0.167 0.011 
Council Regulation (EC) 859/2003 
nationals of third countries who are 
not already covered by those 
provisions 
9 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Regulation (EC) 1030.2002 
laying down a uniform format for 
residence permits for third-country 
nationals 
20 3 1 0.150 0.083 0.138 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC 
establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and 
occupation 
45 1 2 0.022 0.167 0.019 
Council Directive 2000/43/EC 
implementing the principle of equal 
treatment racial or ethnic origin 
33 1 2 0.030 0.167 0.025 
Aggregate results *935 *67 **2.154 **0.056 **0.179 **0.041 
Aggregate results (no implementing) *806 *62 **2 **0.057 **0.167 **0.042 
Note: *Total and **averages 
 
Measures pertaining to a variety of areas have been included in this category. Legal 
migration is made up of all measure related to labour migration, family 
reunification, study or training, researchers, integration and long-term residents. 
The two 2000 Directives on equal treatment are based on Art. 13 TEC. Aggregate 
results for delegation and discretion are slightly higher than for irregular migration, 
but are still low. On the contrary, average constraint is higher than irregular 
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migration, signalling tighter control by the Council than in the case of irregular 
migration.  
Similar to the results recorded for irregular migration, there are two particular 
measures worth focusing on in the area of legal migration, the Integration Fund 
Decision and Residence Permit Regulation. The former measure displays 28.5 and 
14.2 percent in delegation and discretion respectively, while the latter 15 and 23.8 
percent in the parameters. Delegation and discretion are however almost 
undetectable in the rest of the legislative acts of this set. Again, similar to findings 
in relation to asylum policy, the legislative acts that have received the greatest levels 
of attention in the academic literature display little if any powers granted to the 
Commission (Cerna 2013; Menz 2011; Ruffer 2011). This has led some 
commentators to argue that this area is the most underdeveloped in EU migration 
policy (Geddes 2008: 134). While most commentators have pointed to the lack of 
common interests in developing this policy area, this thesis tests in Chapter 6 the 
absence of grounds for delegation as a means of explaining low results in this area.  
 
Unanimity was employed for all measures adopted under Art. 63(3)(a) until 
Lisbon. Therefore, contrary to all other sub-sectors, it is not possible to compare 
different periods marked by shifts in decision-making. Unanimity has not affected 
the legislative output though, as the number of measures adopted is in line with 
asylum policy.  
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 3.3.4) Policy-area analysis: Administrative measures 
 
Table 3.5. Delegation in administrative law 
Legislation A B C D E F 
Council Decision 2008/381/EC establishing 
a European Migration Network 
47 10 4 0.213 0.333 0.142 
Regulation (EC) 862/2007 of the EP and the 
Council on Community statistics 
43 4 4 0.093 0.333 0.062 
Regulation (EC) 1905/2006 establishing a 
financing instrument for development 
cooperation 
155 27 6 0.174 0.500 0.087 
Council Decision 2006/688 mutual 
information mechanism on asylum and 
immigration measures 
24 6 5 0.250 0.417 0.146 
Council Decision 2005/267 establishing a 
secure web-based information and 
coordination network of migration 
management services 
19 5 3 0.263 0.25 0.197 
Council Decision 2004.867.EC amending 
Decision 2002.463.EC ARGO programme 
5 2 1 0.400 0.083 0.367 
Council Decision 2002/463/EC adopting an 
action programme for administrative 
cooperation ARGO 
32 7 4 0.219 0.333 0.146 
Aggregate results *325 *61 **3.86 **0.23 **0.32 **0.16 
Aggregate results (no implementing) *325 *61 **3.86 **0.23 **0.32 **0.16 
Note: *Total and **averages 
 
Five measures in this sub-set originate from Art. 66 on administrative cooperation 
in the area of migration. Two of these measures are about the funding cooperation 
on migration issues without sectorial differentiation (ARGO Decisions55), and four 
are about knowledge and information in the three dimensions of production, sharing 
and dissemination (e.g. the EMN Decision, the Decision on mutual information 
mechanism). That is why they were considered in this category. The other measures 
in this set such as the Migration Statistics Regulation and Development Cooperation 
Fund stem from a number of other Treaty articles. Aggregate levels for both the 
delegation ratio and discretion index are the highest in the data set. 
The Secure Web-Based Information and Co-ordination Network Decision 
features 26.3 percent delegation ratio and 19.7 percent discretion index. This is an 
executive measure that confers a variety of administrative and management tasks 
on the Commission in addition to a good deal of discretion in managing them. The 
Mutual Information Mechanism Decision displays a delegation ratio of 37.5 percent 
and discretion index 21.9 percent. Almost exclusively related to irregular migration, 
                                                          
55 The "ARGO programme" is a “Community action programme […] to support and complement 
the actions undertaken by the Community and the Member States in the implementation of 
Community legislation founded on Articles 62, 63 and 66 of the Treaty” (ARGO Decision, Art. 
1). 
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the legal basis of this Decision is nonetheless Art. 66. Always related to a possible 
uncertainty rationale, the EMN Decision shows high delegation and discretion, 
respectively at 21.3 and 14.2 percent. This Decision provides for coordination 
between national and European authorities, and experts in the field of migration. 
The ARGO Decision features 21.9 percent and 14.6 percent in delegation and 
discretion respectively, while its amending Decision features 40 percent and 36.7 
percent respectively. ARGO was an all-embracing programme, funding projects 
from borders to asylum and from visas to immigration. The Development 
Cooperation Regulation has been included in the data set because, on top of 
repealing past legislative acts in the field of migration, it features a number of 
articles exclusively dedicated to migration-related measures. It is also generally 
guided by the viewpoint that migration and development are inextricably linked. 
The latter feature was the result of a long-term re-framing of development and 
migration issues, which is also supported by the Global Approach to Migration that 
emerged in 2005 (Commission 2005c). 
 
Art. 66 was governed under unanimity until 1 May 2004, after which it fell 
under QMV. The switch corresponds to a change in legislative output, with 2 
measures adopted before that date and 3 after), but there is no significant difference 
in terms of delegation and discretion as both the ratio and the index remain high 
throughout the period. Hence there does not seem to be a direct relationship between 
decision-making structures and delegation.  
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 3.3.5) Policy-area analysis: Borders and visas 
 
Table 3.6. Delegation in borders and visas law 
Legislation A B C D E F 
Commission Decision 2010/49/EC 
determining the first regions for the 
start of operations of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) 
3 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commission Decision 2009.876.EC 
adopting technical measures for 
entering the data and linking 
applications 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commission Decision 2009/756/EC 
laying down specifications for the 
resolution and use of fingerprints for 
biometric identification and 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regulation 810/2009 of the EP and 
the Council on a Community code on 
visas (Visa Code) 
278 5 4 0.018 0.333 0.012 
Commission Decision 2009/720/EC 
laying down the date for the 
completion of migration from the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commission Decision C(2009) 3770 
modifying the technical specifications 
for the uniform format for residence 
permits for TCNs 
7 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2009/377/EC Commission Decision 
adopting implementing measures for 
the consultation mechanism and the 
other procedures referred to in 
Regulation (EC) 767.2008 concerning 
the VIS 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regulation 81/2009/EC amending 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as 
regards the use of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) 
5 1 2 0.200 0.167 0.167 
Commission Decision C(2008) 8657 
laying down a certificate policy as 
required in the technical 
specifications on the standards for 
security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued 
by Member States and updating the 
normative reference documents 
(contact details for certification 
authorities) 
3 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Regulation 1104/2008/EC on 
migration from the SIS 1+ to the 
second generation SIS II 
73 24 4 0.329 0.333 0.219 
Council Regulation (EC) 856/2008 
amending Regulation (EC) 1683/95 
uniform format for visas numbering 
of visas 
5 1 1 0.200 0.083 0.183 
Regulation 767/2008 concerning the 
Visa Information System (VIS)  
154 17 7 0.110 0.583 0.046 
Regulation 296/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation 562/2006 
5 2 1 0.400 0.083 0.367 
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Legislation A B C D E F 
establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of 
persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code) 
Commission Decision 2008/602/EC 
laying down the physical architecture 
and requirements of the national 
interfaces and of the 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2008/456/EC Commission Decision 
laying down rules for the 
implementation of Decision 
574/2007/EC establishing the 
External Borders Fund 
134 5 4 0.037 0.333 0.025 
2008/333/EC Commission Decision 
of 4 March 2008 adopting the 
SIRENE Manual and other 
implementing measures for the 
second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Regulation (EC) 189/2008 on 
the tests of the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2008/173/EC Council Decision on the 
tests of the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2007/599/EC: Commission Decision 
implementing Decision 574/2007/EC 
of the EP and of the Council as 
regards the adoption of strategic 
guidelines for 2007 to 2013 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council and EP Regulation 863/2007 
on rapid intervention teams (RABIT) 
82 13 4 0.159 0.333 0.106 
Council and EP Decision 
574/2007/EC External Borders Fund 
for the period 2007 to 2013 
198 55 6 0.278 0.500 0.139 
2007/171/EC Commission Decision 
laying down the network 
requirements for the Schengen 
Information System II 
1 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2007/170/EC Commission Decision 
of 16 March 2007 laying down the 
network requirements for the 
Schengen Information System II 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regulation 1987/2006 on the 
establishment, operation and use of 
SIS II 
170 16 5 0.094 0.417 0.055 
Regulation (EC) 1931/2006 of the EP 
and the Council on local border traffic 
41 2 2 0.049 0.167 0.041 
2006/752/EC Commission Decision 
establishing the sites for the Visa 
Information System during the 
development phase  
3 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006/648/EC Commission Decision 
laying down the technical 
specifications on the standards for 
biometric features related to the 
development of the Visa Information 
System  
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council and EP Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community 
code on the rules governing the 
164 7 3 0.043 0.250 0.032 
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Legislation A B C D E F 
movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) 
2005/358/EC Council Decision 
designating the seat of the FRONTEX 
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Regulation 851/2005 
amending the visa list regulation 
11 5 3 0.455 0.250 0.341 
Council Regulation 2252/2004 on 
standards for security features and 
biometrics in passports 
15 2 1 0.133 0.083 0.122 
Council Decision 2004/512/EC 
establishing the Visa Information 
System (VIS) 
13 3 4 0.231 0.333 0.154 
Council Regulation 2007/2004 
Frontex 
124 17 5 0.137 0.417 0.080 
Council Regulation (EC) 694/2003 on 
uniform formats for Facilitated 
Transit Documents (FTD) and 
Facilitated Rail Transit Documents 
(FRTD) provided for in Regulation 
(EC) 693.2003 
14 3 1 0.214 0.083 0.196 
Council Regulation (EC) 693/2003 
establishing a specific Facilitated 
Transit Document (FTD), Facilitated 
Rail Transit Document (FRTD) 
30 0 1 0.000 0.083 0.000 
Council Regulation (EC) No 
334/2002 amending Regulation 
1683/95 laying down a uniform 
format for visas 
8 2 2 0.250 0.167 0.208 
Council Regulation (EC) No 
333/2002 on a uniform format for 
forms for affixing the visa issued by 
Member States to persons holding 
15 2 1 0.133 0.083 0.122 
Council Regulation (EC) 2424/2001 
on the development of the second 
generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) 
14 3 4 0.214 0.333 0.143 
Council Regulation 1091/2001 on 
freedom of movement with a long-
stay visa 
3 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Council Regulation 789/2001 
reserving to the Council 
implementing powers examining visa 
applications 
8 2 1 0.250 0.083 0.229 
Council Regulation 539/2001 listing 
the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas 
19 2 2 0.105 0.167 0.088 
Aggregate results *1624 *189 **1.66 **0.10 **0.14 **0.07 
Aggregate results (no implementing) *1449 *184 **2.78 **0.17 **0.23 **0.13 
Note: *Total and **averages 
 
Turning now to the most densely populated policy area of the data set, borders and 
visas, the most obvious point to note is that 18 of the 41 measures are implementing 
acts. These have been counted because of their binding legal nature. Among the 41 
measures, a sizeable number show high and medium delegation and discretion. The 
average delegation ratio is 10 per cent and the discretion index is at 7 percent. If 
implementing measures are excluded, delegation jumps seven percentage points to 
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17 percent, with discretion up 6 points to 13 percent. There are simply too many 
legislative measures with high delegation and discretion to introduce them all in 
detail. High and medium delegation ratios are both present in border and visa related 
legislation, these measures are concentrated on technical measures such as IT 
programmes as well as on cooperative and management initiatives such as Frontex. 
 
These points confirm the widespread belief that border and visa policy is one 
of the most advanced area of cooperation in the EU (Niemann 2008: 570). The 
volume of legislative output and the aggregate results in terms of delegation and 
discretion56 corroborate this. On the other hand however, these observations 
highlight the problematic nature of frequent references to politicisation in EU 
migration policy (Stetter 2000). Briefly, many failures or deadlocks in cooperation 
in EU migration policy appear to arise for political reasons. It therefore follows that 
if such sensitivities were not present integration would be more streamlined. While 
prima facie a reasonable assumption, the findings here reveal unexpected 
difficulties with it. First, it is difficult to provide a precise definition of what is 
meant by politicisation. Nevertheless, applying its plainest meaning, it seems 
logical to conclude that administrative measures present the lowest political 
visibility in the legislative set. It therefore makes sense that higher average 
delegation and discretion levels exist here than in other migration categories (see 
previous subsections). However, many regard border and visa policy a politically 
salient issue (Luedtke et al. 2010: 147, 58; Meloni 2005: 1358), yet it features 
average levels of delegation and discretion that are substantially above those of 
legal and irregular migration. Even more ambiguous is the case of asylum policy, 
which stands halfway between all these migration categories but whose position in 
terms of being more or less politicised than legal migration or border and visa policy 
is not clear.  
 
If the contention were true that changes in the decision-making prompt more 
delegation and discretion, this policy area should have been the most advanced over 
time. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, all legislative acts 
stemming from Art. 62(2)(b)(i) and (iii) immediately required  QMV in the Council 
and consultation with the EP. This was consistent with the Treaty of Maastricht 
                                                          
56 Not counting for implementing measures. 
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(Peers 2005). Also, Art. 62(2)(b)(ii) and (iv) were brought under the remit of Art. 
251 (co-decision) after five years, with no Council vote required for that change to 
take effect. On the other hand, art 62(1) was under the five years “transitional 
period” and was transferred to art. 251 as of 1 January 2005. Thus a sort of three-
tiered regime existed in border and visa policy, making this area one of the most 
complicated in terms of intricacies of the legislative process. That being said, 
legislative measures featuring high and medium delegation are equally distributed 
across the two time periods before and after 2005. Hence this sub-set does not lead 
to a clear confirmation of the relevance of decision-making to the degree of 
delegation.  
 
 
 3.4. Discussion 
 
This analysis has found instances of almost all of Franchino's delegating provisions. 
The average delegation ratio and discretion index for the migration policy area57 is 
12.4 percent and 8.9 percent respectively. Based on Franchino's findings a cross-
policy comparative stance is taken here, albeit with a number of caveats. The first 
is to remember that the coding criteria have been slightly modified, including 
agenda setting provisions in this case. At the very least this should have inflated the 
results of this study as compared with Franchino's. However, in keeping with 
Pollack (Pollack 2003b), if the purpose is to chart and measure the powers being 
granted to the Commission the inclusion of agenda setting provisions is justified. 
Secondly, one has to take account of the fact that these figures refer to overall 
discretion in policy sectors, each composed by the entire set of measures traceable 
to that category. Franchino and Pollack account for a variable number of measures 
deemed significant in each policy area. It is not clear what effect that selection 
criteria has for delegation and discretion. As mentioned several times in this chapter, 
the measures that attracted most attention in academic literature do not necessarily 
display the highest delegation and discretion. 
  
Bearing that in mind, it is possible to identify that the Commission's discretion 
in this data set ranks below the level of a number of policy areas such as “Monetary 
compensation amounts” (15 percent), “Agriculture-organization of markets” (14.74 
                                                          
57 Excluding implementing measures.  
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percent), “Fishing-organization of markets” (10.61 percent), and “Competition-
merger control” (9.71 percent). Surprisingly, the Commission's average discretion 
is above those of “Commercial policy (7.37 percent) and Agriculture-financial 
provisions (6.90 per cent)”, two long-established Community competences, 
“Transport-market conditions (6.51 percent); (9) Agriculture-structural policy (6.33 
percent); and (10) Regional policy (6.21 percent)” (Pollack 2003b: 102). A closer 
look indicates that the Commission enjoys uneven delegation and discretion 
depending on the policy sub-sector. Discretion in administrative cooperation, 
borders and visas, and asylum and refugee law is above many of the policy areas 
mentioned above.  
 
A trend seems to exist whereby the Commission is granted powers only where 
the measure deals with rather technical or administrative matters, it becomes less 
relevant as an actor when the legislation in question is about setting European 
minimum standards or harmonising a given policy issue. As migration policy is 
chock-full of minimum standards and harmonising measures, it is evident why 
average delegation ratio and discretion index are medium and low respectively. 
Turning to the grounds for delegation? First, the technical nature of much of the 
measures hints at expertise and general management capabilities as likely rationales 
for delegation. In other words it indicates efficiency and uncertainty. The 
prominence of the Funds across this sub-set also points to the importance of 
credibility of commitments and efficiency. The Frontex Regulation is no exception 
to this as it concerns operational management and delegation seems again to be 
made on the basis of efficiency.  
 
Turning to the typology of legislative measures used, it is striking that of the 
35 measures displaying high and medium delegation not one is a Directive. The 
Council tends not to delegate in this kind of measures. If it is true that member states 
enjoy more discretion in this type of secondary legislation, one would assume that 
consistent implementation would required that mechanisms be inserted within the 
legislation to allow the Commission to properly monitor member states. This would 
be on top of the functions the Commission has by virtue of the Treaty. The findings 
of this dissertation reject this assumption.   
 
The findings of this chapter do not neatly confirm Franchino’s hypothesis that 
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changes in decision-making affect delegation and discretion and that a switch to 
QMV in particular should lead to more discretion. The scatterplot below does not 
deliver a clear confirmation of that hypothesis. The main distribution patterns of the 
two periods marked by the change in voting procedure does not indicate any clear-
cut divergence between the two series, and this is what one would expect if 
Franchino’s theory were correct. 
 
Chart 3. 1. Scatterplot of delegation and discretion before and after 2005 
 
 
The focus thus far has exclusively concerned policy areas and sectors. The 
figures presented were aggregates of results extracted using a methodology 
employing single legislative measures as units of analysis. This analysis is 
combined with another, which is centred on the individual legislative measures. 
Two cut-off points, set at 10 percent and 20 percent respectively, are introduced to 
signify medium and high delegation ratio and discretion index rates. Franchino 
found that the highest discretion for a policy category stood at 20.67 per cent 
(competition – rules for undertaking) (2006a: 176). Bearing that in mind, it makes 
sense to argue that results ranking above 20 percent achieve the highest possible 
scores in EU legislation. A limited number of policy areas populate the space 
between 10 per cent and 19.99 percent, while the majority of Franchino’s results 
fall below 9.99 percent. The results for this analysis are displayed using this 
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classification in table 3.7 below. 
 
Table 3.7. Number of legislative measures with medium to high delegation 
ratios per policy area (first with implementing measures, then without 
implementing measures)  
 
Borders 
and 
visas 
Asylum 
and 
refugees 
Administrative 
Legal 
migration 
Irregular 
migration 
Total 
High 
(0.2 - x) 
11 3 5 1 1 21 
Medium 
(0.1 – 
0.19) 
6 2 1 2 0 10 
Low  
(0 to 0.1) 
24 8 1 10 14 58 
Total 41 13 7 13 15 89 
 
High 
(0.2 - x) 
11 2 5 1 1 20 
Medium 
(0.1 – 
0.19) 
6 2 1 2 0 10 
Low  
(0 to 0.1) 
6 5 1 9 11 33 
Total 23 9 7 12 12 63 
Note: in the bottom half, implementing measures are not counted.   
 
The two-stacked bar charts below first display all categories and then the 
degrees of delegation dealt with here. Looking at the migration categories, measures 
with high and medium delegation are more common in the administrative and 
borders and visas categories (in decreasing order). This takes account of the effect 
of the widely differing number of legislative measures present in each category, 
which instead affects the second chart. That latter chart shows that borders and visas 
and administrative measures (in decreasing order) make up the overwhelming 
majority of measures featuring both high and medium degrees of delegation. 
Therefore, the aggregate results are confirmed when a different view is taken and 
attention is paid to the distribution of measures across policies areas. 
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Chart 3.2 and 3.3. Distribution of legislative measures along migration 
categories and delegation degrees 
 
 
Note: Excluding implementing measures. 
 
There are 20 pieces of legislation58 featuring a delegation ratio equal to or 
above 20 percent, they consist of the migration funds and technical or IT 
                                                          
58 Not counting implementing measures. 
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instruments such as VIS and SIS. This would indicate that the Commission is most 
empowered where the objective is to strengthen credibility (securing member states’ 
commitments is an explicit objective of the Funds), and to rely on operational 
management (efficiency reasons). There are eleven legislative measures that 
qualified as medium, ranging from 10 to 19.9 percent. This sub-set is made up of 
some of the remaining legislative measures related to Funds, other technical 
measure related to IT systems (SIS), and Frontex and related measures. This only 
reinforces the previous finding about credibility of commitments and efficiency. 
The other 33 pieces of legislation feature low delegation, with values from zero to 
9.9 percent. Among them nine feature no delegation whatsoever. The conspicuous 
number of measures with low delegation confirms Franchino’s finding that the 
majority of measures feature low delegation and discretion. For him, this is because 
the Council favours national administrations over EU implementation paths when 
creating legislation (Franchino 2006a: 163-79).   
 
 
 3.5. Conclusions 
 
The quantitative content of this chapter serves as a guide for the ensuing qualitative 
research by identifying clusters of delegation. The first finding is that delegation 
and discretion are present in this policy area to an extent that is comparable to other 
EU policy areas. It has also been shown that variation in delegation and discretion 
does happen both across and within policy areas. Nevertheless the quantitative 
models present in the literature help little in understanding the determinants for such 
delegation. Thus, as identified in Chapter 2, the following chapters look at the 
various determinants of delegation and investigate the extent to which they can 
explain the various levels of delegation recorded in this chapter.  
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4. Delegation in asylum and refugee law 
 
While the foregoing chapter provided a clear picture of the amount and distribution 
of delegation in EU migration policy, this chapter marks the first of four dealing 
with the migration categories identified in Chapters 2 and 3 from a qualitative 
standpoint. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the migration categories used in this 
dissertation have largely been organised around Treaty articles. They are: asylum 
and refugee policy; irregular migration; legal migration and administrative 
cooperation; and finally, border and visa policy. With particular reference to asylum, 
the last chapter revealed that on aggregate this policy area shows medium 
delegation and low discretion, with four measures featuring a high and medium 
delegation ratio. Asylum and refugee policy is also marked by the second highest 
constraint ratio in the entire data set, signalling a high level of member states’ 
control over the Commission. 
 
Legislation on asylum and refugee policy between 1999 and 2009 stemmed 
from Art. 63(1) and (2) TEC. These Treaty provisions granted Community 
competence on “[m]easures on asylum” such as the “criteria and mechanisms for 
determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application” (i.e. 
the Dublin Convention), and minimum standards concerning reception, 
qualification, and procedures for granting or withdrawing refugee status. The Treaty 
also allowed for “[m]easures on refugees and displaced persons” regarding 
minimum standards for temporary protection and burden sharing. Of these 
measures, only burden sharing was omitted from the five-year arrangement that 
should have triggered a vote in the Council (Peers 2011: 301).  
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to distinguish between a refugee 
and an asylum seeker given the frequency with which the terms are conflated. The 
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as an 
individual, 
 
“… who owing to a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ for reasons 
of political opinion, race, religion, nationality or membership in a 
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particular social group are outside their country of nationality and 
are unable or, as a result of such fear, unwilling to return to it” (M. 
Gibney, J. 2004: 5-6).  
 
An asylum seeker on the other hand may acquire refugee status should their 
application for asylum be accepted by a hosting state, they are not however 
endowed with this status until such time as this occurs (M. Gibney, J. 2004: 10). 
Thus it is the responsibility of the receiving state to decide whether an asylum 
seeker is granted refugee status, whether they are granted another form of 
international protection such as subsidiary protection or protection for humanitarian 
reasons, or indeed whether their application is denied. 
 
This chapter deals with each of the determinants of delegation highlighted in 
the second chapter. The first section briefly summarises the relationship between 
Commission and Council, with analysis of this dynamic continuing throughout the 
rest of the chapter. Three subsequent sections deal with the independent variables: 
need to reduce uncertainty; desire for strengthening the credibility of commitments; 
and, quest for efficiency and effectiveness. And, as similar migration funds have 
emerged in other migration areas, the forerunning European Refugee Funds are 
discussed at length to develop an understanding thereof. 
 
 
 4.1. Analysis of the determinants of delegation 
 
 4.1.1) Institutional factors: Council internal division, and conflict 
between Council and Commission 
 
Delegation scholars are divided over whether conflict within the Council brings 
about increased or reduced levels of delegation. Following principal-agent models, 
Pollack holds that conflict within the Council leads to reduced levels of delegation 
as the possibility of sanctioning the agent decreases in the context of divided 
preferences among principals (2003b). With an eye to implementation, Franchino 
posits that conflict within the Council can lead to no implementation or poor 
implementation, thus, in his view, delegation to the Commission is essential for the 
purpose of policy effectiveness (2004). A more widely accepted hypothesis in 
principal-agent models is that delegation and discretion should decrease as conflict 
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between the Council and the Commission increases59. The purpose of this section 
is therefore to briefly summarise the institutional contexts surrounding asylum 
policy. 
 
It is rather telling that the first subheading used to sum up the results of the 
first multi-annual programme in JHA (‘the Tampere Programme’) is “Important 
achievements in a difficult environment” (Commission 2004f: 3-5). This report 
refers to member states’ resistance to the Commission’s initiatives in this area and 
this title effectively captures the tone of the relationship between the two EU 
institutions regarding asylum policy. While guided by consensus on certain 
overarching principles, member states were divided on a number of aspects of the 
legislation. It was agreed that there was a need to preserve the principle of asylum, 
yet on the other hand, member states also agreed that reducing asylum seeker 
inflows was desirable. Divergence also arose on a number of practical issues, the 
best demonstration of which is perhaps the number of years it took for the Council 
to reach agreement on first asylum package: five years for the Asylum Procedure 
Directive; three years for the Reception Condition Directive; and, four years for the 
Asylum Qualification Directive. A number of substantive points that emerged 
during the debates concerning these measures contributed to these delays. They 
ranged from access to labour markets for asylum seekers to the lists of countries 
regarded as “safe” for the purposes of asylum assessment procedures. For instance, 
Council negotiations over the Asylum Qualification Directive were reportedly put 
on hold for several months pending  adoption of a new migration law in Germany 
(European Report 2003b, 2004c). Similarly, Council proceedings concerning the 
Reception Conditions Directive were stalled due to German misgivings as to the 
authority of the EU to rule on matters concerning access to its labour market 
(European Report 2003d). The issues most intensely debated in this Directive were 
related to access to labour market, freedom of movement, the scope of the Directive 
(the inclusion of subsidiary protection), and education and training (Agence Europe 
2002a; Council 2000x). The subsequent sections highlight the most controversial 
of these issues. 
 
Proposals, Communications, and press releases issued by the Commission 
                                                          
59 See Chapter 2 for a thorough presentation of these hypotheses.  
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between 1999 and 2009 provide evidence of liberality regarding TCNs, member 
states’ obligations and the remit of legislation concerning asylum seekers and 
refugees. Member states, on the other hand, have tended to oppose such proposals 
to the extent that the Commission has been required to issue several redrafts of its 
proposals60. In an unusually harsh press release for example, the Commission 
outlined how its original proposal on the Reception Conditions Directive was 
watered down by the Council on provisions concerning family members, freedom 
of movement, employment and vocational training, and, quality and availability of 
reception conditions (Agence Europe 2002c, 2002d; Commission 2002a). 
Moreover, the Commission was compelled to table a second proposal on minimum 
standards – the ‘Asylum Procedure Directive’ – after the Council spent over a year 
in internal wrangling over its first proposal (Commission 2002c). This second 
proposal came about only after the Belgian Council Presidency and the Commission 
President recognised the presence of a complete deadlock during the Laeken 
European Council. Tensions were again evident when, much to the dissatisfaction 
of the Commission (European Report 2000g) and the EP (EP 2000b: 15-16), the 
Council retained Comitology implementation powers in the Eurodac Regulation. 
Indeed, as stated by the EP, the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC was 
the result of the Council’s previous failure to reach an agreement on two similar 
proposals made by the Commission in 1997 and 1998, which was “lamentable in 
view of the seriousness of this matter” (EP 2000a: 22).  
 
Commissioner António Vitorino indicated a belief that, contrary to the desires 
of the Commission, the low level of harmonisation was explicitly provided for 
through a high number of legal exceptions in the texts adopted. This was one of the 
main reasons behind the Commission’s emphasis on developing a second phase of 
the European asylum system. Vitorino is reported to have stated that “The level of 
harmonisation for the first phase is very limited, therefore the added value will be 
limited, we need other legislative instruments”, and while he understood that there 
is “a certain legislation fatigue on asylum within the Council”, there were “too many 
exceptions” in the legal texts adopted to that date, and therefore no “fair sharing of 
the burden” (Agence Europe 2004b).  
Although made before the first package of major asylum measures was 
                                                          
60 E.g. the first European Refugee Fund, Eurodac Regulation, the Asylum Procedure Directive.  
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completed, this statement reveals the Commission’s dissatisfaction with how this 
policy area was taking shape, while also demonstrating how it continued to push its 
agenda irrespective of the realities on the ground. Indeed, one month after the 
Tampere assessment was completed, the Commission proposed a radical overhaul 
of the measures both under discussion (the Asylum Procedure Directive) and 
recently agreed upon (Commission 2004e). While at the time this was justified as a 
response to the need to improve the legislation, the timing was puzzling. And 
despite the fact that member states were under treaty obligations to conclude the 
first package of measures on asylum by May 2004, they were unable to achieve this 
and the Asylum Procedure Directive was only adopted in December  2005.  
 
In conclusion, it seems safe to say that Commission and Council were at odds 
on asylum and refugee policy during this period. This is supported by the 
quantitative analysis discussed in Chapter 3 in that this relationship featured the 
second highest constraint ratio among migration categories.  
 
 
 4.1.2) Uncertainty  
 
It is one of the central tenets of this dissertation that the more a policy field is 
plagued by information and knowledge gaps, both in content and sharing, the 
greater the incentive for principals to delegate powers to a third party. Such 
delegation may be for the purpose of gathering information, or may be intended to 
produce expert knowledge on behalf of the principals. This section first focuses on 
the issues that characterise cooperation on information and knowledge concerning 
asylum at the European level, and then analyses the extent to which these issues 
correspond with delegation in secondary legislation. A similar approach is taken in 
the forthcoming qualitative chapters. 
 
Boswell and Geddes hold that data on asylum “tend to be fairly reliable” 
(2011: 156, 70). Thus the overall picture concerning asylum-related data for the 
period covered by this dissertation is not particularly problematic. Asylum may be 
contrasted with irregular migration61 and likened to labour migration in this regard 
                                                          
61 See next chapter.  
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(Poulain and Singleton 2006: 376). As with labour migration62, cooperation on 
asylum statistics has been built upon existing frameworks institutionalised by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees63 (Kraler and Reichel 2010b: 22; 
Loescher and Milner 2011: 189). That said, the majority of migration measurements 
result from the collection and aggregation of cross-national information. It therefore 
follows that pan-European migration statistics are, in the main, only as good as the 
national components given that the “completeness of the tables depends largely on 
the availability of data from the relevant national statistical institutes” (Fassmann 
2009: 31).  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, most member states had already established 
their own means of collecting and interpreting data on asylum and refugees. That 
said some exceptions did exist where such data was completely absent prior to EU 
accession, in such cases data collection was reportedly only introduced during the 
1990s (Kraler and Reichel 2010a: 6). Malta, for instance, created an asylum 
database as a direct consequence of requests from the EU (Kraler and Reichel 
2010a: 6). Another issue was the variation in criteria employed in asylum-data 
collection. For example, while some member states counted total resident asylum 
seeker and refugee populations (15 out of 25 member states), others counted only 
refugees who had received Geneva Convention status (Fassmann 2009: 37). These 
were not trivial matters. Indeed, while negotiating the European Refugee Fund in 
early 2000, the Spanish delegation objected to the use of statistics for the allocation 
of money as these data had not been harmonised in any way at EU level (Council 
2000w). 
 
The Commission began developing a statistical toolkit in 1999 as a direct 
consequence of the growing importance of asylum as a political issue (European 
Report 1999d, 2001b). In its 2000 Communication on asylum, the Commission 
named “[i]nformation, exchanges and common evaluations” and “statistics” as the 
first two priorities for this policy area (Commission 2000b: 14, 15). In addition to 
which, it became its stated intention to identify, 
                                                          
62 See Chapter 6. 
63 As from its webpage, the “The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
was established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is 
mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee 
problems worldwide” Unhcr, 'Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
About Us.', <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html>, accessed 10 August 2014..  
110/326 
 
 “new mechanisms for cooperation between national authorities to 
compile and exchange information, analyse statistics, provide 
‘early warning’ and rapid information on national and Community 
administrative and judicial decisions, the exchange of good 
practice, training, processing requests and Country of Origin 
Information” (Commission 2006e: 2).  
 
Both the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies proposed information exchange 
mechanisms on asylum (as well as other areas of migration) in 2001 (Agence 
Europe 2001g; Commission 2003d; Council 2001r; EUObserver.com 2001a). In 
2002, CIREA64 ceased to exist after approximately four years of activity 
(Commission 2003d: 4), and all its tasks were transferred to the Commission, which 
in turn set up EURASIL (the EU Network for Asylum Practitioners). Cooperation 
on asylum statistics at the EU level received a major boost with the introduction of 
the Migration Statistics Regulation. In addition to which, a “system of mutual 
information” was created where “those in charge of migration and asylum policy in 
the Member States” could share “information and views” (European Union 2006a: 
Recital 3, 4)65. The availability of better and more reliable information from 
member states, and enhanced communications between them helped 
administrations address misconceptions and improve cooperation toward the long-
standing objective of achieving a Common European Asylum System. An important 
aspect of which was the harmonisation of statistical apparatuses as, in addition to 
being an objective per se, this provided the Commission with a firmer and more 
central role in migration policy (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 168). 
 
Despite this progress, policy-makers were aware that substantial long-term 
problems remained regarding a number of statistical issues. For one thing, 
achieving consistency and comparability of data required the presence of common 
working definitions. The absence of which made it “clear that the available 
European statistics on migration and asylum [were] not adequate for the preparation 
and monitoring of legislation and policy” (Commission 2005d: 4). Nevertheless, 
although common definitions were deemed essential by member states to combat 
                                                          
64 A Council Working Party on asylum.  
65 For more on these two measures, see Chapter 6. 
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‘asylum shopping’66 and despite the definition of an asylum seeker being grounded 
in common minimum standards set out in the Asylum Qualification Directive, broad 
variation persisted among member states even years after this Directive’s adoption 
(Commission 2010a). Every now and then, these problems would pop up in the 
media (D. Casciani 2002b). Council documents also reveal that member states were 
interested in obtaining more information on what their counterparts were doing on 
a number of asylum issues. The Council circulated questionnaires on, inter alia, 
accelerated procedure (Council 2001z), renewed applications (Council 2001y), 
transfers of protection (Council 2000k), alternative forms of protection (Council 
2000i), complementary forms of protection (Council 2001q). Practices as regards 
international protection varied conspicuously, and this was a cause for concern 
among member states. For example, in the late 1990s France and Germany strictly 
adhered to the letter of Geneva Convention and thus refused to recognise 
persecution by non-state actors as a ground for granting refugee status67 (Delouvin 
2000: 71; Green 2001: 93; 2005: 339; Koslowski 1998: 171). On the other hand, 
the UK did grant international protection also in those cases, which created 
implementation problems with regard to the Dublin Convention (Agence Europe 
2002b; The Guardian 2001b). A decade later, difficulties persisted, which led the 
Commission to voice many criticisms in its report on the application of the Asylum 
Qualification Directive (Commission 2010d). 
 
Statistics on recognition rates are a good example of how definitions directly 
impact on asylum policy. These statistics are highly important and are often quoted 
in asylum policy; they refer to the share of applications upheld as a function of the 
total number of decisions made, and can be broken down into first and final 
decisions. In 2011, recognition rates varied hugely among member states. Even 
more telling is the fact that recognition rates varied within specific nationalities of 
asylum seekers (Iraqis, Afghanis and Somalis) across Europe (Commission 2009a: 
23; ECRE 2012). The likelihood of an Afghan national seeing his or her asylum 
request granted in 2011 was 73% in Sweden but only 37% in Germany. Similarly, 
an Iraqi national stood a better chance of having his or her application approved in 
                                                          
66 See next section.  
67 It should be said that some of these member states had other forms that granted some sort of 
protection to those falling out of the strict interpretation of the Geneva Convention. See Barbou 
Des Places Ségolène Barbou Des Place, 'Evolution of Asylum Legislation in the Eu: Insights 
from Regulatory Theory', (16; Firenze: European University Institute, 2003) at 10. 
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Belgium (81%) than in Denmark (13%). And a Somali national had a 95% chance 
of approval in Italy as compared with 39% in France. This was happening seven 
years after the first legislative package on asylum was adopted.  
There were a number of reasons for this variation, among them issues such as 
“lack of objective and reliable country of origin information” which are directly 
linked to the role of information and knowledge (Council of Europe 2009). 
Obtaining information on countries of origin had long been an issue for EU member 
states, which regarded the harmonisation of such information as an important 
factors towards more homogeneous asylum procedures across Europe. In other 
words, having common knowledge of the situation on the ground in many of these 
third countries could therefore help to standardise recognition rates across Europe 
(Commission 2000b: 14; EP 2001b: 22). Indeed, Monar states that resolving this 
was one of the objectives behind establishing the “high level working group on 
asylum and migration” in 1998, a body charged with “provid[ing] the Council with 
a list and assessment of countries of origin and transit[,] and to develop[ing] 
integrated action plans in respect of these countries” (1999: 156). This issue 
achieved political recognition during the November 2004 European Council when 
The Hague Programme was debated (Agence Europe 2004d; Council 2004c) and 
was eventually institutionally recognised through the EASO (Financial Times 
2009). However, as late as 2009 the Commission, Council, and a number of stake 
holders consulted on the Impact Assessment of EASO recognised the lack of 
harmonised country of origin information as one of the key issues preventing the 
achievement of a “fair and more harmonised treatment of applications for 
international protection throughout the Union” (Commission 2009b: 5). 
 
Information and knowledge in the area of asylum policy tends to receive 
media and political attention (Mouzourakis 2014). For example, member states with 
high per capita rates of asylum applications68 are sensitive to the perceived excess 
burden placed on their systems. However, member states rely on statistics and 
information on one another’s asylum trends and administrative practices to justify 
such claims. Information on asylum and refugee flows and stocks has therefore 
increased in importance and particularly where EU funding allocations have 
become tied to these data (Kraler 2005). Indeed according to the EU Court of 
                                                          
68 See next section.  
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Auditors, France and the UK were still losing out on funding in 2005 when 
compared with other member states because of how data collection on asylum 
policy was carried out (European Report 2007b). The importance acquired by these 
EU funding schemes should not be underestimated. At the time the first European 
Refugee Fund was established, Germany criticised the idea of financing individual 
member states it labelled as transit countries that did not host asylum seekers (direct 
reference was made to Italy). In 1999, Chancellor Schroeder reportedly declared 
that as approximately 80 percent of refugees reaching Italy then moved on to other 
countries, Italy should not receive money from EU funds (La Stampa 1999).  
 
As set out in the section on effectiveness69, the outcome of the asylum 
procedure is fundamental to distinguishing between irregular migration and asylum 
and refugee protection. If the procedure ends with a rejection of the application, and 
no other forms of protection or stay are offered by the hosting state, the applicant 
must leave. To provide a snapshot of the phenomenon, there were approximately 
13,695 successful applications (25.2% of the total)70 and 40,735 rejected 
applications (74.8%)  during the second quarter of 2010 in the EU27 (Eurostat 
2010). There is evidence to suggest that a conspicuous number of rejected 
applicants fall out of trace (D. Casciani 2002b). This is where the boundaries 
between asylum and irregular migration begin to blur.  
Data on this phenomenon is critically lacking and this gap is consistently 
recorded in the academic literature. By 2001, the Commission was highlighting 
evidence of gaps in the data of several member states in relation to the return of 
rejected asylum seekers, while for other countries data was classified under the 
general return category, including irregular migrants (Commission 2001e). 
Apparently, member states were not immediately forthcoming on this and the 
Commission undertook a more focused initiative involving a sub-set of member 
states (Commission 2003d: 9-10; European Report 2003f). Part of the problem with 
this data arose due to inherent difficulties in data gathering, however political 
pressures were also at play given that these figures are usually taken as an indicator 
of the effectiveness of asylum policy (Blinder 2013: 8; Christina Boswell and 
Geddes 2011: 172). If numbers of missing applicants turned out to be significant, it 
would seriously discredit the policies of those member state governments who are 
                                                          
69 Section 4.1.4. 
70 Figures include Geneva Convention refugees, subsidiary protection and humanitarian reasons. 
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generally tough on rhetoric. A clear example of this reticence is seen in former UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair's refusal to put forward even rough figures of the number 
of failed asylum seekers present in the UK during a BBC interview given in the 
lead up to the 2005 UK general election (BBC 2005). After revealing that the 
asylum backlog was nearly double the estimate, UK Home Secretary David 
Blunkett stated that he was “absolutely committed to the transparency, clarity and 
reliability of official statistics”, as he believed that it was “essential that people have 
confidence in the statistics produced, especially on such an important issue as 
asylum" (The Guardian 2003; The Independent 2001a; The Times 2001b). At the 
EU level, the political salience of such information was implicitly recognised both 
in the May 2001 Council Conclusions mentioned above (Council 2001r), and in the 
EP report evaluating the 2003 Commission Action Plan on migration and asylum 
statistics (EP 2003b: 10). 
 
Another sensitive aspect of asylum policy relates to secondary movement, 
meaning the movement of an asylum seeker from one country to another. This had 
been covered by the Dublin Convention since 1997, however, despite member 
states’ obligations to exchange information under this agreement the Commission 
concluded this mechanism did not work properly (Commission 2000d: 12). For 
instance, statistics collected under the Dublin scheme recorded approximately 3,000 
transfers out of and approximately 4,500 transfers into in member states’ territories 
in 1998. The Commission’s response was to highlight that if effective collection 
and communication were present these numbers should have correlated with one 
another. In other words, member states simply lost track of around 1,500 transfers. 
This illustrates difficulties not only with knowledge on asylum itself, but also with 
information sharing. Member states recognised that more cooperation was needed 
in this respect, and provided an effective response through Eurodac.  
 
In sum, this review of uncertainty-related issues in asylum policy 
demonstrates that problems existed and persisted during the ten years under 
investigation. In particular, these problems related to: lack of statistical 
harmonisation; differences in the underlying concepts and practices applied by 
member states; politicisation of asylum-related information; and, weak structures 
of cooperation. And yet, prior to this time-period many member states had already 
established their own forms of information gathering in regards to asylum, and 
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international bodies had a long established tradition of this. Therefore, uncertainty 
in this policy area was not quite as critical as was the case for irregular migration71. 
The discussion to follow considers how these issues of uncertainty gave rise to 
delegation. 
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
The development of European Refugee Funds highlight EU efforts to improve the 
quality of data coming from national administrations72. In the 2000 Decision the 
Commission was only the recipient of data gathered by the member states, it had 
little room to question or interpret this data save under advisory procedure (Art. 
10(3) and 23). These provisions did not change much in the 2004 Decision except 
for the insertion of a reference to member states’ duties to collaborate with the 
Commission in collecting statistics relevant to the Fund. The obligation of member 
states to provide data to the Commission went further unaltered in 2007, however 
the Commission was granted the discretion to “evaluate the quality, comparability 
and completeness of the statistical information in accordance with normal 
operational procedures”. In order to do so, at “the request of the Commission 
(Eurostat), Member States shall provide it with all the necessary information” (Art. 
13(5)). In other words, the Commission has an explicit power to question the figures 
coming from member states and to request clarifications if needs be. Contrary to 
the previous developments, the arrangement introduced in 2007 implies that the 
Commission is an expert capable of assessing member states’ data.  
This expertise is also evident in Temporary Protection Directive. Here, the 
Commission is the body responsible for determining whether an emergency 
situation exists under art. 5(1), how it ought to be dealt with, and whether it is 
appropriate to extend emergency arrangements under Art. 4(2), Although the final 
decision on such matters can only be taken by the Council, the Commission’s 
information must both be the basis for such a decision and must be included therein, 
inter alia (art. 5(3)(d)). Further administrative cooperation and the exchange of 
                                                          
71 See next chapter. 
72 The European Refugee Fund has a long and complicated history in itself. The first Council 
Decision was adopted in 2000 and the second in 2004. A third Decision was taken jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council on 23 May 2007, repealing the 2004 Decision and inserting 
the Fund into the General programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” 
(SOLID). SOLID included three other Funds: EU Borders Fund, EU Return Fund, and EU 
Integration Fund for Third-country nationals. 
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information is channelled through the Commission and a web of national contacts 
in a similar fashion to other legislative measures presented in this chapter (art. 
27(1)). 
 
In the Asylum Procedure Directive, the Commission must receive notice of 
changes to member states’ national “safe third country” lists (Art. 27(5)). A member 
state must also notify the Commission of any decision to add a country to its 
national list (to be distinguished from the “minimum common list”) (Art. 30(6)). In 
terms of the “minimum common list”, the Commission formulates modification 
proposals based on a range of information. It is afforded broad discretion in this 
regard (Art. 29(3)), which highlights the expert role member states confer upon the 
Commission. This is very important, particularly in light of the fact that the 
Commission was initially opposed to the concept tout-court (European Report 
2006b). Indeed, when the Commission initially decided on the list internal divisions 
emerged within the College of Commissioners (European Report 2006a). However, 
as member states were so divided, no option could be agreed upon other than to 
leave the matter at the discretion of the Commission (European Report 2004a). 
 
The 'Eurodac' Regulation covers both asylum seekers and irregular 
immigrants73, but its principal purpose is to compare “fingerprints for the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention”. It may therefore be said to tackle problems 
concerning expertise and information sharing. A Central Unit located within the 
Commission has been granted responsibility for aspects of the system’s operational 
management. Importantly, Eurodac must both provide annual figures and “draw up 
statistics on its work every quarter” on a number of its functions (Art. 3(3)). In 
addition to which the Commission may also, under Comitology procedure, propose 
to add some statistical tasks additional to those already undertaken (Art. 3(4)). The 
Commission is also charged with a number of informational, evaluating, and 
reporting tasks in Art. 2474, but none of these functions involves the provision of an 
explicit pro-active power, hence they are not counted as delegation. 
                                                          
73 The inclusion of irregular migration in the database was highly controversial at the beginning. 
Reportedly, Germany and Austria fought hard in the Council, during the Maastricht period, to 
include that category in the database European Report, 'Justice and Home Affairs: Full Session 
in Prospect for May 28 and 29', European Report (1998b), European Report, 'Justice/Home 
Affairs Council: Little Tangible Headway but Willingness to Boost Cooperation', European 
Report (1998a).. 
74 These are mainly related to the functioning of the Central Unit. 
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On the other hand, it is important to note that the Council retained the power 
to compile statistics on asylum shopping (Art. 12(2) and (5)). This is one of the very 
few cases where the Council retained implementing powers for itself, and it is 
significant that it decided to avail itself of that opportunity in the case of statistics. 
Reportedly, a majority of member states in the Council wanted to retain 
implementation on this very sensitive issue (Agence Europe 1999f). Debates on this 
issue were intense, with the Council on one side and the EP and Commission on the 
other, with Commissioner Vitorino unsuccessfully opposing a Franco-German deal 
on the Comitology arrangements (European Report 2000g, 2000j, 2000e). 
 
The Reception Conditions Directive is also relevant to the issue of 
information sharing. First, the Commission plays an important role in facilitating 
cooperation among member states by gathering information. According to Art. 22, 
member states must inform the Commission on “data concerning the number of 
persons, broken down by sex and age, covered by reception conditions”, as well as 
“provide full information on the type, name and format of the documents provided 
for by Article 6”. Commission efforts at gaining a larger role in these matters was 
rejected by a number of member states (Council 2001v: 45). 
The Dublin Regulation features a notification requirement with respect to the 
Commission in order to avoid or solve asymmetries in information provided by 
member states, however nothing more is required (Art. 21(6)). A similar situation 
exists in respect to the Asylum Qualification Directive. This Directive established 
an institutionalised mechanism for cooperation that placed the Commission at the 
centre of a web of national contacts. The aim of which was to strengthen 
cooperation and communication among member states (Art. 35). It should be noted 
that the Council rejected proposals for the creation of similar networks in respect 
of the Reception Conditions Directive and the Asylum Procedure Directive.75 
Nevertheless, as these provisions fail to assign a proactive role to the Commission, 
they are not counted as delegation. 
 
 
                                                          
75 Compare the original Commission proposal Commission, 'Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee 
Status. Com(2000) 578 Final. Cns 2000/0238.', (Brussels, 2000a) at 7. with the ultimate text of 
the Directive.  
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 4.1.3) Credibility of commitments 
 
This section investigates the extent to which the wish to strengthen the credibility 
of commitments is a determinant of delegation in the area of asylum policy. Chapter 
2 described how problems surrounding the credibility of commitments are 
connected to potential member states’ defections from previously agreed policies.76 
This section is intended to provide an overview of the problems nested in this policy 
area and to identify how those issues have affected cooperation. In short, it can be 
said that member states experienced problems with imbalances due to the inflow 
and distribution of asylum seekers in addition to the crises that marred this policy 
area. As was the case with the previous section on uncertainty, this section is divided 
in two parts. The first looks at the asylum situation in Europe and issues connected 
to credibility of commitments. The second turns to the extent to which these issues 
have been matched by delegation in secondary legislation. 
 
The first question regards the commitments member states have undertaken 
in this policy area. While it appears that all categories of migration are of equal 
importance in the Treaties, the Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions 
directly refer to a “Common European Asylum System” (European Council 1999: 
A. II.). While in the same document the need for “common policies on asylum and 
immigration” is also acknowledged (European Council 1999: 3), asylum policy is 
dealt with in a level of detail that includes identifying complete harmonisation as 
the ultimate aim in policy areas such as asylum procedures. The same is not the case 
for other migration categories such as legal migration (Lavenex and Wallace 2005: 
473).77 Member states subsequently altered their commitments in the subsequent 
multi-annual programme known as the Hague Programme (Council 2004a). 
 
Eurostat data on asylum applications show a very complicated picture. 
Member states have experienced different levels of asylum inflows and feature 
distinct administrative practices regarding asylum seekers and refugees. There is a 
clear trend of decrease in asylum inflows across the EU following the spike of the 
late 1990s-early 2000s (chart 4.1 below78). However, individual countries have 
                                                          
76 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
77 See Chapter 6, section 6.1.2.  
78 The chart refers to the period 1999 to 2007 because Eurostat recognises the entry into force of the 
Migration Statistics Regulation (in July 2007). Briefly, Eurostat believes that data for the period 
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experienced very different trends where asylum applications are concerned. 
Germany has seen its number of applications reduce in the years considered. The 
UK experienced a spike in 2002, but has since seen numbers decrease to less than 
a half of 1999 figures. In fact, under political and media pressure, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair stated that he would have like to see the total number of asylum-seekers 
entering the country reduced “by 30 per cent to 40 per cent in the next few months, 
and I think by September of this year we should have it halved” (Geddes 2005a: 
727). France had a steadily increasing trend until 2004, but applications have since 
started to decrease. That rise was largely due to inflows from former African 
colonies (Wihtol de Wenden 2011: 63). Italy has seen its asylum figures increase at 
the end of 1990s, fall to almost half by 2005, and then rise again by 2007. The 
Netherlands experienced its peak in 2000 after which significant reductions brought 
numbers to less than a sixth of peak levels (Engbersen 2012: 93). Whereas Sweden 
is perhaps the most volatile in this set of countries in that its volumes rose until 
2003, nearly halved in the following two years, and then more than doubled by 
2007. In sum, asylum flows and their geography change over time. Indeed, as the 
Swedish and Italian cases demonstrate, flows can change over time within 
countries. From a rational choice perspective, it therefore makes sense to engineer 
solidarity mechanisms that guarantee some form of support for member states based 
on their inflows. 
  
                                                          
before and after that data are not comparable.  
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Chart 4.1. Asylum applications in selected EU countries (1999-2007) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: Asylum applications by citizenship, 1999 to 2007. Annual data (rounded); code: 
migr_asyctz. 
 
Figures for refugee populations highlight similarly uneven numbers and fast 
changing trends. Table 4.2 shows that the countries with the highest total refugee 
populations for 2010 were Germany, the UK, France, and Sweden, in decreasing 
order. However, ten years earlier the ranking was very different (Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, France and the UK, again in decreasing order). Looking at the pace 
of change, the Netherlands saw an annual rate of change of more than 20 per cent 
during the 1990s, while Italy experienced a similar rate in the 2000s. Finally, while 
for the majority of countries featured in Table 4.1 refugees represented a minimal 
portion of the foreign population, refugees represented a sizable minority in both 
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Sweden and Germany. 
 
Table 4.1. Refugee stocks in selected member states (1990-2010) 
  Estimated refugee stock at mid-
year 
Refugees as a 
percentage of the 
international migrant 
stock 
Annual rate of 
change of the 
refugee stock 
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990-
2000 
2000-
2010 
Austria   37 172   48 787   42 630 4.7 4.9 3.3 2.7 -1.3 
Belgium   25 721   17 796   17 892 2.9 2.0 1.6 -3.7 0.1 
France   186 629   131 115   200 687 3.2 2.1 2.8 -3.5 4.3 
Germany   722 250   940 750   594 269 12.2 10.5 6.1 2.6 -4.6 
Italy   12 379   6 437   56 397 0.9 0.3 1.2 -6.5 21.7 
Netherlands   17 154   146 180   74 961 1.4 9.2 4.1 21.4 -6.7 
Spain   8 490   6 851   3 820 1.0 0.4 0.1 -2.1 -5.8 
Sweden   124 723   158 367   82 629 15.8 15.8 6.0 2.4 -6.5 
UK   43 395   121 275   238 150 1.2 2.6 3.4 10.3 6.7 
Source: (UNPD 2013). 
 
The picture is even more striking when asylum application numbers are 
considered relative to host population size. Here, the concept of burden takes on a 
domestic focus in the sense that the sustainability of asylum inflows is measured 
against the relative size of the resident population. Scholars are divided as to the 
most effective means of calculating asylum flows and impact. Thielemann, for 
example, criticises the double criteria of fixed and variable components upon which 
the European Refugee Fund is based, instead preferring a proportional criteria 
calculated relative to the native population. The latter calculation helps to factor in 
the reception capacity of a given state (Thielemann 2006: 446), an issue that has 
gained in importance as the perceived social impact of asylum seekers has 
increased. Member states such as the UK and Austria, for example, favoured an 
approach to burden sharing that would see funding allocations being based on the 
relationship between asylum inflows and population (Agence Europe 2000b; 
Council 2000f; The Guardian 2000a). Nevertheless the Fund’s finalised format 
instead sees money allocated on the basis of sheer volume of flows, irrespective of 
native population size. 
 
Differing rates of asylum inflows and refugee numbers are, however, just one 
piece of the complicated puzzle that is asylum policy in the EU. Crises of 
confidence among member states represent another important component, 
particularly in the context of commitments to collective action. This is the case, for 
instance, where so-called transit countries are concerned. These states  received 
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frequent accusations from fellow member states at both domestic and European 
levels for indolence in stepping up controls and hosting equal shares of asylum 
seekers (Agence Europe 1998a). This criticism was repeatedly addressed to 
Mediterranean member states, including France. Criticisms were voiced against 
France's blind-eye policy following allegations that asylum seekers were exploiting 
loose controls in France and entering the UK through the Channel Tunnel (Financial 
Times 2002g). The German asylum crisis of the early 1990s is frequently recalled 
in the literature, here Germany bore much of the brunt of asylum seekers fleeing to 
Europe from the Balkans (Green 2001: 92-95). Again, in the late 1990s German 
Interior Minister Kanther complained of high asylum inflows and the absence of 
assistance from other member states (Agence Europe 1998a; Agence France Presse 
1998a). Germany was repeatedly recalled that event when calls for more support 
came from other member states in the following years (BBC 2006). Green holds 
that, following its disappointment at lacking cooperation on asylum in the 1990s 
(and particularly the Kohl government’s failure to find a European solution to the 
German asylum problem), the German governments’ priority with respect to EU 
migration policy has been to preserve its own domestic achievements (Green 2001: 
90; Monar 2003: 310-13). In fact, the restrictions implemented in Germany were 
perceived as under threat from a potentially more generous EU asylum policy. 
These concerns are present also in other fields, as for instance family reunification 
(Menz 2011). Hence, Germany has become meticulous in the policies it supports, 
and is sceptical of any talk concerning common or comprehensive EU migration 
policy (Christina Boswell and Hough 2008: 333-34; Green 2001: 99-100; Hellmann 
et al. 2005).  
 
Other asylum-related tensions and crises were present in the 1990s and well 
into the 2000s. Boswell offered an even longer perspective, demonstrating how 
pervasive asylum-related crises were in the past century (Christina Boswell 2000). 
Another example concerns negative competition among member states regarding 
asylum procedures and rights; this is compounded by a fall in recognition rates79 
across Europe. Hatton estimates that the latter dropped from over 50 percent in 1982 
                                                          
79 The recognition rate is defined by Eurostat as “the share of positive decisions in the total number 
of decisions for each stage of the procedure (i.e. first instance and final on appeal)” Eurostat, 
'Glossary: Asylum Recognition Rate', (updated 12 August) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Asylum_recognition_rate>. 
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to 28 percent in 2001 (2005: 107; Messina 2007: 44). The legal convergence 
following the introduction of concepts such as “safe third country” or “safe country 
of origin” into the asylum policies of some member states constituted a form of 
“race to the bottom” (Hatton 2005: 109). In a nutshell, the argument was that “by 
increasing the restrictiveness of their asylum policy […] states will be able to 
redress the inequitable distribution of burdens” (Thielemann 2006: 442). Although 
the Union adopted legislation that should have brought these rates into line with 
one another, they continued to diverge into 2008 (Europolitics 2008). This was 
cause for friction at the EU level. Indeed, in 2009 the Swedish Minister with 
responsibility for immigration rejected accusations of lacking solidarity levied by 
southern member states by highlighting how disproportionate burdens had been 
caused by very low recognition rates in Greece with respect to the same group of 
TCNs (Agence Europe 2009a; Wolff 2008). 
 
The perception of asylum seekers as burdens began to emerge after the end 
of the Cold War. At this time flows increased significantly, as did the associated 
costs, and occasional debates on the issue began to appear in the popular press 
(Hatton 2005). These elements served as the basis for a “policy backlash” that swept 
across Western Europe (Hatton 2005: 107). The 1973 closure of labour migration 
channels also nourished suspicion that asylum seekers were not exclusively seeking 
refuge from persecution, but were also seeking better economic conditions – i.e. in 
reality, they were economic migrants. Again, concerns regarding “bogus asylum 
seekers” spread throughout Europe, with European governments rushing to restrict 
this entry channel. Member states with more generous welfare state provisions felt 
their welfare systems were abused by flows of asylum seekers (Financial Times 
2001a). In particular, such governments believed their systems were compromised 
by less favourable ones in other member states. The emergence of a public discourse 
on bogus asylum seekers is therefore central to the evolution of asylum policy in 
Europe (Christina Boswell 2003b: 317; Cerna and Wietholtz 2011: 199; Green 
2002: 11). The idea of bogus asylum seekers has been variously framed across 
European countries. For instance, the former Austrian Interior Minister talked about 
“economic refugee”, blurring the line distinguishing an asylum seeker genuinely 
seeking shelter from persecution and a migrant who is looking for better economic 
conditions (Agence France Presse 1998b).   
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The policy response to the concept of asylum seekers as burdens was the 
restrictive trend in asylum policy discussed earlier. Nevertheless, member states 
realised that ever tightening national policies would not attain the desired goal of 
reducing asylum inflows, rather it would place further strain on international 
relations (Koslowski 1998: 169). Thus, as the Belgian Minister Antoine Duquesne 
stated in 1999, it was time to "put an end to negative competition between Member 
States" (Agence Europe 1999e). Burden sharing emerged as a way of levelling out 
imbalances among member states. Germany was the first country to table an explicit 
proposal advocating this approach in the early 1990s (Thielemann 2006: 446-47). 
The reasons for this initiative are clear. Germany received approximately half of all 
EU asylum applications between 1988 and 1997 due to the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc and the emergence of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Bloch et al. 2000: 2). 
Its proposal for burden sharing was rejected due to opposition from a number of 
member states, and “temporary protection 'in a spirit of solidarity'” was offered 
instead (Christina Boswell 2003b: 324; Hatton 2005: 109). These issues re-emerged 
in the context of the first negotiations on the European Refugee Fund (Council 
2000r). 
 
A succession of refugee crises awakened member states and created an 
environment where perceptions of risk and the domestic importance of achieving 
political results with regard to asylum became aligned (Financial Times 1999b). 
Indeed, one of the reasons behind the creation of the European Refugee Fund and 
the Temporary Protection Directive was to lower the uncertainties concerning 
emergency situations (member states had recently experienced the Kosovo crisis, 
this is explicitly referred to in the Temporary Protection Directive). Burden sharing 
as a lesson derived from the Kosovo crisis is something that also Commissioner 
Vitorino highlighted (Agence Europe 2000c; Financial Times 1999a). While it is 
true that the timing of the perceived crises varied across member states, these 
developments had become an engrained element of debate surrounding migration 
and asylum in Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden by the late 
1990s  (Alink et al. 2001: 291-92). In addition, while one could be critical of the 
small sums initially allocated to the Fund, such amounts could have bought into the 
scheme also initially reluctant member states. Indeed, it may well have strengthened 
the “symbolic” image of the Fund as a form of exercise in solidarity between 
member states (Hatton 2005; Thielemann 2003, 2005). That said, the growth of this 
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fund from €216 million in 2000 to almost €700 million in 2007 is further evidence 
of increased cooperation and the recognised importance of this policy area over the 
years following its establishment.  
 
Aside from the European Refugee Fund, burden-sharing in EU asylum policy 
mainly materialised through norm-sharing (Barbou Des Place 2002). The 
assumption behind which is that differences in norms and practices are believed to 
influence the choice of destination state among asylum seekers. As long as reception 
conditions differed, it was believed that asylum seekers would have incentives to 
move again within Europe (Bloch et al. 2000: 4; Council 2000n: 4). French Minister 
of Interior Daniel Vaillant voiced this concern, amongst others, and in the run up to 
the adoption of the Asylum Qualification Directive told to his British counterpart 
“they [the British] must also make an effort to harmonise legislation in order to 
make Britain less attractive”. This was a direct reference to Britain’s practice of 
recognising refugees on the basis of persecution by non-state actors, a policy 
opposed by France and Italy (The Guardian 2001b).Ironically, given its position 
that common norms would have led to a more even distribution of asylum-seekers 
across Europe, this criticism was actually well received by the British government 
(Financial Times 2001e; The Guardian 1999). Similarly, Germany came to see 
harmonisation as a means of ensuring burden sharing given its stance that Europe-
wide rules would diminish incentives to exploit more generous provisions in certain 
member states (Hellmann et al. 2005: 150; Schuster 2000: 129). However, Spain 
criticised the harmonisation of social benefit payments and sought to have it ruled 
out due to fears that this factor influenced the choice of the destination country 
among asylum seekers (European Report 1999e).  
 
Measures introduced to restrict secondary movement between member states 
were largely based on the welfare magnet thesis and are connected to concerns of 
abusive exploitation of welfare systems. It follows that they too relate, to the issue 
of disproportionate costs being shouldered by some member states. Secondary 
movements “are more likely to be seen as voluntary and motivated by economic or 
quality of life concerns than by safety” (S. E. Zimmermann 2009: 75). According 
to the Commission, in 2001 the net beneficiaries of the Dublin Scheme were the 
UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, while the net losers were Germany, 
Austria, Italy and France (Commission 2001a: 3). It was revealed that, of the 
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655,204 asylum applications lodged in the EU between 1998-1999, member states: 
exchanged 39,521 requests for take charge / take back applicants (6% of total 
applications); accepted 27,588 of those (4.2%); but actually transferred only 10,998 
applicants (representing 1.7% of the total applications, or 27.8% of total requests) 
(Commission 2001a: 2). The net result is that “in more than 95% of cases it is the 
Member State in which the asylum application is lodged which assumes 
responsibility for examining it” (Commission 2001a: 2). In purely numerical terms, 
the Dublin Convention did not seem to address an important component of asylum 
in member states. On the other hand, this phenomenon seemed to continue into the 
2000s. In 2009 the Commission reported that the “asylum 'lottery'”, due to 
“deficiencies in procedural and substantive standards”, constituted “a driver behind 
continuous secondary movements. Multiple applications remained high – at 17% in 
2006 and 16% in 2007” (Commission 2009a: 11).  
 
These remarks confirm that the first asylum package adopted by the EU did 
not substantially change the underlying imbalances in asylum trends. Reportedly, 
all actors involved in the Dublin Regulation recognised that deficiencies were 
present in the framework, and these were connected to the “lack of trust among 
member states” (Agence Europe 2008d; European Report 2004d). Putting aside the 
quantitative aspects of the phenomenon, the key issue concerning secondary 
movements among asylum seekers has always been the perception of an abusive 
exploitation of national welfare systems (Mitsilegas 2014: 185). 
 
This section has clarified the frequency and extent to which asylum flows 
changed in magnitude and destination during the period under review. It has also 
shown that, while national migration experiences have differed, a gradual consensus 
has emerged on the need for a reduction in flows. Crises were also frequent and at 
times undermined mutual trust among member states. 
 
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
The 2000 European Refugee Fund was the first step taken by member states 
towards “receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and 
displaced persons” (TEC, Art. 63(2)(b). The essence of the Decisions, for Barbou 
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Des Places, is to “set [an] institutionalised fiscal-sharing system” where “low 
receivers [compensate] major receivers” (2002: 24). The Fund recognises that flows 
change both geographically and over time and, by employing a proportional 
element it leaves it open for any member state to benefit. In addition, as the Funds 
are time-limited revisions are carried out periodically. This provides a means of 
stabilising a rapidly evolving political situation. It also empowers principals to reign 
in their agent, should they so wish, by refusing to renew the programme when it 
expires (Pollack 1997: 119). This is not a distant possibility. In one interview, a 
senior official from one of the founding member states expressed dissatisfaction 
about the Commission’s management of the Migration Funds and indicated the 
negotiations concerning the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework would 
be an occasion through which to bring about some changes (Interview 1). In 
addition, a fixed element was incorporated into the scheme to draw in member states 
unaffected by pressing asylum concerns (Christina Boswell 2003b). Reportedly, 
this was brought to the negotiating table by member states who, while at the time 
were not experiencing significant flows of asylum seekers, thought the Fund should 
have helped them in building capacity to respond to potential future flows 
(European Report 2000c). Although it was originally thought that this element 
would have gradually disappeared, it has remained firmly in place within all 
revisions made to date. That said, the fixed component of the first Fund (2000) 
amounted to approximately one third of the total budget, whereas in 2004 revision 
saw this reduced to 16 per cent (Hatton 2005: 111). 
 
The coding results set out in Chapter 3 indicate that the Commission enjoys 
high levels of delegation and medium discretion in the three Decisions. That said 
each also displays a steady decline over time in relation to both the delegation ratio 
and discretion index. The delegation ratio is inversely proportional to the total 
number of provisions and is positively related to the number of provisions 
delegating some powers. If a conspicuous increase in the number of provisions in 
the legal text (which more than doubled between 2004 and 2007) is not matched by 
a similar trend in delegating provisions, then the ratio will decrease mathematically, 
which in turn affects the discretion index. In a principal-agent reading exclusively 
focused on quantitative results, the constant decrease in both delegation and 
discretion would suggest that principals have revised the initial empowerment and 
increased constraints on the Commission (a form of 'negative feedback') (Tallberg 
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2003: 21). However, a closer look at the legal text qualifies such remarks. 
 
The Commission adopts guidelines that identify priorities for the multiannual 
programmes (European Union 2004e: art. 12(1)). It therefore has significant power 
to guide how allocated funds are used also at the national implementation level. 
This decision-making authority is constrained by the Comitology committee 
(management procedure), however the power of setting guidelines has proven an 
important instrument not only with respect to the ERF, but also for the very idea of 
a common EU asylum policy. In its evaluating report (Commission 2011e: 11), the 
Commission highlighted that the Fund had provided grants to 1,403 projects 
between 2005 and 2007, disbursing approximately €151 million of the €297 million 
spent in those years. In this sense, the EU contributed to shaping asylum-related 
projects across Europe by setting methods and objectives for (at least part of) 
national policies on asylum. In addition, the three priorities identified for 2005-
2007 aimed at strengthening the incorporation and application of the EU legislative 
acquis, thus further contributing to harmonising on the ground practices 
(Commission 2011e: 10). 
 
The Commission's role in assessing national actions was however contested 
at first. Council documents reveal that the French delegation saw the Commission’s 
role as fundamental to ensuring member states “evaluation[s]” were subjected to 
scrutiny.  This was a reaction to the Austrian delegation’s suggestion that no prior 
evaluation should be carried out by member states, citing this would absolve 
member states of their responsibilities. The Austrian delegation also wished to limit 
the Commission’s role to one of communications recipient, however the French 
insisted that it have authority to issue a ‘request’ for information and hold a 
monopoly over assessment80. It was proposed that assessments would require every 
member state to provide “sufficiently detailed information to enable the 
Commission to verify” that member states comply “with the provisions of this 
Decision and the financial rules in force” (2000, art. 8(3)). The fact that the Austrian 
delegation subsequently dropped its request would suggest that France was able to 
win unanimous consensus on this point. This granted to the Commission a decisive 
role in ensuring individual responsibility in the context of member states’ allocation 
                                                          
80 Compare the text of the proposal with Council Council, 'Proposal for a Council Decision Creating 
a European Refugee Fund. 8678/00', (Brussels, 2000w) at 18., and the final text of the Decision. 
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of Fund money. These developments are highly important for this dissertation. 
 
It was noted in the earlier discussion on credibility of commitments that 
divergences in adoption of the widening EU acquis were much discussed by 
member states. Indeed, it is an important testament to the strengthening role of the 
Commission on credibility of commitments that it was empowered to set the agenda 
(albeit in the context of Comitology). This has also been identified by other scholars 
(Thielemann 2005: 818). Delegation to the Commission strengthens credibility of 
commitments in at least three conspicuous ways: it focuses European action on 
asylum; it provides ex-ante scrutiny on financed actions; and, it allows for the 
monitoring and sanction of member states' conduct in administering the Fund’s 
finances. 
 
The Temporary Protection Directive also tackles imbalances by promoting 
assistance in emergencies (European Report 2000i). In the past, member states 
showed little solidarity towards those bearing the most onerous consequences of 
inflows (e.g. Germany, Austria for the Kosovo crisis) (Alink et al. 2001). With this 
Directive (alongside the European Refugee Funds), member states committed to 
preventing excessive burdens falling on individual member states. From the 
perspective of the development of a Common Asylum Policy, this Directive was the 
first effort in standardisation that envisaged establishment of minimum standards in 
reception conditions, qualification for international protection status, and 
procedures to be followed in granting such status. This legislative mosaic was 
intended to convince future asylum seekers that they would receive the equal 
treatment anywhere in Europe and that an application filed in any member state 
stood the same chance of success. 
 
The Directive also allocates a small number of critical responsibilities to the 
Commission to help prevent against derogation from commitments to solidarity. If, 
for example, the Commission recognises the existence of an emergency it may 
propose that the Council take a qualified majority decision thereon (art. 5(1)). It 
may also propose the extension81 or termination of emergency arrangements if 
                                                          
81 Germany proposed that, under the solidarity article, any continuation of the emergency 
mechanisms happened after the proposal of the Commission, contrary to a simple Council 
decision Council, 'Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards for Giving 
Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures 
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deemed appropriate (Art. 4(2), Art. 6(1)(b)). However, this power is somewhat 
curtailed by the fact that member states can also prompt the Commission to propose 
such a measure. While a formal reading of the legal text does not decisively answer 
the agenda setting question, the Directive does signal a cautious political approach 
by member states. The Commission has no power to enforce any agreement. As 
Barbou Des Places highlights, even after the entire mechanism had been activated, 
i.e. member states have taken a QMV vote in the Council, they “are not bound by 
any concrete obligations”, but simply have “to indicate, in figures or in general 
terms, their capacity to receive such persons” (2002: 22).  
 
As discussed in the opening section of this chapter, the presence of a marked 
difference between the Commission's original proposals and the texts eventually 
adopted is a common feature of all the Directives constituting the first phase of EU 
asylum policy. This has been noted by both media and academic commentators 
(European Report 2004g; Hellmann et al. 2005: 153-54). This trend tends to 
surround some of the most contentious points of each Directive. That said the 
Council was also divided on such matters. For example, when agreement was 
reached at Council level on the Reception Condition Directive, some member states 
were very critical of the result. In particular, the Swedish Minister of Immigration 
criticised the standards set by the Directive as “way below our standards” 
(EUObserver.com 2002d). This was a particularly salient point given that one of the 
main objectives of this measure was to remove asylum-shopping incentives by 
standardising reception conditions across Europe. Access to labour markets was 
another a contentious issue during Council negotiations (Council 2002b). And a 
number of issues82 “of a politically sensitive nature” (Council 2003d: 3) were 
debated at length during Council negotiations (Council 2002a: 39) on the Asylum 
Qualification Directive. 
 
The Reception Condition Directive implementation assessment report 
highlighted that, although the flexibility of the Directive’s provisions made 
infringements a virtual impossibility, member states' practices varied hugely. The 
                                                          
Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing 
the Consequences Thereof. St 6914 2001 Init.', (Brussels, 2001g)..  
82 The definition of “serious harm” which constituted the basis for the recognition of subsidiary 
protection; access to integration facilities (which is left to Member States' discretion); and again 
access to labour market. 
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Commission concluded that this “undermines the objective of creating a level 
playing field in the area of reception conditions” (Commission 2007a: 10). To 
improve monitoring, the Commission proposed the idea of national contact points 
to, inter alia, streamline communication and facilitate the sharing of experiences 
among member states (Commission 2001c). This was coupled with the provision 
of statistics (as previously discussed in the section on uncertainty above). While 
eventually rejected by member states, this proposal was re-introduced by the 
Commission in the recast Directive. The Commission signalled from the beginning 
that this initiative could have been financed through the European Refugee Fund, 
which would have rendered it virtually cost-free for member states. In addition, the 
EP proposed the establishment of an “independent European supervisory system, 
under the authority of the UNHCR” to supervise “matters relating to employment, 
training and education, and to material reception conditions generally in Member 
States”. This element was also rejected in subsequent negotiations (EP 2002b: 91-
92). More intrusive arrangements, such as inspections by the Commission, were not 
considered despite similar arrangements being undertaken for all migration funds. 
Indeed, the EP was already conducting inspections of reception facilities at this time 
(Commission 2008a: 6; UNHCR 2012: 18). The prospect of empowering the 
Commission to take on such duties was actually voiced after the EP’s inspection of 
the Lampedusa reception facility harshly criticised the poor conditions of that 
structure. Commissioner Frattini’s reportedly responded by saying there were “only 
five officials at the Commission [who] were involved with asylum”, and that the 
“European Commission [to his knowledge] has never carried out such inspections” 
(Agence Europe 2005d). 
 
Member states chose an agenda setting rather than a monitoring and 
sanctioning role for the Commission in the Dublin Regulation. As a result, it is 
empowered to set the implementing rules for:  
 “settling differences between Member States concerning the need to 
unite the persons in question [humanitarian clause], or the place where 
this should be done” (Art. 15(5));  
 “taking charge and taking back” (Chapter V of the Regulation); 
  preparations and procedures for transmitting requests (art. 17(3) second 
indent), acceptable evidentiary requirements  (Art. 18(3)) and the 
interpretation thereof (Art. 20(3));  
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 the carrying out transfers and related matters (Art. 19(5) and 20(4)); and, 
 the establishment of “secure electronic transmission channels” (Art. 
22(2).  
The use of Comitology in Art. 15(5) is noteworthy in that it assumes the form of a 
compensation chamber. It is significant that member states did not agree an 
arrangement on either this matter or on Art. 19(5) and 20(4), which directly address 
problems with the implementation and effectiveness of the Dublin Convention with 
regard to the carrying out of transfers. Having said that, it has to be underlined that 
this agenda setting happened under the strictest of Comitology procedures, i.e. the 
regulatory procedure. The Commission’s involvement in such matters was 
significant, albeit it took place under the close eye of member states. Finally, in 
addition to its traditional role of monitoring through reporting and amending, the 
Commission has authority to approve bilateral arrangements between member 
states where modifications to normal procedures do not infringe upon the main 
tenets of the Regulation (Art. 23(2)). 
 
The Commission has further agenda setting responsibilities under the Asylum 
Procedure Directive. In this instance it drafts the list of countries eligible for 
classification as safe country of origin or safe third country, and this prompts a 
qualified majority vote by the Council (Art. 29(1) and 36(4)). Formally, changes to 
this list can only be made by the Commission, however it must consider any 
requests for change submitted by the Council (Art. 29(3)) or member states (Art. 
29(4)). 
 
 
 4.1.4) Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
This section has two objectives. First, it sheds light on the extent to which failures 
were present in asylum policy at both national and European levels. It further 
considers whether these failures gave rise to delegation to the Commission. 
Secondly, it examines whether member states unburdened themselves and 
consequently freed up vital resources by making use of the Commission's 
coordinating and managerial role. 
 
In order to investigate failures, one should understand what a successful 
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asylum policy is. For member states, a successful asylum policy boils down to 
reducing numbers83 (Terry Givens and Luedtke 2003: 291-30; Guiraudon 2000a; 
Hatton 2005; Thielemann 2006). Apparently, some countries have been very 
effective in doing this. Past studies have argued that Germany, for instance, spent 
much of the 1980s and 1990s trying to restrict asylum. This culminated in 1993 
with mainstream political parties amending the constitutional right to asylum 
(known as ‘the asylum compromise’) (Bosswick 2000: 47-50; Green 2013: 339). A 
reduction of inflows seems to validate this policy response. After experiencing high 
volumes of applications in the early 1990s, German asylum figures reduced steadily 
for the rest of that decade and throughout the 2000s. Both before and after the peak 
of the early 2000s, the UK’s Labour government adopted legislation aimed at 
restricting asylum (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011: 199-201). Again applications 
steadily decreased from over 100,000 in 2002 to approximately 25,000 towards the 
end of that decade (see Eurostat figures in table 4.1). Costs associated with hosting 
asylum seekers, e.g. legal aid (The Times 2003), were also mounting. This was a 
thorny issue in the Asylum Procedure Directive adopted at the EU level, which is 
captured by the difference in transposition deadlines. While the Directive had to be 
transposed within two years, the provision on legal aid in three (European Report 
2004g). According to media and academic commentators, previous internal re-
location programmes did not meet burden-sharing objectives within the UK 
(Christina Boswell 2003b; The Independent 2000). The increase towards the end of 
the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s was one of the factors that motivated the UK 
to work with its EU counterparts on asylum matters. Home Secretary Jack Straw 
declared in late 1998 that “[asylum policy] is an area where work with our European 
partners is essential” (Associated Press International 1998). This position remained 
stable in the following years, although signs of dissatisfaction were mounting. 
Home Secretary Blunkett declared,  
 
“Progress has still been too slow[.] We need to give confidence to 
people living in all EU countries that we are giving priority to these 
issues. Without such trust public concern will rise” (The Guardian 
2002a).  
                                                          
83 On the other hand, it is important to appreciate that for other actors, such as advocacy groups, a 
successful asylum policy is measured by the, for instance, fair procedures and the degree of 
protection granted to individuals Matthew Gibney, 'Policy Primer. Asylum Policy', The 
Migration Observatory (University of Oxford, 2012)..  
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More controversially, Italy is regarded by some to have achieved a momentary 
success in reducing asylum inflows after adoption of its ‘push-back policy’ 
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2010; Giuseppe Sciortino 2014). This was, however, 
later challenged and struck down in the courts (European Court of Human Rights 
2012; Vogt 2012). As a consequence of that European Court of Human Rights 
judgement, Italy pledged not to undertake such policy in the future (MPG 2012). 
Therefore, to what extent this policy could be qualified as successful is open to 
question.  
 
The effects of restrictive asylum policies on asylum flows have nevertheless 
been called into question. First, a number of these policies were adopted in the 
context of a significant decrease in overall numbers of applications lodged in the 
EU. When Maastricht entered into force in 1993, 516,705 asylum applications were 
filed in the EU15. When Amsterdam entered into force in 1999, 352,705 
applications were lodged in the EU15, a reduction of 31.8% when compared to 
1993. And, when the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, Eurostat counted 
266,390 asylum applications. Secondly, the impact of state policies on volumes of 
application has been called into doubt in recent years (Hatton 2011). Thielemann’s 
analysis of the Swiss and UK cases is cause for scepticism over the real effects of 
state policies on asylum flows. Qualitative studies of the UK case have revealed 
that asylum seekers were not influenced by general asylum policy in selecting their 
destination states; it follows that changes in such policies are likely to have proven 
even less influential (Thielemann 2006: 448). Thielemann also employs 
quantitative methods to test the hypothesis that asylum policy affects asylum flows. 
He examines push and pull factors traditionally used by migration scholars to 
understand the patters of asylum applications in a set of OECD countries between 
1986 and 1999. Thielemann finds that “the effect of policy related factors […] is 
not as significant as that of historic and economic factors” (2006: 463). More 
precisely, prohibitions on work and low recognition rates display an effect, whereas 
movement restrictions, benefit systems (either cash or in-kind), and the presence of 
stringent provisions (e.g. safe third country) do not emerge as important predictors. 
Bosswick contests the effectiveness of Germany’s ‘asylum compromise’84 in 
                                                          
84 See previous section. 
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cutting the number of asylum applications on the basis of timing and broader policy 
and administrative changes carried out in the same period85 (2000: 50-51). In sum, 
caution is to be advised when seeking to connect a reduction in volumes of asylum 
applications and the success of a state policy, as other plausible explanations may 
well be present. 
 
Another thorny issue in asylum policy is the extent to which governments 
have been able to remove asylum seekers from their territories where their 
applications have been rejected86, this has been termed the “deportation gap” (M. 
Gibney 2012: 4). An IOM study in 1999 highlighted a number of problems arising 
from past policy efforts concerning both voluntary and forced repatriation of 
asylum seekers (Koser 2001: 11-12). A later UNHCR study found that, 
 
while large numbers of asylum seekers arrive, and few are given 
refugee status, fewer still are forced to leave the country. 
Deportation remains a singularly rare occurrence. Indeed, the 
striking feature of the data is that it shows that deportations have 
in no way increased in a manner commensurate with overall 
asylum applications (M. Gibney and Hansen 2003: 4).  
 
A further UNHCR study found that asylum seekers whose applications had been 
rejected made up a significant portion of all expulsion decisions in Germany (Noll 
1999: 50). For Green, Germany’s “inability to remove failed asylum seekers is 
arguably the Achilles heel of the entire system, as it undermines the credibility of a 
state’s attempts to secure its borders” (Green 2002: 11). Governments have 
undertaken a number of initiatives to empower and improve their “deportation 
machine[s]” (Fekete 2005: 69-70). These mainly include budgetary increases 
(Spain, Sweden), increased numbers of staff dedicated to deportations (Spain), and 
setting targets for annual deportations (UK87). These problems were not solely 
                                                          
85 These regarded the access to the labour market for asylum seekers and the practice of 
fingerprinting them.  
86 It is interesting to see that issues regarding rejected asylum seekers touched not only country at 
the south or eastern periphery of Europe. See the pressures on the Irish governments in the early 
2000 Financial Times, 'Asylum Seekers Find Little Welcome in Ireland', Financial Times 
(2000a).. 
87 For an interesting perspective on the UK, and some comparative remarks with Germany and The 
Netherlands National Audit Office, 'Returning Failed Asylum Applicants', (HC 76; London, 
2005).. 
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apparent to academics and practitioners but were also acknowledged in political 
circles. In a speech given at the opening of Britain’s 2005 EU Presidency, Prime 
Minister Blair focused, in part, on the effective return of rejected asylum seekers. It 
is noteworthy that Blair's attention was exclusively limited to the 'repressive' front 
of migration. No mention was made to any forms of legal migration, or integration. 
As priorities, he listed only enhanced security for borders, and return for failed 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants (Agence Europe 2005b). Moreover, it has 
been reported that the German Interior Minister informed his British counterpart 
that there were some “400,000 rejected asylum seekers which Germany cannot 
remove and are eligible for state support” (M. Gibney and Hansen 2003: 6). The 
media was also well aware of this phenomenon and the difficulties associated with 
quantifying it (Financial Times 2000c; The Guardian 2000a). 
 
Turning to internal relocation mechanisms in the EU, towards the end of the 
1990’s it was becoming clear to policy actors and commentators that the Dublin 
Convention was not working. In particular, great dissatisfaction was mounting 
regarding the loose solidarity commitments undertaken by some member states. In 
short, reforms were necessary88. First, it appeared there was more than a degree of 
confusion over the purpose of the Convention. Some were of the opinion that 
Dublin mechanism failures were synonymous with burden-sharing failures. 
However, this seems somewhat inaccurate. Theoretically, the Dublin mechanism 
could work perfectly well without achieving an equitable redistribution of asylum 
seekers. Its objective was not equitable redistribution, but allocating responsibility 
for processing applications. The Dutch assessment of the Dublin revision highlights 
this exact area of confusion in stating “it is questionable whether the Dublin 
Convention is the appropriate instrument for achieving such an equitable 
distribution” (Council 2000u). 
 
One of the many troubling aspects of the Dublin Convention was the low 
take-up among member states (European Social Policy 2008). The Commission, for 
                                                          
88 Any survey of the press of these years will provide countless of declarations in that sense Agence 
Europe, 'During Informal Meeting in Birmingham, Germany Reopens Question of Sharing 
Burden of Refugees - Other Results of the Session', Agence Europe (7150, 1998a), Agence 
Europe, 'Dublin System Must Be Improved', Agence Europe (9674, 2008d), European Report, 
'Commission Floats Dublin Convention Review Plan', European Report (2000l), The Guardian, 
'Uk Plan for Asylum Crackdown: Proposal for Rapid Reaction Border Guards', The Guardian 
(2002a).. 
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example, cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Convention in noting “the 
considerable problems faced in attempting to monitor the impact of the Convention 
in the absence of adequate statistical information” (Commission 2003d: 6). 
According to the few figures collected by member states during its early days, and 
with only one notable exception, no member state transferred more than 1 per cent 
of asylum applicants under the Dublin scheme (Commission 2000b, 12). Denmark 
bucked this trend by transferring approximately 18 per cent of its asylum 
applications. Nevertheless, the Commission has suggested this success can be 
explained with reference to Denmark’s bilateral agreement with Germany (one of 
biggest receivers under the scheme). The Commission began canvassing member 
states to identify attitudes towards a revision of the Dublin mechanism as early as 
2000, at which point it was immediately clear that major changes were not feasible 
(European Report 2000l; Financial Times 2001c). In 1999, the French Interior 
Minister reportedly declared that “the Dublin Convention was being applied 'badly' 
but that it was probably better to work with this agreement than to try to formulate 
a new one” (Agence France Presse 1999).  
 
Efficiency in asylum policy was a long-standing goal of policy-makers. There 
were frequent calls from all levels to speed up procedures. The EP, while noting 
that intergovernmental procedures for solidarity among member states were not 
working, called for such action (Agence Europe 1999d, 2001f, 2009e). Similarly, 
while unable to agree on a means of achieving it, member states were also keen to 
see a speeding up of procedures.  Member states’ emphasis on quick procedure was 
criticised by advocacy coalitions as detrimental for the asylum seekers’ rights  
(Agence Europe 2005a; Financial Times 2005b). Fast-track procedures emerged 
early on in Europe-wide debates about how a European asylum policy ought to look 
(Agence Europe 2002g, 2003g). These procedures are used by a number of member 
states for applications that are assessed as manifestly unfounded (Reneman 2014). 
UK Prime Minister Blair indicated his belief that cooperation at the EU level 
offered the prospect of establishing common fast-track procedures (The Guardian 
2002b). And, although the Council revealed through a survey of national positions 
that practices varied hugely, all member states agreed in principle to the adoption 
of fast-track procedures and to the strengthening of harmonisation (European 
Report 2000d). 
At the EU level, two initiatives are particularly noteworthy. The failed 
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imitative of common asylum application-processing centres, and EURODAC. 
While EURODAC has already been analysed, the former idea envisaged the 
creation of centres outside Europe to process asylum requests, jointly managed by 
the member states. It was not enacted, at least externally, because of the complex 
legal implications and difficult feasibility (on the other hand, UNHCR informed 
member states that internally it could have been done) (Financial Times 2004).  
 
In sum, the area of asylum witnessed several policy failures. To name but a 
few, these included constant policy efforts to reduce numbers of asylum seekers, 
the continued presence of sizable numbers of rejected asylum seekers whose 
removal was difficult to achieve, the continuous variation in recognition rates across 
EU member states, and efforts at blocking secondary movement. Efficiency was 
clearly also manifest in the desire to speed up asylum procedures and reduce their 
costs.  
 
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
In the interests of efficiency, the Commission has been conferred with authority to 
set out guidelines and priorities for the actions to be funded under the European 
Refugee Fund. According to Czaika (2009), it is authorised to manage and 
administer financial transfers to member states, determine the criteria used to select 
actions for funding and select which actions are funded. This set-up applies to all 
migration funds, as will be discussed in the chapters to follow, and is intended to 
prevent management dispersion and financial waste. The fact that member states 
agreed to converge on key issues and grant the Commission a substantial say in 
formulating these priorities underpins the credibility of commitments made. It also 
has important consequences for the efficiency of the entire operation. In other 
words, the Commission is, to a great extent, the operational manager of the Funds.  
The Commission could use up to 5 percent of the 2000 Fund’s available 
resources for ‘Community action’ to “finance innovatory action or action of interest 
to the Community as a whole” (Art. 5(1)). Although this is an important example 
of delegation, it must be noted that the Commission originally requested that up to 
10 percent of the Fund to be dedicated to these measures (Commission 1999b: 8). 
In 2004 a two-percentage point increase was applied to the share of the Fund 
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allocated to the Commission’s exclusive discretion (Art. 8). This had been preceded 
by a push by the Commission for a significant increase in the Fund budget, which 
it deemed essential to overcoming its “symbolic” nature. However, following a 
2004 redefinition of the actions that were to be promoted through the Fund, the 
Commission’s remit became much more constrained (Art. 8(2)). In a subsequent 
2007 revision, the 'Community actions' share of the Fund was increased to 10 per 
cent. This is even more significant when it is considered that the Commission did 
not request such a rise on this occasion (Commission 2005h: 25). Member states 
instigated this change in agreement with the EP (indeed, the latter had proposed an 
increase of up to 15%) (EP 2005: 19, 71, 76-77). 
While the Commission had more money to spend on Community actions, it 
was also charged with meeting more specific criteria. It may be argued that the 
higher the number of criteria to be met, the more constrained the supranational actor 
is. However this is not effectively measured through Franchino's coding criteria as 
it assigns values on the basis of typology, not the number of occurrences (2004). 
Nonetheless, on careful review of the criteria for actions to be funded, it appears 
that the Commission is not more constrained but rather has gained competences. 
Looking at the Fund from an historical perspective, one notes a low degree of 
specification in the 2000 Decision, with a Commission relatively free to promote 
actions within the context of a non-exhaustive list (Art. 5 (1)). The 2004 Decision 
however introduced a more comprehensive list of actions featuring four specific 
points additional to the typology of actions funded by member states (Art. 8 (2)). 
While this can be read as a restrictive turn concerning Commission's discretion, the 
2007 revision increased this list again, this time to eight-points. The new list 
included all the previous points and introduced new ones concerning common 
statistical tools, structural support for networks present in at least ten member states, 
and the provision of support in emergency situations. The Commission also gained 
powers under another section of the Fund, that of ‘technical assistance’. This 
involved some overlap with the previously held duties along with the introduction 
of new areas of responsibility (e.g. IT systems, and information and training 
measures for national authorities). In sum, although the Commission's remit has 
become more controlled, it is also broader. 
This line of reasoning should however be considered in the context of 
Comitology. The implementation of funded actions took place in 2000 using the 
'advisory procedure', traditionally classified in EU textbooks as the most permissive 
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for the Commission (Hix 2005: 54-55; Nugent 2001: 268-71; Pollack 2003b: 118). 
In 2004, in addition to the advisory procedure, the Decision introduced the 
'management procedure'. In the 2007 revision, the 'advisory procedure' was 
superseded by the 'regulatory procedure with scrutiny'. In a principal-agent 
approach, this dynamic can be read as a tightening of the grip on the Commission. 
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that, in its proposed revision, the 
Commission foresaw neither the addition of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, 
nor its application in the case of adoption of the strategic guidelines89. In short, if 
extensive powers have been delegated to the Commission, member states have also 
found a number of ways to limit its action. A possible reading of the situation is that 
member states saw the benefit of channelling the Funds through the Commission, 
but were unsure how the latter would operate. Therefore, they kept tight control on 
the Commission’s remit. From this perspective, this was a win-win scenario that 
saw member states achieve the common interest of more decisive action in this area 
while simultaneously retaining tight control of their agent90. 
 
Operational management is also present in the case of Eurodac Regulation. 
Eurodac was a technical addition to the failing Dublin Convention that was 
considered necessary to facilitate its successful operation. In other words, it 
provided the essential component necessary to stop the practice of asylum shopping 
(Agence Europe 1999c). The EP apparently supported endowing the Commission 
with an important role, “including responsibility for the co-ordination of data 
exchange and for operating a central database of fingerprints” (The Irish Times 
1998). However this was “categorically” resisted by France and Denmark 
(European Report 1998b, 1998d). The Commission was nevertheless tasked with 
supervising the Central Unit on matters such as security and data protection (Art. 
13(4) and 14(2)). In addition, the Central Unit has a number of duties concerning 
the workings of system. As the Central Unit is located within the Commission and 
the Commission is responsible for it, evaluations and improvements relating to the 
Unit’s operation fall within the Commission's purview. The power of simple 
evaluation would not normally constitute a delegating provision, but the fact that 
                                                          
89 Compare the Commission’s proposal Commission, 'Proposal for a Decision of  the European 
Parliament and the Council Establishing the European  Refugee Fund for the Period 2008-2013 
as Part of the General Programme  ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’ {Sec(2005) 
435}. Com(2005) 123 Final. Cod 2005/0046', (Brussels, 2005h) at 52. with final text of the 2007 
Decision (art. 17(3)). 
90 I owe this latter observation to Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos. 
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the Commission can modify the Central Unit’s working procedures means this does 
constitute delegation (Art. 24).  
 
In terms of effectiveness, the picture for the minimum standards Directives 
adopted by the EU is complicated. No provisions were identified in the legal texts 
that could be explicitly linked to the policy failures identified above. Having said 
that, the extent to which further delegation could have improved the situation is not 
clear, and it is even less clear whether such a move would have proven politically 
feasible. The only case where failure was widely recognised was the Dublin 
Convention, and member states introduced the Eurodac to address this. While the 
Commission is granted powers through the Eurodac Regulation, they seem to relate 
more to the kind of operational management that the Commission is usually granted 
in large IT undertakings such as the SIS or the VIS91. In other words, these powers 
seem more related to efficiency than effectiveness.  
 
With regard to the Asylum Procedure Directive, few efforts were made to 
coordinate policies on reception at the European level before this measure was 
introduced, and it is problematic to begin classifying national policies as failures in 
this area. In fact, as member states' policies varied so widely it is difficult to identify 
whether previous problems led to delegation. For instance, asylum seekers in 
Denmark had an obligation to remain in reception centres in order to qualify for 
assistance, whereas in Sweden additional financial assistance was made available 
to asylum seekers residing outside reception centres (UNHCR 2000: 22)92. Member 
states committed different amounts of resources to asylum reception (Commission 
2001h: 25). However, this stemmed from unique combinations of factors such as 
welfare systems, constitutional arrangements concerning the provision of asylum, 
and historical legacies of hosting asylum seekers and refugees. Arguably, EU 
cooperation did not emerge because of previous failures, but because lacking 
coordination of national policies caused regional problems (negative externalities). 
Finally, as the Directive is not an operational one, i.e. it does not feature any 
executive tasks and there is no need to delegate operational management. This 
rationale is replicable with regard to almost all legislative measures dealing with 
common standards in this area.  
                                                          
91 See Chapter 7.  
92 UNHCR (2000) Reception Standards for Asylum Seekers in the European Union: 22. 
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 4.2. Conclusions 
 
An analysis of institutional contexts reveals that there were a number of divisions 
between member states, but also various points of convergence. In theory, divisions 
within the Council should lead to more delegation to the Commission. However as 
Franchino suggests (Franchino 2004), this is true so long as there is no conflict 
between the Council and the Commission. In the case of asylum policy, this 
dynamic was turbulent to say the least.  
 
The picture presented in this chapter in relation to uncertainty is mixed. It 
rarely induced member states to confer powers on the Commission. Indeed, the 
Commission was often cast as the recipient of notices or the agent responsible for 
disseminating information concerning member states, but this action could seldom 
be the result of its own initiative. Neither could it contribute to the processing of 
that information nor could it oblige member states to take account of its 
contributions. This finding seems to be in line with other studies of delegation 
(Franchino 2004: 269, 72-74, 91, 93). The elements promoting delegation were not 
present in the final legal text. And, until the Migration Statistics Regulation was 
introduced in 2007, the Commission had limited involvement in creating 
knowledge on or informing member states of asylum shopping practices. This was 
despite the fact that little empirical study had been conducted on this hotly debated 
phenomenon. No mention was being made of issues surrounding information on 
countries of origin either. And, even more importantly, little responsibility was 
conferred upon the Commission to investigate, assess or request accurate and 
reliable information from member states on what happened after asylum 
applications were lodged both in terms of the various procedural stages and in the 
event of a rejection93. 
Having said that, there are a few notable exceptions. While in the first two 
Refugee Fund Decisions the Commission was loosely associated with the statistical 
submissions that formed the basis of member states' funding allocations, the third 
revision empowered it to directly intervene in their evaluation. It is noteworthy that 
the Commission is not explicitly mentioned in the legal text until the Decision’s 
                                                          
93  On this, see also the next chapter on irregular migration.  
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third revision. Finally, the Commission's input is fundamental to any decisions 
concerning the list of “safe countries of origin” under the Asylum Procedures 
Directive. 
 
Turning to the credibility of commitments, only a limited role was recorded 
for the Commission on the agenda setting side of minimum standards, while no 
sanctioning powers were recorded at all (except for the European Refugee Funds). 
Member states, albeit realising that EU action could provide a remedy to negative 
externalities, were not however keen on granting powers to the Commission in this 
area. They identified a number of problems in this area, such as secondary 
movement, disproportionate and hard-to-predict inflows, and alleged abuse of 
welfare systems (Mitsilegas 2014: 186). They also experienced a number of crises 
of confidence. That said member states nonetheless opted for a strategy of minimum 
coordination in this area. To that end, a set of minimum standard measures was 
devised that was supposedly capable of limiting disproportionate inflows and 
secondary movement. Member states linked this package to a solidarity mechanism 
(the European Refugee Funds) and this drew buy-in from all actors. Although 
symbolic in its infancy, this system engaged all member states in a broad operation 
that, at least initially, mattered to only a small number of them. This is critical to a 
discussion on delegation as member states placed the Commission at the centre of 
this rebalancing mechanism thereby conferring it with broad and significant 
powers.  
 
The importance of efficiency as a key determinant of delegation is 
immediately apparent from operational arrangements such as the Refugee Funds or 
Eurodac. More precisely, operational management accounts for a number of 
delegating provisions in these measures. There was however no evidence that 
effectiveness was a driving force behind delegation. Member states paid close 
attention to previous failures in the cases of uneven recognition rates across Europe, 
secondary movement, and the status of rejected asylum seekers. They opted not to 
involve the Commission in the first and last of these, and decided to rely on its 
agenda setting function with respect to secondary movement (albeit under strict 
Comitology procedures).  
 
Looking back at Chapter 1, three main trends were identified in EU migration 
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policy literature. The case of asylum policy allows us to discuss one of the best-
known explanations for EU cooperation on migration, the venue-shopping 
argument94. Guiraudon's insights are only partially vindicated in this dissertation. 
Indeed, contrary to one's expectations based on her analysis, member states were 
found to have conferred powers on EU institutions. The important question is what 
sorts of powers. A conspicuous gap was identified with regard to powers of 
sanctions under EU level agreements, limitations were also found with respect to 
monitoring. Member states started out with loose coordination in this area in the 
early 1990s, this bore little fruit though. The incorporation of Dublin, together with 
the construction of a level playing field by means of norm-sharing again left many 
member states dissatisfied95 (Mitsilegas 2014). That said the political compromise 
establishing weak sanctioning measures won much support, this was seen as a win-
win for many member states. Member states with longer histories of migration (e.g. 
UK, Germany) did not want to replicate constraints at the EU level that had been 
painstakingly by-passed at home (Guiraudon 2000a; Joppke 1998). In practice, this 
translated into a preference for little if any sanctioning powers over member states’. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, countries new to the issue of immigration 
signed up to EU arrangements having had little experience with asylum policy, let 
alone its implementation. These countries also featured poor records in 
implementation (Jordan et al. 2003). In the case of Italy, for example, EU asylum 
policy took the form of principled agreements consistent with a broader pro-
European stance (Agence Europe 2001c; Corrado 2002). Having experienced 
exclusion from the first Schengen agreement, Italy preferred to accept an asylum 
legislation package despite its lack of clear benefits (Magnani 2012: 652; Vincenzi 
2000: 101-03). Weak sanctioning mechanisms meant more discretion in on the 
ground application of EU rules. And reports on the Dublin Convention signalled 
that member states in the external ring of the EU were classified as net recipients 
under the Dublin rules, but actual transfers were so “modest” that no talk of 
excessive burden made sense (Commission 2000d). In other words, the gap between 
the letter of EU rules and their implementation already resembled a gulf. In the end, 
while politicians and policy-makers argued against concessions at the EU level that 
would replicate or create domestic constraints, they drifted incrementally towards 
                                                          
94 See Chapter 1 for a thorough presentation of the argument. 
95 This prompted a revision of the asylum package between 2011 and 2013. While interesting indeed, 
a deeper comparison between the first and the second asylum packages is not feasible in the 
limited space of this research, and exceeds the period considered in this dissertation (1999-2009).  
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tighter cooperation over time. This demanded credibility and management to work. 
Past scholarship has highlighted the role of the external dimension of 
migration policy as an alternative to asylum policy deadlocks (Cristina Boswell 
2003c) or as a solution to institutional problems (Lavenex 2006). Where problems 
are understood as institutional constraints that member states wish to avoid, this 
chapter has shown that member states restricted monitoring capabilities and granted 
limited powers to the Commission through legislation setting minimum standards. 
In other words, it seems redundant for member states to have established an external 
dimension of EU cooperation on asylum only as a means of limiting the control of 
supranational bodies given that they had already engineered asylum legislation to 
minimise the role of the Commission.  
 
Normative assessment of EU asylum policy abound (Fekete 2005; M. Gibney, 
J. 2004; Juss 2005; Kaunert and Léonard 2012). Mitsilegas looks at the extent to 
which notions such as solidarity and trust are exclusively interpreted through 
member states’ interests, and the damaging consequences this trend has for 
migrants’ rights (Mitsilegas 2014). This neglect of migrants’ perspectives has given 
rise to a peculiar situation wherein solidarity is based on delegation, that is to say 
member states express mutual commitments to solidarity by sharing key policy 
principles and pooling resources through agencies such as EASO and Frontex 
(Mitsilegas 2014: 189-90). This chapter has confirmed this insight by showing the 
degree of commitments that EU member states to solidarity among themselves. 
While this thesis focus might be ill suited to answer to an assessments of the impact 
of EU asylum law on migrants’ rights, the first section of this chapter has shown 
that, overall, the Commission and the Council had two different stances when it 
came to that issue between 1999 and 2009. Broadly, the Commission took a more 
liberal stance towards migrants’ rights than the Council.  
 
In terms of Community Method, while it is certainly true that member states 
introduced a number of soft policy initiatives in this area, this dissertation highlights 
that member states were also eager to create hard, binding solutions to a number of 
problems. Binding measures were seen as key to solving many of the problems 
member states experienced in relation to fair distribution of asylum seekers and 
responsibility for applications. In addition to which, formal action was taken 
towards supporting policy implementation through establishment of the Funds. 
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These measures prioritise strengthening of the legislative acquis and provide further 
evidence of the commitment to common policies (or at least nominally converging 
ones). In other words, it would be a mistake to interpret policy experimentation as 
a sign of discontent with the Community Method and its formal output. 
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5. Delegation in EU secondary legislation on 
irregular migration 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a qualitative account of the level of 
delegation and discretion in irregular migration policy. Findings set out in chapter 
3 indicate that irregular migration includes only one measure displaying high 
delegation and medium discretion. In addition, this policy area displays the lowest 
average levels of delegation and discretion of all migration categories analysed in 
this dissertation, at 3.9 percent and 2.6 percent respectively. The average constraint 
ratio is also however the lowest among migration categories, at 1.25 percent96 
 
The EU legislative acquis on irregular migration is based on Art. 73(3)(b) and 
includes measures on “illegal immigration and illegal residence, including 
repatriation of illegal residents”. However, much of the legislation adopted by the 
EU concerning asylum and borders and visa policy in the years considered had a 
bearing on irregular migration to a greater or lesser extent (Andreas 2003). After 
the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, the Commission shared the right of 
initiative with member states, there was unanimous voting in the Council, 
consultation with the EP, and the CJEU had only limited powers. It was only after 
the five-year transitional period that the Commission gained the exclusive right of 
initiative (May 2004). 
 
 Irregular migration97 is a broad expression that can be used to encompass 
different forms of irregular entry, stay, and employment within the context of 
national and international discourse. Member states' past efforts at dealing with 
irregular migration had to overcome a huge initial problem relating to the lack of a 
                                                          
96 All these figures refer to results not including implementing measures.  
97 In this research, the expression 'irregular migration' is preferred over other forms also present in 
EU documents, such as 'illegal migrants'. For an early debate on the issue, see the UNHCR 
recommendations to the EU European Report, 'Justice and Home Affairs: Unhcr Says Eu's 
Immigration Policy Is Undermining Right of Asylum', European Report, 29 July 2000a.. “The 
terms irregular (with no regular/legal status), undocumented (without the appropriate papers) 
and unauthorised (without legal permission for entry, stay and work) migration denote different 
facets of the wider phenomenon of irregular migration” Bastian Vollmer, 'Comparative Policy 
Brief - Political Discourses', Clandestino. Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable 
Data and Trends Across Europe (ELIAMEP, ICMPD, 2009) at 1.. While such distinctions can 
be important from a legal standpoint, for the purpose of this research these terms are used 
interchangeably. 
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common definition or understanding of what “irregular migration” constituted 
(Espeth Guild 2004: 3-29; Mitsilegas 2004: 36-37). Legal definitions differed 
among countries, and in at least one case no definition existed at all (Spain) 
(Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 5). Recently EU law has come to define an 
irregular migrant as a, 
 
third-country national present on the territory of a Member State, 
who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions for stay or 
residence in that Member State (European Union 2009a: Art. 2(b)).  
 
As with the previous chapter on asylum policy, institutional dynamics within the 
Council and between the Council and the Commission are first investigated. 
Irregular migration in Europe is then analysed with regard to problems of 
uncertainty, credibility of commitments, and efficiency and effectiveness. A brief 
conclusion sums up the relevant findings.  
 
 
 5.1. Analysis of the determinants of delegation 
 
 5.1.1) Institutional factors: Council internal division and conflict 
between Council and Commission 
 
Cooperation in the Council regarding irregular migration is difficult to characterise. 
The leading view of the Council was that,  
 
illegal entry and illegal migration has come to represent a major 
problem in the Member States of the European Union as well as 
elsewhere in Europe (Council 1999i).  
 
On one hand, this is the area in which the Council demonstrated most clearly their 
ability to create and shape a policy without recourse to the agenda setting role of 
the Commission. The majority of the measures in this area do not stem from 
Commission proposals but from individual or joint member state proposals. In this 
regard political consensus was not nominal but very much applied. On the other 
hand there were doubts over the effectiveness of the measures adopted in the initial 
years. The following discussion demonstrates that actual implementation of these 
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measures was found wanting by the member states. When the Commission began 
proposing legislation divisions emerged more clearly. The Return Directive and the 
Employer Sanctions Directives demonstrate, mainly through the length of the 
negotiations but also the number of reservations entered by national delegations, 
how thorny and divisive the matters at stake were. This is reflected in the average 
length of negotiations in the Council; for Council-led legislation this was 14 
months, whereas for Commission-led legislation it was 25 months.  
 
The fact that this policy area was mainly left to member states in the first five 
years also makes it difficult to assess Council-Commission relations. It is difficult 
then to assess the extent to which preferences diverged as the Commission did not 
table many proposals. Of the eleven measures adopted up to December 2004, only 
two were based on the Commission’s initiative. One Commission proposal was the 
consequence of a request presented in another Council Directive, and the other was 
the Directive on residence permits for victims of trafficking (European Union 
2004d).98 At the supranational entrepreneurship level, the Commission pushed for 
more cooperation in this area from the 1980s and began publishing policy papers 
from the time it obtained the power to propose legislation in JHA (first within the 
context of a new approach to migration) (Commission 2000c). The Commission 
submitted comments on specific forms of irregular migration also covered under 
other policy areas, such as the case of “undeclared work” (Commission 1998). In 
2001 the Commission issued a Communication exclusively dedicated to irregular 
migration (Commission 2001d), which was reportedly well received by the Council 
(Agence Europe 2002k), and then it followed this with several others in the period 
considered.  
 
One of the few areas of contention between the two actors was the 
Commission’s advocacy for matching the tightening of irregular migration with 
increasing channels of legal migration. However debates on this issue were limited 
and light. The fact that the Council had relatively little to be concerned about in 
terms of agency loss is recorded by the constraint ratio set out in Chapter 3, which 
                                                          
98 There were signs at the time that the Council was split during negotiation Agence Europe, 
'Conference on Trafficking in Human Beings Does Not Agree to Grant Residence Permits to 
Victim', Agence Europe, 21 September 2002h.. In addition, by the transposition date, 12 member 
states had not incorporate the text into their national legislation Agence Europe, 'Parliament 
Wants Action Plan to Tackle Human Trafficking', Agence Europe, 18 November 2006b. 
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is the lowest of all migration categories. Authors have argued that the Commission 
seemed to consider that increased labour migration could be achieved only if 
coupled with a resolute stance on irregular migration and employment, or that more 
family reunification could be obtained only by stemming irregular inflows (Bell 
2010: 165). For instance, as argued by Commissioner Frattini, 
 
[w]e need a reinforced and more efficient fight against illegal 
immigration, fundamental for the credibility and coherence of our 
immigration and asylum policies” (Agence Europe 2006c).  
 
This line of reasoning makes it clear that action on irregular migration was deemed 
essential to seeing advances in other migration policy areas materialise. Such claims 
also found echoes in debates within the EP (Agence Europe 2007a), and was 
supported also by individual member states (Agence Europe 2001d; Hansen 2014). 
Member states also demonstrated that they could and wanted to cultivate some of 
their agendas on irregular migration, as well as other areas such as family 
reunification, outside the EU framework. This in turn upset the Commission due to 
fears of being sidelined. This was the case with the G5 meetings of interior 
ministers99 that involved regular gatherings to discuss pressing issues or to step up 
cooperation (Agence Europe 2005e).  
 
 
 5.1.2) Uncertainty 
 
Knowledge gaps existed in all aspects of irregular migration including entry, stocks, 
flows, demographics, and dynamics. Two things can therefore be expected of 
delegation based on uncertainty in this area; first, a pronounced role for the 
Commission in providing expertise on irregular migration; and secondly, a 
prominent role for the Commission in receiving and disseminating information. By 
definition there is no direct administrative record of the multi-faceted social 
phenomenon that is variously labelled irregular migration. Figures and estimations 
are generally derived from other data sets. However as discussed in the previous 
chapter, past research has found that the synergies between different sources and 
data were not fully combined, 
                                                          
99 France, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Germany.  
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in order to create specific indicators that would not only better 
monitor state practices in the field of irregular migration but also 
shed light on migrants´ strategies (Kraler and Reichel 2010b: 53). 
 
In 1991 the Commission stressed the need for harmonised statistics 
“providing reliable information over a satisfactory timescale” in order to overcome 
the gap in knowledge on irregular migration (Mitsilegas 2004: 30). One year later 
this request materialised into the creation of the Centre for Information, Discussion 
and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) within the 
Council. CIREFI was dissolved in July 2010, its tasks now covered by Frontex 
(Peers 2011: 584). This agency has acquired relevance since 2004 for data 
collection and analysis in irregular migration (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 1). 
The first Eurostat studies on irregular migration date back to the late 1990s 
(Eurostat 1998b, 1998a). This is perhaps a consequence of the Commission and 
CIREFI's advocacy for EUROSTAT involvement in the collection of migration 
statistics (European Report 1998d), something that one interviewee from the 
Commission confirmed (Interview 3). 
 
The Commission observed that there were a number of problems related to 
collecting and analysing data and that these related to “statistical confidentiality” 
and “data sensitivity” issues. While “statistical confidentiality” refers to privacy 
issues of an individual, “data sensitivity” is connected with political, policy or 
operational reasons. This latter element has been put forward as one of the main 
cause of the poor state of data gathering in irregular migration, as commentators 
have argued that “numbers of illegal immigrants are underestimated due to the 
reluctance of Governments to admit that they have failed to seal their borders 
properly” (Mitsilegas 2004: 39). One issue of importance to the Commission was 
that of increased transparency in collection, use and diffusion of data on irregular 
migration. The Commission’s Action Plan on irregular migration set its first step as 
“boosting co-operation between national authorities through more information-
sharing and joint operations” (European Report 1998d). This was welcomed by the 
Council, with France being the only exception, in the spirit of Tampere as it related 
to the publication of data (Mitsilegas 2004: 31). France contended that research 
results should not be made public and argued that these should have been limited to 
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government officials and EU bodies dealing with the matter. This element of 
reticence in sharing and releasing information on irregular migration has affected 
much of EU policy on irregular migration (Agence Europe 2002b). Ultimately the 
sensitivity of information relating to irregular migration was clear to all policy-
actors (EP 2003b: 5). In the context of a revision of Community statistics on 
migration the Commission indicated that, due to the sensitivity of the matter, 
irregular migration statistics deserved a separate treatment and their disclosure 
should have been more limited (Commission 2003d: 8, 9; European Report 2003e). 
The Commission seemed to believe that the introduction of the OMC, with its 
emphasis on exchange of information and best practice, could represent a response 
to continuous gaps in information and knowledge (Agence Europe 2001e).  
 
An example of the difficulties related to obtaining and assessing information 
on irregular migration emerged during the Council-led analysis of member states’ 
removals of the irregularly present TCNs. The Council stated that  
 
the statistical data contained in this document may not be 
completely accurate, either because statistics are not updated or 
because national administrations do not collect the relevant 
information (Council 2000|).  
 
Again on information-sharing, in the late 1990s the EP presented a report on 
a rapid alert system for transmitting information on irregular migration involving 
the Commission (Agence Europe 1999a). The idea of an early-warning system was 
also echoed in a series of initiatives of the 2000 French Presidency which did not, 
in contrast, foresee any involvement of either the Commission or the EP (Council 
2000}). The non-involvement of the Commission is noteworthy as France had 
sought a more centralised system than the fragmented and often bilateral exchange 
of information that existed at the time within CIREFI (European Report 2000h). 
The quality of the information provided should also have improved according to 
the French Presidency, providing more and reliable information in a standardised 
manner by means of a revised version of the 'form' in use at the time (Council 
2000~, 2000e). Past efforts however met with a number of differing views from 
member states (Council 2000d). Some preferred bilateral exchanges (Council 
1999d: 2), others were sceptical of the new 'form', while others noted that the 
153/326 
information gathered was too dissimilar to be systematically summarised and 
compared (Council 2000c: 3). While the UK and the Netherlands proposed to 
abandon the system altogether as it was deemed ineffective, Germany pushed in the 
opposite direction and insisted that it should be made compulsory (Council 2000b). 
In other words, the proposed solution to a clear policy failure did not involve the 
Commission in any way. 
 
Another example that illustrates the difficulty of collecting and comparing 
data coming from different member states becomes apparent if attention is paid to 
CIREFI data collection practices. In 1997 member states agreed on the data to be 
collected within CIREFI. This was mainly based on a number of categories such as 
refused aliens, illegal presence, facilitators, removed aliens, regularisations, etc. 
First of all however, these categories were questionable in terms of both accuracy, 
e.g. “refused aliens” did not distinguish between efforts at multiple and single 
entries. Secondly comparability was an issue, i.e. it was not certain that member 
states meant the same thing when it came to illegal entry, stay and employment. 
Due to these difficulties and “with a view to enhancing the collection of statistical 
data on illegal migratory flows and assessing the situation in a uniform manner”, in 
March 1998 it was decided “to make the Commission's statistical service, 
EUROSTAT, responsible for collecting and processing data on behalf of CIREFI” 
(Council 2000}: 2). Serious problems also arose with the collection of evidence in 
this policy area. That is cooperation in sharing information and knowledge was not 
always forthcoming, for example the monitoring system adopted by the Council for 
irregular migration initiatives under Maastricht received information only from 
some member states (Council 1999f). The Greek delegation also issued a 
questionnaire to other delegations to obtain further information on regularisation 
programmes, again obtaining responses from only some delegations (Council 
1999h, 1999g). To help in better tackling the problems related to knowledge and 
information in irregular migration, CIREFI proposed a “[c]onceptual framework to 
be used in the exchange of data on illegal entry in international cooperation” 
(Council 1999i). With reference to the possibility of forging a common returns 
policy, Commission officials explained how difficult it would be in the absence of 
“harmonised methods for calculating statistics”. In doing so they first highlighted 
examples of member states who did not provide any data, they then raised the issue 
of non-uniformity of data on phenomena falling under categories of irregular 
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migration. For example, some member states were reportedly including “people 
who were denied entry to the EU at a land border” in return figures (European 
Report 2002c). During the French Presidency in 2000 a, seminar on illegal 
immigration networks reached wide-ranging conclusions on irregular migration, 
stating that  
 
“it was clear that existing practices were found wanting and the 
participants expected practices to be improved. This was the case 
for communication and the exchange of information: The 
participants unanimously called for smoother and swifter 
communication procedures (Council 2000h: 15) 
 
Despite a context characterised by uncertainty, politicians have not hesitated 
to jump on this issue (Agence France Presse 2002; EUObserver.com 2002c; 
European Report 2002d). Many commentators have suggested that the release of 
figures and facts on irregular migration has caused public concern within Europe 
and has caught the attention of politicians and policy-makers (BEPA 2006: 6, 9, 
16)100. Indeed this claim is made in the opening statement of the CLANDESTINO 
an EU-funded project that has become the most respected source of information on 
irregular migration data. Sizes, stocks and flows are obviously difficult to control 
and verify in this area, which is by definition outside the remit of state control. 
Whether spontaneous or nurtured by politicians, public opinion in member states 
demonstrated concern over numbers and purported increases in irregular migration. 
There was also support for the notion that the EU was the appropriate place to tackle 
this phenomenon (Agence Europe 2002n). The latest confirmation of this trend was 
identified in the 2012 Eurobarometer survey on awareness of Home Affairs policy 
among citizens. This found that a majority of respondents were in favour of 
increased EU assistance to member states in handling irregular migration and felt 
that the costs of such assistance should be shared among member states 
(Eurobarometer 2012: 14-16). This concern over irregular migration has been 
tackled in political discourses by displaying what some authors term “effective 
                                                          
100 See also Blair's declaration on trafficking (followed by Jack Straw), which also served the 
purpose of blocking irregular migration through the Balkan route Financial Times, 'Cook Seeks 
'People Trafficking' Curb Illegal Immigration Britain to Ask Eu Partners to Help Close Balkans 
Route to West', Financial Times, 19 January 2001b, The Guardian, 'Penalising the Poor: The 
West Wants the Free Movement of Capital, but Not of Labour. It Is Illogical and Immoral', The 
Guardian, 19 March 2001a.. 
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governance”, that is to say the tendency to focus “on numbers (of arrests, 
deportations, sums spent, border guards hired)”, with the ultimate goal being 
political attention and recognition (Vollmer 2009: 2). This is only strengthened by 
the fact that the general public is increasingly concerned with the extent and 
dynamics of irregular migration, indeed more so than any other aspect of migration 
(Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 2). 
 
A number of examples can clarify this trend. Sarkozy's political career is 
regarded as emblematic of the benefits of being seen as resolute and effective in 
dealing with migration in general, and irregular migration in particular (Marthaler 
2008: 387). His resolve in dealing with migration, and irregular migration in 
particular, as the French Interior Minister was also a major factor in his candidature 
to the Elysée. While operating in this capacity, Sarkozy gathered Interior Ministers 
from a select number of member states to adopt a European strategy on the issue, 
thus gaining domestic and international recognition (Financial Times 2005b). UK 
Home Secretary Blunkett saw cracking down on irregular migration as the only way 
of re-establishing “trust” in the migration system and opposing right-wing parties 
(Financial Times 2002e). The combination of “number games”101 and perceived 
threats has enabled politicians to benefit from irregular migration issues (Financial 
Times 2002f). The Italian Interior Minister for example asserted that there were two 
million people waiting in Libya to sail to Europe, even though the source(s) of those 
figures were not made clear (The Times 2004). This reference to Libya exemplifies 
one of the most frequent images of irregular migration (The Observer 2003), which 
is connected to the “myth of invasion” of African immigrants onto European 
Mediterranean shores (de Haas 2009). This perspective also permeated through to 
the highest political levels as demonstrated, for instance, through the Council 
statement concerning ‘[c]onclusions on illegal immigration and trafficking of 
human beings by sea’ (Council 2002d). Early estimates of irregular immigration 
into Europe followed a similar pattern, with widespread adoption and use of figures 
by EU institutions which received little scrutiny (Giuseppe Sciortino 2004: 18). 
                                                          
101 “The term 'Number Games' is coined to note the significance and role of the numbers in media 
and policy discourses. State authorities, governments (and occasionally other stakeholders such 
as NGOs, think tanks, etc.) use and interpret figures depending on their own strategic interests” 
Vollmer, 'Comparative Policy Brief - Political Discourses'.. As an example of these number 
games and of political will to exploit concerns on irregular migration at all levels of the political 
food chain, see The Observer, 'Bosnia Cashes in on Migrants', The Observer, 28 January 2001, 
The Times, 'Study Says 100,000 a Year Enter Illegally', The Times, 6 October 2005a.. 
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Again, this emerged during Council debates on the Asylum Procedures Directive 
where Italian Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu reportedly held that “the two 
questions of illegal immigration and asylum are linked” as  “only 6 or 8% of 
requests for asylum made by illegal immigrants are founded” (Agence Europe 
2002g). 
 
 A host of other actors also became increasingly aware of the magnitude of 
irregular migration. The Commission and other international actors such as the UN, 
ILO, OECD and the Council of Europe became involved in irregular migration 
issues from the 1970s onward (Cholewinski 2004: 160). In 1997 the United Nations 
Population Division asserted that “undocumented migration is ‘one of the fastest 
growing forms of migration in the world today’” (BEPA 2006: 11; Düvell 2011b: 
78). The OECD began regularly releasing reports on irregular migration from the 
mid-1980s (Düvell 2011b: 78, 81), and in 1999 stated that in Europe the “wide 
range of statistical observation systems employed but is above all testament to the 
exploratory nature of these first attempts” (European Report 1999b; Tapinos 1999a: 
233). The OECD also focused on the weakness of the statistical apparatus in dealing 
with irregular migration, the level of difference between national systems, and the 
difficulty of ensuring reliability even within national systems (Tapinos 1999b). This 
conclusion was perfectly in line with the result of one of the first Eurostat studies 
on the topic, stating that,  
 
même s’il n’est pas complet, cet inventaire des estimations donne 
une idée de leurs lacunes, montre même dans la plupart des cas leur 
absence de fondement statistique (Eurostat 1998b: 72)102.  
 
Numbers games have also affected the Commission. Although the 
Commission recognised that by definition it is “impossible to have a clear picture 
of the scale of the phenomenon” of irregular migration (European Report 2001d), 
it was nonetheless eager to put forward its proposals, possibly due to “its social, 
economic and political implications” (Mitsilegas 2004: 30). This is clearly visible 
in the Communications and Green Papers issued on irregular migration issues in 
the early 2000s. It is puzzling then that the Commission concluded more recently 
                                                          
102 My translation would be: “even if not complete, this inventory of estimates gives an idea of their 
gaps, showing also that, in the main, they lack any statistical grounding”.  
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that “the data presented in this note do not support the idea that illegal immigration 
to the EU is increasing” for the period 2004-2007 (but with some categories of data 
going back to 2002) (Commission 2009c: 35). Similarly in its recent report on the 
Employers Sanction Directive, the Commission stated, “the majority of irregular 
migrants remain undetected”. While this may well be the case, no evidence is 
provided to support this statement (Commission 2014c: 2). 
Doubts surrounding data and information on irregular migration aside, it is 
evident that after such statements by some of the key actors in the field it was not 
possible to ignore the phenomenon. These statements, however, portrayed neither a 
reliable nor a common knowledge of the scale and dynamics of the phenomenon in 
Europe. For many member states this was also lacking at the national level. To 
conclude, it is easy to see the high degree of uncertainty – understood in this 
dissertation as impacting on the role of information and knowledge – surrounding 
any talk about the intensity and form of irregular migration at both national and 
European level.  
 
Since uncertainty is defined as the lack of knowledge and limited flow of 
information, this overview of the national and European situations shows the extent 
to which the policy area of irregular migration suffered as a consequence of 
uncertainty. Indeed, uncertainty permeated both the national and European levels, 
and ranged from information collection and sharing to the provision of expertise.  
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
In 2001 and 2004 the Union equipped itself with two measures dealing with 
“the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals” 
(European Union 2001a, 2004c). A crucial element for the viability of these two 
legislative measures was the presence of a reliable information mechanism that 
could provide member states with and allow them to share information on expulsion 
decisions. While the original French proposal did not include clauses related to the 
circulation of information among member states, the final text included it (Art. 6). 
This function was not delegated to the Commission but was left to member states 
to manage. This turned out to be a determinant factor in the difficult implementation 
these measures had. In 2004 the Commission stated that “it must be noted that no 
progress has been made on a common mechanism for exchanging information on 
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return decisions” (Commission 2004b: 10). The Council was of the same opinion 
when it encouraged national administrations to cooperate more on that matter 
(Council 2004f: 1-2). In light of this acknowledged informational weakness, it is 
even more puzzling that the 2004 Decision granted no power to the Commission in 
this area. Moreover, although the 2003 proposal called on all member states to 
present an annual report to the Commission providing detailed information on the 
application of the Decision (Council 2003b), this was judged too cumbersome and 
was scrapped in the final version in favour of a more general provision of 
information “on the number of enforcement measures […] which were reimbursed 
in accordance with this Decision” (Art. 4). The EMN Report on 'Return Migration', 
which captured attitudes of a number of member states' national administrations, 
found that the Directive did not have any significant take up by member states103, 
inter alia, because of lack of information about other member states' decisions 
(EMN 2007: 19-20). In sum, while there was a recognised need for information 
sharing the Commission was not involved.  
A similar element is present in the Italian initiative on the organisation of joint 
flights for removal of third country nationals (European Union 2004b). A 
“systematic exchange of information”, albeit envisaged by the Italian Presidency as 
a flanking measure for the 2004 Decision, did not materialise in the legal text 
(Council 2003c). The Irish Presidency seemed to agree when it held that “this issue 
needs to be addressed in order to give full effect to the Decision” (Council 2004e). 
The solution to these recognised problems came a full two years after the proposal 
had been tabled with the entry into force of Mutual Information Mechanism 
Decision (Commission 2006c; European Union 2005). A couple of months 
following the adoption of the Decision, the Council called on the member states to,  
 
report regularly to the Council and to the Commission on joint 
flights carried out by them and to share the information and 
experience for the benefit of all Member States (Council 2004d). 
 
The 2003 Directive on assistance in removals recognises the need to 
communicate relevant information for the purposes of carrying out removals of 
                                                          
103 “Despite the widespread transposition, there has been little or no experience in its 
implementation” Emn, 'Return Migration', EMN Synthesis Report: Research Study III (2007) at 
19.. 
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TCNs transiting through other member states. This simple recognition, which is not 
present in other contemporary legislative measures, derives from Art. 4(3) but is 
managed by member states. Any modifications to the “form” used in such 
information exchanges are made under a Comitology procedure, thereby granting 
the Commission a say on how information is managed and used (Art. 4(3), second 
subparagraph).  
 
The 2004 Regulation on the creation of an immigration liaison officers’ [ILO] 
network was the outcome of a Greek initiative (Council 2003a). Immigration liaison 
officers are mandated to aim for “the prevention and combating of illegal 
immigration, the return of illegal immigrations and the management of legal 
migration” (Art 1(1)). This Regulation feeds into the plan to manage the external 
borders of member states by “setting up […] networks of immigration liaison 
officers posted in third countries”. Member states’ consular officials are thus invited 
to share knowledge and information on irregular migration flows coming into the 
EU. In order to facilitate that, the Commission has been empowered to design and 
adopt a “model and a format” for the six-monthly report that each Council 
Presidency must complete concerning the activities of ILO network (Art. 6(2)); 
draft the annual evaluation report on the activities of the network; and, compile an 
annual “factual summary” on the situation and progresses in the management of 
irregular migration, together with “such proposals or recommendations as it deems 
appropriate” (Art. 6(4)). While these provisions are clearly aimed at reducing 
uncertainty, they also deal with efficiency issues. This is particularly the case with 
the final two provisions given that they concern saving resources through the 
centralised management of certain aspects of policy aspects through the 
Commission. 
The EP’s proposal favoured an even stronger role for the Commission, 
suggesting that it should have responsibility for informing and updating liaison 
officers on the conditions of “entry, exit and residence in the various Member 
States” (EP 2003a). The EP’s position was that this arrangement would be “in the 
interests of improving information policy in the fight against illegal immigration” 
(EP 2003a)104. This would have amounted to a further confirmation of the 
Commission’s role in reducing uncertainty by managing information. It should also 
                                                          
104 Emphasis in the original.  
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be noted that not all member states have the means to assign migration liaison 
officers to a number of countries (the Commission’s 2009 proposal to amend this 
Regulation stated that member states had ILOs in more than 130 countries) (Peers 
2011: 545). In such cases, it was proposed that the Commission should play a 
central role in providing an equal amount of information to all players in the 
Council. This element was however dismissed in the final version. 
 
The Commission has similar powers concerning the management of 
information within the European Return Fund as it does in relation to the other 
migration Funds. It can request information (Art. 14(4)), has the power to 
“check[ing] the existence and proper functioning of management and control 
systems in the Member States” (Art. 11(2)), and can withhold or suspend “payments 
in part or in full” if those systems fail. The “reference figures” mentioned in Art. 
14(4) are the basis on which annual disbursement allocations are made and are a 
direct product of the management system. It is therefore safe to say that in instances 
of verified mistakes in data the Commission is authorised to take appropriate 
measures. In addition to uncertainty, a credibility of commitments logic is evident 
here where proper functioning of the policy is assured by the Commission's power 
to monitor and, if needs be, sanction specific operational failures. 
 
Under the Employer Sanctions Directive member states must communicate 
data and figures concerning inspections to the Commission, it is then responsible 
for reporting on the issue (Art. 16(1) and (2)). This tackles a source of uncertainty 
concerning internal labour market controls operated by member states and also 
gently pressures member states to do more in terms of controls. Germany, for 
example, is one of the few member states where, according to commentators, 
opposition to irregular immigration has translated into more efforts in labour market 
inspections (Castles 2006: 16; Düvell 2011b: 61; Martin 2014).  
 
 
 5.1.3) Credibility of commitments 
 
In 1998 the Council invited the Commission to put forward “practical 
proposals for combating illegal immigration more effectively [that] need to be 
brought forward swiftly” (Council 1998). Despite this recommendation the 
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Commission abstained from presenting such proposals, instead leaving the way 
clear for member states (Barbagli et al. 2004: 38-39). This proactive role of the 
member states is testament to their interests. The Tampere European Council 
committed the Council to adopt legislation tackling human trafficking and the 
networks involved in such practices (European Council 1999: IV, 23). The Hague 
Programme emphasised the need to tackle irregular employment, nevertheless 
member states were left to set the targets for the reduction of the informal economy 
within the European employment strategy (Council 2004a: 10). The fight against 
“illegal immigration” also appears to be the ultimate objective behind a number of 
policies on borders and visas, asylum, and cooperation with third countries (Council 
2004a).  
 
Estimates of irregular migration in the EU have considerably improved since 
the EU-funded CLANDESTINO Project. Numbers of irregular migrants in the EU 
ranged from:  
 
 3.1 to 5.3 million in 2002, i.e. 0.8 percent to 1.4 percent of the total 
EU population or 14 per cent to 25 percent of the foreign population;  
 2.2 to 4.8 million in 2005, i.e. 0.58 percent to 1.23 percent of the total 
for the EU-15  population or 8 percent to 18 percent of the foreign 
population; and, 
 1.8 to 3.3 million in 2008, i.e. 0.46 percent to 0.83 percent of the total 
EU-15105 population or 7 percent to 12 percent of the foreign 
population (Vogel 2009: 4).  
 
These figures are particularly significant when compared with numbers of 
foreign residents, and that is especially the case for 2002 when the maximum 
estimate represented a quarter of the total foreign population. A trend of decline is 
also evident from these figures, estimates for the numbers of irregular migrants as 
percentage of foreign population approximately halved between 2002 and 2008 
(Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 1, 2). This trend also seems to be carried through 
to some member states such as Germany, although not to all. There is also wide 
disparity between member states in terms of numbers of irregular migrants. It is 
                                                          
105 This declining trend is not entirely due to the Enlargement process, as the aggregate calculation 
is made for the same set of Member States (i.e. 15).  
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clear from these figures that a number of countries were particularly subject to 
irregular migration, they are (in declining order for 2008): the UK; Italy; Germany; 
France; Spain; Poland; and, Greece. In addition to which the ratio of numbers of 
irregular migrants to the resident populations appear high for countries such as 
Greece, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland. Such disparity arguably 
prompted individual member states to put financial solidarity mechanisms in place, 
as was the case with Belgium (Agence Europe 2002b) and Spain (Agence Europe 
2002l). 
 
A final element relevant to the issue of uncertainty in irregular migration 
concerns actual flows (Düvell and Vollmer 2011: 6-7). Flow patterns seem to have 
significantly changed since Frontex has begun to track them. This factor encourages 
a long-term approach as member states realise that flows are likely to change in 
magnitude and composition through time. Such a long-term approach must, in turn, 
be underpinned by credible commitments in order to be effective. That aside, from 
the perspective of uncertainty the rapid change in points of entry reveals the 
importance of the circulation of information among member states, something the 
early warning system discussed in the previous section was intended to tackle. At 
times these shifts in the geography and typology of “illegal border crossing” were 
very rapid. For instance, Frontex reported that the ratio between land to sea illegal 
border crossing in the Eastern Mediterranean Route106 jumped from 65 percent to 
35 percent respectively, to 90 percent to 10 percent between the first and the second 
quarters of 2010 (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 10). This route alone made up 
54 per cent of all illegal crossings into the EU (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 
10). From a geographic viewpoint, Italy went from more than 35,000 detections of 
unauthorised entries in 2008 lo less than 10,000 the year after, whereas in the 
Turkish-Greek land borders they went from less than 10,000 in 2009 to more than 
46,000 in 2010 (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 10).  
 
Crises also affected the credibility of member state commitments in this 
policy area. Some member states saw irregular migration as a consequence of the 
length of their borders and their geographical positions, and believed that help 
should have come from other member states in that respect. Other member states 
                                                          
106 Mainly from Turkey to Greece by land or sea. 
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viewed the conspicuous presence of irregular migration as due to ineffective 
migration management, they therefore deemed that improving the situation required 
a national policy response (Agence Europe 2003a). The effective removal of 
irregularly present TCNs was one issue that arose. Another was the need to address 
the scenario whereby irregular migration was not only present in Europe but was 
tolerated in some countries. Irregular migration was also constantly produced in 
member states, because possible sources of irregular migration were not closed 
either. Migrants could still overstay their visas, cross borders without travel 
documents or with forged ones, or take up employment in member states without 
having the necessary permissions to do so. Although commentators have 
highlighted that estimates of absolute numbers of irregular migrants suggest a  
decrease since the mid-2000s for a variety of reasons (Düvell and Vollmer 2011), 
its political relevance has not (Kraler and Rogoz 2011). Irregular migrants found 
hiding in trucks, vans, and other modes of transport have made headlines in a 
number of member states.  
Member states recognised that pressing imbalances emerged from the 
different levels of and exposure to irregular migration present among them 
(Commission 2006b: 3). A thorny issue surrounded the suspicion that authorities in 
some member states were turning a blind eye to flows they knew were only 
transiting through their territories without the intention of staying. In the early 
2000s for example, France and the UK held several high-level meetings to try to 
sort out problems related to asylum seekers and irregular migrants reportedly 
flowing from France to the UK via the Channel Tunnel (Financial Times 2002b; 
The Times 2001a). French authorities supposedly behaved ambiguously towards a 
number of would-be asylum-seekers initially camped close to the town of Sangatte, 
thus allowing them to later make an onward journey to the UK (Wihtol de Wenden 
2011: 74). Such speculation and concerns undermined the credibility of 
commitment to the policy of reducing the numbers of irregular migrants. More 
recently southern member states have complained of lacking solidarity from other 
member states and have threatened to reconsider other migration policy 
commitments in response. In 2006 eight heads of state and prime ministers jointly 
wrote to the Finnish Council Presidency seeking renewed EU action to relieve the 
southern member states most exposed to irregular migration inflows (Agence 
Europe 2006f). A Spanish request for more assistance from fellow member states 
was opposed by Germany and France. Germany stated  that its financial solidarity 
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had limits, and reminded how little help it had received in the early 1990s to cope 
with its own asylum crises, and France connected the current Spanish problems to 
the pull-factors of the regularisation that country carried in 2005 (Agence Europe 
2006a; European Report 2006c). Specific issues also divided member states, such 
as whether and how to redistribute the presumed irregular migrants107 landing on 
some member states’ shores. In the 2000s this has been a frequent request of smaller 
member states such as Malta (Agence Europe 2007c), and which have been often 
supported by the EP (Agence Europe 2007b). 
 
A further question regarded what to do with the irregular migrants already 
present in the territory. Regularisations (amnesties or normalisations) can be 
broadly defined as,  
 
any state procedure by which non-nationals who are illegally 
residing, or who are otherwise in breach of national immigration 
rules, in their current country of residence are granted a legal 
status108 (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009: 9).  
 
The REGINE study – a large-scale EU-funded research project on 
regularisations in Europe – found that all member states featured “production” of 
irregular migration in one way or another. Large-scale regularisations, while 
routinely practised in the past by a number of member states, are now often met 
with widespread criticism (Finotelli and Arango 2011: 496-97). The REGINE 
project calculated that between 5 and 6 million irregular migrants were regularised 
from 1996 to 2008 using different methods and based on different legal statuses 
(Kraler 2009b). However regularisations do not entirely solve the problem of 
irregular migrants already present in member state territories. Of the 4.7 million 
applications lodged in the period 1996 to 2007 only 3.2 million were accepted. On 
top of these residual failed applications, about which little is known, one must add 
the constant inflow of irregular migrants. The Commission places numbers of the 
latter group at “between 893000 and 923300” annually by aggregating estimates for 
21 Member States, though net inflows are believed to be “much less” (Commission 
                                                          
107 While member stated tended to regard these migrants as irregular, it could be noticed that their 
legal status was unclear, as some of them could lodge an asylum requests when offered the 
possibility.   
108 Emphasis in the original.  
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2007f: 3). 
Turning to specific cases, Italy ran six regularisations between 1982 and 2002 
involving approximately 1.5 million irregular migrants (Baldwin-Edwards and 
Kraler 2009: 71-73). Between 1985 and 2005 Spain regularised approximately 
1.176 million irregular migrants. France regularised in the region of 268 thousand 
individuals between 1973 and 2006. Guiraudon and Jileva have found that France, 
through a “case-by-case regularization system [has processed] as many as 20,000 
persons a year” (2006: 283; Kraler 2009a: 37-38). Germany has a category of 
irregular migrants who have come to be 'tolerated' by virtue of satisfying a number 
of possible criteria (Council 1999g). In practice the obligation to leave is suspended, 
but their presence has an ambiguous legal status (Council 2000z: 2). Between 1996 
and 2006 Germany regularised approximately 75 thousand “hardship cases, 
'Rejected asylum seekers', and 'Long-term tolerated persons' 
('Bleiberechtsregelung')” (EUobserver.com 2007).109 That said approximately 84% 
of all “known applications” for regularisation programmes are made up by Italy, 
Spain and Greece (in decreasing order) (Kraler 2009b: 3). It is clear then that,  
 
recent experience in Europe shows that it is not an option to decide 
whether to have an amnesty or not; rather, the choice is between 
repeated amnesties and discreet amnesties carried out on a case-by-
case basis (Tapinos 1999a: 243). 
 
These differences in practices have amounted to crises of confidence between 
countries that practice large-scale regularisation programmes, mainly southern EU 
states such as Italy and Spain, and states harshly opposing this policy option, such 
as Germany, the Netherlands and, more recently, France (Brick 2011: 6). One of the 
most recent battles on this issue occurred during the negotiations for the 2008 
'European Pact on Immigration and Asylum', when the Spanish and French Interior 
Ministers were unable to settle the dispute on whether or not to insert a clause 
banning mass regularisation (EurActiv 2008). In the end the proposed ban was 
diluted as the pact was “only political and not binding”, as former Italian Prime 
Minister Berlusconi put it (Agence Europe 2008c). In terms of mutual trust, there 
                                                          
109 For the sake of comprehensiveness, it has to be noted that some member states would argue 
against an understanding of “tolerated persons” as irregular migrants Christal Morehouse and 
Michael Blomfield, 'Irregular Migration in Europe', (Washington, DC: Migration Policy 
Institute (MPI). 2011) at 4..  
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is a widespread image of the southern states as constituting the “soft underbelly” of 
Europe (Finotelli 2009: 866). Those countries feature a deeply rooted shadow 
economy that makes any reduction in the stock and inflow of irregular migrants 
difficult (Geddes 2003), thereby triggering the widely criticised practice of 
regularising migrants. This image nurtures scepticism among some member states 
regarding the capacity and willingness of others to adopt and implement irregular 
migration-control measures.  
 
To conclude, member states have been subject to differing flows of irregular 
migrants and have hosted uneven numbers of irregular migrants. Despite being 
present in almost all member states, regularisations were uneven in terms of 
numbers of irregular migrants regularised, the legal status of migrants both before 
and after the regularisation, and the methods used. 
 
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
The Directive on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions targeted the problem 
arising from TCNs subject to expulsion orders moving to another member state and 
therefore avoiding EU expulsion (European Union 2001a, 2004c). In an internally 
border-less Schengen area the possibility of TCNs fleeing prosecution by moving 
from one country to another was plausible. Evidence of this phenomenon however 
remained anecdotal at best, indeed no figures were retrievable from any of the 
documents consulted in this dissertation. The first element crucial for the viability 
of the legislative measure was a reliable information mechanism; this has already 
been discussed in the previous section. The second was a financial element that 
could resolve imbalances arising from expulsion decisions. Member states were 
concerned about the consequences of executing expulsion decisions issued by other 
member states once TCNs were in their territories. Article 7 sets out that the 
Commission is granted powers to formulate a proposal “to adopt appropriate criteria 
and practical arrangements” to establish how “[m]ember [s]tates shall compensate 
each other for any financial imbalances” originating from the application of the 
Directive. In other words authority was delegated to the Commission to formulate 
the proposal for the creation of the compensation mechanism. Clarifying the 
financial consequences of the Directive makes the agreement viable (Council 
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2000v). Council negotiations demonstrate that the issue of costs was a concern for 
many national delegations (Council 2000t). (Council 2000t)(Council 
2000t)(Council 2000t)(Council 2000t)By reassuring actors that the rules for future 
development of the Directive would be laid down by a third party and would not 
result in periodic ad hoc agreements, the neutrality necessary to convince all actors 
to take part was present. 
 
The idea behind the 2001 Carrier Sanction Directive was to make private 
transport industry actors liable for the immigration consequences of their services. 
Some member states, such as the UK and Germany, had indeed introduced similar 
measures as far back as the mid-1980s (Hatton 2005: 108). The Council, and 
particularly France who had proposed this measure, considered that “making 
carriers face up to their responsibilities constitutes one of the essential lines of force 
of this [irregular migration] policy” (Council 2000s; European Report 2000b). With 
this legislation in place member states could also avoid a race to the bottom arising 
from efforts to offer advantageous deals to private carriers to the detriment of EU 
counterparts. At the time this measure was designed there were particular concerns 
regarding unfair competition in the air transport sector. Consequently there were 
reasons for delegation of strictly monitoring functions. In practice however this 
Directive features no delegating provisions whatsoever, not even the otherwise 
ubiquitous right to propose amendments after a revision of the policy.  
 
Another Decision where credibility has played an important role in delegation 
is the European Return Fund. The Fund is part of a broader package of Decisions 
making up SOLID (“Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows”), and was 
the first legislative measure adopted in this policy area using the co-decision 
procedure. The structures, provisions, and delegation within the Fund are similar to 
the European Refugee Fund analysed in the previous chapter. And in addition to the 
reasons set out in the previous chapter for adopting a burden-sharing mechanism, 
variability over time must be taken into account. In the case of irregular migration, 
flows and destination countries change so swiftly that the best arrangements 
member states can adopt are ones that facilitate a flexible component of the Fund 
to be allocated on the basis of the sheer numbers of irregular migrants coming in. 
The Commission serves the function of concentrating member states’ efforts on a 
limited number of priorities. The power of adopting the strategic guidelines that 
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guide the activities of the multiannual programmes promotes overall cohesion in 
the projects supported by the Fund (Art. 18). In this way, the actors involved in the 
Fund must design their initiatives according to a limited number of priorities 
following principles already set out under the EU Cohesion policy. These guidelines 
are adopted under the most stringent Comitology procedure, known as the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny, to restrain the Commission's scope. The 
Commission is also entitled to examine the “multiannual programmes” (Art. 19(3)) 
before approving them. In the event that the Commission finds the programmes 
inconsistent with the guidelines it can invite the member state in question to provide 
more information and to revise the programme (Art. 19(4)). The attention paid to 
its structure and the respect shown for its guidelines reinforce the credibility of the 
Fund, in that member states’ plans are controlled for conformity under the 
Commission’s supervision. The revision of the multiannual programme can be 
made either upon the request of a member state or the Commission (Art. 20(1)). 
Finally, approval of the multiannual programmes takes place under the management 
procedure (Art. 19(5)), with a mid-term review of the strategic guidelines being 
carried out by the Commission (Art. 22(1)).  
As discussed in the previous section, the Commission must check the 
existence and adequate functioning of management and control systems in member 
states (Art. 11(2)(a)). And to further strengthen credibility of commitments to the 
guidelines, the Commission can withhold and suspend payments where necessary 
(Art. 11(2)(b)). The Commission is tasked with monitoring the administration of 
the Fund in the member states to control its proper functioning, this can be done 
through on-the-spot checks if needs be (Art. 33). Indeed, the Commission also has 
significant freedom in exercising its controlling powers. Article 34(2) exemplifies 
this in stating that the Commission can decide to rely exclusively on the auditing 
authority of a given member state but it can resort to more intrusive controls if 
“there is evidence to suggest shortcomings in the system”. All these elements signal 
the importance of the credibility rationale to delegation in relation to the Fund 
where a great deal of power has been delegated and a significant amount of freedom 
has been afforded to the Commission in exercising them. Again, this is exemplified 
by the fact that the Commission can ask member state administrations to carry out 
inspections on its behalf if it suspects the presence of irregularities (Art. 45(1), 
second indent). Overall, by controlling the administration and functioning of the 
Fund the Commission has a key role in ensuring the credibility of the policy.  
169/326 
There was an interesting development during the negotiations for the Return 
Directive in that, in order to reach consensus on the key issue of detaining 
irregularly resident TCNs, some member states voiced the possibility of providing 
a specific stream of funding to a sub-set of countries (reportedly Italy, Spain, Greece 
and Malta) under the European Return Fund as a form of side-payment (Associated 
Press International 2008; European Report 2008b). This is because the Directive 
states that TCNs can be detained for up to 18 months and that appropriate care, and 
free legal aid, must be provided. In countries with large suspected numbers of 
irregular migrants this is likely to result in significant costs.  
 
Finally, the Employer Sanctions Directive was the first EU measure to 
explicitly connect irregular migration to labour markets. The regulation of internal 
controls (Art. 14) was a controversial issue during EU-level negotiations. Indeed 
the measure of opposition to it can be gauged by the fact that the Commission 
initiated the infringement procedure against 20 member states. Taking into account 
that the UK, Ireland and Denmark did not opted in, this means that 83 percent of 
member states failed to transpose the Directive in time (Elspeth Guild 2014). This 
element would have made important progress in reducing employment among 
irregular migrants and was strongly recommended by a number of commentators 
and institutions (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 144; Geddes 2003, 2008; 
GIuseppe Sciortino 2009)110. States considered new to the issue of immigration 
(e.g. Italy) displayed a preference towards external controls (e.g. land border 
controls), over internal ones. This has been directly linked to EU pressures in 
shaping migration policy (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009: 121). Towards the end of 
the 1990s the Commission estimated that “undeclared work” made up 16 percent 
of EU GDP, representing between 7 and 19 percent of regular employees (ILO 
2010). This Directive could have made the difference for a number of member states 
affected by an allegedly strong shadow economy and the draw it created for 
irregular migrants. This link was made clear in a number of EU documents, inter 
alia, in The Hague Programme (Agence Europe 2004d). Provocatively, in 2000 a 
spokesperson for Commissioner Vitorino reportedly asserted, 
 
‘I do not know’ if, despite their great declarations against illegal 
                                                          
110 Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Frattini made several declarations to that effect during 
his tenure.  
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immigration, Member States knowingly keep a ‘stock of illegal 
immigrants’ as cheap labour but ‘at any rate we must put an end to 
this situation’ (Agence Europe 2002i). 
 
The Directive fostered the credibility of commitment to the reduction of 
irregular migration in Europe in a number of ways. Common financial and criminal 
penalties were set out together with provisions for labour market inspections. None 
of the rules regarding those points featured delegation to the Commission. However 
in its first report on the application of the Directive the Commission pointed out 
that the sanctions devised by member states varied hugely, to the point that it “raises 
concerns [over] whether sanctions can always be effective, proportionate or 
dissuasive and will therefore have to be further assessed” (Commission 2014c: 10). 
In addition, numbers of labour market inspections and the percentage of both 
employees and employers covered by such inspections was so minimal in some 
member states that “it [was] unlikely to dissuade an employer from hiring irregular 
migrants” (Commission 2014c: 9).  
The number of inspections was a controversial issue from the beginning 
among member states and between the Council and the Commission (Vogel and 
Cyrus 2008: 5-6). On one hand, a common benchmark for the number of inspections 
executed in a year was believed to be the only safeguard against unfair competition 
among member states. Yet on the other, as member states had varying degrees of 
irregular migration in their territories, some member states in the Council observed 
that for countries with a lower presence of irregular migration having high volumes 
of inspections would impose an unreasonable burden. One solution could have been 
to let the Commission and member states change the thresholds member states had 
to comply with annually on the basis of the continuous reporting already provided 
for in the Directive and subject to the Comitology procedure. This is not a far-
fetched idea as similar provisions exist in migration Funds wherein the Commission 
is free to decide if the national management systems need closer scrutiny through 
inspections (see above on European Return Fund). It is interesting to note that the 
Commission considered it “necessary” for the credibility of the Directive to have a 
quantitative benchmark for inspections and to ensure the quality of such 
inspections. It is clear that member states were not of the same opinion, among 
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those who rejected this provision were Germany, the Netherlands and Poland111 
(Council 2007c: 8, 13; 2007a: 16).  
  
 
 5.1.4) Effectiveness and efficiency  
 
As in the previous chapter this section focuses on the rationales for delegation based 
either on previous policy failures at the national or European level, or because of 
purported time and resource savings. Problems in national policies dealing with 
irregular migration were already evident in the 1990s and 2000s. The issue of how 
to reduce irregular migration has been a constant presence in Presidency 
Conclusions and Commission Communications. The problem for all policy actors 
was how to make it work.  
Visa policy was considered essential in reducing irregular migration, as it is 
widely recognised that visa over-stay, and not sea landings, is the main source of 
irregular migration (Hollifield 2014: 181; Morehouse and Blomfield 2011: 12), 
although one could be forgiven for imagining the reverse to be the case judging by 
media coverage of the issue. Internal apprehensions confirmed that in the UK the 
majority of those irregularly present were visa over-stayers (for the years 2008-
2011) (EMN 2012: 120). While visa policy is analysed in Chapter 7, a few 
considerations are pertinent here. Analysing data on regularisation in Southern 
member states and other sources of data regarding irregular migration (internal 
apprehensions and estimates), commentators have argued that a sizeable proportion 
of irregular migrants in some of the countries traditionally considered lax in 
migration controls (e.g. southern Member States) had actually entered via visas 
released by more generous diplomatic systems. For instance, it has been estimated 
that sizeable numbers of irregular migrants present in Italy, Spain and Portugal 
actually entered through German-issued visas (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009: 130-
31; Finotelli 2009: 896). In addition, as discussed in the previous sections of this 
chapter the connection between irregular migration and the shadow economy had 
long been established. However because the EU had limited if any power over 
labour market policies, action on this front was difficult to undertake. Other 
initiatives aimed at stemming irregular migration are extremely expensive and of 
                                                          
111 Even more opposition received the Commission's proposal that the TCN in question should not 
be removed until “any back payment from” his/her remuneration has been provided. Twelve 
Member States objected to such element.  
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uncertain results (EMN 2012: 8). EU efforts at sealing its borders through a number 
of high-tech projects have yielded mixed results at best and have been among the 
biggest expenditures in EU cooperation on migration so far.  
 
From the historical records of member states and EU initiatives in this field, 
it is safe to conclude that there have been serious problems with returning TCNs 
either to transit or to their countries of origin (Collier 2013: 134). This was the case, 
for example, for the removals target adopted by the Labour government in the UK. 
Admitting failure in 2005, Home Secretary Charles Clarke refused to set down 
another target stating only that the, 
 
number of failed [asylum] applicants and dependents removed each 
month [had to increase] more than the number of unfounded 
asylum applications (The Times 2005b).  
 
Italy, after managing to increase enforced expulsions up to the early 2000s, 
saw figures scaling down again due, inter alia, to “budgetary problems” (Finotelli 
and Sciortino 2009: 130; Giuseppe Sciortino 2014). This emphasis on return is 
again present in a number of documents. Just weeks after the adoption of the 2004 
Decision on joint flights for instance, the Council urged member states to increase 
“the rate of returns from the EU” (Council 2004d). The French presidency of the 
second half of 2000 set itself the objective of shifting European policy in that 
direction (European Report 2000a). France has also had many problems in returning 
irregular migrants (Hollifield 2014: 181). These calls to the Council in fact 
originated from deep-seated domestic problems. Ellermann argues that “Germany 
has been at the helm of diplomatic and administrative efforts to increase the efficacy 
of repatriation policy” (2008). The majority share of the increase in deportations 
between the mid-1980s and the 2000s seems to be ascribable to failed asylum-
seekers rather than “illegal migrants” or “migrants offenders” (Ellermann 2008).112 
This was an expensive strategy as asylum-seekers come from a host of countries, 
multiplying hence the costs of returns by the number of ‘destination’ countries. In 
2001 alone return flights to 145 destination countries were carried out (Ellermann 
2008).  
                                                          
112 While about 8,000 deportations carried out in 1985, after a peak of 47,000 in 1993, deportations 
stabilized around 35,000 in 2000. 
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It is however the need to be seen by electorates as active that pushes 
politicians of all persuasions to devise and propose all manner of policies 
concerning irregular migration (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011). In February 
2001 the centre-left prime ministers of Italy and the UK, respectively Amato and 
Blair, wrote a joint letter to a prominent UK newspaper arguing for better tools at 
the EU level for identifying and returning irregularly present TCNs (Guardian 
Weekly 2001). Whereas in 2002 Blair proposed to tackle irregular migration with 
extreme solutions, and this was in line with the position of the centre-right Spanish 
Presidency (Financial Times 2002a). Finally, member states do not release much 
information on the actual costs of returning irregularly present TCNs, so it is quite 
difficult to assess the efficiency of this policy option (EMN 2012: 12). A 
Commission staff document does however give some insight into the amounts spent 
by member states in executing the returns policy, albeit stating that figures and data 
are hard to come by and are not comparable. In 2004 Spain spent €38 million 
returning 27,600 irregular migrants; French efforts to return the top 5 nationalities 
cost €34 million (for 16,500 people); Ireland removed 599 persons for €1.7 million; 
and in Germany, while the federal budget allocated €18 million for transportation 
of 30,000 people, the Länder are estimated to have spent other €20 million 
(Commission 2005a). 
 
In its 2001 Communication on a “common policy on illegal immigration”, it 
is striking to note the absence of any reference to figures on the returns policy or on 
irregular migration in general for that matter. This is rather problematic as irregular 
migration is argued to be one of the most pressing concerns for the EU, yet there 
are no substantial facts to support this claim. To be fair though, in this 
Communication the Commission recognised that facts and figures were deemed 
uncertain and subject to revision and in fact dedicated the first analytical section to 
the need for better “understanding [of] the phenomena” (Commission 2001d: 7). In 
2002 the Commission released some figures on returns,  
 
According to the available figures 367,552 persons have been 
removed in total in the year 2000, for 1999 the number of removed 
aliens amounts to 324,206 persons. In the framework of assisted 
voluntary return programmes conducted by IOM 87,628 persons 
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emigrated in the year 2000 out of the EU voluntarily, for 1999 the 
number is 78,273 persons (Commission 2002b)113.  
 
While these figures are interesting as they provide at least some context on 
this little understood phenomenon, they fail to provide a complete picture of the 
returns situation by neglecting to indicate the percentage these returns represent 
compared with the number of expulsion decisions. This is key to identifying the 
number of irregular migrants that remain in the EU. Again, when the Commission 
published the first “Annual report on the development of a common policy on 
illegal immigration”114 in 2004 it included no figures to provide context on actions 
either already adopted or to be undertaken. In a 2005 Memo referring to returns in 
the EU-25 during 2004, the Commission reported that it had gathered information 
showing that of 650,000 “return decisions” issued by member states only 160,000 
“forced returns” were actually carried out. It would be logical to conclude that, 
adding the 48,000 “voluntary returns” to that figure, this points to a 27.2 per cent 
rate of compliance with expulsions decision (Commission 2005g: 1). However it is 
impossible to make such a simplistic determination, as forced expulsions do not 
necessarily refer to expulsion decisions taken in the same year. Gathering data from 
sources other than CIREFI, the Commission holds that approximately one third of 
all return decisions are implemented (Commission 2005g: 5). It is also interesting 
to note that the Commission sought data other than that provided by CIREFI's, a 
choice not indicated in the Annual report. This seems to suggest that the reliability 
of the CIREFI’s figures was dubious at best, and, at worst, the Commission 
considered them as in need of some form of support and thereby of diminished 
value. The final figures released by the Commission were quite different from those 
issued by CIREFI, an outcome the Commission justified as being the result of 
differing methods of collecting and compiling data. Comparing the return decisions 
to removals effected between 2005 and 2007, the Commission showed uneven 
ratios among member states ranging from 260 percent for Greece, 138 percent for 
                                                          
113 For some more figures covering the same period, see also Commission, 'Commission Staff 
Working Document - Annex to the General  Programme Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows - Extended Impact  Assessment {Com(2005) 123 Final}. Sec(2005) 435', 
(Brussels, 2005a).. 
114 There have been a report every about three years Commission, 'Annual Report on the 
Development of a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, Smuggling and Trafficking of Human 
Beings, External Borders, and the Return of Illegal Resident. Sec(2004) 1349', (Brussels, 
2004b)..  
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Estonia and 132 percent for Bulgaria115, to 21 percent for Lithuania, 18 percent for 
Ireland, and 14 percent for Romania (Commission 2009c: 28). If a member state's 
success or failure in retaining control over migration in its territory is measured by 
its ability to reject those who are within its borders irregularly, it is safe to say that 
member states had plenty of room for improvement. 
 
Problems in returning irregularly present TCNs either to countries of origin 
or transit arise due to a number of reasons including: bureaucratic politics, i.e. 
differences in effectiveness and incentives for different branches of the 
administrative machineries of member state; difficulties in member state and EU 
foreign policy, i.e. striking international agreements so that TCNs can be 
returned116; judicial politics, i.e. the capacity and or willingness of judiciaries to 
take the decisions resulting in the expulsion of TCNs. Arguably one of the most 
convincing reasons is that the prospect of carrying out removals is contingent upon 
identifying TCNs and securing the agreement of destination states to receive them 
(Barbagli et al. 2004; Ellermann 2008; Triandafyllidou 2010).  
 
The European Council stressed the “urgency of strengthening efforts to 
prevent and combat illegal immigration in an efficient manner”, particularly at the 
southern borders (Agence Europe 2009d). Individual countries also intermittently 
emphasised their efforts through coordinated appeals “to speed up the process of 
combating illegal immigration” (Agence Europe 2005e, 2006d). In some cases the 
appeal for faster action on irregular migration seemed to imply a criticism of how 
the Commission was handling the dossier (Agence Europe 2003i). The EP appeared 
divided on the issue. While some MEPs staunchly asserted the need for an “efficient 
fight against irregular migration” and criticised the practice of mass regularisations 
                                                          
115 Those high number can be explained by taking into account that statistics use the as nominator 
in the ratio the actual number of returns, which can be larger than the denominator – the number 
of return decisions – because of administrative backlogs dragged from one year to the next. 
116 It is difficult to underestimate the importance of readmission agreements in this sense. 
Readmission agreements are famously difficult to sign and implement according to the academic 
literature. The simple reason for this is that sending countries have little interest in agreeing to a 
policy that offers little in return. Brady reports that a senior JHA official working in the Council 
explained that “a country with 2,000 nationals illegally resident in the EU, sending money back 
home, is infinitely better off than a country with 2,000 extra unemployed people” Hugo Brady, 
'Saving Schengen: How to Protect Passport-Free Travel in Europe', (London: CER, 2012) at 14, 
The Times, 'Leaders Expected to Unite on Tough Approach to Migrants', The Times, 20 June 
2002.. In 1999 action at the national level was in the early stages, not to mention EU level 
cooperation or simple coordination Council, 'Summary Report of Member States' Contributions 
on Readmission Questions (See 6933/99 Migr 15 + Add 1 and Add 2). St 7609 1999 Rev 1', 
(Brussels, 1999b).. 
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(Agence Europe 2005h), others seemed more opened to a more rights-based 
approach to irregular migration and, while considering mass regularisations 
ineffective, were not opposed to it in principle (Agence Europe 2007a). The 
Commission expressed the need for a “more efficient fight against illegal 
immigration” and argued that achieving this aim depended on a combination of 
different tools: from the Rapid Reaction Border Teams connected with Frontex, to 
the e-borders initiative encompassing an automatic entry/exit system (Agence 
Europe 2006c). Indeed operational cooperation, such as pooling resources and joint 
operations, was reportedly more interesting to member states, than efforts at 
harmonising legislation (Agence Europe 2002e, 2002b, 2003i).  
 
In sum, return policies were largely unsuccessful and imbalanced at the 
national level as evident from rates of compliance with return decisions. A number 
of factors caused these failures, not all of them within the remit of EU action. In 
other words solving these issues required coordinated action exceeding EU 
capabilities. While there were a number of calls to make irregular migration policies 
more efficient, the extent to which they were achieving their goals in the first place 
and the benchmark against which success was to be measured was unclear. This 
was largely because calls frequently lacked specifics on how existing policies were 
performing and how they could be improved.  
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
Turning to efficiency, the Immigration Liaison Officers Regulation requires 
the Commission to inform all member states of agreements made by individual 
states. This also applies to member states’ “intentions” to send an official to a third 
country so that other member states can join in and benefit from the individual 
initiatives of others. Although efficiency rationales are evident here, the 
Commission only has powers of notification, thus it is not counted as delegation. 
 
The Commission is granted up to 7 percent of the European Return Fund’s 
€676 million budget, i.e. approximately €47 million over seven years, to “finance 
transnational actions of interest to the Community as a whole” (Art. 6(1)). 
Alongside the technical assistance available at the discretion of member states, the 
Commission can also propose technical assistance worth up to €500,000 of the 
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annual budget (Art. 16). The list of actions eligible for financing seems to be 
exhaustive, albeit the wording is rather vague which arguably allows for quite a 
degree of freedom in interpreting and applying these constraints. All of these 
provisions point to an efficiency rationale, whereby the Commission is empowered 
to carry out many of the managerial tasks connected with the Fund. 
 
Concerning effectiveness, the Union equipped itself with a number of 
measures aimed at expelling irregular migrants and sending them back to a third 
country of origin or transit. This is the case with the Directive on the mutual 
recognition of expulsion decisions, the Carrier Sanction Directive, the Directive on 
assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air, the Decision on 
joint flight for removals of TCNs, and finally, the Return Directive. In many of 
these cases no powers were delegated to the Commission, and in the few cases 
where this did happen it had no obvious connection to previous failures. That said 
apprehensions decreased between 2008 and 2012, and removals oscillated between 
167,000 and 199,000 from 2010 to 2012. Therefore one could also conclude that 
delegation on the basis of addressing previous policy failures, if ever present, has 
faded. However as acknowledged by the Commission, it is only possible to  
speculate whether these changes are due to EU or national policies, the economic 
crisis, political and social changes in some of the sending countries, or changes in 
the direction of international flows (Commission 2014b; Düvell and Vollmer 2011).  
 
With the Employer Sanctions Directive member states acknowledged that 
past efforts at sanctioning employer malpractices were far from satisfactory 
(Preamble, Recital 21). The Impact Assessment accompanying this legislative 
proposal identified a number of areas where previous policies had failed. It is 
interesting to note that the EU could do very little in light of,  
 
“Insufficient human resources allocated to the bodies or units that 
are expected to deter, detect and penalise undeclared work”; 
“Inadequate financial resources at the disposal of the competent 
bodies or units to undertake monitoring and act upon violations 
observed”; “Obstacles to field operations (e.g. legislation that 
allows employers to deny access to inspectors if they regard 
conditions on the site as unsafe)”; “Lack of information to 
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undertake effective controls (e.g. few risk analyses, limited access 
to information from tax authorities and banks on companies under 
suspicion, employees reluctant to testify against those who exploit 
them)”; “Lack of data to assess the outcome of inspections” 
(Commission 2007e: 10).  
 
Allocation of resources within member states, collection and processing of 
data for effective labour inspections, and decisions regarding the priority of national 
laws were beyond EU action. For a more radical perspective one could refer to 
Castles' analysis of failure in migration policy. He observed that “the growth of 
undocumented migration throughout Europe can be seen as a response to neo-
liberal labour market deregulation […]. Thus, undocumented migration is an 
indirect effect of state policies which have quite different motivations” (Castles 
2004: 215).  
 
A number of national delegations questioned the appropriateness of these 
measures both on grounds of subsidiarity for some articles, e.g. rules on inspections 
and labour markets-related definitions, and their legal basis (Council 2007d). 
Therefore, although it was clear from the beginning that effectiveness was among 
the reasons for delegation, the scope of EU action was limited and closely guarded. 
One of the most problematic and important elements of this Directive was the 
section on sanctioning. Controversial during the Council negotiations, particularly 
where criminal sanctions were concerned (Council 2009), it involved no delegation 
of authority to the Commission. As previously discussed, internal controls are 
believed to yield important effects in reducing employment among irregular 
migrants. However the Commission’s proposal requiring “Member States to ensure 
that the employee records of at least 10% of the companies established on their 
territory are inspected” was watered down by the EP, which opted for a much more 
modest 5% (EP 2009: 24). The same EP report states that the “current average 
national requirement is 2 %” (EP 2009: 24). This issue was also divisive in the 
Council both with regard to the content of sanctions and the principle of involving 
the Commission in the design of criminal sanctions (European Report 2007a, 
2008a). Member states were thus required to communicate data and figures on 
inspections to the Commission, which was then in charge of reporting on the issue 
(Art. 16(1) and (2)). This set-up was regarded as likely to place pressure on member 
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states to do more in terms of controls. However, even if it fails to become a 
sanctioning mechanism for member states and thereby stopping short of acting as a 
credibility-enhancing mechanism, it is sufficient to consider it as touching on 
effectiveness. The quest for effectiveness would have seen further progress if, as 
suggested in a SCIFA revision of the legal text, member states were required to 
communicate the previous years' inspection figures as well as making commitments 
on present year targets (Council 2008b, 2008a). That would have meant a step 
forward, namely from information to actual commitment with the Commission 
positioned as repository for both information and commitments, although again not 
sanctioning powers. In other words it would have meant a further step from 
effectiveness to credibility.  
 
 
 5.2. Conclusions 
 
The necessity of reducing uncertainty in this policy area was very high during 
the period analysed here, as indicated by the review of the academic, institutional 
and political discourses in the second section of this chapter. However this did not 
translate into major concessions to the Commission. Although plaguing this policy 
area, uncertainty constantly fails to materialise through concrete provisions in the 
legal texts dealing with the gathering and spreading of information. There is also 
almost no delegation that could be related to the provision of expertise. Even if 
much of the overall purpose of much of this legislation is to reduce uncertainty, this 
seldom translated into delegation. Better information and knowledge coupled with 
increased dissemination thereof were policy needs clearly expressed by both EU 
actors and a wider constellation of actors concerned with migration policy, e.g. the 
OECD. What is more, the viability of the Directive on mutual recognition of 
expulsion decisions and the Decision on organisation of joint flights for removals 
of TCNs demanded information sharing. However the Council did not empower the 
Commission to make these agreements work, which lead to a situation where 
measures became ineffective. An exception to this is the Immigration Liaison 
Officers Regulation, which requires the Commission to take part in its information 
mechanisms. As with all other funds in migration policy, the European Return Fund 
contained provisions that implied an expert role for the Commission. In sum, 
similar to the findings of the previous chapter on asylum, uncertainty does not seem 
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to be an important determinant for delegation.  
 
Credibility of commitments to the “fight against illegal immigration”117 was 
severely corroded by member state practices such as large-scale regularisation 
programmes and high levels of attraction to shadow economies among irregular 
migrants seeking work. Delegation to the Commission emerged through agenda 
setting provisions, the authority to prioritise and concentrate member states’ efforts 
(in the European Return Fund), and occasionally the power to supervise them. 
Although often essential for the efficient cooperation of member states, these 
provisions fail to amount to a critical mass that could be detected by the criteria of 
the quantitative analysis. In addition, the Commission at times exercises a 
determining role in matters of burden sharing such as the financial mechanisms in 
the Directive on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of TCNs. 
Moreover, it proposes amendments and recommendations on the Immigration 
Liaison Officers Regulation on the basis of its annual report, and under the 
Comitology procedure in relation to the Directive on assistance in cases of transit 
for the purposes of removal by air.  
Although the credibility of commitments appears to be a reliable predictor, 
there are cases where it does not result in delegation. A noteworthy example of this 
is the Employer Sanctions Directive. Member states, the Commission and the EP 
all recognised that illegal employment was one of the main drivers behind irregular 
immigration into Europe, i.e. it was a pull factor (Commission 2007e: 4). However 
member states avoided any direct involvement of the Commission in the workings 
of national enforcement. The most contentious aspect of this area relates to 
regularisations (Düvell and Vollmer 2011: 9). While the EU was at least able to 
agree the Return Directive on the problematic area of returns, nothing of the like 
materialised for regularisation. However a different approach is acquired if 
regularisations are framed as an admissions policy as distinct from a patch for 
ineffective irregular migration policy. In the end, these practices amount to the 
movement of people from an administrative category of exclusion into a ‘clean’ 
administrative inclusion zone. Seen from this perspective, by definition 
regularisation resides outside of EU competence, as is the case with all admission 
policies (Giuseppe Sciortino 2004: 36).  
                                                          
117 To use a common expression in EU documents. 
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The only measure with a high operational dimension is coincidentally the one 
identified as displaying the highest levels of delegation and discretion, the European 
Refugee Fund. No broad delegation has however been conferred to the Commission 
in other cases where regulatory failures were manifest. In this sense, and recalling 
its rejection in the previous chapter, the hypothesis that previous regulatory failures 
determine delegation does not seem to be supported by the analysis of secondary 
legislation (Stetter 2000). Broeders and Engbersen have highlighted that the 
capacity of member states to make early estimates of and detect irregular migrants 
have greatly increased through enhanced use of databases and biometric identifiers 
such as Eurodac and or VIS (Broeders and Engbersen 2007). However there is a 
mounting degree of scepticism towards them. While member states and EU 
institutions seem to see these tools as essential to achieving the desired reduction in 
irregular migration, the Commission has recently expressed doubts as to the merits 
of these policies compared with other exogenous factors. The Council is also 
increasingly dissatisfied with the length and costs associated with these 
undertakings (see Chapter 7).  
 
Chapter 2 highlighted that an intergovernmental perspective would suggest 
cooperation was more likely to advance in asylum, border and irregular migration 
policies than on labour or secondary migration due to only partially overlapping 
national interests (Messina 2007: 17). On the contrary, this chapter has shown that 
cooperation on irregular migration, as measured through delegation and discretion, 
is the lowest among all migration categories. In addition, if legislative output is 
considered labour migration is as significant as asylum policy. 
Huysmans believed that the existence of irregular migration justified the 
restrictive nature of other migration policies (2000: 753). This would suggest that 
member states integrated more in this area as this represented their paramount 
concern. This study demonstrates that on the contrary, integration as measured by 
delegation is almost non-existent. However this also highlights the limits of a focus 
on delegation. In the first five years member states tried to shape this policy area in 
the most intergovernmental way possible under the Amsterdam arrangements. And 
this prompts the question of whether this means there was no integration in this 
area. Member states attempted to duplicate national models at the European level, 
achieving mixed results. Some of the legislation regarding returns was re-framed 
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by Commission-proposed legislation in the second half of the 2000s. This signals 
that while the EU is flexible enough to allow member states to express their 
priorities and policy preferences almost without restriction, save for those imposed 
by their peers, it also accommodates reform from within, and radically so. The idea 
of duplicating national systems and policies is far from peculiar to irregular 
migration (Menz 2011). While this approach can in some ways be seen as an 
opportunistic exploitation of the EU venue, it also shows a pragmatic take on EU 
integration in the context of a “great variety of legal cultural characteristics” present 
across member states (Düvell 2011a: 294). It also highlights how different forms of 
policy-making can co-exist for long periods within the Community pillar. This 
confirms experimentalist readings of migration policy making. And it is interesting 
that, as a result of a study on delegation, it is possible to appreciate the extent to 
which member states have put different policy making methods into practice. 
 
In terms of the liberal/restrictive divide, the situation is more complex than it 
is in relation to other migration categories. Due to member state dominance in the 
early years it is difficult to single out the relative contribution of individual 
institutions at the EU level, i.e. the Commission and the Council. On the other hand, 
the Return Directive, which was the one Directive that civil society organisations, 
NGOs and academics expected would make a positive change in migrants’ rights, 
disappointed many (Ripoll Servent 2011). This assumption rested on the likelihood 
that the Commission and the EP would come together to enmesh migrants’ rights 
into EU legislation, something that has received mixed assessments so far (Lopatin 
2013; Ripoll Servent 2011; Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2014). The loose nature of 
this purported alliance is illustrated also in the case of the Employer Sanctions 
Directive. The EP significantly watered down the initially high commitment to 
labour market inspections that, according to the Commission, was a key element of 
this Directive. Furthermore, while perhaps guided by pragmatic assumptions 
concerning EU institutional politics, the fact that the Commission chose to leave 
this entire policy field to member states speaks volumes of its purported 
championing of migrants’ rights.  
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6. Delegation in Legal Migration and 
Administrative Cooperation 
 
 
Chapter 3 showed that the delegation ratio and discretion index of legal migration 
and administrative cooperation are diametrically opposed. In aggregate terms, legal 
migration is the second lowest migration category for delegation and discretion, 
while administrative cooperation is the highest. Moreover, the relatively small set 
of legislative measures concerning legal migration features few instances of high 
and medium delegation, while the even smaller administrative cooperation set 
features six legislative measures with high and medium delegation. This chapter is 
dedicated to understanding why that is the case.  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty commits the Union to adopt,  
 
measures on immigration policy within the following areas: […] 
conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for 
the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence 
permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion (art. 
63(3)(a) (TEC). 
 
Article 63(4) (TEC) deals with, 
  
measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals 
of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State may 
reside in other Member States.  
 
Finally, administrative cooperation entails,  
 
measures to ensure cooperation between the relevant departments 
of the administrations of the Member States in the areas covered by 
this title, as well as between those departments and the Commission 
(Art. 66 (TEC)). 
 
Legal migration is identified in the literature as the area where EU policy has 
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advanced the least. Cooperation on legal migration at EU level has been slow and 
difficult in many respects. One of the reasons it has been so is that legal migration 
policy was determined under the unanimity rule until the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force in 2009 (TEC, Art. 63, third indent). This was the only policy area that 
remained under these rules for this length of time, demonstrating that member states 
drew lines in the sand marking out the elements where cooperation and negotiations 
had to proceed more carefully. 
For purely presentational reasons, this chapter deals with both administrative 
cooperation and legal migration together. Following the structure set out in previous 
chapters, a brief initial section contextualises the relationships within the Council 
and between the Commission and the Council with relation to these policy areas. 
The following three sections clarify delegation in legal migration and 
administrative cooperation along the lines of the three independent variables: 
uncertainty; credibility of commitments; and, efficiency and effectiveness. A brief 
conclusion sums up the relevant findings. 
 
 
 6.1. Analysis of the determinants of delegation 
 
 6.1.1) Institutional factors: Council internal division, and conflict 
between Council and Commission 
 
The Council was more divided on legal migration than on administrative 
cooperation. As in previous chapters, the length of Council negotiations was used 
to identify conflict. For administrative legislation the average length was 14 
months, whereas for legal migration it was 21. The latter figure however masks 
significant exceptions such as the nearly four years it took to negotiate the Family 
Reunification Directive, and the almost three years spent on the Long-Term 
Resident Directive. In legal migration, member states were divided on a long list of 
substantive issues such as student mobility, dependent families, and access to labour 
market for researchers. One possible explanation for such deadlocks is that many 
issues included in legal migration relate directly to regulatory competition, which 
is at the heart of the dominant economic policy paradigm118. The Commission 
seemed to acquiesce to that reality after five years of efforts (Commission 2004a: 
                                                          
118 I owe this point to Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos. 
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9). It is noteworthy that, in the Commission’s evaluation of Tampere, legal 
migration was the only area where solidarity was not invoked. Thus a “realistic 
approach” was deemed the most suitable for legal migration, while solidarity was 
made central to all other areas, including asylum, borders and visas, and irregular 
migration (Commission 2004a: 9-10). Looking at the substantive points, member 
states did not seem to differ on administrative cooperation to the extent seen in legal 
migration. There were few if any divergences in the case of ARGO, or the 2005 
Decision on the web-based information system. In the case of the EMN, member 
states state agreed on the non-suitability of the EP’s presence during Steering Board 
Meeting, had common views on strengthening the role of the Board but conflicting 
ones on its composition (Council 2007b). The only significant exception was the 
Mutual Information Mechanism Decision. In that case, lines of divisions were 
many, as for instance  on the typology of information to be shared and at what level 
that discussion should be held (Council 2006c). 
 
Commission and Council were highly divergent in the realm of legal 
migration. The Commission actively produced proposals on legal migration from 
early on, repeatedly restating its views on, inter alia, the desirability of labour 
migration channels, the benefit of family reunification (also in terms of integrating) 
(Commission 1999a: 3, 9) and attracting highly skilled migrants to Europe 
(Commission 1999a: 2, 3, 9; 2004a: 9-10). The Commission was at times critical of 
the agreements reached, for example it judged the Family Reunification Directive 
as being “more restrictive” than its own proposal (Commission 2008f: 2). The 
Council did not however, in the main, share the same positive viewpoints. Germany, 
backed by a varying combination of member states, consistently opposed any talk 
of opening up labour migration or losing its veto over this delicate issue (Agence 
Europe 2004a). While QMV was taboo for virtually the entire period under 
examination here, the Commission highlighted that the deadlock on some JHA 
dossiers could only be overcome by streamlining decision-making (Commission 
2004a; Prodi 2000: 9). The quantitative results of Chapter 3 also identify that 
member states exercised rather intensive control over the Commission in the area 
of legal migration. In a comparison of legal migration and irregular migration, two 
categories with relatively low levels of delegation and discretion, the constraint 
ratio calculated for the former was higher than the latter. Finally, in the case of 
administrative cooperation, while the Commission pushed hard for harmonised and 
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reliable statistics, the Council delayed in taking a decision in this area (Agence 
Europe 2005f). The Commission repeatedly highlighted that more knowledge was 
needed to improve policy, and although the Council agreed in principle, policy 
action arrived late (Agence Europe 2003j). The length of the negotiations over this 
Regulation seems to be partly due to the EP’s determination in securing a deeper 
involvement in the Regulation, benefiting from the negotiations on the new 
Comitology rules ongoing at the time. Again, lines of division were evident in the 
case of Mutual Information Mechanism Decision, with some Countries rebuffing 
some of the Commission initiatives (Council 2006c). That being said, for the rest 
of the legislative measures in administrative cooperation there was no conflict 
comparable to the area of legal migration.  
 
 
 6.1.2) Uncertainty 
 
Compared to irregular migration, legal migration faced relatively minor problems 
in terms of knowledge and the circulation of information. Member states had a good 
deal of data on national labour markets, residence permits, and other legal migration 
related issues. It is worth nothing that definitions of employment-related statistics 
in the EU are based on International Labour Organization (ILO) standards. At the 
national level, statistics are comparable by virtue of the “European system of 
national and regional accounts” (ESA95, or 1995 ESA), which provides 
“information on the structure and developments of the economy of the Member 
States of the European Union and their respective regions” (Eurostat 2015a). In 
general, labour market statistics have improved considerably since adoption of the 
“Employment” Chapter (Title VIII) of the Amsterdam Treaty.  
 
It is frequently noted in the literature that labour and skills shortages 
potentially influence member state decisions to accept and organise labour 
migration channels (Devitt 2011; Menz 2002: 726; Ruhs and Anderson 2012). In 
broad terms,  
 
labour and skills shortages occur where there is a demand for 
labour in a particular occupation, but a lack of workers who are 
available and qualified to do the job (Christina Boswell and Geddes 
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2011: 84).  
 
The IOM has highlighted that the definition of what constitutes a “gap” in the labour 
market or in skills among workers varies hugely from state to state. Indeed 
definitions are hard to come by (IOM 2012: 11; Ruhs and Anderson 2012: 2). For 
instance, quoting from a 2002 OECD study, the IOM notes that “employers tend to 
report on recruitment difficulties, but not on labour shortages per se” (IOM 2012). 
Ruhs and Anderson note that there are fundamental differences in the way shortages 
and skills are thought of between employers and economists (Ruhs and Anderson 
2010). 
Early studies on the quality and comparability of data concerning labour 
migration highlighted “the inadequacies and incompleteness of data” (Dobson and 
Salt 2002: 5). Regarding labour migration statistics, Dobson and Salt have argued 
that, in the six countries included in their study119, it “is difficult to make valid 
comparisons in respect of stocks and flows of foreign workers”, and this “because 
of wide differences in data availability, in sources and methods of data collection 
and in definitions and coverage” (2002: 4).  
These academic and practitioner debates are echoed in the EU context. One 
of the Commission's first attempts at making the case for a common EU labour 
migration policy called for “each member state [to] compile annual reports on their 
labour needs”, which would form the basis of an “overarching EU approach to 
recruitment” (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 94). These categories were 
however explicitly excluded from cooperation in the 1998 Action Plan on migration 
statistics (Commission 2003d: 5). As a consequence the Commission was 
reportedly unaware of how many migrant workers were already working across and 
within member states, and what the estimated labour market demand was for 
migrant workers (EUObserver.com 2001b).  
 
In parallel to its first proposal on labour migration (Commission 2001f), the 
Commission put forward the Open Method of Coordination in migration policy 
(Commission 2001g). The idea behind this method was that by sharing objectives, 
information and best practice, member states could eventually adopt a common, 
albeit loose, approach to migration. This soft policy move was deemed essential as 
                                                          
119 Germany, Italy, UK, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland. 
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the open resistance of certain member states offered no hope for any binding 
agreement. The five-year Hague Programme presents a rare example of member 
states expressing interest in receiving input from the Commission on legal 
migration. Here, the Council asked the Commission, to put forward a “policy plan 
on legal migration”. Notably, this should have included “admission procedures 
capable of responding promptly to fluctuating demands for migrants labour in the 
labour market” (Carrera and Formisano 2005: 4).  
However, such a policy plan might prove unattainable. In a realistic view, 
there are limits to the potential for EU action in this area. The IOM observed the 
high potential cost of a technical operation capable of both ascertaining whether 
labour or skills gaps exist in a given member state(s), and releasing that information 
in a sufficiently timely fashion to facilitate its exploitation for job-creation 
purposes. It is exactly for that reason that “some countries, such the United States, 
do not perform systematic analysis of occupational skill needs for migration policy 
purposes” (IOM 2012: 13). 
 
Governments have also encountered difficulties in forecasting exact figures 
for actual demand of workers in a given sector of the economy (Münz 2004, 2008). 
In other words, labour shortage forecasts have been far from perfect. Even 
conceding that governments could hazard estimates at the number of workers 
needed, the number of migrants attempting to access a given sector could be far 
higher or lower than anticipated. The political risks related to using such estimates 
are illustrated by the UK experience in the last decade (Christina Boswell and 
Geddes 2011: 88-91, 100-01). Estimates of the potential influx of labour migration 
in the UK turned out to be much lower than the actual flows (Financial Times 
2005a; Vargas-Silva 2014). It must be noted that there was a strong determination 
among government political elites backing the choice of allowing into the country 
labour migrants inflows. Home Secretary Blunkett confirmed that consensus by 
saying he “saw no upper limit to labour migration” (Geddes 2005a: 727; Smith 
2008: 423). It is likely that this under-estimation has contributed to the increased 
salience of immigration in UK (Blinder 2014; x. D. Casciani 2002a). In sum, 
although policy actors had better information on labour migration than on irregular 
migration, they clearly found it difficult to operationalise in the furtherance of 
national or EU level policy-making. 
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Issues to do with collecting and producing reliable data on family 
reunification were identified in the early 2000s. The Commission requested access 
to such information in its family reunification proposal (Commission 2000f: 6; 
2002d: 13), which was rejected by the Council. Following requests from the EP, it 
emerged that some member states had no knowledge of the magnitude of the 
phenomenon. These states were solely gathering “general data on persons granted 
admission for non-asylum related reasons”, i.e. they did not have any break-down 
of categories within legal migration (Commission 2001e: 10). Again due to the 
“widely differing definitions used”, information on family reunification was 
deemed “of little use for developing and implementing policy” by both the 
Commission and the EP (Commission 2003d: 13). 
 
Overall, cooperation on statistics across migration categories presented a 
number of problems. An early EP report stated that,  
 
in some instances, Eurostat receives inadequate or insufficiently 
appropriate and unequivocal information from the various actors 
because those actors constantly use differing definitions, which 
leads to the international comparison of data and, hence, to the 
efficacy of policy forms being impaired (EP 2003b: 5).  
 
To solve this, the Commission proposed a debate be held “to verify whether 
Community legislation and harmonisation in the field of statistics would be useful”. 
This would serve the purpose of preventing “duplication of effort and, secondly, to 
bring definitions and practices into line with each other so that all the actors are 
ready and able to publish accurate figures (EP 2003b: 5). Acknowledging that 
Eurostat’s role was crucial in this area, the EP fully endorsed the Commission’s bid, 
“to propose further measures to improve statistics and information exchange” 
aiming at the “communitisation of asylum and immigration policy” (EP 2003b: 7).  
A stronger role for the Commission also appeared warranted by the fact that 
“to date, not all the Member States are supplying comprehensive information to 
Eurostat” (EP 2003b: 7). The EP repeatedly warned of the potential and actual 
politicisation of statistics and the bodies producing them. In the EP’s view, such 
politicisation might affect the quality of statistics and the policies based thereon. 
Highlighting that the Council recognised the pervasiveness of this issue, the EP 
190/326 
therefore recommended that the Commission propose suitable solutions (EP 2003b: 
10).  
After the 2003 Action Plan on Community statistics, the Commission 
proposed a Regulation in 2005 that was eventually adopted in 2008. Besides what 
mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the considerable time lapse between 
proposal and adoption is telling of the political sensitivity of this issue. Indeed, the 
Council highlighted that “[r]estrictions should be allowed for reasons relating to 
national security” and the sensitivity concerns “of data on illegal migration and the 
granting of Geneva Convention status” (Council 2001x, 2001u). Political 
sensitivities were again signalled by the Council Presidency Conclusion of May 
2001, which stated that “[d]ue consideration should be given to demonstrable 
sensitivity concerns” (Council 2001t: 5). And concerns over these sensitivities 
lasted throughout the Council-EP negotiations under co-decision (Council 2006f). 
Problems were not only connected to the sensitive nature of certain information, 
but also to its collection. In 2003 the Commission identified areas where collection 
still needed to either commence or improve, this included “data on legal […] entry 
and stay; second instance asylum decisions and data on the implementation of 
procedures” and data related to the Dublin Convention (Commission 2003d: 6). 
 
Specific issues remain unanswered when it comes to the role of information 
within legal migration. For instance when assessing the Family Reunification 
Directive in 2012, member states and NGOs criticized the fact that little knowledge 
or research was available on the “abuses” of family reunification (Commission 
2012c). However, this did not stop public or political opposition to family 
reunification channels. More broadly, the Commission argued for more information 
concerning national policies on migration and asylum. It referred to the potentially 
negative externalities that national policies might have on other member states in 
the context of an internal borderless zone, and proposed an information mechanism 
to facilitate the sharing of knowledge (Commission 2005i). Indeed the need for 
information was even evident from the actions of member states. For example, the 
German delegation conducted a survey of fellow delegations to obtain information 
on admission channels, with specific reference to quotas. This clearly implied a 
need for better and more reliable information in relation to legal migration (Council 
1999e). 
This latter initiative is also relevant to the broader phenomenon of internal 
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consultation within the Council. Analysis of Council documents revealed that the 
practice of circulating questionnaires and questions was quite common in relation 
to migration and, in a comparative stance, to a lesser extent foreign policy. That 
investigation also revealed that irregular migration featured prominently, with over 
ten consultations in five years (1999-2004). These latter consultations related to a 
wide range of issues including, but not limited to: member state legislation on 
preventing and combating illegal immigration networks(Council 2000a); detention 
pending expulsion (Council 1999c); expulsion by air (Council 2000g); illegal 
migration from the Balkans (Council 2001s); alert mechanisms in airports (Council 
2002c); exchange of information on irregular migration (Council 2000~)(Council 
2000e); legalisation of irregular migrants (Council 1999h, 1999g); and, early 
warning systems (Council 2000m). Matters related to asylum120, borders and 
visas121, and to a lesser extent legal migration122 were also among the topics of 
discussion. The sheer volume of these consultations is testament to member states’ 
willingness to obtain and share information. A possible explanation for this 
approach points to the sensitivity of the information at stake. This theory is 
supported by the clear preference for keeping information on irregular migration 
within the Council and the fact that some of these documents are yet to be disclosed 
to the public123. On the other hand, it is not necessarily clear what level of sensitivity 
is attached to other dossiers, such as the accelerated asylum procedure and “transfer 
of protection”, i.e. migrants already covered by some form international protection 
who move to another member state. In addition, the adoption of the Mutual 
Information Mechanism Decision in 2006 does not seem to have stopped this 
practice, as information on employer sanctions was circulating among member 
states in this way as late as 2009. Admittedly the volume of these exchanges has 
dropped sharply, but its resilience shows that the Council still favours internal 
management of information on some matters. It must however be noted that this 
procedure was not problem-free, as many of questionnaires witnessed late replies 
or received no reply whatever from some member states. 
 
                                                          
120 See Chapter four, section 4.1.2.  
121 For example, uniform format for short-term visa, risk assessment, visa database, visa refusals. 
122 For instance, marriage of convenience and family reunification Council, 'Compilation of Replies 
to Questionnaire Concerning Council Resolution of 4 December 1997 on Measures to Be 
Adopted on the Combating of Marriages of Convenience. 10998/99', (Brussels, 1999a)., quota 
system for labour migration.  
123 Not only those pertaining to irregular migration.  
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To sum up, there was widespread recognition across the policy community 
and individual governments that a number of problems existed with the quality and 
comparability of statistics, and the operationalisation of knowledge for policy 
purposes. This was the case for labour migration and the elaboration of estimates 
for migration inflows. Member states resisted early calls for increased 
harmonisation at the EU level on this matter. That said many member states had 
consolidated practices and knowledge on the terms of residence or employment of 
migrants within their own territories. Overall though, information circulation was 
still problematic, as recognised, inter alia, by the practice of questionnaires and the 
proposal for a mutual information mechanism.  
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
Problems concerning knowledge and information sharing were present in 
legislative measures on legal migration, as demonstrated through the Blue Card 
Directive (European Union 2009c). Similar to many other cases analysed in 
Chapters 4 to 7, the Commission’s proposal on the Blue Card Directive observed 
problems with the comparability of data available from the few schemes in Europe 
targeting high-skilled immigrants. For many member states, data was simply not 
available (Commission 2007c: 3). In the Commission's words, the “scale of the 
problem is difficult to quantify” and “only very rough estimations can be provided” 
(Commission 2007c: 3). Faced with opposition from some member states, the 
Commission needed better mapping of and insights into the scale of the issue to 
progress its long-standing campaign for the establishment of labour immigration 
channels.  
To ensure that member states are aware of the effects of the Directive in 
national labour markets, the legal text stipulates that member states must 
communicate information to the Commission on: fixed levels of admission of 
TCNs; the outcomes of labour tests that member states might enact before issuing 
any Blue Card permit; real volumes of admissions; renewals and withdrawals; 
nationality and occupation of Blue Card holders; family members; and, member 
state of previous residence (if any). Having said that, these provisions are not 
considered delegating powers, as they do not directly empower the Commission to 
alter the course of the policy. In other words, the Commission acts as a mere 
recipient of information but does not have explicit power to shape policy in this 
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area. Admittedly the Commission might employs this information to compile 
reports and propose amendments on the basis of their content. However, this 
possibility is not enumerated in the legal text. 
 
Under Art. 66 on administrative cooperation, the Union equipped itself with 
a comprehensive means of funding European action on migration issues, albeit 
minimal. This was the ARGO Decision, which features high delegation and 
discretion. At a time when formal cooperation was still emerging, the ARGO 
programme aimed at facilitating administrative cooperation across member states 
by improving knowledge among national administrations about their respective 
practices. As the presence of different administrative practices was considered a 
possible source of excessive burdens for some member states, better knowledge 
was considered a first step towards closer cooperation. In the Commission's 
proposal, reference was made to “developing a common working methodology and 
culture between the Member States”, a “better understanding of the administrative 
processes in each Member State”, and the “computerisation process and electronic 
exchange of data” (Commission 2001b: 3). In this respect, Art. 10(3) empowers the 
Commission to “promote and facilitate” all kinds of actions falling within the remit 
of the Decision, including to “promote cooperation between national agencies in 
implementing Community rules” (Art. 3(a)). In sum, the Decision confirms the 
second hypothesis regarding uncertainty: delegation tends to occur when 
information-sharing and communication problems arise, rather than because of 
needs for expertise. 
 
Another important piece of legislation dealing with uncertainty is the 
Decision establishing a mutual information mechanism on asylum and immigration 
measures. An internal Commission document refers to national measures such as 
regularisations or quotas as examples of information to be shared. It may then be 
argued that this Decision has an important credibility of commitments value, as it 
was believed that national measures could alter or undermine collective efforts at 
establishing a common European migration and asylum policy (see next section). 
This was a long awaited measure dealing with communications among 
member states, particularly in relation to national measures with the potential to 
affect other member states (Commission 2005i: 2). Highlighting the enduring 
political sensitivity of the information concerned, France recommended that the 
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mechanism be limited solely to information gathering, leaving any further 
discussion and action at the discretion of the ministerial level. In the view of the 
French delegation, a “permanent and binding mechanism” could have been 
inappropriate (Council 2006c: 2). This interpretation was contrasted by other 
member states who backed the Commission, such as Germany (Council 2006c: 2, 
3). This backing was crucial in light of the numerous internal divisions between 
national delegations, as illustrated through the objections raised during negotiations 
(Council 2006c, 2006e), and the distance between the Commission’s proposal and 
the stance of some national delegations. The Commission asserted that the proposal 
would have been strengthened by including a provision requiring an “exchange of 
views” between fellow member states or member states and the Commission 
(Commission 2005i: 3). This turned out to be controversial, with a number of 
member states judging this provision too political and involving a flavour of pre-
screening of national policies. Thus member states argued that the Commission 
should have been either only partially (Germany) or not at all involved (UK) 
(Council 2006e: 11). 
In its proposal the Commission lists about ten measures already adopted, 
which feature notification requirements similar to what this Decision was meant to 
achieve. With regards to uncertainty, the Commission is empowered to request 
additional information from a member state on topics covered by the Decision (art. 
2(3)) where it deems it appropriate. However in others (art. 2(4)), member states 
have conspicuous discretion over answering to such request. The Commission is 
also included in the web of national contact points designated by member states to 
exchange information. In addition, the proposal explicitly refers to court decisions 
as relevant information to be shared however, at the insistence of Germany, no 
additional information could be demanded in relation thereto (Council 2006c: 8). 
Finally, the Commission has to draw up a “general report” which forms the basis 
for the exchange of views “at ministerial level”. In all these cases, the Commission 
is at the centre of mechanisms aimed at sharing and providing information among 
member states. Again, this confirms the second hypothesis connected to uncertainty, 
but not the first on expertise.  
 
The same issue concerning the circulation of information is tackled by the 
Secure Web-Based Information and Co-ordination Network Decision. The Council 
empowered the Commission to undertake the operational management of this 
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service, which speaks to the efficiency and effectiveness rationales124. Moreover, it 
provided it with a say in “the structure and content thereof [i.e. the network] and 
the elements for information exchange” (Art. 2(1)). The same article also provides 
a non-exhaustive list of “elements” that leaves the Commission with scope to 
intervene in this matter (Art. 2(2)). Importantly, the Decision does not open any 
door for the Commission to elaborate on this data; therefore its expertise function 
seems less relevant here. 
 
The Migration Statistics Regulation (European Union 2007b) encompasses 
all migration categories, from refugee protection to irregular migration, and from 
borders to labour migration. Its legal basis however lies outside Chapter IV on 
migration (Art. 285(1) TEC). This Regulation represents a test case for the 
uncertainty rationale, as it is the result of a widely recognised need for better 
statistics on all migration areas and exchange thereof (Commission 2003d: 2; 
Council 2001r). Even though the Regulation does not oblige member states to 
harmonise their statistical toolboxes, it requires them to specify the approaches 
taken to facilitate more precise comparisons and an assessment of sources 
(Commission 2005d: 3). This is no trivial point, as one interviewee in the 
Commission revealed that in the early years following Amsterdam, the Council 
provided information with no additional remarks on sources or methods used. To 
improve the situation the Commission tried to involve Eurostat in the process and 
in Council meetings, however this was opposed by the Council (Interview 3).  
The Commission's report on the implementation of the Regulation 
highlighted that pre-existing cooperation on statistics and exchange of information 
relied on voluntary contributions by member states. The Commission stated,  
 
European migration statistics were characterised by poor data 
availability and a low degree of harmonisation. In many cases, 
basic EU level aggregates could not meaningfully be produced as 
the component national data were either not available for some 
Member States or were prepared using widely differing statistical 
definitions. The lack of harmonisation meant that analyses and 
comparisons of data relating to different Member States were 
                                                          
124 See section 6.1.4. 
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unreliable and potentially misleading. This implied that an 
important area of European public policy lacked appropriate 
statistics to inform evidence-based decision making (Commission 
2012b: 5).  
 
Problems still persisted following implementation in terms of definitional issues 
that reduce comparability, timeliness of the data provision, and accuracy. 
(incomplete and absent data still persisted) (Commission 2012b). 
Having said that the Regulation itself does not feature many delegating 
provisions from a quantitative perspective, and a number of constraints are present, 
which are perhaps the result of the political sensitivities mentioned above. That said 
the delegating provisions included in the Decision are important. As the Preamble 
states, the Commission is “empowered to update the definitions, to decide on the 
groupings of data and additional disaggregations and to lay down the rules on 
accuracy and quality standards” (Recital 16). This empowerment is articulated in 
three provisions: Art. 8(1) grants the Commission the right to make “additional 
disaggregations” in a number of areas; and, Art. 9(3) states, if the Commission so 
requires, member states must provide all information “necessary to evaluate the 
quality, comparability, and completeness of the statistical information”. However, 
these measures are adopted under the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny, the 
strictest of the Comitology procedures. These elements confirm both hypotheses 
related to uncertainty. The Commission is recognised as an expert in statistical 
affairs (collection, assessment and processing), and is also the institution charged 
with ensuring that information is supplied and shared. 
 
Always under administrative cooperation, the Union decided to equip itself 
with a permanent provider of knowledge and information. Previous chapters have 
frequently highlighted how EU policies relied on patchy knowledge bases, such as 
in the case of irregular migration, or voiced concerns on the lack of information on 
a particular issue (see above). The Council finally approved the establishment of a 
European Migration Network (EMN) in 2008, which directly answered the data and 
knowledge needs of “the Community and its Member States” (European Union 
2008d). Before this Decision was adopted there had been a forerunner to the EMN, 
which was followed by a Green Paper on its future (Commission 2006f; Geddes 
2014: 11). 
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The Commission is entrusted with a number of powers through this Decision. 
Regarding uncertainty, the Commission must “adopt the EMN's annual programme 
of activities”. Read together with Art. 6(1), and taking account of the fact that the 
Commission also sits on the Steering Board, the Commission has some powers in 
setting the direction of the research-related activities of the network. This 
demonstrates trust in the expertise of the Commission as the network was intended 
to become the key source of reliable knowledge for all member states involved125. 
In addition, the Commission compiles a synthesis report based on the national ones, 
“bringing together the main findings and placing them within an EU policy 
perspective (e.g. by relating them to recent policy initiatives)” (Commission 
2008d). This is not to be underestimated as it also serves as the basis for the 
Commission’s Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (Commission 2012a: 2). 
In sum, delegation to the Commission seems to take place under an uncertainty 
rationale related to its expertise and for reasons of efficiency (see third section). 
 
 
 6.1.3) Credibility of commitments 
 
As in previous chapters this section aims at understanding member state 
commitments on legal migration and administrative cooperation, and the extent to 
which those commitments were tarnished by imbalances or past crises. In terms of 
commitments, member states were required by the Treaties to set rules for entry and 
residence, long-term residence permits, and intra-EU movement. Notably, explicit 
mention of labour migration was absent from the Treaty. At Tampere the European 
Council added a commitment to fair treatment and the right of long-term migrants 
to work as employees or to become self-employed. For legal migration and TCNs 
policy, reference is only made to policy “approximation” among member states 
(European Council 1999: A. III. 20, 21). There is no mention of common policies 
for legal migration, as in the case of “common visa policy”, there is only an 
aspiration for “more efficient management” (European Council 1999: A. IV. 22). 
The 2004 Hague European Council stated that,  
 
                                                          
125 Denmark does not participate in this Decision, and Ireland opted-in in 2009 European Union, 
'2009/350/Ec: Commission Decision of 28 april 2009 on the  Request by Ireland to Accept 
Council Decision 2008/381/Ec Establishing a  European Migration Network (Notified under 
Document Number C(2009)  2708)', (Brussels, 2009b)..  
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[l]egal migration will play an important role in enhancing the 
knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic 
development, and thus contributing to the implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy (Agence Europe 2004d).  
 
This connects labour migration policy to other flagship projects of the EU, but fails 
to specify any further or more precise commitments. The Commission pointed out 
that member states already had obligations under several international agreements 
regarding family reunification and many of them had family rights in their 
Constitutions (Commission 1999a: 3-5). Over two years later the Commission 
noted that, while the European Council restated its commitments to the Tampere 
“guidelines” without entering into details as to what this entailed, the Council was 
deadlocked on finding workable solutions (Commission 2002d: 2). This speaks to 
the absence of strong commitments as well as to the deep divisions among member 
states. Therefore, it seems that member state commitments on legal migration were 
weak, which in turns diminished the need to strengthen the credibility of those 
commitments. 
There was however no reference to enhanced administrative cooperation in 
the Tampere programme. What is more, few references were made to increased 
cooperation among member states at all, except for border controls. On the other 
hand, the following five-year Hague Programme set out that, “strengthening 
practical and operational cooperation between relevant national agencies [was] of 
vital importance” (Council 2004c). 
 
The idea of an EU labour migration policy attracted both supporters and 
opponents. Early Commission attempts to establish common rules for TCN workers 
floundered among diverging preferences in the mid-1990s and again in early 2000s 
(Financial Times 1994). In 2000 the Commission argued the case for labour 
migration channels, and stated that “overall, migrants generally have a positive 
effect on economic growth, and do not place a burden on the welfare state” 
(Commission 2000c: 27; The Independent 2001b). Capitalising on the momentum 
that the Tampere European Council had apparently initiated, the Commission 
proposed a Directive in 2001 “on the conditions of entry and residence for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employment activities” (Agence Europe 
2001a; Commission 2001f). One could interpret the Commission's early attempts 
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to establish a common EU labour migration policy as a further instance of a 
competence-eager bureaucracy rushing to put its foot inside the door of a new 
policy area (Hix 2005: 67-69). Having said that the Commission's stance has at 
times been ambiguous over what a Community policy would entail, which has not 
helped in countering resistance among member states. The European Employers’ 
Association (UNICE) endorsed the idea of a single procedure (and a single 
legislative measure) on admission and residence rights for TCNs for employment 
purposes, as suggested in the first Commission Communication on the matter. 
Having said that, UNICE was not clear on how such a method would work in 
practice. It questioned in particular how labour shortages would be formulated and 
made flexible enough to comply with subsidiarity requirements (Council 2001b). 
The EP also questioned the competence of the Commission in such affairs (EP 
2001c).  
 
The Commission's approach changed completely because this initially bold 
strategy failed (Commission 2005j; Euro-East 2005; Financial Times 2005c). 
Overall the Commission brought labour migration into the broader context of legal 
migration, and tackled it in a sectorial fashion. The idea was to harmonise an ever-
increasing number of legal migration sectors in a piecemeal way. Thus far the 
Commission has managed to propose and adopt measures related to students and 
trainees, researchers, high-skilled migrants126. Another of the Commission’s 
strategies to make headways into labour migration was to highlight the potentially 
negative externalities arising from a non-harmonised labour migration 
environment. This was framed in terms of increased flows into irregular migration. 
To that end, the Commission issued a Communication on “the links between legal 
and illegal migration” (Commission 2004c). Portrayed in terms of effectiveness, the 
Commission's strategy was to highlight past failures of existing national labour 
migration policy in terms of their irregular migration consequences, and to argue 
from there for a European legal migration policy. The underlying argument was that 
the more legal migration channels are opened the less irregular migration is created 
(Carrera and Formisano 2005: 6; European Report 2005b).  
 
Finally, the Commission has highlighted the demographic benefits European 
                                                          
126 Outside the period of this research, it is important to add that the EU adopted in 2014 a Directive 
on intra-corporate transferees and another on seasonal workers. 
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societies could reap from increased immigration (Fargues 2011). At the beginning 
of the new millennium, the often-quoted UN study on Replacement Migration 
raised major concerns on this issue (2000). The Commission immediately tuned 
into this analysis and proposed its demographic and economic perspectives on the 
future of the Union in 2000. In this study the Commission stated that, “across the 
EU as a whole, it is net migration that has become the principal component of 
population growth” (Commission 2000c: 24). International migration plays a 
significant role in the size and structure of the population in most EU member states. 
According to Eurostat, member state population increases in recent years have 
mainly been due to net migration (Eurostat 2011a). As European states face huge 
problems related to ageing populations, immigration is seen as one of the potential 
solutions to the potentially disruptive consequences of a falling birth rate (Brücker 
et al. 2006: 136). 
 
In contrast with the Commission’s preferences as revealed above, 
commentators have suggested that difficulties in reaching agreements and 
designing policies at EU level are mainly due to the different interests at play among 
member states (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 76, 81; Cerna 2013). 
Domestically, opinion polls usually tend to favour tough stances on migration. In 
2006 polls revealed that “40% of respondents in France and more than 60%” in 
other countries (UK, Italy, Spain and Germany) believed that “there were too many 
immigrants in their country and that their country's immigration policy was making 
it too easy for migrants to enter legally” (von Weizsäcker 2007: 121). The situation 
had escalated somewhat with the emergence of a financial crisis, when, a Financial 
Times survey conducted in 2009 “showed that over three-quarters of adults in Italy 
and the UK”, and about two-thirds in Spain and Germany, “supported the idea of 
sending migrants who cannot find a job home” (Ruhs and Anderson 2010).  
 
Countervailing this pressure, business associations have frequently taken a 
positive stance on labour migration, which can in turn find a positive reception 
within governments (Caviedes 2004: 306; European Report 2004f; Messina 2009: 
3). However these are not necessary conditions. In the early 2000s, the UK made a 
clear distinction between irregular migration and the huge flows of asylum seekers 
(which had to be halted and reduced, respectively), and labour migration (which 
had to be promoted) (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011; Financial Times 2003, 2005d). 
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Empirical studies converge on the fact that employer and business associations were 
not active in supporting a UK labour policy (Statham and Geddes 2006; Wright 
2012). Another powerful source of influence, particularly for centre-right 
governments, is their link to catholic electorates. In Italy for instance, this factor 
has frequently put a brake on the most extreme policy proposals coming from allied 
parties in the context of government coalitions (Zincone 2006). This makes for an 
unstable situation at EU level, where member states must respond to a number of 
pressures while also preserving their political stance, at least rhetorically.  
 
A further line of division is that sets of member states have different historical 
experiences of labour migration. A number of examples can illustrate this. 
Temporary labour migration schemes were a common feature of most Western 
European states from the end of WWII to the 1973 oil crisis. Germany, the UK, 
France, the Netherlands, and Belgium were among those countries that actively 
sought increasing numbers of migrants to meet labour market needs (Castles 2006: 
2; Castles et al. 2014: 104-11). On the other hand, countries like Italy, Portugal and 
Greece were among those countries sending their citizens to work abroad. These 
programmes ended after the oil crisis, and policy-makers assumed labour migrants 
would return to their home countries when no longer able to secure employment. 
The opposite turned out to the case, with migrants even trying to bring their families 
in too (Castles et al. 2014: 111-18). This profoundly impacted policy makers and 
public opinion in destination countries, to the point that labour migration and family 
reunification became objects of contentious political debates (Simon and Lynch 
1999: 457, 64). Former sending countries became destination countries for other 
migratory flows between the end of the 1980s and the 1990s, and adopted labour 
migration schemes to try to regulate these inflows (Castles et al. 2014: 113-15; 
Perlmutter 2014). These differences in timings and experiences made for an uneasy 
mix at EU level, where compromise has been difficult to achieve thus far.  
One example of the effects of these different traditions is the Italian initiative 
for labour migration quotas in the EU. Quotas for entry were a relatively common 
practice among certain member states (Commission 2006d: 14-15; Smith 2008: 
423) and Italy has been fairly consistent in supporting the idea of an EU labour 
migration policy (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009: 121, 24). Domestic pressures were 
relevant to this stance, as Italy's employers association saw the idea of a zero 
immigration policy as disastrous (BNP Paribas Economic Newsletter 2005; 
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Financial Times 2002c). In this context, Italy unsuccessfully sought to upload its 
quota system for use at EU level (Agence Europe 2003g). In 2003 Interior Minister 
Pisanu supported the idea of, “having a European system of quotas” (The 
Independent 2003). To him, this would have helped to satisfy labour market needs 
and reduce irregular migration by granting entry to fixed numbers of TCNs. The 
failure to upload this model was due to opposition from countries that had used 
similar policies in the past, for instance France and Germany (Agence Europe 
2003b; Agence France Presse 1999; BBC 2006; Le Figaro 2003; Martin 2014: 237). 
The persistence of this stance was confirmed several years later, when Interior 
Minister Schäuble stated this approach was not even on the agenda in Berlin. This 
statement was in response to a question on Italian and Spanish labour migration 
quotas and a suggestion that a mechanism such as this be adopted at EU level (BBC 
2006). While the Commission’s in a 2000 Communication was that quotas were not 
a feasible strategy, the JHA Commissioner argued in their favour only a few years 
later (Agence Europe 2003d). During talks about a possible shift to QMV in 2004 
for legal migration matters, a group of member states including, inter alia, 
Germany, Austria, and Denmark, jointly pushed to retain “access to the labour 
market […] under national scope" (as centre-right Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang 
Schüssel put it (Agence Europe 2004a).  
 
Particularly after the mid-2000s, a minimum level of convergence began to 
emerge on the desirability of adopting a scheme for highly skilled migrants. Many 
EU countries developed programmes to encourage high skilled migration during 
the early 2000s (e.g. Belgium, Germany, France, UK) (Apap 2001: 2-3; Carrera 
2007a: 10; Financial Times 2001d; Hansen 2007). Competition over attracting 
highly skilled migrants brought the potential for member states to begin 
undercutting one another (Cerna 2013). This trend does not relate solely to high-
skilled workers, but also encompasses researchers and students (Agence Europe 
2002f). Member states joined other countries in what has been called the “global 
race for talent” (De Somer 2012: 4; von Weizsäcker 2006). Indeed, the Commission 
constantly reminded them of the connection between the Lisbon Agenda pledge of 
a knowledge-based economy and the need to attract students and researchers into 
Europe (Agence Europe 2005c). In other words, it connected the desirability of 
labour migration policies to other flagship EU projects. However many 
commentators have highlighted that the net result of differences in experiences and 
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interests has led to a situation where member states were not cooperating with each 
other, but “competing against each other” over the same pot of skilled migrants. 
This intra-EU competition is exemplified by the decision of member states to add a 
European framework to their existing national models for attracting skilled 
migrants rather than surrender the latter and adopt a common overall approach 
(Cerna 2013; Collett 2008). Apparently, competition over labour migration was not 
recognised as burdening other member states. While some authors have argued that 
the “use of third-country nationals in the labour market of one Member State may 
create imbalances in competition between the Member States” (Szyszczak 2006: 
497), this sort of argument is not cohesive and is frequently questioned. Member 
states seem to remain unconvinced of the benefits of tightly coordinating their 
labour migration policy.  
 
As previously discussed, there is an accepted wisdom in some quarters of the 
academic literature and the media that migrants exploit family reunification and 
free movement rights, which ultimately damages some member state welfare 
systems. This is known as a welfare magnet thesis (Finotelli 2009), whereby more 
generous provisions in a given member state encourage migrants to go “shopping” 
for the best offers. This is a clear case of the potential for a given member state’s 
policies to damage others in the context of an internally borderless area. The 
Commission’s proposal on family reunification explicitly refers to this problem. 
Similar to the discussion on norms-sharing in the area of asylum policy, the 
underlying idea is that harmonisation “serves the purpose of preventing forum 
shopping by third country nationals seeking the Member State with the most lenient 
rules on family reunification” (Oosterom-Staples 2006: 454, 87). 
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Chart 6.1. Trends in family reunification in the EU (2008-2010)  
 
 
 
Source: Commission (2014a). 
Notes: data missing for the Netherlands for 2008.  
 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
2008 2009 2010
Family reason: Permits for joining a non-EU citizen
Belgium Germany Spain France Italy
Netherlands Austria Sweden UK
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2008 2009 2010
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
fa
m
ily
 p
er
m
it
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
to
ta
l p
er
m
it
s
Shares of family permits
All first permits issued for family reasons (EU27) - share of total permits
Family reasons: Person joining a non EU citizen (EU 27) - share of total permits
Family reasons: Person joining a non EU citizen (EU 27) - share of family permits
205/326 
The two charts above (Chart 6.1) show that in 2010 family reunification still 
represented slightly less than one third of all EU residence permits (the blue area in 
the graph below, measured on the left hand axis), this is within the context of a 
decreasing trend overall since the start of the new millennium (Commission 2011d). 
More than two thirds of family reunification permits was due to permits issued to 
family members of a TCN in 2010 (purple line, measures on the right-hand axis). 
If member states wanted to cut overall levels of immigration, families joining a 
TCN constituted an important piece in the puzzle. That said these overall trends for 
the EU-27 masked different trends at the national levels (chart above). Many EU 
countries witnessed flat or slightly decreasing trends in absolute numbers 
(Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands), while a small set of member 
states recorded uneven or increasing trends (Italy, Spain, Belgium, the UK).  
 
Finally turning to administrative cooperation, the Commission and the 
member states realised that, in order to strengthen the adoption of common 
frameworks in all areas of JHA cooperation (border controls, asylum etc.) they 
needed some degree of support during implementation as well as some common 
projects on top of legislative action. The ARGO Fund emerged to meet this need. 
While the overall amounts were minimal, it is worth noting that ARGO represented 
an endorsement of a previous effort emerged during Maastricht and the continuance 
of a project aimed at fostering common policies (Commission 2001b: 17-18). The 
majority of the initiatives financed were seminars, conferences, exchanges, and a 
few projects. 
 
Summing up, there were no clear commitments by the member states in the 
area of legal migration above and beyond what stated in the Treaties, and a variety 
of opinions existed on the usefulness and feasibility of an EU labour migration 
policy. Efforts at promoting cooperation, either by the Commission or individual 
member states, could not create enough interest, let alone commitment, among all 
member states. The fact that member states were divided in the Council is irrelevant 
as commitments to an EU level action were lacking. The only possible exception is 
family reunification, where both commitments and likelihood of tensions 
originating from magnet welfare thesis were present. For what concerns 
administrative cooperation, while on the sidelines at the Tampere European 
Council, it remerged as a vital area of cooperation in the mid-2000s. 
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Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
Some legislative measures pertaining to legal migration have been considered by 
commentators as crucial for the evolution of EU migration policy. These are the 
Family Reunification Directive, the Long-Term Resident Directive, the Free 
Movement Directive, Students Directive, and Researchers Directive. Chapter 3 
revealed that these measures do not include much if any delegation. It is therefore 
pertinent to ask why that is the case. A first explanation could relate to time. As 
these decisions were taken relatively early in the history of EU cooperation on 
migration, it is possible that principals (member states) were reticent to concede 
major powers to the Commission. This contrasts with contemporary measures that 
generate strong delegation (European Union 2000b, 2000a, 2001c). In addition, this 
line of reasoning may appropriately describe the context surrounding the adoption 
of the first three of these measures, but it is less convincing in relation to the latter 
two. Another potential explanation is simply that these measures did not need any 
delegation. In other words, delegation served no policy need. Finally, and similarly 
to the minimum standards Directives in asylum policy, the distance between the 
positions of Commission and Council could account for the absence of delegation. 
Due to the significant amount of legislation, only some of the measures adopted are 
discussed in detail. 
 
The proposal for a Council Directive on the 'right to family reunification' for 
TCNs received a cold reception from member states. Member states had different 
national legislative regimes governing the matters at stake, and found it difficult to 
agree on the key definitions of the Directive (what constitutes a family, a dependant, 
a minor, etc.) (European Report 2000f). The Council tried to regroup several times 
by identifying the “sensitive political issues on which delegations’ positions diverge 
considerably” and restarting the debate focusing on these, but achieved varied 
results (Council 2000l, 2001f). Germany, for instance, was concerned about the 
consequences such legislation would have on its “national labour market” and 
“national budget”, while Austria had a general reservation on the whole proposal 
(Council 2000j). Difficult negotiations lasted for more than three years, with lines 
of division existing between member states on all portions of the proposal 
(European Report 2000k, 2001a). This prompted the Commission to the release of 
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two revised proposals that substantially watered down its initial proposal (European 
Report 2002a).  
The Directive displays a number of exceptions and is ambiguous in different 
provisions (e.g. concerning labour access127), which makes effective monitoring of 
compliance difficult (Pascouau and Labayle 2011: 100; Peers 2006: 214, 15). The 
Commission had a negative view of the potential variations and safeguards retained 
by member states (Commission 2008f, 2011c). Negotiations proved politically 
costly for all actors involved, with debates reportedly taking place both between 
member states and also between the Commission and the member states. 
Agreement was also hard-won on procedural aspects, for example in relation to the 
deadlines for replying to applications for family reunification and renewal of 
residence permits. Again, the Commission was of the opinion128 that the, 
 
alternative solutions put forward by the delegations had weakened 
the text to such an extent the objective of harmonising Member 
States legislations in this field was becoming increasingly distant 
(Council 2001h: 2) 
 
Some national delegations such as the Netherlands objected to the “rendez-vous” 
clause, a common provision in EU legislation (Council 2002e: 22). Nine years after 
the Directive’s adoption, member states showed little appetite to modify to their 
levels of discretion granted during its revision (Commission 2012c: 2). 
 
The Commission's proposals for the Family Reunification, Long-Term 
Resident, and Free Movement of EU Citizens Directives each contained a provision 
on sanctions (“Penalties”). This was scrapped in the final text of the first two, but 
not for the latter. This provision was inserted in many proposals in the early 2000s, 
but was dropped in response to strong opposition by the Council. While a 
conspicuous number of member states questioned the appropriateness and 
legitimacy of such a provision, the Commission argued that this was a traditional 
element of legislation (Council 2001i). In the context of the Temporary Protection 
Directive, the French delegation remarked that a solution should be found for this 
                                                          
127 For both employed and self-employed Steve Peers, Eu Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 468.. 
128 Before putting forward the third proposal. 
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matter as it had already emerged in the context of the Family Reunification 
Directive (Commission 1999a: 30; Council 2001j: 32). It further considered that 
this issue was related to the entire Title IV of the Treaty (i.e. horizontal issue).129 In 
other words, the French move was a clear signal that if a decision was made not to 
include this provision in the final legal text, it should have been applied consistently 
throughout the legislative acquis (which was developing at the time). This early 
debate should not be overlooked, as it is revealing of member state appetites for 
monitoring and sanctioning in this policy area. While negotiating the Family 
Reunification Directive, Belgium and Germany opposed this provision on the 
ground that it was vague and appeared only to duplicate EC treaty rules (Council 
2001i). In some cases penalties did not seem to refer to member states but rather to 
individuals who contravened the Directive, the example of marriages of 
convenience is mentioned in relation to the Family Reunification Directive. 
However it was suggested later that this could also affect civil servants within 
national administrations, a point raised by Germany and Austria, who opposed such 
interpretation (Council 2001l: 25). In response, the Commission argued that this 
was a vital tool for identifying the extent to which the Directive was being 
implemented correctly and therefore was essential to its monitoring role.  
By September 2001, an agreement seemed to be reached on a sort of 
horizontal provision to be applied to all legislation. This provision did not envision 
a requirement that member states notify the Commission of what penalties had been 
agreed. In other words, penalties were something to be entirely managed within the 
Council. However, few months later the Commission revisited the issue in a paper 
aimed at harmonising wordings and definitions across all asylum legislation 
(Council 2001m: 18-19). This implicitly created a political endorsement of weak 
monitoring in this body of legislation. The emergence of such protracted debate 
over a provision that, in the Commission’s estimation, was a traditional element in 
EC policy-making did not constitute a promising start for monitoring and 
sanctioning elements in the emerging JHA legislation. After the provision was 
deleted in the Dublin Regulation (Council 2002f: 29), it did not re-emerge in other 
Council discussions. The justification for its insertion in the case of the Free 
                                                          
129 The negotiations on the Asylum Qualification Directive made explicit reference to the Temporary 
Protection Directive as the template upon which modelling all further provisions. The provision 
in the Qualification Directive which foresaw the notification to the Commission was deleted in 
the negotiations Council, 'Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on 
Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status. St 11844 2001 Init', 
(Brussels, 2001k) at 42.. 
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Movement Directive seems to have been the broad and varied ties to several Treaty 
Chapters.  
 
The Researchers Directive 'on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research' set itself the ambitious goal 
of attracting 700,000 researchers by 2010 (increased to one million by 2020 in 
2013) (Commission 2011b: 9). The Directive applies to researchers seeking entry 
into the EU for more than three months having established a “hosting agreement” 
with a “research organisation”, be it public or private (Art 2(c)). The procedure 
leading to admission is noteworthy. In practice once member states have selected 
the “research institutions”, and if all the conditions are met by the “research 
organisation” hosting the “researcher”, “Member States are obliged” to release the 
residence permit and grant admission to the TCN (EP 2013: 3; Peers 2011: 452). 
Having said that, delegation here is not towards EU bodies - the Commission has 
little if any powers in this Directive -, but to public and private actors within EU 
member states.  
 
Turning to measures dealing with administrative cooperation, the EP report 
on ARGO empathetically described the connection between implementation and 
credibility of commitments. First, the EP saw one of ARGO's core objectives as the 
preparation of a more extensive “responsibility-sharing” mechanism, albeit limited 
to the field of border control (EP 2002a). This confirms the reading of migration 
funds as devices established to strengthen credibility of commitments aimed at 
facilitating solidarity among member states. In other words member states 
voluntarily bound themselves to a solidarity framework, with money being 
allocated according to collectively chosen criteria. The EP was also keen to stress 
the importance of the Commission’s involvement,  
 
[u]niformity between the practices of the Member States when 
applying Community law cannot be obtained by strengthening co-
operation and collaboration simply among their national 
administrations, it also requires the backing of the Commission in 
its capacity as guardian of the Community's interests (EP 2002a: 
8).  
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There were many more EP amendments which went in the same direction, i.e. 
emphasising the Commission's role in monitoring, proposing and strengthening 
Community and national actions (e.g. Amendment 11 to art. 1; Amendment 12 to 
art. 3; Amendment 33 to art. 10, Amendment 34 to art. 11) (EP 2002a: 11,12, 20). 
The Council eventually dismissed all of these amendments.  
The Commission is granted “financial control” over measures deemed 
eligible for funding (Art. 11(5)). In concrete terms, this means that each action to 
be financed is the subject of “grant agreements” between the Commission and the 
national agencies proposing the actions. The financing decision and contracts 
arising therefrom are subject to financial control by the Commission and to audits 
by the Court of Auditors. Although there are no provisions that force suspension or 
withdrawal of allocated funds as is the case in other migration funds (e.g. European 
Refugee Funds), the binding contractual form is important as it better facilitates the 
Commission in performing its controlling tasks. Finally, the Commission may 
decide to invite “representatives from the candidate countries to information 
meetings after the ARGO Committee's meetings” (art. 13(5)). This external reach 
granted to the Commission is not unusual. In the Secure Web-Based Information 
and Co-ordination Network Decision, the Commission can, under Art. 7, enter into 
“agreements with bodies governed by public law established under the [EC treaties] 
or established within the framework of the [EU]”. This also enables the 
Commission to strike agreements with other EU bodies if deemed appropriate.  
 
 
 6.1.4) Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
It is essential to remember that any talk of labour migration became a sort of 
political taboo at both national and EU level for a sub-set of member states 
following the 1973 Oil Crisis. One prominent consequence of the end of labour 
migration policies at that time130 was that the issue of family reunification emerged. 
Efforts at limiting this channel have fallen short, as family reunification remains 
one of the main sources of immigration for many European countries. Opposing 
                                                          
130 Not all closures of labour migration schemes actually achieved their objectives. According to 
Hollifield, “the first real attempts by the French government to assert control over immigration 
(permanent workers, family members, seasonal workers […]) ended in failure” James F. 
Hollifield, 'France', in James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, and Pia M. Orrenius (eds.), 
Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) at 
164. 
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this policy preference, the Commission pushed for cooperation based on a multi-
faceted strategy discussed in the previous section. More broadly, authors have 
argued that restrictive policies can fail in their intent for a number of reasons. Inter 
alia, in a regional context such as the EU “spatial” or “inter-temporal 
substitution”131 occurs when migration is simply diverted to other member states 
(Czaika and De Haas 2013: 497). Nationally and regionally speaking, different legal 
orders and policies can induce migrants to access some countries over others 
(Czaika and De Haas 2013: 497). 
 
As discussed in the previous section, past experience has severely limited 
policy options when it comes to labour migration. Looking at the latest wave of 
labour migration, i.e. the fascination with highly skilled migrants, member states 
employing inducement programmes have enjoyed mixed success (e.g. Germany, 
UK) (Apap 2001: 9-16; Cerna and Chou 2013; Martin 2014: 238). Germany 
developed a “Green Card” initiative in the early 2000s that aimed to attract 
approximately 20,000 IT specialists into the country in response to evidence of 
labour shortages in that sector. However, this provoked political clashes with the 
Christian-Democrat opposition of the time (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 
88-89). This illustrates that even a category as seemingly non-controversial as 
highly skilled migrants (Cerna 2013) can become a source of tension in a country 
where an anti-immigration policy has become a dogma. Aside from Germany’s 
peculiarities this example clarifies that unlike all other migration categories 
analysed in this dissertation, no agreement could be reached on legal migration, not 
even in relation to overarching principles. In irregular migration or asylum and 
refugee policy, member states did at least agree that illegal immigration had to be 
stemmed and asylum flows reduced. This is not to say that differences and conflicts 
were not present. On the contrary conflicts emerged because of divergent policies, 
such as in the case of large-scale regularisations, or administrative practices leading 
to different recognition rates. Nonetheless, there was at least an overarching 
agreement on the direction of policies. That was not the case for legal migration 
wherein member states were not able to agree, even in principle, on the desirability 
of labour migration channels.  
In a comparative stance, some authors have argued that “France and Germany 
                                                          
131 Emphasis in the original.  
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appear to be relatively unattractive for highly educated migrants” mainly because 
the “unemployment rate of immigrants with a tertiary educational degree” is 
“enormous in these countries and wages are significantly lower than in the UK and 
the US” (Geis et al. 2011: 788). It is therefore unsurprising to find that “shares of 
high-skilled migrants are much higher in the UK and the US than in continental 
Europe” (Geis et al. 2011: 788). In the case of the Blue Card Directive, the failure 
of European policies to attract highly skilled migrants was evident for all policy 
actors. Member states had compelling reasons for changing the direction of policy 
on this issue as, according to the OECD “foreign-born workers with university or 
equivalent qualifications make up just 2 per cent of the EU labour market” (Collett 
2009). This is less than half the percentage for the United States (4.5 percent), while 
that figure is about 8 percent for Australia and 10 percent for Canada (Commission 
2007b). The Commission demonstrated the extent of European problems in 
attracting skilled migrants in its proposal, stressing that while the “EU is the main 
destination for unskilled to medium-skilled workers from the Maghreb (87% of 
such immigrants)”the majority (54 percent) ”of the highly qualified immigrants 
from these same countries reside in the USA and Canada” (Commission 2007c: 3). 
According to the Commission, the determinants of this situation are: the 27 different 
national administrations; difficulties for moving internally within the Union; and, 
the length and complex administrative procedures (Collier 2013: 149). However, 
the fact that an argument could be made for an EU scheme aimed at attracting highly 
skilled migrants fell short of convincing member states to impose a single, common 
procedure on admission (Zaletel 2006).  
 
As discussed on a number of occasions in this chapter, family reunification 
has become one of the largest flows of legal migration among European states since 
labour immigration schemes were blocked in the early 1970s (Christina Boswell 
and Geddes 2011: 109). Taking this element into account, member states can be 
divided into two main groups: those states that experienced significant inflows of 
family reunification throughout their history of migration; and those that have only 
recently experienced this phenomenon. Looking at individual member states, 
countries such as Austria, France and the Netherlands, family reunification 
“currently account for 40 to 60% of all permanent immigration (Kraler and Kofman 
2009: 2). Whereas, in countries such as Italy, Spain, and the UK where labour 
migration is still a strong immigration channel, family reunification accounts for a 
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lower share of total admissions (albeit still significant, ranging from 31 to 39 
percent). A Commission note stated that, in the early 2000s this migration channel 
constituted “more than 50% of the total legal immigration to the EU” (Commission 
2011c). Therefore, if member states are to be taken seriously in their frequent 
declarations about reducing immigration to Europe, this should be the first area 
where action is taken (Christina Boswell and Geddes 2011: 104-05). These levels 
of inflows also reveal the failure of successive reforms of family reunification 
undertaken with the intent of reducing numbers (Christina Boswell and Geddes 
2011: 112; Terry Givens and Luedtke 2003: 291-30). This failure is the result of 
both national and international law, and jurisprudence on this issue (Guiraudon 
2000b; Joppke 1998; Pascouau and Labayle 2011; Ruffer 2011: 941). As a 
consequence of these legal constraints member states could not block this channel 
entirely. They therefore seem to have opted to make it more difficult and 
unpalatable for applicants by introducing stringent criteria for, inter alia, integration 
measures, for example imposing age limits and inspections regarding fraud and 
abuses (Kraler and Kofman 2009: 4; Kraler 2010: 34-36; Ruffer 2011: 944-48). 
These restrictive objectives can be seen most clearly in relation to family 
reunification for TCNs as compared with EU nationals (who are protected by more 
generous free movement provisions) (Pascouau and Labayle 2011: 5; Ruffer 2011). 
During the negotiations on the Family Reunification Directive, the Council 
was divided on a number of issues. Although made explicit by the Commission, the 
Council seemed unconvinced of the need for more efficiency and clearer 
procedures. An example of this can be seen in the various deadlines accompanying 
the procedures set out in the text. The Council was divided on this, and concern was 
raised over the prospect of adopting common deadlines in light of different 
administrative structures present in member states (Council 2000o: 6; 2001n: 10; 
2001o; 2001p: 2). On the other hand, relinquishing all deadlines would have meant 
giving up to any serious effort at harmonisation.  
 
While efficiency gains for legal migration were not clear to all, they were 
apparent to policy actors in relation to administrative cooperation. A case in point 
is the Enlargement process, wherein great emphasis was placed on the need for 
accession countries to establish adequate administrative capacities in border control 
and irregular migration (Agence Europe 2002m, 2002p). Increased efficiency in 
administrative cooperation on asylum was already an objective of Commission’s 
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Communications in the early 2000s (Commission 2000b: 15, 17). The EP linked 
the adoption of the ARGO programme to efficiency gains in terms of time and 
administrative resources, suggesting potential improvements in visa procedures as 
a specific example (Agence Europe 2002j). The Commission judged the adoption 
of ARGO as “extremely important” (Agence Europe 2002c). Member states were 
eager to access funding facilitating such administrative cooperation, judging by the 
fact that the Odysseus programme, the forerunner to ARGO, terminated its financial 
envelop one year in advance (Commission 2001b: 2). The objective of the Decision 
on the web-based information and cooperation network was to establish a rapid 
early warning mechanism concerning irregular migration between member states. 
The fact that member states have tried to achieve that since the end of the 1990s, 
but with questionable results, is testament to their quest for more efficient 
cooperation (Commission 2003a).  
 
To sum up, while member states had mixed success in restricting secondary 
flows into Europe at the national level, it is not clear how to assess their efforts in 
labour migration. The only clear policy initiative concerned highly skilled migrants, 
and these EU policies (particularly the continental ones) failed to attract the 
category of migrants sought. Turning to administrative cooperation, efficiency 
gains were actively sought through concrete initiatives and were supported by all 
EU actors.  
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
The purpose of ARGO was to strengthen and harmonise administrative practices 
across the EU. Official documents placed particular emphasis on harmonisation and 
homogeneous implementation of Community legislation put in place by national 
administrations (Commission 2001b). Such requests reflected problems of 
effectiveness in national administrative practices, which the measures promoted 
through ARGO were intended to address. The fact that administrative cooperation 
under ARGO-funded projects took on a legally binding status was a step from a soft 
cooperation policy, based on voluntary participation and good will, to compulsory 
cooperation inscribed in a legal framework. 
As is usual for migration funds, the Commission is tasked with the operational 
management of ARGO. This is clear from Art. 12(3) point (a) and (b), where the 
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Commission is required to prepare the “annual work programme” and “evaluate 
and select the actions proposed by national agencies”. These routine operations took 
place under the Comitology procedure (respectively, management and advisory). It 
is possible to interpret the decision to empower the Commission to “evaluate and 
select” the actions to be financed as a way of overcoming shortcomings of previous 
EU level action in the light of what has been said above, and given that these 
elements would normally be classified under operational management. In this light, 
this was an effectiveness decision. Having said that the limited nature of this 
decision must not be forgotten, in terms of the actual capabilities it created. ARGO’s 
funding amounted to €25 million for a 4 year period, surely not a sum that could 
reshape national administrative practices. 
 
As previously discussed, the Blue Card Directive is the only legislative 
measure explicitly concerning labour migration to have been adopted in the period 
analysed. Provisions dealing with labour market access in other legislative 
measures do not feature any Commission involvement. More profoundly, these 
provisions are frequently coupled with labour market tests, whereby access for 
TCNs is conditional upon a number of criteria. Again, delegation fails to materialise 
in this legislative measure. This casts more than a doubt on the reliability of 
effectiveness as a determinant for delegation, if due account is taken of the policy 
failures in attracting highly skilled migrants. The Family Reunification Directive is 
another example. This Directive represented an opportunity for member states to 
limit this significant immigration channel, an area where previous national attempts 
had largely failed. However it does not show any instances of delegation that can 
be read in terms of effectiveness.  
 
Delegation in the measures stemming from administrative cooperation 
frequently satisfies the efficiency rationale. One legislative measure that is possible 
to connect to an effectiveness rationale as well is the Secure Web-Based 
Information and Co-ordination Network Decision, which quantitatively features 
high delegation and medium discretion. This result is in line with other legislative 
measures that establish IT system (e.g. SIS, Eurodac). While rather comprehensive 
in its reference to migration, the Decision is actually only about irregular migration, 
as specified in the Preamble (point 1). Both the development and management of 
the network are under the supervision of the Commission (Preamble, point 2). Art. 
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2(1) grants the Commission “responsibility for the development and management 
of the network”. This is easily definable as “operative management”, as Franchino 
would put it, which positions it as delegation based on efficiency. However, this 
Decision results from a revision of a previously existing informal network, whose 
results have been received with mixed responses (Commission 2003b; 2003a: 2). 
In the words of the EP, the Commission’s proposal was responding, 
 
to the criticism of the existing early-warning system repeatedly 
voiced by the Member States and the desire for increased and at the 
same time simplified coordination in the field of irregular 
immigration (EP 2004a: 9),  
 
In other words, an explicit connection was drawn between previous policy 
failures and delegation to the Commission, hence it seems appropriate to see this 
provision as aiming at effectiveness. It was not only a question of saving time and 
resources, it was also a matter of achieving the stated objectives. Art. 3 empowers 
the Commission to both establish the terms and procedures surrounding access to 
the network, and the rules and guidelines for its use. Art. 5(4) provides the 
Commission with scope to propose the establishment of further security measures 
regarding access to the network, under the advisory procedure in Comitology. Most 
of the delegating provisions are about conferring operational tasks to the 
Commission, or adopting rules and conditions for implementing and using the 
network. As previously noted, this result is in line with a broader tradition that sees 
the Commission at the centre of large IT endeavours in this policy area. 
The Mutual Information Mechanism Decision confers similar powers on the 
Commission, where it is responsible for the “development and management of the 
network”. While this surely represents an instance of operational management, 
explicit reference is made to previous informal obligations of member states that 
were considered ineffective. Therefore this delegation can also be considered as 
based on effectiveness (Commission 2005f: 3). In its impact assessment, the 
Commission considered the feasibility of adopting a loose informal cooperation 
mechanism between member states, but rejected it in the light of past experiences 
of ineffectiveness (Commission 2005i: 4). That said, this viewpoint was contested 
as a number of member states insisted on keeping the cooperation more informal 
(including Italy, France, Belgium and the UK) (Council 2006c). 
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The Commission, the EP and the Council, i.e. all actors involved in the 
Migration Statistics Regulation, agreed that previous “attempts to harmonise 
definitions through gentleman agreements with the Member States have repeatedly 
failed, indicating the need […] for greater action at Community level” (EP 2007). 
In its proposal the Commission was unusually explicit on where problems lay, 
stating that “acting individually, and despite extensive non-legislative attempts by 
the Commission to improve coordination in this domain”, member states did not 
“supply to the Commission the harmonised data necessary for comparable 
Community statistics on migration and asylum” (Commission 2005d: 4). 
Consequently, this can be understood as a delegation on the basis effectiveness, 
justified by past failures of soft EU policy regulatory efforts. 
 
The Commission is tasked through the EMN Decision with a number of 
managerial and efficiency tasks. The EMN is composed of National Contact Points 
and the Commission. Its activities are guided by a Steering Board, which “should 
provide political guidance […] including contributing to the preparation of and 
approving the EMN's annual programme of activities” (Preamble 11). The Steering 
Board is composed of one representative from each member state, one from the 
Commission and two scientific experts. The Commission convenes and chairs its 
meetings (art. 7(3)). After adopting the EMN's annual programme of activities, the 
Commission is tasked with monitoring the activities of annual programmes, and 
must also report to the Steering Board. Based on the projects presented, the 
Commission must fix the indicative amounts to be made available for individual 
grants and contracts, and the National Contact Points. It can also enter into 
agreements with “other entities” in order to collaborate towards the achievement of 
the objectives of this Decision, subject to the approval of the Steering Board.132 
Although this Decision aims at solving problems of uncertainty, delegation 
seems more closely related to efficiency. In other words, disregarding the general 
aim of this Decision to tackle problems of information and knowledge, delegation 
to the Commission is mostly related to managing the network's operation and 
monitoring its output. In this regard, the EP seemed more favourably disposed to 
giving to the Commission more authority over harmonising statistics, assessing the 
                                                          
132 Until 2012, two of these agreements have entered into force, with Norway and Croatia 
Commission, 'Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Development of the European Migration Network, Com(2012) 427 Final', (Brussels, 2012a) at 
2.. 
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impact of EU legislation, and studying patterns of national implementation (EP 
2008a). The majority of these amendments were discarded in the final version (EP 
2008a: 11-13) along with the EP's bid for a seat in the Steering Board, which had 
been supported by the Commission but not the Council (EP 2008a: 25). 
 
 
 6.2. Conclusions 
 
This chapter compounds findings related to two separate migration categories, legal 
migration and administrative cooperation. Regarding legal migration measures, 
qualitative analysis confirms the limited amount of delegation and discretion 
highlighted in Chapter 3. Administrative cooperation on the other hand offers 
interesting insights into the relationships between dependent and independent 
variables. 
 
The picture regarding uncertainty is mixed. The analysis of legal migration 
offered almost no confirmation for the uncertainty rationale, a result consistent with 
the findings of other empirical chapters (e.g. irregular migration). If exclusive 
attention is paid to the measures most commented in the academic literature, results 
are negative. These are all the measures stemming from Art. 63(3)(a) and (4) TEC. 
While much attention was devoted to abuse of legal migration channels by TCNs, 
no legislative measures analysed here featured clauses dealing with these issues 
(not even notification requirements). On the other hand it should be remembered 
that, the situation concerning statistics and knowledge surrounding legal migration 
was in far better shape than that of irregular migration policy for example, resulting 
in a reduced rationale to delegate. Administrative cooperation is however 
characterised by delegation, which frequently serves informational and 
communication needs133 but rarely the need for expertise. 
Turning to administrative cooperation measures, a qualitative analysis of the 
Migration Statistics Regulation somewhat confirmed the findings of the 
quantitative analysis in Chapter 3. This Regulation features delegation in key 
aspects of information gathering, processing and circulation. The Mutual 
Information Mechanism Decision also addressed long-standing problems with 
communication and information sharing among member states (as discussed in 
                                                          
133 H2, section 2.3. 
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other chapters). Among the five cases analysed in the qualitative chapters of this 
study, this is no doubt the most definitive correlation between uncertainty and 
delegation. These examples involved far-reaching provisions dealing with the root 
causes of uncertainty across migration policy, and represent key test cases because 
of their primary focus on reducing uncertainty (as distinct from the many other 
measures that sought to achieve these ends only as secondary objectives). The 
ARGO Decision also features interesting, if embryonic, attempts to establish 
channels of communication and to advance knowledge of member states 
administrative practices.  
On the other hand, other important measures offer only limited confirmation 
of the uncertainty rationale. The stated goal of the EMN Decision was to provide 
expertise and advance migration knowledge. However it provides only partial 
confirmation of the uncertainty rationale as much of the delegation here relates to 
efficiency rather than expertise. In Boswell's estimation the EMN’s establishment 
demonstrates the Commission’s entrepreneurship, as it originated through loose 
cooperation, which was later followed by a proposal to establish an ad hoc 
institution. The Commission's strategy in that case was to involve “national 
governments in producing studies could help to normalize debate on controversial 
policy issues, and make them more likely to endorse the findings” (Christina 
Boswell 2008: 485). However this says little about the purported reliance of 
member state on the Commission as an expertise provider, something that 
delegation studies would expect, and much more about the political use of 
knowledge. Geddes offers an explanation of the EMN as an example of “soft, non-
binding governance” (2014: 10), i.e. an alternative to the Community Method. He 
stresses the networking potential of this body, and highlights the intergovernmental 
lenses through which policy actors involved view it. This intergovernmental 
perspective derives from the fact that experts are pooled within these networks by 
member states. That said, the decision to create a formalised body responded to 
long-term informational and knowledge needs in this area. The fact that a legislative 
measure was adopted after other policy efforts had been attempted is testament to 
the fact that the demand for something more institutionalised was present among 
these policy-actors. The network analysis Geddes carries out is certainly insightful 
and helps to interpret policy actors’ perspectives, but seems to downplay the fact 
that these webs emerge upon an institutionalised layer which is formalised through 
this Decision.  
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Finally, these instances of delegation tend to confirm only the second 
hypothesis regarding uncertainty. That is to say delegation mainly relates to 
information sharing and channels of communication between actors, rather than the 
provision of expertise. The survey of the literature on delegation in Chapter 2 
revealed that authors differed a great deal in their understanding of the 
Commission’s role in reducing uncertainty. Authors such as Hix and Nugent believe 
that the Commission is an expert actor. Pollack and Franchino hold that while 
principal-agent approaches would stipulate that delegation occurs because the agent 
is an expert in a given policy area, empirical studies reveal that the Commission has 
managerial expertise at best. Moravcsik holds that member state expertise is no 
match for the thinly staffed Commission, which tends to comply with what a 
secretariat of an International Organisation would do. This chapter tends to confirm 
the latter viewpoint, wherein the Commission’s overall role is not one of expertise-
provider but rather one of facilitator and streamliner of communication and 
information. 
 
The need to secure member state commitments in the area of legal migration 
has not led to as much delegation as it did in other migration categories. Many 
legislative measures show undeniably low levels of delegation and discretion. 
Nevertheless this observation should be prefaced with an acknowledgement that 
member states did not commit themselves to tight agreements. This is highlighted 
in the cautious tone of high-level political communiques and programmatic 
documents. Other studies have highlighted the limited effects that international 
organisations such as the OECD and EU have on labour market policies 
(Armingeon 2007). In the case of the EU, these studies have highlighted that EU 
initiatives have had some effect at national level but only when the highest national 
political level was directly involved in policy-making, and policies consequently 
reflected their preferences. This chapter adds to that body of literature by 
demonstrating the limited potential of EU policies to make inroads into core 
elements of state sovereignty where member states do not support such 
involvement. The most notable exceptions to this story are the various funds that 
have been included in this area, namely: ARGO; the Development Cooperation 
Regulation; and, the Integration Fund Decision. As in previous chapters, all three 
feature a number of provisions aimed at securing member state commitments by 
delegating powers to the Commission.  
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Finally turning to efficiency and effectiveness, it is possible to identify a 
number of provisions delegating operational management to the Commission in the 
case of administrative cooperation. For instance, this happened for the EMN 
Regulation, the Development Cooperation Regulation, and ARGO. Always in the 
area of administrative cooperation, the picture for effectiveness is also more 
positive than in previous chapter, where explicit links could be traced between 
previous failures and delegation in, inter alia, the Secure Web-Based Information 
and Co-ordination Network Decision, the Migration Statistics Regulation. 
However, for what concerns legal migration, the picture is again negative for 
effectiveness. In an area where failures have been numerous and explicitly 
acknowledged by policy actors (e.g. labour migration, family reunification), more 
instances of the Commission's empowerment were expected. 
 
The comparison between these two migration categories further highlights 
the importance of distance between the policy stance of member states in the 
Council and that of the Commission. The literature would predict that in cases 
where multiple principals are split, as with the Family Reunification Directive, 
agents would be able to exploit the situation and gain the upper hand in terms of 
delegation or agenda setting (Pollack 1997: 112-13). However delegation literature 
suggests that, the more divergent the Council and Commission’s preferences are, 
the less delegation to the Commission should be expected (see Chapter 2). The cases 
of legal migration and asylum policy confirm the difference between the 
Commission and Council’s stances along the liberal / restrictive divide. This is 
clearly the case for the Family Reunification Directive, where the Commission had 
to table three different proposals to satisfy the Council’s fragmented position. The 
Commission frequently remarked that the Council’s objections had diluted and 
compromised the integrationist objectives of the original text, thereby favouring a 
repressive framing (Agence Europe 2000c). The thorny issues for the Students 
Directive, which saw Commission and member states in opposition, were the 
possibility of movement within the EU and access to work. These features were 
deemed essential to attract students into Europe and therefore to reverse the 
negative trends in the global competition for talent. The Council opposed such 
moves for a variety of reasons ranging from outright dismissal of any talk on labour 
migration to fear of abuse of this migration channel.  
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Regarding shifts away from the Community Method, Caviedes suggests that 
the OMC in migration policy has been used by the Commission as a tool to enter 
the new policy field of legal migration (Caviedes 2004). Caviedes argues that the 
Council’s refusal to adopt the Commission’s proposal on an OMC in migration 
policy is not a sign of the unsuitability of the method, but is “a testament to the 
perceived discursive power of the OMC process” (2004: 306). This is because, 
 
being forced to compare and evaluate immigration policy in an 
open forum together with civil societal and international actors, 
whose views on immigration are often quite liberal, involves a risk 
of losing control over the agenda-setting process (Caviedes 2004: 
306).  
 
However, this is doubtful. Member states were highly successful in resisting and 
avoiding such intrusions from well-organised interests groups  in other policy areas, 
such as occupational health and safety policy (Smismans 2008). A study of 
delegation proves that member states can limit or virtually exclude the Commission 
if they so wish, if the ultimate objective of new policy-making methods is to exclude 
supranational actors (Bickerton et al. 2014). The near complete absence of 
delegation in legal migration shows this. If the case of integration measures is 
considered, it is plain that there are simply no secondary legislation measures with 
that explicit objective, except for the Integration Fund and the two 2000 Directives 
on discrimination (European Union 2000c, 2000d). Moreover, this occurred despite 
explicit commitments to TCN integration in the Treaties and in other programmatic 
documents. 
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7. Delegation in border and visa legislation 
 
 
Chapter 3 indicated that the area of border and visa policy features a number of 
legislative measures with high levels of delegation and discretion. Aggregate levels 
of delegation and discretion are also the second highest among migration 
categories.134 This chapter seeks to establish why delegation features so 
prominently in this policy area. In light of the fact, however, that this migration 
category has such a large amount of legislation attaching to it, it was not possible 
to examine all the pieces of legislation qualitatively. Instead, it was decided to 
examine only the most important pieces of legislation and those relevant to 
delegation. 
 
Competences on borders and visas are defined in the Amsterdam Treaty in 
Art. 62 TEC. The following issues are dealt with in this rather long and expansive 
text: (1) absence of internal controls; (2) measures concerning external borders; 
(2(b)) visas for external borders valid for no more than three months; and (3) 
freedom to travel within the territory of the member states for no more than three 
months. Considerations regarding external borders have featured in EC/EU affairs 
at the very least since the Single Market initiative of the late 1980s (Cassarino 2006; 
Geddes 2005b; Hobbing 2005; Monar 2001). Migration is not the sole policy 
concern relating to the notion of borders, a variety of different policy issues ranging 
from trade to tourism and from criminal activity to transport are also linked thereto. 
In short, policies centred on borders are not exclusively related to migration, but are 
enmeshed with a number of other policy considerations. 
 
 The importance of borders has also been present in the public consciousness 
in a historical sense. First, traditional notions of sovereignty rely on borders as the 
most visible sign of the territoriality of state power. Borders however also have 
deeper ontological meaning. In the words of Boswell and Geddes, “it is the borders 
of states that make international migration visible as a distinct social process” 
(2011: 13). Historically, the concept of sovereignty became entangled with notions 
of territory, borders and citizenship. Secondly, public opinion is susceptible to 
                                                          
134 When implementing measures are excluded from the set.  
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media portrayals of boats crowded with migrants arriving on European shores 
(Christina Boswell 2003a: 99; de Haas 2009). Eurobarometer surveys issued in 
2004 revealed that 80 percent of all respondents favoured reinforced controls at the 
gateways to the EU. These figures went as high as  89 percent among Italian 
respondents, and 81% among German respondents (Jorry 2007: 4). 
 
In line with the structure of the previous chapters, delegation in border and 
visa affairs is analysed according to the two institutional components of the conflict 
both within the Council, and between Council and Commission. The impact of three 
independent variables (uncertainty, credibility of commitments, effectiveness and 
efficiency) is investigated in three subsequent sections. This is then followed by a 
brief conclusion summing up the results of this analysis. 
 
 
 7.1. Analysis of the determinants of delegation 
 
 7.1.1) Institutional factors: Council internal division, and conflict 
between Council and Commission 
 
Overall, it seems that the internal divisions within the Council were relatively 
superficial and that general agreement prevailed. The average length of debate 
within the Council varied greatly. Debates concerning the 2001 Visa List 
Regulation, the 2001 SIS II Regulation, the 2004 VIS Regulation, and the 2008 
SIS+ to SIS II Regulation took between six and eighteen months to be agreed. 
Whereas the Schengen Border Code Regulation and the 2006 SIS II Regulation 
took nearly two years, and the 2008 VIS Regulation took more than three. It must 
be said though, the duration of negotiations appears more justified when the 
complexity and length of the latter two legal texts is taken into account. Debates 
concerning these legal texts also varied in intensity. No significant division emerged 
for the 2004 VIS Regulation, whereas a number of technical issues were raised 
during negotiations surrounding the Visa List Regulation. These included visa 
requirements for stateless persons and refugees, which proved a contentious point 
between the Council and the Commission (Council 2000p, 2000q). Intense debates 
surrounded a number of political and technical issues on the 2008 VIS Regulation; 
the need to reconciliation in the Council’s fragmented relationship with the EP also 
arose here (Council 2006a, 2006b).  
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Overall, the analysis of official documents and press coverage reveals that the 
Commission’s preferences were broadly in line with that of the Council. The 
emphasis was on more control and wider use of IT in the performance of tasks 
related to borders and visas. That said there were some points of contention. These 
were mainly related to the border guard initiative, which began to emerge in in the 
early 2000s and was opposed by some member states. The EP report also revealed 
the contentious nature of Frontex (EP 2004b: 12). Ultimately though, the 
establishment of this agency and the fact that the final legal text bore striking 
resemblance to the original proposal highlights that convergence was possible. In 
addition, only about two weeks separated the Commission's proposal from the 
Council Conclusions approving the agency, signalling that substantial agreement 
had already been achieved by the time the proposal was published (EP 2004b: 29). 
That said the Commission saw reinstatement of border controls as an important 
measure (in continuity with the long-standing protection of the Single Market), 
while member states tended to favour a more flexible use of this option (Financial 
Times 2011a). Where visas were concerned, much of the debate surrounded 
technical features of documents and consular cooperation. In this respect, 
Commission and Council were not far apart. There was nevertheless some specific 
areas of contention. These included, inter alia, Comitology rules for the VIS 
(Council 2004b), and proposals for visa requirements for refugees from countries 
not subject to visa requirements. The latter was resisted by the Commission but 
endorsed by the Council (Council 2000y). The Council and the Commission did 
however display similar views on many aspects of the broader topic concerning the 
massive use of IT in border controls (SIS II) and visas (VIS) (Commission 2004a: 
9). However, there has been growing dissatisfaction in the Council concerning the 
Commission’s handling of these undertakings. 
 
 
 7.1.2) Uncertainty 
 
Following the format set out in previous chapters, two questions guide this section: 
Were there any acknowledged needs for information and expertise among policy 
actors? And, if yes, what was the Commission’s role in answering to these needs? 
When Amsterdam entered into force, member states had long established their need 
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for better and more reliable information. At the EU level, lack of information and 
knowledge in border and visa issues was addressed through the establishment of 
extensive IT systems. The SIS, the first and best known, had been up and running 
since 1995. The Union IT toolbox was expanded to incorporate visa information 
(VIS), as well as information on cognate areas such as asylum and irregular 
migration (EURODAC). In relation to the second research question, member states 
assigned responsibility for the operational management of these costly, long-term 
and complex undertakings to the Commission. Moreover, they considered the 
Commission (and other EU agencies also) as a hub for information and knowledge 
sharing. Ironically, this trend is corroborated through the body of academic articles 
that highlight lack of accountability in these initiatives and the potential threat to 
civil liberties. Simply put, these warnings imply that something substantial 
happened in this policy area (Balzacq 2008; Bigo et al. 2012; Wolff 2008: 263-66). 
 
When the new agency with responsibility for IT systems in migration, eu-
LISA, started its work in December 2012, it was responsible for managing three 
databases: SIS II; VIS; and, EURODAC. The vast presence of IT systems points to 
the importance that collecting data and having better and more reliable information 
on border issues has acquired since cooperation on those matters began in the EU. 
Papagianni reports that measures were put in place for the exchange of statistical 
data on visa applications as early as 1994, or on “possible malfunctions at the 
external borders” since the Schengen initiative (2006: 116, 17). These measures 
were amplified in the wake of the September 11 attacks in the US, after which 
member states reportedly requested that the Commission “set up an information 
exchange network on visas issued” (European Report 2001c). A strong 
concentration on visa policy persisted several months after this as is evident in a 
Commission Communication on irregular migration (Commission 2001d). The 
Commission considered improved knowledge and communication on visas 
instrumental to increased understanding of irregular migration and improved 
prospects of its reduction. Its plan was to establish an information exchange system 
on visas issued by member states, common visa centres, and the network of liaison 
officers in national representations abroad (EUObserver.com 2003c; European 
Report 2003a).135 Member states welcomed these IT measures. One of the evidence 
                                                          
135 See also Chapter 5.  
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is that while the UK has decided not to engage in much of the collaboration on 
borders and visas, it did opted into SIS alongside non-EU countries such as Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland. New functionalities proposed to be included in the 
revised SIS II, such as biometric information, were debated at length by the Council 
(Council 2000{, 2006d). At the insistence of some member states (e.g. Germany), 
the new system was required to collect such data (EUObserver.com 2003b, 2003a; 
Mitsilegas 2007: 388; Parkin 2011: 11). That said the early phases of Schengen 
cooperation on information sharing were not always straightforward. Information 
from member states was apparently not always forthcoming, which created 
problems in assessing the effectiveness of the Convention (European Report 
1999c). A Commission staff working paper from the early 2000s noted that, on top 
of the lack of relevant debate concerning statistics on legal migration within 
CIREFI (see previous chapters), in order to “complete the picture of third country 
nationals’ flows to the EU” data on “short term visas [and] multiple Schengen visas 
etc.” would be needed (Commission 2001e). 
 
The quest for more in the way of automated, smart, computerised borders has 
been relentlessly pursued in the EU, this is in line with international trends 
(Papademetriou 2011: 3, 4). The goal of the wide-spread adoption of IT systems in 
managing borders is to “'preclear' legitimate travellers and instead target likely 
threats and passengers about whom nothing or very little is known”, “all done as 
far away from the physical border as possible” (Papademetriou 2011). The link 
between border control and irregular migration is therefore strong. The underlying 
idea is that “active surveillance and exclusion of irregular migrants by the state 
depends heavily on information and knowledge production” (Broeders 2007: 72). 
Moving controls away from physical borders to more abstract locations and, 
crucially, as far away from the states’ territories as possible, echoes some of the key 
concepts developed in migration policy in the 1990s and early 2000s – particularly 
the idea of ‘remote control’ policies (Guiraudon 2000a). However, commentators 
have rightly pointed out that a visa is already a form of “remote control”, which 
somewhat dilutes claims that this is a novel policy development (Mau et al. 2015: 
3).  
 
Problems experienced in this policy area related to: the accuracy of 
information gathered; compatibility of the various national systems with one 
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another; the interoperability of various databases and software; the gap between 
national and European systems; and, the sheer size of the database. In terms of the 
latter, it was calculated that, once completed and operational, VIS was to be among 
“the largest biometric databases in the world” (Brady 2012: 29-30). There is also 
an important sociological dimension to the extensive creation and use of IT systems. 
If these developments in the “digitisation” of borders signify the need for better and 
more effective control, these measures confirm to all actors – from would-be 
migrants to business travellers, from citizens to those of other statuses – that 
something is being done to control the movement of people (Broeders and 
Hampshire 2013). In the context of a deep politicisation of migration across Europe,  
 
significant pressure [has been put] on governments to act and, 
crucially, to be seen to be acting to 'better manage’ their borders. 
The adoption of high-tech border controls can be understood in 
terms of their instrumental and symbolic value for governments 
eager to persuade electorates that they have immigration 'under 
control' (Broeders and Hampshire 2013: 2, 3, 6).  
 
That being said, the symbolic value should not downplay the efficiency aspects of 
these IT systems in providing for the policy needs of member states. A similar 
interpretation has been applied to the practice of reinstating internal border controls 
(Groenendijk 2004).136  
 
With regards to migration, the SIS stores information about “persons to be 
refused entry to the Schengen area as unwanted aliens”, and also “identity papers” 
(Broeders 2007: 79). SIS facilitates the detection and refusal at borders of 
“unwanted aliens”, and it enables law enforcement authorities to check the identity 
of persons already present in the territory (Broeders 2007: 80). The EP report on the 
switch from SIS1+ to SIS II states that in December 2007 this was the “largest 
common European data base, with a total data volume […] of 22,450,781, from 
which 1,142,988 is related to persons” (EP 2008b: 7)(EP 2008a, 7)(EP 2008a, 7)(EP 
2008a, 7). Of those individuals, the largest category concerns irregular migration. 
In cases where national law enforcement agencies need more information than is 
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available on SIS, they may refer to the “SIRENE network of national contact 
points” (Parkin 2011: 4).  
 
Risk analyses conducted by Frontex are a further initiative aimed at gathering 
information and expertise on this policy area. They are intended to provide uniform 
and standardised information and knowledge to all EU actors.137 However, an 
ICMPD study on the status of information exchange in this area found that, in 
relation to the two main activities of information gathering and exchange 
“FRONTEX access to intelligence information is narrow since the Agency 
possesses limited admittance to gather and analyse personal data” (ICMPD 2010: 
61). In addition, “personal data is communicated via existing channels (mainly via 
EUROPOL) during joint operations” (ICMPD 2010: 61). The same study stated 
that “only a few [member states] are main sources of data input to EUROPOL’s and 
INTERPOL’s databases” (ICMPD 2010: 9). Another study reached similar 
conclusions in 2004, stating “the poor quality of information sent to Europol is 
testimony to the lack of trust” among law enforcement authorities (Agence Europe 
2004c)(2004a). In other words, although these bodies were established to provide 
enhanced services to member states, member states were reluctant to share 
information between one another and through these bodies. This was a self-
defeating move as was observed in the aforementioned ICMPD study, which stated 
that the “apparent lack of pro-active provision of information” by member states 
was “worrying” and it put into questions the quality of these databases “as, 
naturally, [these] are only as good as their input” (ICMPD 2010: 110). 
 
This drive towards better and more reliable data however did not end there. 
The borders package proposed by the Commission in 2008 recommended the 
establishment of an “entry/exit system” that would, inter alia, determine the number 
of visa over-stayers present in the EU at any given time (Commission 2008c, 2013a; 
Geyer et al. 2008; Peers 2011: 197-99). According to a number of estimates, visa 
over-stayers represent the largest category of irregular migrants in the EU, and the 
entry-exit system is the last undertaking aimed at better knowledge and 
understanding of migration issues. It demonstrates the need for more and reliable 
statistics, a long-standing issue in EU affairs (Geyer et al. 2008: 3). And its 
                                                          
137 More on this below. 
230/326 
positioning as an information-focused initiative is reinforced by the fact that it 
would have little effect in terms of real reduction of irregular migration. That is, 
counting and registering over-stayers does not equate to locating, finding, and 
expelling them. 
 
The Commission has also been supportive of the interoperability of databases 
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and issued a Communication to that 
effect in 2005 (Commission 2005e). According to Mitsilegas, this was an important 
step towards the further centralisation of powers in the Commission in the area of 
JHA (Mitsilegas 2007). The potential for such interoperability has been called into 
question by a number of actors ranging from commentators to policy actors 
(Hobolth 2013: 425-26; Mitsilegas 2007: 391-94; Parkin 2011). These criticisms 
centred mainly on issues of privacy of personal data, access to data, and the 
principle of purpose limitation (Financial Times 2000b; The Guardian 2000b). The 
fact that Commission and member states have been successful in seeking such 
changes in relation to such a delicate matter seems to be the result of their having 
portrayed interoperability as a merely technical matter (Commission 2005e; 
European Report 2005a). A recent example of the awareness that surrounds this sort 
of information and data sharing is the Commission' Communication entitled 
Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice 
(Commission 2010c). This Communication dealt, inter alia, with thorny issues such 
as access to personal data, purpose limitation and fundamental rights. And its main 
purpose was to dispel doubts and concerns expressed by civil society and academia 
concerning the extent of data collection and storage in this undertaking (Besters and 
Brom 2010; Geyer et al. 2008). This is not the only negative consequence of the 
move towards the digitisation of borders. Significant delays and repeated failures 
in effecting the shift towards IT systems has created difficulties at the institutional 
level. The Commission's reputation has suffered in the eyes of several member 
states, particularly following its management of the SIS II (see below) (Europolitics 
2009).  
 
To sum up, the number, size and continued presence of these databases 
provides evidence of the quest for more and better information in this policy area. 
The Commission has been its centre and the timeline of SIS proves that these efforts 
at reducing uncertainty predate the period considered in this dissertation. Similar to 
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findings in relation to legal and asylum policies, European cooperation on these 
issues rested on a foundation of national expertise.  
 
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
The Visa List Regulation requires the Commission’s involvement in all inter-
member state communications relating to changes in the two lists annexed to the 
legal text. It was, for example, incumbent upon the Commission to prepare a report 
on the action the Romanian government was willing to take with regard to irregular 
migration. On the basis of these policy pledges, the Regulation requires the 
Commission to report back to the Council and make “any useful recommendations” 
(Art. 8). This therefore implies that the Commission is intended to make use of the 
expertise it accumulated as negotiator of the Enlargement process (Sedelmeier 
2010).  
 
Although the Commission stated that its proposal for the Visa Information 
System (VIS) Decision did not seek to specify the content of the VIS and solely 
sought to secure funds, its actual legislative proposal went into much more detail. 
It referred to European Council documents where the importance of collecting, 
disseminating and efficiently utilising information was emphasised. In this respect, 
the VIS was, inter alia, likely to: “contribute to the improvement of consular 
cooperation and to the exchange of information between central consular 
authorities”; “contribute to the prevention of “visa shopping”; and, “facilitate 
application of the Dublin Convention determining the State responsible for 
examining applications for asylum”. These elements highlight how information – 
and its circulation among member states – was deemed important in the context of 
creating the VIS (Commission 2004h: 3). That said the Decision features no 
delegation that can be linked to this issue of uncertainty. It does not empower the 
Commission to specify the type of data gathered, how it is accessed nor how it is 
disseminated. And the Commission recognised it could not add further details on 
these matters to its proposal as, at the time, there was no “political orientation by 
the Council on basic elements of the VIS” (Commission 2004h: 4). A similar 
situation arose with the VIS and Short Term Visa Regulation (European Council 
2008). These Regulations set out the rules for gathering statistics on short-term 
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visas but the Commission is excluded from this initiative (art. 17).  
 
Both expertise and information asymmetry are tackled in the Frontex 
Regulation. Frontex is tasked with risk analysis (Art. 4) and, to that end, designs 
the templates for analysis and carries out “general” and “tailored” assessments. It 
must also incorporate a risk analysis model into the common core curriculum for 
border guards. A number of scholars have observed that this is perhaps one of the 
most important tasks assigned to Frontex (Neal 2009; Pollak and Slominski 2009). 
For Neal in particular, risk is the “predominant conceptual language in the rationale, 
documentation and practices of Frontex” (2009: 334). And the model of risk 
analysis is described as, 
 
bifurcated in that it is directed at both the (potential) movement 
of people and capacities and weaknesses of Member State 
border systems (Neal 2009: 348).  
 
For instance, when this body reports its findings to the Council it is likely to trigger 
naming and shaming practices due to the assessment of member states' borders 
practices. Moreover, this information is also taken account by the Commission 
when determining the allocation of financial support under the European Borders 
Fund.  
Frontex is empowered to “take all necessary measures to facilitate the 
exchange of information relevant for its tasks with the Commission and the Member 
States” (Art. 11). The Regulation also stipulates that the Agency “should follow up 
on the developments in scientific research”, as well as “disseminate this information 
to the Commission and to the Member States” (Recital 8). Article 7 also states that 
Frontex should “set up and keep centralised records of technical equipment for 
control and surveillance of external borders” present in the member states. As Jorry 
points out, this could be the basis for a first-ever database on member states’ 
capabilities with regards to border control (Jorry 2007: 24). Frontex exchanges 
information and cooperates with other bodies dealing peripherally with borders and 
migration (e.g. Europol). Data exchange with these bodies on operational matters 
have reportedly been established and functioning properly (Jorry 2007: 17). 
In sum, Frontex’s risk analyses have become a source of information and 
forecasting for member states, highlighting the expert role of the Agency. Expertise 
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is also present in the research and design function carried out by the Agency, as well 
as its contributions towards the common curriculum. Finally, Frontex also engages 
in information sharing such as through the centralised record of equipment, data 
exchanges with other EU bodies, and between EU bodies and member states. 
 
In the first complete consolidation of the rules on crossing borders since 
Schengen (‘the Schengen Borders Code Regulation’), the only provisions 
concerning information on border crossing are Art. 13(5) (refusals of entry) and Art. 
8(4)) (relaxation of border checks). These clauses directly affect the reduction of 
uncertainty regarding irregular migration flows (as people refused at borders are 
used to produce estimates of irregular migration flows), and the credibility of 
commitments to securing external borders (as any relaxation of border controls 
must be justified by “exceptional and unforeseen circumstances”). The Commission 
is solely a recipient of information on these matters, as the articles in question spell 
out what detailed information member states must submit. Although the 
Commission is at the centre of all member states notifications and reports (as Art. 
34 attests), such clauses nonetheless fall short of the criteria for delegation. While 
it is true that the Commission can act on a member state’s failure to notify, unlike 
the Migration Statistics Regulation138, the Commission is not empowered to modify 
the sort of information member states submit (unless it is proposed through further 
legislation).  
 
Similar to the Schengen Borders Code Regulation, the Commission is at the 
centre of the member states’ notification requirements in the Visa Code. The 
Commission works as a central information hub (Art. 3(2), Art. 8(7)(8), Art. 
22(3)(4), Art. 31(2)(3), Art. 33(5), Art. 40(5))139 and is required to draw up regular 
reports concerning local Schengen cooperation (art. 48(4)). Interestingly, it may in 
turn delegate compilation of these reports to the member states concerned (art. 
48(5)). According to the Commission, the EU lacked a channel for exchanging 
“useful and comparative data on the number of visas issued and refused” 
(Commission 2006a: 7). And to resolve this issue it proposed that member states 
submit regular updates to it on these statistics. It is also important to note that, under 
the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, the Commission was entrusted with 
                                                          
138 See Chapter 6. 
139 Article 53 summarises these notification requirements. 
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amending “non-essential elements” of the Annexes (art. 50), including Annex III 
dealing with statistics. The fact that member states chose the strictest form of 
Comitology to constrain amendments to non-essential aspects of what were 
considered technical matters should come as no surprise. As the Commission 
pointed out, member states had not previously collaborated on this issue despite the 
prior adoption of legislative measures under Maastricht. Within the Regulation, 
rules on the “exchange of supplementary information” among member states have 
to be adopted under Comitology.  
 
A number of “new technical features and functionalities” have been 
introduced with SIS II, “including new categories for alerts, the storage of biometric 
data (photos and fingerprints) and the interlinking of alerts” (Parkin 2011: 7). On 
the other hand, these innovations were not without their problems. As a number of 
commentators argued, the massive injection of biometrical data into IT systems that 
allowed for interconnectivity within and between systems and allowed for a number 
of possible uses and users, ran the risk of contravening the principle of purpose 
limitation of personal data (Parkin 2011: 28). In addition, the intertwining of data 
within databases serving different purposes could facilitate discriminatory practices 
on the part of law enforcement agents and agencies, thereby breaching the non-
discriminatory principle of EU law. In the wake of 9/11, EU member states decided 
that greater access should be conceded to a number of additional actors, in primis 
to Europol and Eurojust. This further illustrates a move towards greater inclusion 
of EU actors to use the same information for a variety of purposes ranging from 
immigration to legal prosecution (Parkin 2011: 10).  
 
Similar to what has already been noted with respect to the other Funds, the 
Border Fund Decision establishes an important role for the Commission in vetting 
the “quality, comparability, and completeness of the statistical information” (art. 
14(10), third indent and fifth). If the Commission finds such information is not up 
to standard, it can request that a member state supply it with further information. 
Frontex can also make a similar request (Art. 15(2)). This happens in the context of 
the risk analyses carried out by the Agency, which form the basis of the “annual 
distribution of resources”. In other words, the Commission's monitoring and 
scrutiny applies to a rather sensitive area as these figures form the basis on which 
money from the Fund is allocated. This indicates that this delegation provision, 
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while also solving issues surrounding uncertainty, answers to credibility rationales 
inasmuch the Commission ensures the reliability of information upon which 
disbursements are made. In other words, while it is true that statistical and 
informational issues are resolved by delegation to the Commission, this is a by-
product of action taken towards the ultimate goal of alleviating costs and burdens 
placed on individual member states due to a number of factors (see next section for 
a full list). 
 
 
 7.1.3) Credibility of commitments 
 
In line with the corresponding sections of previous chapters, this focuses on 
previous crises of confidence among member states and on the disproportionate 
burdens imposed on individual member states (or sub-sets thereof). At the Tampere 
European Council, border policy was linked first and foremost to irregular 
migration (European Council 1999: 3). This enhanced cooperation between 
authorities, brought about “exchange programmes and technology transfers”, and 
introduced a geographical focus by emphasising “maritime borders” (European 
Council 1999: 24). When compared with legal migration for example, member 
states specified where they wanted policies to go in more detail, thereby signalling 
a higher degree of interest. Member states also committed to a “common active 
policy” on visas, albeit that the meaning of 'active’ was not entirely clear. This 
policy incorporated “false documents” and had an immediate effect on efficiency 
by introducing “closer co-operation between EU consulates in third countries” and 
“common EU visa issuing offices” (European Council 1999: 22). Overall, this 
provides a sense of clear commitments by member states and a concrete idea of 
where policies were to go. The idea of “Integrated Border Management” was also 
reasserted at the highest political level through the draft Constitutional Treaty. That 
idea was a fil rouge that can be traced through the ten years of cooperation in this 
area (Commission 2004a: 9). In its revision of the multiannual programmes of the 
AFSJ area, the European Council praised the creation of Frontex and emphasised 
the importance of the “Plan for the Management of the Maritime Borders” in 
addition to SIS and VIS, albeit that the latter two were listed under the “fight against 
terrorism” (European Council 2004: 2, 3). Member state commitments to building 
up external frontiers are also highlighted by the repeatedly high budgetary 
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allocations agreed in order to acquire tools necessary for managing those borders 
(see sections below on SIS developments).  
 
As the spotlight switched to border controls and their effectiveness in the late 
1980s, discourses concerning shared responsibilities and solidarity among member 
states emerged (Hobbing 2005: 1). Abolishing internal borders meant member 
states occupying internal geographical locations became reliant on the border 
control implementation practices of other member states. This clarifies the extent 
to which mutual commitments and trust were necessary in this area from a very 
early point (Jorry 2007: 4). For instance, Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema 
justified his requests for European support in establishing readmission agreements 
with other countries (considered easier to obtain in a collective fashion) by stressing 
that Italy was one of the countries "most exposed, to both East and South" (Agence 
Europe 1998b).140  
Member states have however long held doubts over the effectiveness of other 
countries' border controls. In the late 1990s, German Interior Minister Manfred 
Kanther criticised the quality of Greece and Italy's border controls in the aftermath 
of the Kurdish asylum crisis noting that "[t]he situation in southern Europe is not 
what we might expect" (Agence France Presse 1998a, 1998e; Financial Times 
1998a). That said, German law enforcement agencies were reportedly aware that 
inflows of Kurds clearly did not originate directly with Italy, but also involved other 
EU countries (mainly France) (The Guardian 1998a). In the context of an election 
looming the following year, Germany’s highest ranking politicians called for “much 
tougher Italian action to stop the flow of illegal immigrants from Turkey” (Agence 
France Presse 1998a; The Guardian 1998b). And while Italian Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi maintained that Italy welcomed refugees, a position endorsed by the 
President of the Republic Scalfaro, the Austrian Interior Minister reportedly 
accused Italy of getting rid of refugees by sending them to other EU countries 
(Agence France Presse 1998d). The same Minister, together with the Austrian 
Foreign Minister, went on to assert that all participants of the Schengen Agreement 
should have ensured that the rules were respected (European Report 1998c). In 
other words, in the space of a few weeks the credibility of commitments to common 
external border control was called into question (Agence France Presse 1998c).141 
                                                          
140 In such requests, the Spanish Prime Minister Aznar supported him. 
141 For a more recent episode, see the debates surrounding Greece conduct as a Schengen member 
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These examples are intended to illustrate how intensely politicised the issue of 
borders is (Financial Times 1998b), which makes unrealistic any hope of resolving 
it through purely economic or material means. Referring to the 2004 Enlargement, 
Pastore reports that Italian border control authorities were at high alert when, 
following a number of years spent at the forefront of Europe’s gatekeeping efforts, 
they had to cede a portion of their Eastern front responsibilities to the Slovenian 
(Pastore 2002: 2-3).142 Similar concerns were voiced by German authorities prior 
to the 2004 Enlargement to the east (Green 2001: 100). Indeed, growing fears 
concerning the acceding states gripped the general public and authorities during this 
time (Bade 2004: 359-60). A fear of “exposure” first arose after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, with the German Federal Border Guard emphasising its fear of “the 
exposure of German eastern and southern borders to illegal immigration” (Monar 
2003: 310-13). Interestingly, Monar notes that “successive German governments” 
have considered a European solution to these concerns logical (2003: 310-13). 
 
The symbolic value of borders is also indicated in the reinstatement of EU 
border controls. According to this 'emergency brake present in the Schengen 
Convention, any member state may reintroduce controls at its borders “where 
public policy or national security so require[s]'” (Hobbing 2005: 11). This option 
strengthens credibility of commitments inasmuch as it offers member states some 
temporary leeway when facing emergency situations, thus avoiding any legal 
straightjacket whose respect might be regarded as unrealistic in such events. In 
other words, the commitment to a policy does not equal the absence of some 
flexibility in the rules. Perhaps even more importantly, this clause allows 
governments to reassure citizens (Groenendijk 2004). Its not so infrequent use 
suggests that member states tolerate a moderate use of this tool as it is primarily 
considered a response to domestic factors, thus no member state is willing to contest 
the rationale for any given reinstatement. This idea of a silent consensus is 
reinforced by Groenendijk's finding that, of all 33 cases of reinstatement only once 
did one member state (Germany) request clarification from another as to why it was 
re-introducing the internal borders.  
                                                          
Financial Times, 'Eu Plans to Exclude Wayward Schengen Nations', Financial Times (2011b). 
142 The image of alliances between Mediterranean countries in these matters – at times suggested 
by commentators – can be misleading. Italy apparently rushed to criticise Greece for failing to 
control its border when boats of irregular migrants started to land on the Calabrian coast Agence 
Europe, 'Greece and Turkey React Strongly to Italy's Accusations', Agence Europe (7770, 
2000a).. 
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Integrated border management (IBM) is an all-pervasive notion in EU affairs 
that emerged at the Laeken European Council in 2001 as a policy response to EU 
border control problems. As a practical example of what a “European management 
concept on border control” might entail, the Belgian Council Presidency suggested 
a “European Border Police” (Council 2001e). The Commission insisted and 
expanded the idea in its 2002 Communication on integrated border management 
(Commission 2002e). However, implementation of such a mechanism has proven 
difficult in the EU context owing to the “particular territorial situation with a 
fragmented borderline and patchwork structure of legal systems” (Hobbing 2005: 
2).  
 
Another element worth considering is that EU borders have continually 
shifted due to the Enlargement process. Following the 2007 Enlargement only 11 
member states were left with land borders to patrol amounting to 7,958 km143 
(House of Lords 2008: 14). This has meant that, while some member states had to 
rely on other member states for border control, other member states felt an increased 
pressure to patrol de facto common borders (Hobbing 2005: 5). There are also wide 
disparities in the length of borders to be patrolled. While Slovakia and Hungary are, 
for example, responsible for patrolling less than 150 km, Finland, Romania, and 
Poland have more than 1,000 km to cover. It must also be noted that land borders 
represent only a fraction of the EU’s 80,000 km coastline (House of Lords 2008: 
17-18; Jorry 2007: 5). Moreover, there are “over 280 international airports” in the 
EU (Brady 2012: 6). Their importance as international borders was stressed by 
Spanish Interior Minister Rajoy in highlighting that airports are the main points of 
entry for irregular migration (The Independent 2002). In 2008, 1,792 Border 
Crossing Points were regulated under Schengen rules, 43 percent of which belonged 
to only four countries: 250 in Germany, 158 in Italy, 171 in Denmark, 193 in France 
(in a Schengen-27) (Commission 2008b: 96-97). The Commission observed that 
some of the countries under stress because of control duties had per capita GDPs 
that were lower than average (Commission 2005b: 6). This point was also taken up 
by individual member states. For instance, French President Sarkozy declared that, 
 
                                                          
143 This does not include Spain with its enclaves.  
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A number of partners, which are not the richest countries, 
constitute the borders of Europe and do not have the resources to 
protect the borders of Europe. We must help them, there are no 
two ways about it (Agence Europe 2009c).  
 
Following the 2007 enlargement, all but two144 states with external land borders 
featured GDP per capita rates ranging between 37 percent and 62 percent of the 
EU27 average (Eurostat 2015b). Furthermore, borders are not solely used by 
migrants but are subject to a number of other dynamics. For instance, according to 
the World Tourism Organisation the “total number of international arrivals 
worldwide [rose] from 687 million in 2000 to 940 million in 2010” (Brady 2012: 
7). London Heathrow processed an “average of 190,000 persons per day in 2011” 
(Broeders and Hampshire 2013: 5). Thus it is clear that the physical distribution of 
borders makes for an uneven picture in Europe.  
 
Turning to visas, statistics on Schengen visas145 issued by member states 
indicate that the numbers are high but localised. While in 2009 approximately 
10.261 million visas were sought, 2010 saw this number increase to approximately 
11.812 (a more than 15 per cent year on year increase) (Commission). In 2012 five 
states received more than 60 percent of all applications, they were France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Finland (Commission 2013b). According to the Commission, 10 
out of the 23 Schengen member states (Ireland and UK are excluded as non-
Schengen members) had over 100 consulates around the world (Commission 
2005b: 56).146 The practice of granting visas varied among member states too, but 
numbers remained high in all cases. Germany issued visas in respect of 87 percent 
of applications, Spain 90.6 percent, France 81.6 percent, Italy 100 percent, and 
Sweden 83.7 percent. Visa processing, while little analysed, should be more 
carefully scrutinised for its effect on irregular migration given that the 
overwhelming majority of irregularly present TCNs appear to be visa over-stayers 
(Finotelli 2009; Finotelli and Sciortino 2013; Giuseppe Sciortino 2014).  
                                                          
144 If Switzerland, Spain and Cyprus are excluded, only Greece and Finland had per capita GDP of 
more than 63 percent of EU 27 average.   
145 Type C, valid for less than 3 months. 
146 Inexplicably, there was no reference date for these figures. The only clarification added was that 
“The figures for visa applications are based on administrative data for a given year. They have 
been rounded” Commission, 'Commission Staff Working Document.  General Programme 
Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows.  Annex. Extended Impact Assessment.', 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2005b) at 56..  
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As an indication of the cost of border controls in Europe, the Commission 
revealed in its pre-enlargement preparation document for the Thessaloniki 
European Council that the amount spent at the time by individual member states 
was approximately €3 billion per annum (Aus 2008: 112; Commission 2003c: 18). 
Brady reports that the UK’s annual budget for its Border Agency is also around €3 
billion (Brady 2012: 27). That said a French-commissioned study on borders which 
was presented at the 2003 Justice and Home Affairs meeting in Rome stated a “big 
hole in terms of knowledge” was cost, and that there was “no comprehensive 
accounting system for sea border controls” (European Report 2003c). Referring to 
uneven costs affecting member states because of border controls, Commission 
President Prodi is reported to have stated that, 
 
some EU countries are responsible for the internal security of the 
Union and it is necessary, in the future, that the financial and 
operational burden be shared by all EU states (EUObserver.com 
2002a).  
 
To remedy to this issue, the Commission President proposed the introduction of 
“common border guards”. From a win-win perspective, while simultaneously 
achieving buy-in among reluctant member states, this would perhaps also have 
allowed sceptical member states to scrutinise the quality of border controls across 
the Union.147 Indeed an Italian-led feasibility study on the possibility of joint 
operations at the borders garnered positive attention when presented to the Council. 
This signalled an early interest in the possibility of both pooling personnel and other 
resources, and of agreement on common objectives and practices (Agence Europe 
2001b). Mitsilegas seems to concur with this argument as he suggests that Frontex 
has been the policy response to lingering scepticism among the ‘old’ member states 
concerning the capacity of accession states to cope with tight border rules such as 
those demanded in the Schengen acquis (entered into EU legislation with 
                                                          
147 Commissioner Vitorino was of a similar opinion Agence Europe, 'Eu/Immigration: Commission 
Recommends Setting up European Border Guard Corps, in Framework of Common Internal 
Border Management Policy', Agence Europe (8206, 2002o), Agence Europe, 
'Eu/Borders/Immigration', Agence Europe (8390, 2003c), Euobserver.Com, 'Eu Ministers Meet 
in Rome to Discuss Border Police Eu', EUObserver.com (2002b).. The issue re-emerged years 
later, in similar terms Financial Times, 'All Eu Countries ‘Should Bear Border Control Costs'', 
Financial Times (2004)..  
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Amsterdam) (Mitsilegas 2007: 361). For Hobbing, solidarity is interpreted 
differently by certain sets of EU states. In his estimation, “old” member states 
consider that financial solidarity should be attached to operational involvement by 
all participating member states. Obviously this serves the purpose of reassuring all 
member states that controls and management procedures are appropriate and up to 
standard.  On the other hand, “new” member states view such requests as overtly 
intrusive and oppose the operational presence of foreign staff in their territories 
(Hobbing 2005: 8).  
 
A note of caution is however warranted at this point. A simple quantitative 
approach showing how much is spent on border controls, or what percentage of 
external borders are now covered by a handful of states, could mask the qualitative 
leap that happened with Schengen and the process of shifting borders. The result of 
the Enlargement process and of expanding participation in Schengen has been that 
some states have seen their external borders disappear while others have seen their 
borders switch from being national borders to Schengen borders. Thus when 
confronted with issues on their borders, this latter group of member states cannot 
think of them as internal affairs but must immediately see them as EU and Schengen 
related issues (Carrera et al. 2011: 3). 
 
This section has demonstrated the extent to which member states were subject 
to different risks in relation to physical borders, and how these borders have been 
in constant flux. It has also highlighted the different levels of visas applications 
across European states. Crises were far from unheard of in this area, with member 
states frequently criticising one another for weak or wanting controls. Indeed this 
highlights the conceptual shift in European thinking on borders, which, at least to 
some degree, has lost its exclusively national focus and has come to symbolise 
something of a common issue. The limits of this shift are however illustrated by the 
persistence of the practice of reinstating internal border controls.  
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
Most of the delegation identified in these policy areas is connected with agenda 
setting. The 2001 Schengen Information System Regulation (SIS II) required that 
the Commission develop the system (Art. 2). This Regulation conferred 
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implementing powers on the Commission (Art. 5) as expressed under Art. 3 and 4 
(respectively, under management and regulatory procedure). And through it the 
Commission acquired important agenda setting powers in a realm that had to that 
point been intergovernmental in nature. The context within which this occurred was 
information-rich in that, the Commission had the first SIS model from which work, 
the Council indicated a number of new functionalities that were required to be 
inserted, and it also suggested how the new infrastructure should work (Council 
2001a). In sum, the Commission's action was guided by past and present Council 
initiatives. These two bodies added a joint declaration to the Council minutes 
specifying what the object of Comitology decisions would be and what new 
legislative measures were to be adopted (Council 2001c: Annex III). The 
Commission however argued that the regulatory procedure did “not comply with 
the criteria regarding choice of procedural methods established [, reserved] all its 
rights under the Treaty”, basically threatening to take legal action (Council 2001d). 
Yet it was not only left with the task of developing and managing the new system 
(see section below on efficiency), but also undertook an important role in designing 
these features (at least nominally). This example of delegation shows how member 
states may have seen the Commission as the proposer of politically risky (security 
and personal data protections arrangements; Art. 4(b) and (d)) or potentially costly 
policy solutions (which may have caused some member states to drag their feet, 
even where the entire project was financed by Community money) (Art. 4(c)). 
 
The Visa148 List Regulation was an important step towards the completion of 
harmonisation in visa policy. The EP's stance on the subject was that the “text 
proposed by the Commission sets out to achieve total harmonisation” in this area 
(EP 2000c). An important provision that delegated powers to the Commission is 
Art. 8(2). This authorises the Commission to enter into talks with a third country 
(Romania) on topics such as illegal immigration and residence, and then report to 
the Council. If the Commission deems it appropriate, it can add recommendations. 
The Council, on the basis of the Commission’s report, determines the date from 
which that country will fall under the scope of Art. 1(2) (i.e. its nationals are 
exempted from visa requirements) (Preamble, Recital 12). This is an example of 
agenda setting where member states secure commitments by involving a third party 
                                                          
148 Article 62(2)(b) of the EC Treaty clarifies that these are “visas for intended stays of no more than 
three months”. 
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in the policy making process. 
Even more intriguing is the case of Art. 1(4)(d). According to this article the  
 
Commission shall examine any request made by the Council or by 
a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council amending 
the Annexes to this Regulation to include the third country 
concerned in Annex I and remove it from Annex II.  
 
The term “examine” implies a degree of discretion for the Commission where it 
must assess a member state's request concerning a matter of foreign policy. On one 
hand this is an awkward provision as it does not allow the Commission to propose 
that a third country be moved from Annex II to I (which could be seen as a re-
statement of its power of proposing)149. Whereas, on the other hand, the issue of 
“reciprocity and solidarity” arose immediately as a key concern for a notable 
number of member states such as France, Germany, Belgium and Spain. All the 
while the Commission was sceptical as to the legal basis of any such initiative 
(Council 2000q: 3). Its role as a filter for member state requests, whereby not all 
requests are immediately implemented but must first undergo a third party 
evaluation, favours a credibility of commitments rationale.. The Commission’s 
position seemed to benefit from a recommendation of the Council Legal Service to 
introduce a procedure which, instead of providing for automatic reinstatement of a 
visa requirement for a third country, would involve a Council decision following a 
Commission proposal (Council 2000y: 1). These provisions were strengthened in 
the 2005 amended version of the Visa List Regulation. Thus as this is considered a 
case of effectiveness, it will be analysed in the next section. 
 
The Schengen Borders Code confers important powers on the Commission in 
terms of reinstatement of internal border controls, a sensitive topic over which 
tough political battles have taken place in the past. The Commission has the power 
to “issue an opinion” within the “procedure for foreseeable events” in the case of 
“temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders” (Art. 24(2)). This 
“opinion”, which by itself does not constitute an instance of delegation, must be 
viewed as a “consultation between the Member State planning to reintroduce border 
                                                          
149 Something which indeed the Commission proposed few years later  
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control, the other Member States and the Commission”. Furthermore, the 
Commission is not bound to issue that opinion, but “may” opt to do so (although it 
must be noted that the Commission, in its proposal, stipulated “shall” and not 
“may”) (Commission 2004g: 56). The process is politicised as a result given that 
the Commission is likely to have to justify its reasons for intervening. This is also 
an important issue in cases where member states decide to prolong internal border 
control; in such cases the Commission’s opinion has to be considered account again 
(Art. 26(2)). As the Commission’s involvement was completely absent from the 
previous Schengen rules (Peers 2011: 180) this represents a concession to the 
Commission in this area. This attention to internal border control is reinforced in 
Art. 38 (second indent), where the Commission is required to report on and present 
proposals in relation to problems with the application of provisions relating to 
internal borders. It has been calculated that member states reinstated border controls 
17 times between the Border Code application date and June 2010 (Peers 2011: 
182). 
 
The Frontex Regulation is one of the most prominent elements of the idea of 
an “integrated border management”. Commentators have stressed the burden-
sharing nature of this Regulation (Hobbing 2005: 14; Jorry 2007: 2), which was 
surely the objective of some member states and explains the resistance of others to 
such policy initiative. It also departs from the almost exclusive agenda setting 
delegation in this area, providing this 'Agency' and the Commission with a number 
of powers. Indeed, there is a sort of double delegation by the member states to 
Frontex and the Commission. This has created a peculiar situation where the 
Commission not only acquired delegated powers of its own, but was also given 
responsibility for overseeing another delegated body in certain respects of its duties.  
The Agency is required to “evaluate, approve and coordinate” proposals for 
operational cooperation between member states in the field of managing external 
borders (Art. 3). This element is essential to avoiding suspicions that the Agency is 
exploited for national interests. Such suspicions are not unlikely to arise, thus it is 
important for the long-term credibility of the Agency that it is seen as a neutral 
actor. Indeed, Carrera believed that the Agency’s focus is often hijacked by political 
pressures from Member States (Carrera 2007b: 12-13). In terms of its functions, the 
Agency is empowered to propose initiatives albeit that such proposals must gain 
the support of the member states (Art. 3, second indent). The Agency has also been 
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conferred with limited discretion to allocate Community finances in relation to 
return cooperation (Art. 9). This is a substantial step-down from the Commission’s 
proposal that the Agency co-ordinate and organise return operation in member 
states, indeed the text approved by the Council actually limits this function to a 
generic “necessary assistance” (Jorry 2007: 18; Mitsilegas 2007: 370). The EP was 
also dubious of these duties being conferred on the Agency, both in relation to cost-
efficiency and the focus of the Agency (EP 2004b: 13-14). Finally, the Agency may 
facilitate cooperation with a third country (or countries) on issues that fall within 
the scope of the Regulation (Art. 14). For that purpose, the Agency may conclude 
“working arrangements” with “authorities of third countries” (Art. 14, second 
indent). 
On the issue of solidarity, the Commission saw both Frontex and Rapid 
Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) (European Union 2007a), as tools to foster 
solidarity and cooperation among member states. By bringing member states 
together through its Management Board (made up of seconded officials, two from 
the Commission and one per member state), Frontex provided the beginnings of a 
peer reviewed monitoring system. It also provided monitoring and evaluation of the 
“result of joint operations and pilot projects”.  The RABIT Regulation stipulates 
that while the deployment of a “Team” can only happen at the request of a member 
state, the decision to deploy lies with the Agency (“the Agency may deploy”, Art. 
12(5)). As a consequence, no one member state can expect to disproportionally 
exploit Frontex’s resources as decision-making responsibilities are split between 
different actors Additionally, the Executive Director of Frontex is not severely 
constrained on this issue as the sole factors guiding his or her decision are: his or 
her assessment of the situation (he or she may deploy experts on the ground to 
assess the situation); the Frontex risk analysis; and, relevant information provided 
by either the requesting member state or other member states. Finally, it must be 
noted that, unlike usual Frontex operations, RABIT operations are funded 
exclusively through Community finance, thereby strengthening solidarity. 
 
To complete this suite of solidarity strengthening efforts and measures aimed 
at lessening burdens related to borders and visas, the European Borders Fund was 
created with a budget of €1,820 million for 2007-2013, which is by far the biggest 
migration related fund. Legislators have acknowledged that burdens are different 
because of,  
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differing situations prevailing in Member States as regards the 
geography of their external borders, the number of authorised and 
operative border crossing points, the level of migratory pressure, 
both legal and illegal, the risks and threats encountered and finally 
the workload of the nationals services regarding the examination of 
visas applications and the issuing of visas (Preamble, Recital 2).  
 
These factors create an unbalanced situation, which this Decision is intended to 
redress at least partially. Delegation and discretion are respectively high and 
medium in this Decision, and the powers granted to the Commission are similar to 
those described in the previous chapters for the other funds.   
 
 
 7.1.4) Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
Following the structure of preceding chapters, this section first looks at previous 
policy failures both at the national and European level as a likely trigger for 
delegation. Secondly, it examines the extent to which efficiency has been a 
determinant for delegation, focusing on the goal of saving time and resources. 
Common rules on border checks and visas were already set out in the Schengen 
Convention (respectively, Art. 6 and 10). A number of doubts emerged as to the 
efficacy of border control measures in the fight against crime and efforts to reduce 
irregular movements across frontiers both before and after the Schengen 
agreements came into force. The analysis of border policy suggests that policy 
failures should not be understood as leading to immediate policy change. The 
evaluation mechanisms of the Schengen system were, for example, long regarded 
as problematic. A French-commissioned report presented in a 2003 conference of 
Interior Ministers in Rome highlighted the loopholes in seaports and sea controls. 
This study reportedly lamented the “lack of a genuine audit on how the 1990 
Schengen Convention's rules on sea border controls are being implemented”. 
Although the Schengen evaluation mechanisms were considered a “step forward”, 
its “recommendations are not binding” (European Report 2003c). According to the 
Commission, discussions on how to reform them were ongoing since 1999 
(Commission 2010b: 5). However by 2009 the Commission continued to highlight 
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that no progress had been made towards involving more Community bodies in this 
area. In other words,  
 
given its intergovernmental basis, Schengen evaluation has been 
and still is entirely in the hands of the Member States, with the 
Commission participating as an observer (Commission 2009d: 4). 
 
Notwithstanding this, the ‘Schengen inspections’ that member states routinely 
conduct on one other’s borders have been proven both to have failed and been 
difficult to reform. An interviewee from a Permanent Representation was clearly 
aware of that failure and acknowledged that member states were simultaneously the 
culprits and the victims in this weak monitoring system. The former Director 
General for Home Affairs Stefano Manservisi reportedly called the Schengen 
Evaluation Mechanisms “little more than a faceless peer review” and referred to the 
need to introduce a 'Community Method' also in the Schengen Governance (2012). 
The Commission proposed to grant some competences for Schengen evaluations to 
Frontex (Commission 2008e: 8), but nothing came of that initiative either. 
 
The most recent diplomatic dispute150 in this dynamic was the Franco-Italian 
spat over the consequences of the Arab Spring (Carrera et al. 2011). This incident 
should have led to “un renforcement profond de Schengen”, to use the former 
French President Sarkozy's words (2011). However, it resulted in little change in 
policy terms as member states were not prepared to agree on ceding more powers 
to the Commission (Brady 2012: 33-36). It also contributed to this failure the fact 
that the two main proponents of this revision had rather different ideas when it came 
to the substance of the reform (Dominelli 2011; Heuzé 2011; La Repubblica 2011) 
In other words, according to Brady all available Schengen revision options entailed 
allocating more powers to the Commission. The resulting compromise (the 
‘Schengen Governance Package’) was tabled in 2011 and expressed through a 
Communication and two legislative proposals (Commission 2011a). It was intended 
to introduce new rules on monitoring, sanctions for flawed implementation, and 
provide for reinstatement of internal border controls. The Commission's proposals 
                                                          
150 Indeed, this is only the last episode of a long list. For instance, towards the end of the 1990s the 
same concerns were voiced after a purported Kurds crisis The Independent, 'Without the Poor of 
the World, Where Would the Rich World Be?', The Independent (1998). Because of this presumed 
invasion, France and Austria restored border controls with Italy.  
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for monitoring and sanctioning also envisaged on-the-spot controls in member 
states and the possibility of isolating a member state by re-imposing border controls 
in the member states surrounding it. The fact that the Commission tabled such 
daring proposals reflects the magnitude of the problems faced. On the other hand, 
some of most radical proposals, such as “unannounced inspections” and a 
“supervisory mechanism”, were far from new as they featured among the priorities 
of The Hague programme (Council 2004a: 15). 
 
EU institutions frequently called for better management of border policy 
(Agence Europe 2003f, 2003e, 2009b). The European Council also called for 
improved efficiency in border controls related in particular to “combat[ing] illegal 
immigration” (Agence Europe 1999b, 2009d). The Commission presented Frontex 
as a way of “achieving large-scale saving[s] in EC financing for the management 
of external borders” (Agence Europe 2002o). Member states, both individually and 
within the Council, stressed the importance of quickly adopting biometric 
identifiers in visa databases (Agence Europe 2005e) to speed up visa procedures 
(Agence Europe 2008b) and improve the “operational capacity” of Frontex (Agence 
Europe 2009e). 
 
Obviously the need for better information and knowledge, as highlighted in 
the first section of this chapter, does not end at the abstract level but relates also to 
a functional need. A comparative study by the ICMPD signalled that of all law 
enforcement agencies border guards “have a greater need to near instantaneous 
access of data from their own countries’ agencies, or from other MS” (ICMPD 
2010: 21). Indeed these agents are at the forefront of preventing and confronting 
irregular migration, tackling human trafficking, ensuring smooth entry of tourists, 
and so forth. If they are to provide an effective and efficient service in the context 
of a common external border, they must be equipped with the necessary information 
and tools. That is why major efforts have been undertaken in this area in terms of 
databases and IT systems. Broeders and Hampshire argue that a key to the 
successful incorporation of IT into this area has been the perception of its efficiency 
(2013). Time and again the Commission has emphasised the time saving benefits 
of large scale databases (Agence Europe 2006e, 2008a). While politicians may have 
been more concerned by their symbolic function, a number of interests have 
clustered around the time and cost-savings that the massive introduction of digital 
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technology promised. For instance, public administration has benefited through 
reduced personnel and resource demands, thereby allowing for redeployment to 
other areas. Moreover business and carrier interests have benefited from a customer 
satisfaction standpoint due to increased time spent in shopping malls in “airport 
departure zones” (Broeders and Hampshire 2013: 1215). More broadly, the 
economic benefits of streamlined border and visa protocols have been far from 
negligible for the travel and tourism sector (Mau et al. 2015: 4). 
 
As illustrated by the SIS II reform, managing large IT systems is not risk-free 
(see previous section). Following this undertaking, it is possible that the 
Commission will be more sceptical of taking full responsibility of such programmes 
in the future. The Commission has instead suggested shifting direct responsibility 
for such projects to an agency dedicated to managing IT systems. Speaking of the 
2008 Regulation on the migration from SIS+ to SIS II (European Union 2008c), the 
EP’s report describes the “enormous disappointment” of the accession member 
states to whom swift access to the system was promised (EP 2008b: 7). That said 
scholars have questioned the extent to which border controls can be effective at all, 
and have openly questioned whether they ever had been (Andreas 2003: 110). A 
further criticism, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is the risk of achieving 
efficiency at the expense of rights. This concern is not exclusively expressed by 
NGOs and civil society organisations. The European Data Protection Supervisor 
emphasised the importance of supervising access to data (particularly biometric 
data), data security and clarity over who had responsibility for managing the VIS 
(Agence Europe 2005g).  
 
 
Qualitative analysis of delegation in selected measures. 
 
Despite the failures in border and visa policy discussed above, effectiveness rarely 
brings about delegation. Previous regulatory failures are explicitly mentioned as a 
reason for the adoption of the revised Visa List Regulation in 2005. In particular, it 
was the non-reciprocity clause that was deemed ineffective in that Regulation 
(European Report 2002b). The consequence of this clause was that a third country 
whose nationals were cleared of visa requirements but subsequently reinstated visa 
requirements for individual member states, could have been subject to an EU 
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response. The potential EU responses were however considered “unsuitable”, and 
the Council agreed to grant more decisive powers to the Commission (Preamble, 
Recital 1). Art. 1 empowered the Commission to: take “steps with the authorities of 
the third country in order to restore visa-free travel”; report back to the Council 
after 90 days and, if necessary, accompany that report with a proposal to restore 
visa requirements for the third-country; or, forego the aforementioned report and 
simply propose to restore visa requirements. By empowering the Commission to 
evaluate and take action against a third country, member states show solidarity 
towards the member states that have been the object of such reinstatement of visa 
requirements.  
The Regulation also falls under the category of effectiveness in a broader 
sense. First, the Regulation acts as a point of convergence for both national and 
European foreign policy and migration. This convergence is enumerated in the 
Regulation through two of the three criteria member states are required to consider 
when determining whether a third country should be included in either of the two 
lists. They are illegal immigration, public policy and international relations 
(Commission 2000e: 9). The Regulation lists all countries whose nationals require 
a visa when crossing a member state's borders (Annex I), and all countries exempted 
from that requirement (Annex II). Member states acted under the assumption that, 
in addition to having better performing migration policies with third countries, 
working together would afford them more international influence and would better 
position them to negotiate international deals. Previously, member states had a 
common list of countries whose nationals were obliged to have a visa but each 
member state could add countries to this list (Commission 2000e: 2). From an 
external point of view, the existence of such a list was not a very compelling foreign 
policy tool. However having to negotiate visa policy with a number of European 
countries en bloc made reinstatement of visa controls with a single member state 
more risky for a third country.  
 
Before the establishment of Frontex a network of national agencies dealing 
with specific aspects of border controls existed, but this was soon judged inefficient. 
Consequently the idea of structuring this network hierarchically around a single 
agency gained ground (Commission 2004b: 4-5; Hobbing 2005: 13, 18). Jorry 
reports that the Greek Presidency (January-June 2003) argued that there were 
“deficiencies of [that] framework for cooperation and the subsequent necessity to 
251/326 
establish a new institutional structure” (Jorry 2007: 8). In particular, the Presidency 
is reported to have highlighted problems relating to,  
 
lack of preparation, co-ordination problems, lack of legal basis, the 
insufficient co-operation of certain participating States[,] a certain 
lack of discipline on the part of the Member States in their 
involvement in these programmes (Agence Europe 2003h).  
 
This opinion was also shared by the EP which stressed the shortcomings of existing 
Council structures dealing with borders and highlighted the problems concerning 
the network structure established across several member states (EP 2004b: 30). To 
address this Frontex was given responsibility for training staff with the aim of 
achieving more homogeneity in the quality of borders controls across Europe, 
something that had been lacking up to that point. This was in line with previous 
requirements under Argo151, something that should have been taken into account to 
“ensure consistency with the objectives and priorities identified by the Commission 
in this context”, at least according to the EP (EP 2004b: 7). In this regard, Frontex 
replaced previous policies that had achieved mixed results at best. 
 
The area of borders and visa policy offers a number of examples of delegation 
on grounds of efficiency. The Regulation concerning implementation powers for 
visa applications is one of the few in the entire legislative acquis that assigns 
implementation powers to the Council. Due to the “sensitivity” of the visa policy 
area and as a way to limit intrusion by other bodies in the field, Finland proposed 
to reserve,  
 
to the Council implementing powers with regard to certain detailed 
provisions and practical procedures for examining visa 
applications (European Union 2001b).  
 
The Regulation updated several instruments related to the Schengen Convention 
such as Common Consular Instructions (CCI). The EP recommended that the 
Finnish proposal be rejected “outright” on a number of grounds ranging from 
                                                          
151 See Chapter 6.  
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institutional flaws to democratic deficit (EP 2001a: 10). Foreign policy 
considerations notwithstanding (Preamble, Recital 8), the Regulation allows the 
Commission to formulate proposals as to possible changes in the CCI and the 
Schengen Consultation Network (Art. 1(1) and (2)) (EP 2001a). This power is 
shared with member states. Yet, it is significant that such powers were granted to 
the Commission at all, particularly in an area where all cooperation up to that point 
had been intergovernmental and in the context of foreign policy concerns. That said, 
it seems that legislators sought to achieve efficiency gains as the issues under 
Comitology arrangements “are to be adopted and regularly amended and updated 
in order to meet the operational requirements” of the consular authorities. In other 
words, the paramount concern was timely and efficient decision-making. 
Indeed, a number of legislative measures aimed to speed up the decision-
making process. Some amended past legislative measures, such as Council 
Regulation laying down a uniform format for visas (European Union 2002b), 
Council Regulation dealing with the numbering of visas (European Union 2008b), 
and EP and Council Regulation amending the Schengen Borders Code (European 
Union 2008a). All these measures displayed high levels of delegation and can be 
explained by legislators’ wishes to update aging administrative or technical 
arrangements, or as a response to technological advances that demanded an update 
of security or IT features. Many of these measures modify the Comitology 
provisions under which technical and security arrangements are decided. Part of the 
explanation for the abundance of measures displaying high and medium levels of 
delegation in border and visa policy is the extensive reliance of legislators on IT 
measures and the process of incorporating and updating the Schengen acquis into 
EU legislation. In the case of the Schengen Borders Code Regulation a number of 
technical matters could have benefited from the assignment of an agent in charge 
of resolving non-essential matters. This is indicated by the abundance of 
Comitology provisions. The Commission can propose new rules for border 
surveillance (Art. 12(5)) and amendments to the Annexes III, IV, and VIII dealing 
with several technical matters. All these Comitology provisions were reformed 
because of the new Comitology rules adopted in 2006, which resulted in a new 
Regulation. 
Delegation in the Regulation on a uniform format for visas is related to two 
efficiency grounds (European Union 2002a). The first is for the Commission to 
continue providing speedy decisions on the technical specifications of visas in the 
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context of mounting security concerns and constant technological developments. 
Secondly, as the Comitology rules had changed since the EU had approved the first 
set of rules on visas under Maastricht in 1995, these also required updating in line 
with the most recent revision in 1999. 
 
It is important to remember the “difficult road” that has led to SIS II. 
Referring to the Comitology arrangements of the 2001 Schengen Information 
System Regulation (SIS II), the Council dismissed the EP's invitation to lessen the 
oversight burden in the Comitology procedure due to the technical nature of the 
project. The EP believed that as the SIS II would have already been a difficult and 
lengthy undertaking, adding complicated Comitology procedures to it would have 
proven detrimental to the primary objective of installing the system quickly. The 
Enlargement was looming at the time and it was believed that the old SIS could not 
have shouldered the additional impact of the accession countries. The EP was also 
alarmed by the financial and staffing implications of this Regulation. Indeed, even 
though it was clarified that staff would have been drawn from EU institutions the 
effect on the Commission was not clear. In other words, the EP highlighted the risk 
of granting powers to the Commission absent corresponding resources (EP 2001d: 
16). In light of these considerations the EP suggested establishing a separate agency 
under the supervision of the Commission, a move that materialised ten years later.  
That said participants did not see the SIS project as a failure. A number of 
states did agree on the need to improve the system and add new “functionalities”, 
but this was within the context of a system that achieved results and simply required 
updates. Therefore effectiveness does not seem relevant here, although efficiency 
was on the other hand was to the fore. Member states assigned its development and 
management to the Commission. On top of which, a key objective of the Council 
was to secure financing from the Community to avoid cumbersome 
intergovernmental efforts at shouldering a project with expenditure implications 
that were far from certain (Council 2001w: 3).  
While the supposed deadline for SIS II entry into force was 2006, the system 
only began operating in 2013 and saw “a 500% increase in its budget” (Brady 2012: 
30; Commission 2013c; Parkin 2011: 1). A profound dissatisfaction with the 
Commission’s handling of the project and a growing mistrust of its capacity to 
manage large IT programmes is evident from official documents and commentary 
concerning the project (Collett and Papademetriou 2011; Council 2010). One of the 
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more non-negligible consequences of which is the emerging idea of creating an 
independent agency to manage EU IT systems relating to the area of freedom, 
security and justice (Parkin 2011: 24). Indeed, although thus far traditionally the 
remit of the Commission, such an Agency is likely to be charged with the  
“development” of the IT of a new entry and exit system, something that thus far 
was traditionally conferred to the Commission (Commission 2013a: 3). 
 
Frontex is provided with a number of powers under the RABITs Regulation, 
which broadly address the grounds of efficiency and credibility. The fact that 
member states have agreed to delegate decisions on these issues to another body 
speaks to the credibility of their commitments and the content of these measures 
aims at efficiency. While member states remained in charge of decisions relating to 
the “selection of staff” and the “duration of their deployment” (Art. 4(3)), the 
Agency determines the composition of teams based on art. 8(b) of the Frontex 
Regulation. This article also specified that a member state could request Agency 
support on technical or personnel matters. The Agency could then directly assist in 
the coordination of operations or deploy its experts (Art. 4(1)). The Executive 
Director of the Agency has the right to propose the profile and number of border 
guards participating in teams, with the Management Board making the final 
decision, and any subsequent amendments thereto, by a three quarters majority (Art. 
4(2)). Member states are furthermore obliged to make their personnel available to 
the Agency except in the presence of an “exceptional situation substantially 
affecting the discharge of national tasks”. The Agency may also acquire technical 
equipment for RABIT operations (Art. 12(4)). In return the Agency is required to 
conduct regular exercises and provide members of the “Rapid Pool” with suitable 
training (Art. 12(5), second indent). Agency decisions on these points must be based 
on information provided by member states, and states must respond to data requests 
within five days (Art. 12(5)).  
 
 
 7.2. Conclusions 
 
The Commission and Frontex have both been granted with powers as to the 
gathering, processing, circulation and dissemination of information on borders and 
visas on grounds of uncertainty. And a number of legislative measures contain 
255/326 
provisions dealing with uncertainty, such as the SIS II Regulation, the EU Borders 
Fund, and the Visa Code Regulation. In some of these cases the Commission is only 
a recipient of information and therefore these provisions fall short of representing 
actual delegation. The need for information and knowledge to achieve a number of 
policy objectives in this area found expression in the Commission’s prominent role 
regarding the IT systems developed in this area. In addition to the previous points 
noted regarding administrative cooperation, this represents evidence of the 
Commission's empowerment due to a need for information and its circulation. 
Nevertheless the Commission's expertise does not appear to have been a 
determinant of delegation in this case, with the exception of Frontex. 
 
As in previous chapters, delegation within the European Borders Fund has 
been found to foster credibility of commitments. In addition to which, credibility of 
commitments has been found to motivate delegation instances of border and visas 
policy such as the Visa List Regulation. The Commission is also granted important 
powers, inter alia, through the Frontex Regulation, the 2005 amendment to the Visa 
List Regulation regarding reinstating visa requirement for third countries, and the 
Borders Code Regulation in the decision-making regarding reinstatement of 
internal border control. In short, credibility of commitments appears to have 
influenced decisions to involve the Commission in this policy area.  
 
The 2005 amendment to the Visa list Regulation grants explicit powers to the 
Commission to address a previous regulatory failure and to enhance its standing on 
foreign policy, thereby indicating delegation on grounds of effectiveness. The 
centralisation of functions through Frontex also speaks to effectiveness as a ground 
for delegation given that the Agency’s establishment was a response to coordinating 
difficulties that emerged during a previous ad hoc and network-based cooperation 
effort. On the other hand a sort of retrenchment has occurred in relation to 
delegation in borders and visas policy where large IT systems are concerned. This 
is due to waning confidence among some member states regarding the 
Commission's capacity to manage such vast undertakings. 
In terms of efficiency however, member states did demonstrate a preference 
for delegating operational management to the Commission in cases where large IT 
systems were involved. Although to follow Franchino’s line of reasoning there is a 
tendency to dismiss the nature of this delegation as technical or managerial, the 
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issues at stake in some cases are indeed more substantial than that. The matters 
decided upon by the Commission, albeit mainly under some form of Comitology 
procedure, deal with data protection, practical forms of collaboration (such as forms 
the filling out of forms by law enforcement agencies), or rules and procedures on 
access to databases. These are matters that have at times evoked strong opposition 
from NGOs, civil liberties groups, national governments and also the law 
enforcement agencies on the ground. Indeed, at times this debate also involved the 
Commission and the member states. For instance, this was the case with regard to 
fingerprinting under the 2008 VIS Regulation. The Commission at first argued that 
questions surrounding fingerprinting could be solved in a separate technical 
legislative instrument. However France “strongly emphasised” that the issue was 
not technical in nature but was in fact a political decision, therefore it was required 
to be dealt with in the main legal text (Council 2005). On the issue of what 
committee should deal with the implementation of VIS, the Commission argued 
that the existing SIS committee could serve this purpose in order to save on 
resources and reduce complexity. Nevertheless Finland, followed by France, 
demanded that two separate committees be created (Council 2004b)152.  
 
As with previous chapters, the present chapter concludes with a discussion of 
findings in the context of the existing academic literature. The reason for Pollak and 
Slominski to characterise Frontex as an instance of experimentalist governance is 
that one of the most important purposes of the agency is to “experiment with new 
solutions to certain problems, some of them not even known yet” (2009: 907). 
However, the fact that the agency has some discretion and aims at innovative 
answers to borer controls problems does not fall outside the theoretical remit of 
principal-agent approaches, as the two authors seem to argue (2009: 905). Principal-
agent approaches regard agencies as able to guarantee principals’ commitments and 
face not only day-to-day working, but also resolving not-foreseen issues arising if 
they fall within the institutions' remit153 (Pollack 2007a). All the debates about 
agents’ slippage would not take place if such a possibility were not foreseen. For 
the two authors, Frontex aims “to accomplish a rapprochement in terms of interests, 
                                                          
152 Inter alia, because two different types of personnel were likely to be involved, because the issues 
at stake were likely to be different as well as the types of information transmitted.  
153 From a legal standpoint, the issue of discretion is more limited than in the case of the Commission 
due to the so-called Meroni doctrine D. Kelemen and Giandomenico Majone, 'Managing 
Europeanization: The European Agencies', in John Peterson and Micheal Shackleton (eds.), The 
Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).. 
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legal traditions and ideas through information sharing and collective learning 
process” (2009: 913). While this may well be the case, one should not discount the 
stated objective of that body. As showed in this chapter, Frontex answers to precise 
expertise and information requests by the member states, something that far from 
being a novelty peculiar to new EU agencies, is part of what the Commission does 
since its inception. Frontex coordinated the Community support to much needed 
joint operation, at the request of the member states. This implies that when 
solidarity is requested, this is channelled through a third party so to increase its 
credibility. Finally, Frontex follows a logic of economy of scale by encouraging 
pooling of member states’ equipment, personnel and expertise. 
 
A popular approach to EU migration policy emphasises the importance of 
security for the developments in this area. This approach sometimes blurs with 
widespread discourses surrounding an emerging, or indeed existing, 'Fortress 
Europe' (Czaika and de Haas 2011: 8-9). From this perspective, emphasis is placed 
on the powers EU institutions and member state officials have accumulated for the 
purposes of creating a sealed European continent, sheltered from irregular migrants 
and other perceived threats. If this contention were to hold true, legislative and 
executive powers with a high degree decision-making autonomy ought surely to 
have been conferred upon EU bodies such as the Commission to shape the form, 
timing, and magnitude of border controls. Frontex has been regarded as 
confirmation of this perspective (EP 2004b: 32; Jorry 2007). And even though this 
Agency does demonstrate significant delegation and discretion, these powers fall 
short of such a reading with regard to a number elements such as autonomous 
patrolling and independent mission set-up. As Jorry acknowledges, “it does not bear 
any policy-making or direct operational powers” (Jorry 2007: 9, 20). This chapter 
has therefore shown that, rather than security reasons, the long lasting quest for 
efficiency has driven developments in border and visa policy as is clearly visible in 
the case of IT-related measures. While in a broader sense these are updated versions 
of remote control policies, the significant delegation in these policy areas has been 
determined by a determination to credibility commit to cooperation in these areas. 
This is in addition to the efficiency gains these developments are meant to achieve 
(Broeders and Hampshire 2013). 
 
The Commission and the Council have shared a common perspective 
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concerning the benefits of IT measures and the use of new technologies in this area. 
This partly explains why delegation and discretion were found at to be at their 
second highest levels in Chapter 3 and confirmed in this chapter. However, it is not 
clear how this reflects the liberal / restrictive divide frequently mentioned in the 
literature (Ripoll Servent and Trauner 2014). The criticisms that have been levied 
with regard to these innovations in terms of citizens’ rights make it difficult to 
classify the Commission’s stance in this area as liberal.  
For Mitsilegas the creation of Frontex represents a sign of mistrust among 
member states (Mitsilegas 2007) that specifically aims to constrain the accession 
states. As existing member states feared the consequences of leaving European 
external borders guarded by new states, they opted to create an agency that would 
instruct them in the implementation of the Schengen rules. However while it is true 
that member states opted for a centralisation of coordinating functions, it is doubtful 
that they conceded more than that. The Agency has almost no decision-making 
power when it comes to legislation or monitoring member state implementation of 
EU legislation. Its autonomy is also limited at the operational level as it relies 
heavily on member state consensus to initiate operations and on their material 
support (e.g. equipment) to carry them out. Indeed the EP seems to suggest that both 
the Commission's proposal for its establishment and the Council's consensus 
underscore the intergovernmental nature of the Agency (EP 2004b: 30), which is at 
odds with hypotheses of centralisation. 
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8. Conclusions  
 
 
This dissertation set out to explain the extent and reasons for delegation in EU 
migration policy. Past studies have focused on policy-making features of this area 
such as networks, EU institutions and member states (Geddes 2014; Menz 2009; 
Monar 2001), the convergence of migration policy across member states (Ette and 
Faist 2007; Hollifield 2014), and the substance of policies (e.g. experimentalist, 
securitisation) (Huysmans 2000). In contrast with the former approaches, this study 
has focused on a traditional feature of EU policy-making, delegation. This is the 
process of member states conferring powers to an EU body through Council action, 
traditionally the Commission. Taking delegation as a measure of integration is not 
novel in EU studies (Moravcsik 1999). It is assumed that if member states were 
willing to confer powers to a third party, this constitutes de facto integration. 
Chapter 2 defines delegation and, most importantly, sets out the most likely reasons 
for delegation on the basis of a thorough review of previous theoretical work on the 
matter. They are reducing uncertainty, strengthening the credibility of 
commitments, and enhancing efficiency and achieving effectiveness. In addition, 
conflict between the Commission and the Council is identified as a potential 
constraint on delegation, whereas different views exist as to how conflict within the 
Council is likely to affect delegation. 
 
Delegation was selected as the dependent variable for reasons of simplicity 
and opportunity. Coding templates already present in the academic literature offered 
clear and simple tools to measure delegation in secondary legislation adopted 
between 1999 and 2009 (Franchino 2004; Pollack 2003b). This quantitative 
exercise laid the groundwork for the discussion of some of the assumptions and 
conclusions present in the academic literature. At the same time, it also highlighted 
the need to couple this quantitative investigation with a qualitative analysis 
assessing the various rationales proposed in the literature to explain delegation. 
Delegation was analysed in respect of five policy areas: asylum and refuge; 
irregular migration; legal migration; administrative cooperation; and, border and 
visa policy. A simple question underpinned this analysis; to what extent are the 
commonly assumed determinants of delegations helpful in explaining delegation in 
EU migration policy? The following section summarises the main findings. This 
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involves an initial overview of the main results, with the focus then moving on to 
the individual determinants of delegation. A section on further avenues for research 
follows before the final section connects the results of this dissertation to broader 
debates in the academic literature.  
 
 
 8.1. Main findings 
 
The first conclusion, established in Chapter 3, is that delegation is present in this 
policy area. This may seem trivial, but previous studies of delegation through 
secondary legislation have neglected this area, thus it is a new finding (Franchino 
2004; Pollack 2003b). To be fair, it must be noted that this lacuna is mainly the 
result of the timing of previous projects, in that they concluded before the end of 
the 1990s. Chapter 3 finds that average levels of delegation and discretion154 in 
migration policy stood, respectively, at 12.2 percent and 8.7 percent for the period 
in question. From a cross-policy perspective, discretion in migration policy ranks 
among much older areas of cooperation such as “merger control” and “market 
conditions” for transports (Franchino 2006a: 176). It was also established that 
delegation levels vary across migration categories. For purely analytical reasons, 
the coding results of Chapter 3 were ranked under three values that refer to levels 
of delegation identified in each legislative measure (high, medium, low).155 Asylum 
policy features two measures each for high and medium delegation, with the 
majority displaying low delegation. Irregular migration has one measure with high 
delegation, the rest displaying low levels. Legal migration features one measure 
each for high and medium delegation, with the rest registering as low. 
Administrative cooperation has five measures with high delegation and one with 
medium levels. And finally, borders and visas features eleven measures with high 
delegation, six with medium levels, and six with low delegation.  
 
Having demonstrated that delegation is present, analysis moved on to the 
assessment of why that is the case. Accordingly, a new question was used to lead 
this analysis: why do delegation levels differ between migration categories? 
Attention was turned to the determinants of delegation to answer this. Chapter 2 
                                                          
154 Without implementing measures.  
155 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of these values.  
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critically surveyed existing academic literature looking for drivers of delegation, 
and extrapolated eight hypotheses concerning the links between the independent 
and dependent variables. The process of selecting and specifying the independent 
variables turned out to be a crucial step in this research, because of the ambiguous 
definitions and applications of the determinants of delegation in the literature 
 
The results of the combined quantitative and qualitative analyses have 
produced unexpected conclusions in light of the theoretical findings identified in 
the existing academic literature. While authors engaged in the study of delegation 
tend to concentrate on individual determinants, the findings of this project indicate 
that this approach is insufficient in the case of migration policy. Delegation results 
from the rationales that underpin the choices of key actors, these are identified here 
as the need for reducing uncertainty, the willingness to strengthen credibility, and 
the quest for efficiency. Institutional contexts, or dynamics between EU actors, are 
also identified as playing a key role in bringing about EU level delegation. However 
it is crucial to note that delegation does not emerge on foot of individual factors, 
but it results from the interplay of various elements. The best analogy for which 
comes from the force field of physics, i.e. the force and strength of individual 
vectors matter, but only inasmuch as they contribute to the resultant vector. The first 
set of factors is labelled ‘rationales’ as, while being related to the policy area in 
question, they have to be accepted by agents to be converted into policies. The other 
two factors describe the dynamics within the Council, the key legislative actor 
during much of the period analysed here, and between the Council and the 
Commission. In terms of the effect of these factors, the first four are thought to 
promote further delegation, while the fifth is inversely related thereto, i.e. the more 
conflict between the Commission and the Council, the less delegation should be 
expected. That being said, it was also found that only certain determinants set out 
in the literature affect delegation. Specifically, while credibility, efficiency, and 
conflict between the Council and the Commission explain levels of delegation, 
uncertainty, effectiveness, and internal conflict within the Council have not been 
found to do so. Table 8.1 below summarises the principal findings. 
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Table 8.1. Rationales and intuitional contexts for delegation in migration policy, and their outcomes  
 Rationales driving delegation Institutional contexts Delegation 
Uncertainty Credibility Efficiency/Effectiveness Council internal 
division 
Divergence Commission/Council 
Asylum Medium High Medium High 
 
High Medium 
Irregular High High Medium Medium 
 
Medium Low 
Legal Low Low Medium High High Low 
Administrative Medium Medium High Medium Low High 
Border and 
visas 
Medium High High Medium Low High 
263/326 
The basic massage of Table 8.1 is that, in order to have medium to high levels 
of delegation a policy area must have had pressing reasons (i.e. ‘high’) related either 
to the rationales of credibility or efficiency, and low to medium levels of opposition 
through conflict between the Council and the Commission.  
 
Another thing to note from Table 8.1 is that ordinal values are relational, that 
is they do not express intrinsic values but are expression of rankings between 
categories. Ontologically it makes little sense to argue that credibility of 
commitments was high in asylum policy and low for legal migration. However, 
what the Table 8.1 is intended to clarify is simply that, in light of the empirical 
research carried out in the previous chapters, credibility reasons were found more 
pressing in asylum policy when compared with legal migration. It is, however, more 
difficult to attribute values when the difference is not as conspicuous as in the 
previous example. For instance, the difference between irregular migration and 
asylum policy in the case of uncertainty is interesting. Knowledge of the former 
phenomenon was poor in many member states, little academic or policy-related 
research existed on it until well into the 2000s, there were no previous knowledge 
bases at the international level upon which European solutions could have been 
built, and the eagerness for more communication and information-sharing was high, 
as signalled by numerous internal Council consultations on the matter. In the case 
of asylum policy however, this was a social phenomenon that national 
administrations had long been dealing with, international organisations had well-
established methods of collecting, processing and releasing data thereon, and while 
the Council did consult internally on it this did not happen to same extent as with 
irregular migration. 
Looking close at table 8.1, the interpretation of the borders and visa row is 
straightforward. Rationales were high, and crucially conflict with the Commission 
was low. Again, reading the table is simple in the case of legal migration and 
administrative cooperation. There were simply no reasons for delegating in the case 
of legal migration, and this was reinforced by intense conflict between the Council 
and the Commission on this matter. Administrative cooperation however saw high 
levels of efficiency rationales coupled with an absence of conflict between EU 
institutions, which resulted in high delegation. For asylum, while rationales for 
delegation ranged from medium to high, conflict with the Commission was at its 
highest (together with legal migration). The contrast between these two opposing 
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trends produces a result that is intermediate in relation to the two sets represented 
by irregular and legal migration on the one hand, and borders and visas and 
administrative cooperation on the other.  
The real puzzle in these results is irregular migration policy. Rationales to 
delegate were present, particularly in relation to credibility of commitments and, to 
a lesser extent, efficiency. While broad consensus existed in the Council on the need 
to combat irregular migration, significant contention also existed on issues such as 
regularisation practices. Conflict between the Council and the Commission was also 
moderate. The only even partially satisfactory explanation for the low delegation 
might be that any form of further action in this area would have strayed into policy 
areas where the EU had no competence. Developments in returns policy encroached 
significantly on foreign policy, and aside from conceding the authority to the 
Commission to negotiate readmission agreements with third countries (which 
member states did through Amsterdam), there was little that member states could 
achieve without granting more powers to the Commission and involving critical 
areas of legal migration or admission (e.g. labour migration schemes to offset the 
incentives of entering EU countries irregularly). However the latter was off limits. 
Another frequently mentioned strategy for reducing irregular migration would have 
involved introducing more internal controls, such as in the labour markets, but 
negotiations on the Employer Sanctions Directive revealed just how sensitive this 
was for member states.  
 
 
 8.1.1) Institutional factors: Division within the Council, and the 
conflict between the Council and the Commission 
 
Two common hypotheses in the literature connect divisions within the Council and 
conflict between the Council and the Commission to the likelihood of delegation. 
This project reveals that the first element does not seem to influence delegation.156 
Nonetheless, the second element is one of the most powerful predictors of 
delegation.157 It must however be noted that this acts as a constraint on delegation, 
not a driver. Thus the two elements are inversely proportional, the more conflict 
between the Council and the Commission increases the less delegation is to be 
                                                          
156 H1 in Chapter 2. 
157 H2 in Chapter 2. 
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expected. Indeed absence of conflict between the two institutions turns out to be a 
necessary, although not sufficient, element for having delegation. In all cases where 
the conflict between the two institutions was high, delegation was driven down. 
Asylum and refugee policy confirms a holistic perspective on delegation. There 
were powerful reasons to delegate on asylum in the first place where credibility and 
efficiency were concerned. Therefore, the combination of these rationales and the 
institutional contexts at EU level yielded a result that lies somewhere between 
irregular and legal migration policies at the lowest end, and borders and visa policy 
at the highest end.  
Two hypotheses were identified in relation to conflict within the Council from 
the literature review conducted in Chapter 2. The first states: on the basis of 
principal agent analysis, the more conflict within the Council, the less delegation 
should exist as divided principals are less capable of controlling a runaway agent. 
The second hypothesis states: on the basis of implementation studies, the more 
divided the Council the more delegation should exist, as member states were less 
likely to fully implement measures if they were not on board during Council 
negotiations. Neither hypothesis could however be confirmed as no discernible 
pattern of influence was identified between conflict within the Council and 
delegation.  
 
Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes seem to believe that the Commission has played 
a limited role in shaping migration policy up until the Lisbon Treaty was approved. 
This is due to the fact that the Commission’s policy objectives could not be 
supported by the CJEU, which in turn was due to the limitations imposed on 
references through preliminary rulings (2013). This work has confirmed that the 
Commission has rarely been given sanctioning powers in secondary legislation. 
This is coupled with the fact that the overwhelming majority of infringement 
procedures initiated by the Commission were later withdrawn (Peers 2011). A 
possible interpretation of this is that the Commission simply opted for a long-term 
strategy. Indeed although the Commission had a number of different policy 
preferences to the Council, it rarely pushed for a more substantial role for itself 
through its proposals. This is key to understanding what most commentators have 
characterised as a low-profile approach by the Commission in this area. The 
Council repeatedly signalled to the Commission that the JHA policy area was a 
sensitive one, and that any instance of cooperation should proceed carefully and 
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cautiously (Majone 2005; E. M. Uçarer 2001). A closer reading of the first years of 
cooperation under the Amsterdam rules is crucial to understanding the relationship 
between the Council and the Commission. Between the end of 1999 and 2001, the 
Commission put forward three measures that were thought to capitalise on the 
political momentum generated at Tampere. These were the Directive on 
Employment (Commission 2001f), Family Reunification (Commission 1999a), and 
the Asylum Procedures (Commission 2000a). These measures represented clear 
defeats for the Commission, obliging it to reconsider the scope and content of its 
policy proposals. While the first measure was simply ignored by the Council with 
little debate traceable in the archives, the others faced intense opposition and debate. 
The Commission had to redraft these measures several times in order to get them 
through the Council. All in the context of a Commission that, for the first time in 
the history of EC affairs, had no formal monopoly over initiative (Majone 2005: 
62). The Council’s attitude towards many of these early efforts by the Commission 
is perhaps best summarised by German Chancellor Schroeder who reportedly said 
that, “[t]he Commission's fantasies have been rationalised” (European Report 
2002e). 
The Council’s opposition to the Commission’s viewpoints could help to 
explain why, even in cases where the Council was divided and the likelihood of 
defection was high, no significant delegation occurred. A telling example comes 
from asylum policy. The Council had not yet finished adopting the first legislative 
package on minimum standards on asylum, when the Commission proposed a 
radical overhaul of the entire system. In other words, the distance between the two 
institutions was not only a question of initial positions, but persisted through time 
(European Report 2004e). Thus while German Interior Minister Schily was 
proposing the establishment of asylum application centres in non-EU countries, 
JHA Commissioner Vitorino was replying that a common European asylum system, 
and not a system of minimum standards, was a necessary pre-condition for such a 
measure thereby highlighting the incomplete nature of EU policy in this area 
(European Report 2004b).  
 
 
 8.1.2) Uncertainty 
 
The notion of uncertainty has been unpacked along two dimensions in this study: 
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the first related to expertise158; and, the second related to information-asymmetry159. 
The hypotheses set out in Chapter 2 state that the more a policy area is plagued with 
uncertainty, the more delegation should be recorded. These hypotheses have not 
been confirmed. Seldom has the Commission been delegated powers to facilitate 
the flows of information towards all participants, this is even less so in the case of 
its purported expertise. Perhaps the best example of this trend is irregular migration, 
where uncertainty was found to be ubiquitous. International organisations such as 
the OECD, the Commission, and other actors began highlighting the need for a 
better understanding of and more data concerning the complex phenomena 
encompassed by the term “irregular migration”. This was also recognised at the 
highest political level, through Council and European Council statements. 
Nevertheless, it was rarely possible to match these concerns to concrete instances 
of delegation in secondary legislation. 
 
Comparing the two hypotheses on uncertainty, there is stronger confirmation 
for powers being delegated to the Commission on foot of a need for information 
sharing rather than expertise. This is confirmed in the case of administrative 
cooperation, where the majority of legislative measures answer information-sharing 
concerns, but only the Migration Statistics Regulation is related to a rationale of 
expertise. Past studies indicate “EU officials with the capacity to control 
information, [and] generate ideas” have expanded their remit in migration policy, 
and that “informational asymmetry and leadership capacity” is a key explanatory 
factor for that expansion (Margheritis and Maldonado 2003: 163). However this 
study has shown that the informational claims of this statement are seldom upheld. 
Although member states often include the Commission in their official 
communications and information flows through notification requirements or 
involvement in networks, secondary legislation rarely grants the Commission 
explicit powers to change a policy on that basis. Most often the Commission is only 
the recipient of information, it rarely has the power to control that information, and 
is frequently obliged to release it. Informational asymmetry is difficult to detect. 
The Commission struggled to obtain information and data from a number of 
member states in a number of areas, most critically perhaps in irregular migration 
and some asylum matters. 
                                                          
158 H3 in Chapter 2.  
159 H4 in Chapter 2. 
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Finally, the idea of the Commission’s having an edge over member states with 
regard to information as the driver for its ever-expanding competence and powers 
is doubtful. Legislators clearly recommend the use of knowledge acquired by virtue 
of the Commission’s reporting duties as a basis to propose amendments to current 
legislation. While this could grant some informational fuel for a runaway 
bureaucracy, it is equally plausible to regard it as an instance of careful evidence-
based policy-making. In other words, changes to legislation must be warranted by 
evidence of policy deficiencies or possible improvements. Moreover, this provides 
a channel for inclusive policy-making whereby actors are made aware of issues that 
might have arisen during the implementation of a policy (via constant reporting), 
and are then presented with proposals to address them. Hence this analysis of 
uncertainty does not confirm that member states are losing ground to a runaway 
bureaucracy. On the contrary, it seems they have engineered mechanisms to 
facilitate cooperation towards collective solutions.  
 
Application of Franchino’s stringent criteria for delegation where a proactive 
policy role is set out for the Commission  resulted in the exclusion of countless 
instances of notification requirements imposed on member states (Franchino 2006a: 
109-10). This confirms the notion of the Commission as repository of Community 
knowledge. Coming back to Chapter 2, these notification requirements underlie the 
idea of the Commission as a tool for lowering transaction costs. In fact, these are 
the means through which the Commission can “meet demands for policy-relevant 
information about the state of the world” (Pollack 2003b: 180). Excluding these 
items from the category of delegating provisions is only tenable when it is 
acknowledged that this dissertation is testing delegation in secondary legislation. 
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that the Commission can use such 
information and knowledge to elaborate its proposals and Communications, 
commence infringement procedures, and report to the EP. 
 
While it is generally believed “the level of expert information required in a 
particular area” is what explains delegation (Hawkins et al. 2006: 13-15; Hix 2005: 
66), this study qualifies those remarks. In many of the cases where high delegation 
occurred, expert information was not the cause. For instance in the case of large IT 
systems such as the SIS II, although expertise was needed member states seemed 
more interested in utilising the Commission’s managerial skills rather than its 
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expertise on migration or IT services (usually something the Commission sub-
contracted). The Commission rarely had the power of shaping, requesting, or 
processing information, and it was not empowered by virtue of its superior and 
authoritative knowledge on migration. There are exceptions to this. For example 
the risk analyses carried out by Frontex are a powerful use of information and 
knowledge. Moreover, the Commission was empowered by member states to 
conduct a series of tasks in relation to the Migration Statistics Regulation that 
implied a significant degree of expertise in the field. However, these were relatively 
rare occurrences, which tallies with other analyses of delegation in the EU. For 
instance Pollack states that,  
 
in international politics member-state principals are likely to have 
strong domestic sources of expertise, and have weaker 
informational incentives to delegate such powers to international 
organizations (2007a: 14).  
 
 
 8.1.3) Credibility of commitments 
 
The survey of the main theoretical approaches in Chapter 2 found that authors tend 
to agree that strengthening the credibility of commitments is one of the main 
rationales behind delegation of powers in a given policy area (Hawkins et al. 2006: 
18; Pollack 2007a: 14; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003: 4). Unfortunately though, 
the same chapter showed how controversial and vague this notion is. By connecting 
its meaning to the likelihood of defection160, it has been possible to demonstrate 
that determination to strengthen the credibility of commitments is positively 
correlated with delegation. More precisely, the idea of credibility has been linked 
to uneven cross-country trends in migration phenomena and past crises of 
confidence among member states. 
 
Asylum and refugee policy provides a good example of the importance of 
credibility of commitments for delegation. A significant portion of delegation 
present in this area is due to the European Refugee Funds, as well as the Dublin 
Regulation and, to a minor extent, Eurodac. While some of this delegation is due to 
                                                          
160 H5 and H6 in Chapter 2. 
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concerns for efficiency161, credibility of commitments plays an important role. 
Delegation is however not as high as it could have been because of the intense 
conflict between the Council and the Commission, which resulted in levels of 
delegation and discretion ranking halfway between the higher results of 
administrative cooperation and borders and visa policy, and the lower results of 
irregular migration and legal migration policies.  
 
Most frequently though, the Commission strengthens the credibility of 
member state commitments through its “agenda setting” powers (Hawkins et al. 
2006; Pollack 2003b: 16). Member states already granted this power to the 
Commission through primary legislation, nonetheless examples of delegation 
through secondary legislation are abundant. These include, inter alia: powers to 
propose amendments; Comitology procedures where the Commission is tasked, 
subject to varying degrees of constraint, with proposing solutions to incomplete 
contracts (legislative measures) between member states; complementing legislation 
by engineering financial compensation mechanisms; or, proposing the triggering of 
an emergency mechanism, as with the Temporary Protection Directive. 
The first hypothesis162 under this heading was linked to Pollack’s suggestion 
that credibility problems are likely to be most acute “when issues impose 
concentrated costs” (Hawkins et al. 2006: 19). Some of the cases analysed here 
exposed evidence of this: as was the case with asylum-seeker flows and stocks; 
external border control for peripheral countries; and, uneven levels of irregular 
migrant stocks. From a rational choice perspective, this should have triggered 
concerns that those member states likely to incur burdens may defect in the future. 
Indeed member states should have designed mechanisms to monitor and, where 
necessary, sanction non-compliance. Yet while monitoring is ubiquitous throughout 
the legislation, for example through obligations to notify the Commission, sanctions 
are rare. It is pertinent to question why that is. 
 
First, Pollack seems to suggest that the absence of explicit sanctioning powers 
in EU legislation should come as no surprise. Indeed he holds that institutions such 
as the Commission,  
 
                                                          
161 See next section.  
162 H5 
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need not be given the power to enforce agreements through 
sanctions, but need provide only enough information about 
compliance to facilitate decentralized sanctioning by the principals 
themselves (2003b: 22).  
 
With a specific reference to migration, a further potential reason is that member 
states were caught between two goals. One aimed at creating agreements that would 
be palatable for domestic audiences, and the other focused on striking agreements 
capable of achieving their stated policy objectives. A way out of this quandary was 
to endow the Commission with its usual monitoring powers, but to carefully avoid 
any sanctioning powers being granted thereto. Monitoring would allow member 
states to be thoroughly informed about sensitive migration issues likely to affect 
them in the context of an internally borderless area. While the lack of formal 
sanctioning powers would allow for an answer that was more politically rewarding 
than institutionally focused. A political agreement of this nature is delicate, as 
indicated by looking at the OMC experiment. In the only study dedicated to the 
introduction of OMC in migration policy, Caviedes holds that member states 
resorted to this method because of member state predispositions “to withhold 
delegating authority from the Commission” (2004: 306). However, after an initial 
surge of interest, references to OMC virtually disappeared from official documents. 
Member states seemed little interested in this loose form of cooperation, and the 
method was abandoned (Caviedes 2004: 305-06). More broadly the introduction of 
OMC is related to the fact that, in Caviedes' opinion, “only in issue areas where the 
presence of an external legislator and adjudicator is deemed necessary to prevent 
shirking will policy be communitarised” (2004: 292). In light of the results of this 
study however, it seems that this statement should be qualified. It has been shown 
here that member states have not shied away from delegating in administrative 
cooperation, borders and visas, and, to a lesser extent, asylum and refugee policy. 
 
 
 8.1.4) Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the literature on delegation refers interchangeably to 
two different notions, effectiveness and efficiency, as likely triggers for delegation. 
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Effectiveness has been linked to previous policy failures163 in this study, and 
efficiency has been linked to the potential for saving time and resources164. And 
despite their frequent confusion with one another, separate results have been 
recorded for efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
The picture regarding efficiency is straightforward, with the results here 
confirming that member states tend to delegate operational management tasks to 
the Commission. This should not however be dismissed as a merely technical issue. 
As discussed on numerous occasions, the powers delegated to the Commission are 
numerous and heterogeneous and range from managing large IT systems to 
providing technical assistance to member states in need, and from managing several 
migration funds to supporting networks of state officials. Member states need an 
actor with managerial expertise, as distinct from technical expertise, upon whom 
powers can be conferred (Franchino 2006a). The Commission fulfils this need. 
Stretching this line of reasoning a little, this seems to echo early debates in 
International Relations literature where the role of the Commission was compared 
with Secretariats in other International Organisations (Jupille et al. 2003). 
Hawkins asserts that, “gains from specialisation are likely to be greater when 
the task to be performed is frequent, repetitive, and requires specific expertise or 
knowledge” (Hawkins et al. 2006: 14). This is what happens in the case of 
delegation based on efficiency. That is, member states recognise that initiatives such 
as the migration funds and introduction of large IT systems require constant support 
from EU institutions. In other words, frequent and repetitive tasks can be fruitfully 
delegated to the Commission in order that gains from a “division of labour” are 
maximised, i.e. member states make decisions and EU bodies execute them. That 
being said the “managerial” tasks the Commission is charged with, while no doubt 
technical in nature, are far from unimportant or non-contentious. Indeed authors 
have argued that the distinction between technical and political is a blurred one, and 
“the imprecision of this very distinction is, in fact, a powerful facilitator for 
reaching intersectoral and intergovernmental compromise at the EU level” 
(Fouilleux et al. 2005: 610; Rosamond 2000: 40-41). In many cases, these efforts 
at delegation have turned out to be controversial and have provoked reactions from 
policy actors, such as civil society organisations in the case of IT databases. This 
                                                          
163 H7 in Chapter 2. 
164 H8 in Chapter 2. 
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study has shown that member states have also used the full range of Comitology 
procedures available to them, demonstrating that they differentiate between more 
and less troubling issues in terms of potential “agency slippage”165. In a way, this is 
a long-standing debate in EU affairs. In his classic work on the Commission, 
Nugent highlights that even though it,  
 
is best known for launching proposals in respect of what may be 
thought of as grand and overarching policies, […] in volume terms 
most of its initiatives are focused on detailed policies in particular 
sectors (Nugent 2001: 10). 
 
The picture in relation to effectiveness, understood as the effort to redress 
previous national or European failures, is however negative. In some cases previous 
failures are indeed quoted in official documents as triggers for delegation. However, 
this happens in only a few cases within the overall set of legislative measures 
analysed. The overwhelming majority of policies issues labelled as failing by 
official documents, practitioners, academics or media outlets, could not be 
connected with specific instances of delegation in this dissertation. The results of 
the analysis carried out in this study demonstrate that previous failures are neither 
sufficient nor necessary to justify delegation in a given policy area. This runs 
counter to a number of accounts in the literature (Majone 2000; Monar 2011: 130; 
Stetter 2000). However findings here confirm Gilligan’s theory that previous 
failures, by themselves, do not really explain advances towards institutionalised 
international cooperation (2009: 50). 
 
 
8.1. Future avenues of research 
 
This study has involved in-depth research on delegation within a single policy area, 
which is an approach that has not been taken before. An obvious initial step towards 
building on the advances made in this study is to carry out a range of similar studies 
across other policy areas. This would facilitate comparison of results, and would 
                                                          
165 Kassim and Menon hold that slippage may occur when “the very structure of delegation provides 
incentives for the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences of the principals” Hussein 
Kassim and Anand Menon, 'The Principal–Agent Approach and the Study of the European 
Union: Promise Unfulfilled?', Journal of European Public Policy, 10/1 (2003), 121-39 at 122.. 
274/326 
allow an assessment of whether the present findings are peculiar to this policy area 
or are generalisable beyond migration policy. It would be possible to include areas 
subject to significant political pressures, such as environment or social policy, or 
indeed less prominent areas such as development and cooperation policy. In 
addition, there is a widespread perception that the role of the Commission is 
diminishing in EU affairs (Nugent 2010: 135-36). It would be possible to test this 
by checking for various levels of delegation and discretion through time and across 
policy areas, using the methods employed here. More profoundly, if this study’s 
central premise that delegation is an expression of integration is accepted, this could 
provide a way of illustrating levels of integration across EU policy. The result of 
which would be to bring much-needed clarity to EU studies focused on integration.  
 
For reasons of space and resources, it was necessary to limit this study to the 
policy-design phase, which tends to portray delegation as a one-off event. However 
once powers are delegated, agents use them, which in turn is likely to impact on 
principals who may revise, withdrawn or indeed reaffirm those powers. This shows 
how delegation is more of a process than a one off-event. A further, and eminently 
relevant, research project could therefore concentrate on the implementation of 
migration policy, so that light might be shed on how delegated powers are exercised. 
This is an important facet of what is usually termed as discretion, though it is little 
studied.166 The implementation of migration funds could make for an interesting 
study of this sort. This study has demonstrated that the powers granted to the 
Commission in those funds are so extensive in remit and depth that, from a 
principal-agent perspective, it is likely their use has had consequences for the 
principals - i.e. the member states in the Council and, recently, the EP. An 
interviewee from a Permanent Representation hinted at some frustration in the 
Council concerning the Commission’s conduct in this regard (Interview 1). A 
similar issue is observable in an area of competence that seems to have been secured 
by the Commission, i.e. the management of IT systems. Events occurred during the 
creation of SIS II that have cast long shadows on the Commission's capacity to 
effectively supervise such projects. 
 
                                                          
166 For an exception, see Dimitrakopoulos Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos, 'Unintended 
Consequences: Institutional Autonomy and Executive Discretion in the European Union', 
Journal of Public Policy, 21/2 (2001), 107-31.. 
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The results of this study could also act as the starting point for a new angle 
on the debate about the restrictive or liberal nature of EU migration policy. An 
interesting approach would be to investigate the effect that significant Commission 
involvement has on the substance of policies. This could be achieved by comparing 
policies featuring high delegation with those where the Commission has had few or 
no powers. This would enable a light to be shone on the effect of EU institutions on 
policy. In particular, it could be interesting to check for such an effect now that a 
number of legislative measures have been re-framed at the EU level, for example 
in asylum policy or in the new package for migration funding established under the 
2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework. 
 
 
8.2. Links with broader debates on the EU and 
migration policy 
 
The point of departure of this dissertation was diametrically opposed to 
experimentalist-informed readings of cooperation in migration policy (Monar 2001, 
2010; Pollak and Slominski 2009). While these approaches focus on efforts by 
policy-makers to avoid the Community Method, this study set off to measure 
integration by investigating one of the most classic features of the Community 
Method, delegation. The resulting analysis found that this policy area has seen a 
significant volume of regular legislative output. Moreover delegation is present and 
significant, and is comparable to other long-established EU policy areas in terms of 
volume. The conclusion is that, as seen through the lens of delegation, migration 
policy has been fully incorporated into traditional EU policy-making mechanisms. 
A recent contribution to the literature holds that “[w]here delegation occurs, 
governments and traditional supranational actors support the creation and 
empowerment of de novo bodies” (Bickerton et al. 2014: 11). This study however 
qualifies this statement by observing that delegation to new EU bodies does not 
happen to the detriment of traditional addressees of delegation such as the 
Commission. In the most pertinent case, delegation to Frontex took place in a policy 
area that already involved high delegation and discretion to the Commission. The 
Commission does not appear to have lost out, in a sort of zero-sum game, but has 
rather been one of the staunchest supporters of the idea of an agency over the years. 
Finally a close relationship appears to exist between the two bodies, as for instance 
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the Commission sits on the Frontex’s Management Board.  
 
The policy-venue explanation for the emergence of migration policy in the 
EU maintains that governments wish to circumvent national constraints on 
migration control and hence have created trans-national cooperation mechanisms 
dominated by law and order officials, with EU institutions playing a minor role 
(Guiraudon 2000a; Lavenex 2006). This dissertation qualifies this argument. As 
mentioned above, Chapter 3 highlights that EU migration policy features as much 
delegation as other more traditional policy areas. Therefore EU institutions are not 
minor players in this area. The qualitative analysis of this study involves an 
assessment of the extent to which cooperation can be explained in rationalist terms, 
namely: uncertainty; credibility; and, effectiveness and efficiency. While policy 
failures per se have rarely induced member states to grant powers to the 
Commission, potential gains from increased efficiency have produced such a result. 
In terms of operational management, working through EU institutions has surely 
meant more opportunities for member states to control and act at the European and 
international level. Frontex, the numerous IT systems167, and the networks 
established by the EU have amplified member states’ reach over a phenomenon that 
is international by definition. Member states have also benefited greatly from 
working within EU institutions in terms of gaining knowledge and information, 
while leaving little room for the Commission to make use of that knowledge to 
either expand its policy remit or to shape policy. And here there is a further line of 
criticism. While the policy venue argument captures member states’ determination 
to avoid close monitoring and sanctioning, which recent contributions have also 
underlined (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes 2013), it has led to a general feeling 
among academic commentators that what EU cooperation is actually about is 
masking and shielding national executives’ true intentions and actions on migration 
policy. This dissertation has confirmed the gap in sanctioning devices in secondary 
legislation, but not of monitoring tools, which are actually abundant. More 
profoundly, EU cooperation on migration policy is also about achieving increased 
efficiency in pan-European regulatory and operational policy undertakings. 
Strengthening credibility through common action is also present, particularly in 
areas such as visas and borders. Again, member states granted important, albeit 
                                                          
167 Although recent, disappointing experiences with large-scale IT systems might have made 
member states more wary of the Commission involvement in this area. 
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variously controlled, agenda setting roles to the Commission to solve credibility 
concerns.  A non-negligible dimension of that is EU funding, which tackles 
imbalances (in some cases admittedly only at a symbolic level) and strengthens 
common actions. These dimensions are however frequently dismissed in the current 
academic debate. 
 
A question about centralisation was posed at the beginning of this document. 
This is a frequent theme when it comes to EU studies. Indeed, it arises often in the 
media through questions that ask things like ‘why do (or did) we give so much 
power to Brussels?’ If the question of centralisation is measured solely on the 
grounds of the number of occurrences of delegation, delegation is present in this 
policy area. Consequently, one could conclude that a process of centralisation has 
been ongoing in this area since 1999. However the qualitative analysis discussed in 
Chapters 4 to 7 provides a more nuanced picture.  
Moravcsik has highlighted that the EU “constitutional order […] preserves 
national democratic politics for the issues most salient to citizens” and tends to 
delegate “to more indirect democratic forms those issues that are of less concern, 
or on which there is an administrative, technical or legal consensus” (Chalmers and 
Tomkins 2007: 85). According to this statement, EU migration policy should not go 
in the direction of more centralisation. However, the analysis of secondary 
legislation conducted here has shown that delegation: does occur in areas of great 
political salience, such as asylum relocation and border control coordination; and, 
also occurs when consensus in not entirely apparent, or when divergence is so stark 
that negotiations stall, such as with the Dublin Regulation. As an addendum, it 
worth noting that secondary EU legislation has largely been neglected or analysed 
only fragmentally in most literature, thus these findings perhaps support a revisiting 
of this approach. 
Centralisation seems to be a by-product of the European migration funds, it 
only happens as a consequence of the Commission’s coordinating role therein (e.g. 
multiannual programming). This also happens in the context of administering and 
managing funds in cooperation with national administrations, which are under 
obligations of constant reporting to the Commission. In the case of IT systems, the 
Commission was at first empowered to establish and manage a number of different 
projects, but many of these were planned to be transferred to other bodies since their 
initial proposals (e.g. VIS, SIS). In addition, the Commission has accepted the 
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support of individual member states, as envisaged in its original mandate. It has 
therefore delegated some of its competences in turn.  
Since 1999 the EU has established a number of agencies focused on migration 
(Frontex, EASO, EU-LISA) and a number that deal directly with migration issues 
(EUROPOL and FRA). Chapter 5 in fact set out how some authors have linked 
agency creation to the centralisation of powers in the field of EU migration policy 
(Mitsilegas 2007). In the broader field of delegation studies, authors have linked 
agency creation with a competence-eager Commission that, conscious of member 
state opposition to its entrepreneurship, sees agency creation as a way of advancing 
its role (Keleman 2002; Wonka and Rittberger 2011). EU migration policy offers 
only partial support for these assertions. For example, while the Commission did 
pushed hard for the establishment of Frontex and its creation represented an 
enlargement of the Community action’s remit, it is also true a sizeable number of 
member states actively supported this initiative.  
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that Moravcsik sees credibility of commitments as 
the only factor capable of explaining the level of delegation in the EU (1999: 73-
77). While confirming his findings on the limited explanatory power of uncertainty, 
this study has also bolstered efficiency as another trigger of delegation. Majone’s 
argument for two logics posits that when principals want to achieve credibility, 
agents have to be as insulated as possible (2001). When the objective is efficiency, 
more controls over agent conduct are admissible. The findings here partially 
confirm these insights. The quest by principals for efficiency is identified as one of 
the most powerful determinants of delegation. However, Majone seems to assume 
that supranational agents act either without prior bias or with a pro-integration 
preference in relation to EU politics. This only partially matches the portrait of the 
Commission identified here, i.e. an agent with consolidated policy experience and 
prerogatives based on decades of EU policy-making. Not only was the Commission 
prodding member states with migration-related proposals since the 1980s (Stetter 
2000; E. M. Uçarer 2001), but it appeared to have established viewpoints on a 
number of migration issues. Finally, the quantitative results of Chapter 3 qualify 
Franchino’s remarks about the impact of decision-making rules on Commission’s 
discretion. While Council voting rules varied a great deal in migration policy in the 
period considered, this seems not to be related to either increases or decreases in 
discretion.  
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Consideration of the substance of policies was deliberately avoided. There 
has been huge debate, both within academia and civil society, concerning the 
restrictive or liberal character of EU and EU-led national policies (Ette and Faist 
2007). However such evaluations have been avoided here as this policy area is 
heavily politicised and it was felt that normative remarks would have changed the 
nature of this research. That said a small number of comments might be useful. 
There is a growing stream in the literature arguing that tension exists between 
liberal EU institutions and restrictive member states (Kaunert and Léonard 2012; 
Lavenex 2006). This dissertation has shown that EU institutions have a more issue-
oriented approach. More to the point, it has demonstrated that in certain cases the 
policy positions of Commission and Council were not that distinct, thus 
undermining characterisations of these bodies as embodying opposite biases 
towards migration policy. It is doubtful that the Commission showed a liberal bias 
in areas such as irregular migration or border and visa policy. With their frequent 
criticisms, commentators, NGOs, and civil society organisations illustrated that the 
Commission shares many of the assumptions and preferences of member states 
regarding the wide use of, what some have termed, intrusive technologies and 
control devices in the areas of border control, alongside a general tendency towards 
restriction of and the need to “fight” against irregular migration (Bigo et al. 2012; 
Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Geyer et al. 2008; Parkin 2011). It might be true 
that the Commission opted for such strategies in order to facilitate increased legal 
migration channels, however the point still stands. It is also clear that the latter 
strategy failed, at least in the period considered here. 
 
At present the EU is drawn into a number of different debates within member 
states (Financial Times 2015b). One that is typical of contemporary discourse in the 
UK is that the Union has gained too much power, some of which should be 
dispersed back to the domestic level (Financial Times 2013, 2014; Townsend 2015). 
These arguments are certainly true to the extent that the Commission has defined 
policy preferences and these have a bearing on individual policies adopted. 
However, this study demonstrates that, overall, the Council does not delegate when 
it is engaged in conflict with the Commission. In practice, this means that the 
Council has been able to create agreements which do not extend the Commission’s 
powers beyond those already granted by the Treaties. Thus unless member states 
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are ready to enter into a radical overhaul of the Union’s architecture with difficult-
to-predict consequences, the status quo is likely to remain in place. Debates in other 
member states such as Italy seem to go in the exact opposite direction, with 
complaints of a feeble Union (BBC 2013; Financial Times 2015a; Riegert 2014). 
However the findings here show that Community bodies tend to be empowered 
either to strengthen commitments or to increase efficiency. In the case of migration, 
member states are already committed to principles of solidarity and have 
established mechanisms to underpin them (e.g. migration funds, the Visa List 
Regulation). The fact that the practical manifestation of this solidarity was amended 
through the last Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) confirms that these 
mechanisms are now engrained in EU affairs (Commission 2014d). It is therefore 
essential to determine the intensity of these commitments, for example by 
measuring budgetary adjustments in the migration funds, and not their firmness. 
However, that has little to do with delegation. For that, a political agreement is 
needed. But it is hard to envision such developments materialising in the near future 
in light of the climate of domestic retrenchment in Europe.  
 
In these final concluding remarks, it is important to provide a recap of the 
overall importance of this work to EU studies. This work has ventured down a well-
worn path of EU studies in looking at delegation as the hallmark of integration. 
Questions surrounding EU integration have long characterised EU studies, and they 
continue being debated today (Bickerton et al. 2014). Migration policy in particular 
is an area where opt-outs and differential policy-making powerfully illustrates the 
idea of a Europe á la carte. Having said that, the findings presented here 
demonstrate that those member states that have entered into this chapter of 
cooperation have shown a high demand for traditional policy-making. Traditional 
here means the adoption of EU Directives, Regulations, and Decisions, in just the 
same fashion as in other policy areas. Chapter 1 outlined how for some authors the 
use of such legally binding measures is part of the traditional Community Method 
(Puetter 2012). Traditional also means that the level of delegation, and by extension 
the level of integration, is comparable to other policy areas, therefore reducing if 
not eliminating the feeling that cooperation on migration is something of a ‘strange 
beast’ in EU affairs. These elements combined mean that, if supranationalisation is 
interpreted as the empowerment of Community actors, this area is not an example 
of “integration without supranationalism” (Bickerton et al. 2014). While efforts at 
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experimenting with migration policy have not been absent, it is remarkable that 
member states have accompanied these initiatives with traditional ways of doing 
business in EU policy-making; meaning an abundant outflow of secondary 
legislation and significant powers conceded to EU institutions. That said, an 
assessment of the content of this policy output or its actual impact in terms of 
implementation, is beyond the means of this dissertation. However, and more 
profoundly perhaps, this study does show that research in the area of EU migration 
policy would benefit from the pursuit of traditional EU integration questions, such 
as: ‘is there any delegation in this policy area?’ and ‘what motivates it?’. While the 
operationalisation of delegation employed here has its limitations, it underlines the 
need for systematic empirical research to show how much power has truly been 
delegated to the EU in specific policy areas. This point may sound obvious since 
the degree of delegation has long been treated as the default dependent variable in 
studies of integration, but it remains a dependent variable that is all too often 
underspecified in a literature where the search for plausible independent variables 
takes precedence. 
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List of interviews   
 
 Interview 1 (03/07/2013). Permanent Representation of a founding 
member state - Counsellor: Home Affairs 
 Interview 2 (03/07/2013). Commission - International Relations 
Officer. 
 Interview 3 (04/07/2013). Commission - Head of Unit. 
 Interview 4 (27/02/2013). EP coordinator for Socialist and Democrats 
delegation of a founding member state. 
 Interview 5 (20/06/2011). Commission - Member of Commissioner 
Cabinet. 
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Annex. List of abbreviations.  
 
Abbreviation Legislation 
Visa Code Regulation Regulation 810/2009 of the EP and the Council on 
a Community code on visas (Visa Code) 
Employer Sanction 
Directive 
Council and EP Directive 2009/52/EC on minimum 
standards against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals 
Blue Card Directive Council Directive 2009/50/EC conditions of entry 
ad residence highly qualified employment 
  
Return Directive Council and EP Directive 2008/115/EC on 
common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals 
EMN Decision Council Decision 2008/381/EC establishing a 
European Migration Network 
VIS Regulation Regulation 767/2008 concerning the Visa 
Information System (VIS)  
  
RABITs Regulation Council and EP Regulation 863/2007 on rapid 
intervention teams (RABIT) 
European Return Fund 
Decision 
Decision 575/2007/EC of the EP and Council 
establishing the European Return Fund for the 
period 2008 to 2013 
European Borders Fund 
Decision 
Council and EP Decision 574/2007/EC External 
Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 
European Refugee Fund 
Decision 
Council and EP Decision 2007/573/EC establishing 
a European Refugee Fund 
European Integration 
Fund Decision 
Council Decision 2007/435/EC establishing a 
European Integration Fund 
Migration Statistics 
Regulation 
Regulation (EC) 862/2007 of the EP and the 
Council on Community statistics 
  
Establishment, Operation 
and Use of SIS II 
Regulation 
Regulation 1987/2006 on the establishment, 
operation and use of SIS II 
Development 
Cooperation Regulation 
Regulation (EC) 1905/2006 establishing a 
financing instrument for development cooperation 
Mutual Information 
Mechanism Decision 
Decision 2006/688 mutual information mechanism 
on asylum and immigration measures 
Schengen Borders Code Council and EP Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders 
  
Asylum Procedure 
Directive 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC on procedures for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status 
Researchers Directive Directive 2005/71 procedure for admitting third-
country national for the purpose of scientific 
research 
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Amended Visa List 
Regulation 
Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 
2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 
listing the third countries whose nationals must be 
in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement as regards the reciprocity 
mechanism 
Immigration Liaison 
Officers Decision 
Commission Decision 2005/687/EC on the format 
for the report on the activities of immigration 
liaison officers networks 
Secure Web-Based 
Information and Co-
ordination Network 
Decision 
Council Decision 2005/267 establishing a secure 
web-based information and coordination network 
of migration management services 
  
Students Directive Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions 
of admission for studies, pupil exchange, training  
European Refugee Fund 
Decision 
Council Decision 2004/904/EC establishing a 
European Refugee Fund 
ARGO amending 
Decision 
Council Decision 2004.867.EC amending Decision 
2002.463.EC ARGO programme 
Frontex Regulation Council Regulation 2007/2004 Frontex 
VIS Decision Council Decision (2004/512/EC) establishing the 
Visa Information System (VIS) 
Asylum Qualification 
Directive 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals as refugees 
Immigration Liaison 
Officers Regulation 
Council Regulation (EC) 377/2004 on the creation 
of an immigration liaison officers network 
Free Movement Directive European Parliament and Council Directive 
2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC 
and 93/96/EEC. 
  
 Council Directive 2003/110/EC on assistance in 
cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air 
Long-Term Resident 
Directive 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 
2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents. 
Family Reunification 
Directive 
Council Directive 2003/86 on the right to family 
reunification 
 Council Regulation (EC) 693/2003 establishing a 
specific Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), 
Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) 
Dublin Regulation Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 establishing 
criteria for determining the Member State 
responsible (DUBLIN II) 
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Asylum Reception 
Conditions Directive 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers 
  
 Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence 
ARGO Decision Council decision 2002/463/EC adopting an action 
programme for administrative cooperation ARGO 
Resident Permit 
Regulation 
Council Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying down a 
uniform format for residence permits for third-
country nationals 
Eurodac implementing 
Regulation 
Council Regulation (EC) 407/2002 laying down 
rules to implement 'Eurodac' Regulation 2725/2000 
for fingerprints (DUBLIN II) 
  
Schengen Information 
System Regulation (SIS 
II) 
Council Regulation (EC) 2424/2001 on the 
development of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) 
Visa Implementing 
Powers Regulation 
Council Regulation 789.2001 reserving to the 
Council implementing powers examining visa 
applications 
 Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual 
recognition of decision on the expulsion of third 
country nationals 
Temporary Protection 
Directive 
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary 
protection in case of mass influx of migrants 
Carrier Sanction 
Directive 
Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the 
provisions of Article 26 of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen 
Visa List Regulation Council Regulation 539.2001 listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas 
  
European Refugee Fund Council Decision 2000/569/EC establishing a 
European Refugee Fund 
Eurodac Regulation Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 establishment 
of 'Eurodac' for comparison of fingerprints for 
Dublin 
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